Why Divine Simplicity is Obvious

A 'Simple' Explanation

In the last few decades, one of the most controversial dogmas of the Catholic faith has been the simplicity of God. For many, the significance of denying composition in God is lost on them. For others, there are so many antinomies involved in affirming the simplicity of God that it seems irrational to do so. Yet all Catholics are bound to profess faith in this truth.

To understand the simplicity of God, we must first understand the meaning of the term. Often, many will erroneously believe that “simple” has its opposite in “distinct.” Hence, when we state that “God is simple,” what we are saying is that “God has no real distinctions.” What compounds this difficulty is that “real distinction” is taken to mean a distinction that is not a mere distinction of name (i.e., a “non-fake” distinction).

Obviously, there would be a number of difficulties if we were to define “simplicity” in this way. It is a dogma of the Catholic faith that the persons of the Trinity are really distinct one from another. Further, the attributes of God would be turned into purely mental abstractions with no foundation in reality.

Hence, the Church has condemned the theses that “no distinction can exist or be understood in God Himself” (D523) and that “every distinction is foreign to God, either in nature or in person” (D524).

First and foremost, it must be understood that “simple” is a negative name of God. When we say “God is really simple,” we are denying something. What is that something? We are denying real composition. It is important to note this again: when we say “God is simple,” we are NOT saying “God has no distinctions,” but “God has no real composition.” So, what is real composition? Real composition is the real union of really distinct things. If you take two lego blocks and unite them together, you have made a bigger block that is a composite of the two smaller blocks. You have taken two really distinct things and united them together, which results in composition. Hence there are TWO aspects to composition: real distinction and real union. Before the lego blocks are placed together, they are really distinct, but they are not composed due to the lack of real union.

Here, we are able to put a somewhat more positive spin on things. When we say that “God is simple,” we are saying that God possesses the fullness of perfection. God contains all the perfections possessed by lower things in a united manner. St. Thomas gives the analogy of the king. The king in his royal power contains all the powers of his lower ministers united in himself. The king does not have separate legislative, executive, and judicial powers, but has the royal power which simply contains all the perfections of the lesser powers in a united way. We can also look at the soul. The soul of man simply and unitedly contains all the lesser powers and their functions in a united way. Man does not possess a vegetative soul, an animal soul, and a rational soul; rather, our rational soul performs all the functions of the lesser souls in a united manner. We can also look at the metaphysical grades. Human nature possesses all the perfections of the higher metaphysical grades in a united manner, possessing the perfections of rationality, animality, life, etc., in a united manner in our humanity.

It is here as well that we see the most manifest reason for why we must attribute this to God. What is the purpose of composition among creatures? When we look at the complexities of machines, the various different parts are united together to perfect each other and to perfect the whole. Yet, as advancements are made, the composition lessens. We are able to create a more perfect machine insofar as the whole needs less outside of itself in order to become perfect in its own grade.

Now, if we apply this same line of reasoning to God, the question “is God simple?” has an obvious answer. When we ask “is God composed of justice?” we are asking “does God need to be perfected by justice?” That is the function of composition: to give something to the whole that it does not already have. The king does not need legislative power because he already possesses it in a perfect manner in his royal power. The rational soul does not need a vegetative soul because it already possesses its functions in the rational soul. So, if we ask “is God really composed of essence and justice?” we are really asking the question “does God’s essence need justice to perfect it?”

From this, the rest of the line of reasoning is obvious. God is the height of perfection. He does not need to be perfected. Hence, it clearly follows that God cannot have composition. His essence already has the perfection of justice in a united manner; it does not need something really distinct from it to perfect it in this way.

With this consideration in particular, we are able to state God’s simplicity in a positive manner and understand it more lucidly in relation to our affirmation that God has true attributes. When we say that “God is just” and “God is merciful,” are we positing purely mental abstractions? No more than when we say “the king has legislative power.” When we say the latter, what do we mean? We mean that the royal power possesses the perfection of legislation. He possesses in a unified manner what lesser ranks possess in a divided manner. Hence, when we say “God is just” and “God is merciful,” we do not imply that the Divine essence has justice and mercy added to it as really distinct perfections; rather, what we mean to imply is that the Divine essence in itself possesses all the perfections of justice and mercy without needing them to be added to it. What creatures possess in a divided way under a multitude of different forms and in a limited manner, God possesses in a simple and unified manner under the sole and simple form of the Deity.

So, how does this work with the Trinity?