Whether Inebriation is a Mortal Sin?

From Xantes Mariales’ commentary on De Malo

Whether Inebriation is a Mortal Sin?

From Xantes Mariales’ commentary on De Malo, Question 2, Article 8

Others err concerning whether the frequency of drunkenness aggravates drunkenness to infinity, and constitutes a mortal sin. If it does not, there stands in opposition St. Augustine in the sermon De Purgatorio, where he says: “to become drunk once is a venial sin; to become drunk frequently is a mortal sin.” If it does, there stands in opposition St. Thomas in the reply to the third objection, where he consistently teaches that if becoming drunk once is venial, then becoming drunk frequently will likewise be venial; because frequency is not a circumstance constituting the species. And from what has been said, only a circumstance constituting the species can aggravate to infinity, and render a sin from venial to mortal, or from no sin to a venial or mortal sin. Nor are there lacking those who think that St. Thomas is not consistent with himself, since here in the reply to the third objection he indicates that drunkenness, by its genus, is a venial sin, with St. Augustine, in the place cited above; and yet in Summa Theologiae II–II, q. 150, art. 2, he resolutely teaches the opposite, namely that drunkenness by its genus is a mortal sin. Nevertheless, there is no disagreement in either of these positions, which, so that it may appear from the first root, [will now be explained].

It must be noted, says St. Thomas (II–II, q. 150, art. 1), that drunkenness (ebrietas) can be taken in two ways. First, for the privation of the use of reason from the drinking of wine; and thus it is not a fault, but rather a penal defect following upon the fault of excessive drinking. Second, for the act of immoderately taking wine, by which a man can become drunk. When drunkenness is taken in the first sense, it can be either no sin, or a venial sin, or a mortal sin. For it will be no sin, says St. Thomas (art. 2), if someone drinks not knowing that the drink is immoderate and that the wine is capable of causing drunkenness; and thus he becomes drunk, as Noah did (Gen. 9). It will be a venial sin, if the one who drinks perceives that the drink is immoderate, yet is ignorant that the wine is capable of causing drunkenness. It is not a mortal sin unless it is plainly presumed and voluntary. Finally, it will be a mortal sin, if the one who drinks perceives that the drink is immoderate and that the wine is capable of causing drunkenness, and nevertheless, while indulging in its use, he prefers to incur drunkenness rather than to be deprived of such pleasure. And thus drunkenness is properly and per se so called, because it occurs from knowledge and deliberation of the will; and it receives the character of mortal sin, not from those things which happen accidentally and outside the intention, but from that which is intended per se.

The fundamental reason, says St. Thomas, why drunkenness, precisely insofar as it proceeds from the will, is a mortal sin, is this: because a man knowingly and willingly deprives himself of the use of reason, by which he exercises the virtues and turns away from sins; and at that moment to deprive oneself of so great a good is a habitually sinful act. But the virtues of acting are ordered to the avoidance of sins; nor would drunkenness be a mortal sin, unless its mortality were considered according to the evil disorder that is harmful, which through the act itself is introduced by the sin. According to that saying of St. Ambrose, we say that drunkenness must be avoided, through which very many vices are caused; for those things which while sober we avoid, through drunkenness we unknowingly admit. Therefore, according to this doctrine, drunkenness taken formally, as we have already explained, is by its genus evil and a mortal sin. But if it is taken materially, that is, for the drinking of wine willed by someone, it is not a sin, and can be only a venial sin. Consequently, since drunkenness taken absolutely contains both formal drunkenness and material drunkenness, it may thus be said that it is not determined to any one kind of sin; but without further determination it can be either good or evil, that is, a virtue or a vice, not evil by declaration. Just as number in itself is neither even nor odd, but can be either of the two, so also care must be taken lest one speak equivocally of drunkenness taken absolutely, which by its genus is neither good nor evil, as was said above, and formal drunkenness, which by its genus is a mortal sin.

With these things established regarding the point, when it is asked whether the frequency of drunkenness constitutes drunkenness a mortal sin, I say that it does not constitute it per se, but only per accidens, and not by the force of frequency precisely considered. Rather, this happens only because frequency produces an experiential certainty that the drink is immoderate and that the wine is capable of causing drunkenness; and once this certainty is present, the one becoming drunk, knowingly and willingly deprives himself of the use of reason, together with the other goods already mentioned; and this cannot occur without mortal sin, as was stated above. Moreover, frequency itself, precisely considered, since it is only the repetition of an act already specified, cannot constitute a new species; nor is it among the number of circumstances that aggravate to infinity, and which constitute a sin from venial to mortal. Therefore it is rightly said that frequency, by its own force precisely considered, cannot constitute drunkenness either from not-evil to evil, or from venial to mortal.

When St. Augustine says that to become drunk once is venial, but to become drunk often is mortal, he speaks of drunkenness according to what happens in most cases . For according to the common rule concerning moral matters, judgment must be made according to what happens in most cases. But in most cases it seems to occur that in the first instances of becoming drunk a person does not perceive either that the drink is immoderate or that the wine is capable of causing drunkenness; and because such ignorance is present, drunkenness can scarcely be entirely excused from sin, as happened in the case of Noah, that is, so that it may at least be excused from mortal sin. Therefore Blessed Augustine says that drunkenness not repeated many times is venial, but when repeated many times it is mortal, for the reasons already set forth. And thus both St. Augustine and St. Thomas are not in disagreement but are true, and in no way do they destroy one another’s teaching.

They differ only in this, that they speak of drunkenness considered in relation to the difficulty which surrounds the perfect doctrine of human doubts, namely whether drunkenness by its genus is a mortal sin; because a man knowingly and willingly deprives himself of the use of reason, rendering himself incapable of acting virtuously. According to this reasoning someone might object: why is it not the same with sleep? For sleep also deprives a man of reason and renders the one sleeping incapable of acting virtuously; therefore sleep would likewise be a mortal sin, just as drunkenness. It is answered that the case is not similar. For sleep and drunkenness differ in this, that sleep is natural and necessary for the repose of the soul, in which all its powers rest and are refreshed; and in natural things there is neither sin nor demerit. But drunkenness is voluntary and destructive, coming upon man and violently depriving him of the use of reason. Moreover, in sleep the use of reason is not entirely extinguished, but rather bound only accidentally; thus those sleeping sometimes perceive things in dreams, as in the case of Solomon and the Prophets, to whom revelations appeared in sleep which they received from God. Indeed, it is commonly said that a man in sleep is more apt to receive divine revelations. But when reason is bound by wine, it is bound per se and in a remarkable manner, so that the intellect remains fettered and unable to operate, whereas nothing similar occurs in sleep. Hence the argument drawn from sleep does not hold, as inferred from a lesser cause.

From these things someone objects: therefore, if such is the case, is it lawful medicinally to make a man drunk in order to provoke vomiting, or to cure some bodily affection? It is answered: if drunkenness is evil by its genus, it is not lawful; because evils are not to be done (especially spiritual evils) so that bodily goods may come about. Thus for the health of the body it is not lawful medicinally to commit fornication, even though fornication is evil by its genus. But I respond: although it is never lawful to blaspheme even for the sake of obtaining a good, because blasphemy is of itself a mortal sin, nevertheless drunkenness is not evil by its genus, and therefore to become drunk medicinally is permitted, as many hold. But whether drunkenness is evil by its genus is a great dispute among the Doctors. St. Thomas here determines nothing, but speaks only conditionally, as you have heard. For above he had resolutely established that formal drunkenness is by its genus a mortal sin; and at the end of the article, in the reply to the third objection, he says that it is lawful to become drunk in order to provoke vomiting. Yet in the end he concludes resolutely that it is not lawful, because what is evil by its genus can never be permitted to be done, especially since there are many other remedies for provoking vomiting, such as drinking warm water and similar things. Just as for calming nature from an excess of seed, for which some claim that there are other remedies which provoke fornication for the health of the body—yet to commit fornication is in no way permitted, according to all. These things have been said incidentally, for the fuller understanding of those matters which are written here at present.

From Commentary on De Malo, Question 7, Article 4

In the second part of the Article there are five arguments, in which the following questions are treated. The first is whether frequency, duration, and lingering (morosa) can make a venial sin into a mortal one. That this is so seems to follow, for St. Augustine teaches this in the sermon De Purgatorio: “if anger is held for a long time, and if drunkenness is frequent, they pass into the number of mortal sins.” Yet many hold that anger and drunkenness are venial sins by their genus. Therefore the Holy Father seems to intend that the circumstances of frequency and duration make a venial sin mortal. Likewise the Master of the Sentences (II, dist. 24) clearly teaches that delectatio morosa is a mortal sin. However, that this is not so seems to be suggested from the fact that no matter how lingering (morosa), prolonged, or frequent a movement of sensuality may be, if reason does not fully consent, it is never mortal. St. Thomas replies that anger and drunkenness are by their genus mortal sins, but they become venial either through a defect of deliberation or through the smallness of the matter. For anger implies a movement toward harming one’s neighbor; but to inflict harm upon one’s neighbor is by its genus mortal, since it is repugnant to charity with respect to the love of neighbor. Yet when the movement remains in the lower appetite and reason does not consent that grave harm be inflicted upon the neighbor, it is a venial sin because of the imperfection of the act, that is, because of the lack of full deliberation. But if anger is held for a long time, it cannot be that the deliberation of reason does not intervene, and thus anger becomes a mortal sin. In order, however, to determine when anger is said to be held for a long time, attention must not be paid to how long it lasts, since, as I said, it can last a long time without the consent of reason, and thus it would not be a mortal sin. Rather, attention must be paid to the negligence by which it could be resisted through reason and is not resisted. Then, I say, duration arising from negligence in resisting anger renders the anger a mortal sin, even if the anger itself does not last very long. Just as in another matter it is commonly said that whoever dies quickly has not lived long, in the same sense the Master says that delectatio morosa is a mortal sin. For he manifestly speaks of the moral delay arising from negligence in excluding it through reason, and not of mere delay in duration considered absolutely. This concerns delectatio morosa in an evil matter; for to delight in a good thing, it is certain, is no sin at all.

Similarly the same judgment applies concerning drunkenness. Drunkenness, insofar as it is in itself, does not turn reason away from God, although during drunkenness reason cannot be turned toward God. Nevertheless, since man is not bound always to turn his reason actually toward God, it follows that drunkenness can be excused so that it is not always a mortal sin. Yet when a man becomes drunk frequently, he seems not to care whether reason be turned toward God. In such a case drunkenness is a mortal sin, because it appears to contain a contempt of reason’s orientation toward God, on account of the immoderate delight in wine.

All these things are confirmed, and the expressions are included in I–II, q. 88, art. 5, rep. 1, where the Holy Doctor says that duration of itself is not a circumstance that draws an act into another species; likewise frequency or assiduity is not such, unless perhaps per accidens from something supervening. For a thing does not acquire a new species from the fact that it is multiplied or prolonged, unless perhaps in the act itself there is a prolongation or multiplication accompanied by something that changes the species, such as disobedience, contempt, or something of that kind. Therefore it must be said that anger, which is a movement of the soul toward harming one’s neighbor, if the harm toward which the movement of anger tends is of a kind that is by its genus mortal, such as homicide, then such anger will by its genus be a mortal sin. Yet it can become venial because of the imperfection of the act, for example if it is a sudden movement preceding the consent of reason. But if the anger is prolonged, it is rendered according to the nature of its mortal genus through the supervening consent of reason. If, however, the movement of anger tends toward something that is venial by its genus, as when someone becomes angry against another in that he wishes to say to him a slight word or a jest, or some lightly reproachful motion, then such anger will not be mortal, however long it may last, unless perhaps per accidens, as when grave scandal arises from it, or because of some other similar circumstance. And in the same way delectatio morosa is called a mortal sin when it concerns those things which by their genus are mortal sins. But in those matters in which such delectatio morosa does not concern mortal sin, it will be a venial sin because of the imperfection of the act, as was said concerning anger. Yet if the delight is prolonged or lingering (morosa), it is reduced to the nature of its object and becomes a mortal sin, on account of the supervening approval of reason toward the intended delectatio morosa.

Concerning drunkenness, finally St. Thomas concludes that it must be said that, according to its proper notion, it has the character of a mortal sin. For when a man casts aside reason and reduces himself to the manner of an animal, through that very reason by which he is ordered to God, he is thereby exposed to many sins, since the vices of life arise from the mere pleasure of wine, which is expressly contrary to virtue. Nevertheless it can become a venial sin, either because of ignorance or because of weakness (for example, if a man does not know the strength of the wine, or does not think by his own deliberation that he will become drunk, as happened in the case of Noah when he was made drunk). Then the drunkenness is not imputed as mortal, but is called merely an excess of drinking. But when intoxication is frequent, it cannot be excused through ignorance, since it appears that the will chooses rather drunkenness with its consequent harms than to abstain from superfluous wine. Therefore drunkenness then returns to its proper nature and falls under mortal sin. Concerning these matters read above distinctly in II–II, q. 150 throughout, but especially art. 2.

Here those things which were mentioned incidentally are sufficiently resolved; and note carefully two propositions proposed by St. Thomas. The first is found here: that drunkenness is not always a mortal sin. For although it deprives one of the use of reason and of the turning toward God, nevertheless since man is not always bound by precept to turn the act of his mind toward God, and since the precept concerning such conversion is affirmative, obliging always but not for every moment, therefore drunkenness is not always a mortal sin. The second proposition is found in I–II in the place cited above: frequent drunkenness cannot fail to be a mortal sin. For it cannot be excused by ignorance, either of the strength of the wine or of one’s own weakness; and thus the will seems rather to choose to endure drunkenness with its consequent harms than to abstain from superfluous wine. But the will ought to be prepared to expose itself to great goods, even with dangers of sin, yet for the avoidance of sins; whereas to expose oneself to those things which can occur during drunkenness merely for the sake of the pleasure taken in wine is against the order of reason, and plainly mortal, from which only ignorance, as was said above, could seem to excuse. According to this doctrine someone might ask how incautiously certain people deduce that a circumstance, remaining a circumstance, can make a venial sin into a mortal one, from the fact that a circumstance makes an act from good to evil, as when someone prays out of vain glory. But to make something from good into evil is something greater than making a venial sin into a mortal one. For good and evil are said to be genera, as is said in the Predicaments (that good and evil are genera of other things); whereas venial and mortal are different species within the same genus of evil or of sin. Therefore if a circumstance can render an act from good to evil (which is the greater), it will more easily render a venial sin mortal (which is the lesser). You are mistaken. St. Thomas responds here in the reply to the third objection, where those who reason in this way are answered: the circumstance which renders an act from good to evil is not taken as a merely accidental circumstance (as you suppose), but as an essential difference specifying the act, transferring it from one genus to another different genus, and constituting it within a determinate genus and species. For example vain glory, which a circumstance taken merely as an accidental circumstance cannot produce. And in the same way a circumstance taken merely as a circumstance cannot make a venial sin mortal, as has been proved. But if it is taken insofar as it introduces the mode of an essentially specifying difference, then it can make a venial sin mortal, as has been explained. Therefore the objection is actually in favor of, and not against, the decision that has been made.

But how the end is placed among the circumstances, and yet moral actions are chiefly specified by the end (how these two things can stand together has already been explained in the preceding questions). For the present it is sufficient to adduce what is touched upon here in the reply to the fourth objection, namely that human specification does not arise from a circumstance insofar as it is a circumstance, but insofar as it is the proper object of the act of the will. And with respect to this object it is commonly agreed that human acts receive their species. Since therefore an external act does not enter the genus of morals except insofar as it is willed, it thereby participates in specification from the end, which is the object of the will. And thus the statement of others (that the end is one of the circumstances not specifying the act) is not rendered false. For the first statement is made with respect to the external act considered in the genus of nature, which in that way receives its species from its proper object entirely independently of the will. But the other statement is made with respect to the external act insofar as it is willed, and in the genus of morals, in which case it receives its species not from the object alone but from the end to which it is ordered through the will. According to that principle: moral acts are qualified by the end (moralia ex fine qualificantur). Therefore there is no difficulty.