Introduction
One of the most common errors within the Church is a certain magisterial “presentism.” This view of the magisterium assumes that only what has been explicitly recapitulated in the contemporary magisterium (especially in the post-conciliar era) can be regarded as “real magisterial teaching.” Hence, when there are theses in authoritative documents that have not been restated in as solemn of a form (or at all) in 500, 1000, or even 1500 years, then such theses somehow lose their status as binding (or is otherwise weakened).
A potent form of this comes in with Jimmy Akin’s articulation of magisterial desuetude:
Sometimes people will argue for their viewpoint by appealing to an older document and saying it “has never been revoked.” This is legitimate in the case of infallible doctrines, but it is often a bad sign when dealing with noninfallible doctrines or practices. Explicit revocations are not necessary, as illustrated by examples of desuetude. Also, if the person could cite a contemporary document to support his position, he likely would do so. If he can’t, this may be a sign the Magisterium has let that doctrine or practice fall into desuetude. (A Climb Up the Rungs of Doctrinal Authority)
This is quite alien to the practice of traditional (or even contemporary) theology. It is quite common to cite magisterial authorities from as far back as the first half of the first millennium that have practically zero repetition since then in official magisterial documents (as occurs often in some of the anti-Pelagian theses). It is mind boggling that we would even have a work like Denzinger’s Enchiridion if such a thesis were even remotely true. Why would I need to know about the magisterial teaching of Pope St. Gregory the Great if most of them are only of historical interest? Beyond this, how does such a thesis even conform with the ordinary practice of various different auxiliaries of the magisterial bodies, such as the ITC, which represents common contemporary theological methodology. Why place a compendium of the teaching of “old document” and the theses we can draw from them as constituent parts of the study of contemporary questions? Wouldn’t these be completely useless loci for the theologian? Wouldn’t it only be useful for the member of the hierarchy determining whether such a teaching is binding or not?
It would also seem to assume a quite developed and centralized form of magisterial pronouncements that only really applies in the contemporary Church, especially in the rise of an ever expanding corpus of magisterial pronouncements in the last 200 or so years. It may (prima facie) seem reasonable to assume that there will be repetition of teachings that are authoritative when one has an entire set of auxiliary organs in Rome to judge on issues along with the endless promulgation of encyclicals, allocutions, etc., but it would simply be anachronistic to view this as the status quo in the history of the Church. How would this principle even apply in the 700’s or 900’s or 1300’s when the body of magisterial literature was quite small? How is it not completely arbitrary to assume that the non-repetition of x teaching after y years means it lapsed but after z years it did not? Do I go from sinning against obsequium on June 2nd, but am free from it on June 3rd?
A clearer perception of the principles of magisteriology, rather than focusing on date, focuses on weight. How weighty is the teaching presented? It doesn’t matter whether it was promulgated yesterday or 1600 years ago, the real question at hand is the degree of authority given to the teaching. The reason for this is simple. Our magisteriology and view of Sacred Tradition is not merely secular or historical, but truly theological (cf., here for more about this). Christ has promised the Spirit of truth to aid those who are the appointed organs of preaching the faith. The greater the insistence of the organ, the more strongly the Spirit protects what is said. Hence, when all of the organs come together to preach the truth as binding on faith (whether within an Ecumenical Council or outside), then the Spirit gives an infallible protection. Further, when he who is appointed head over all (the Pope) teaches a truth as binding on faith to the entire Church, then the Spirit gives an infallible protection.
Yet, the same applied proportionally to teaching in a lesser degree. The Pope obviously means to teach in a more serious manner when he writes an Encyclical letter to the entire Church than when he gives a brief speech to a group of Catholic laymen. The same can be applied in a number of different modes and degrees that are important to keep in mind, but the principle at hand is that the guidance of the Holy Spirit is what is important here. Since it is possible that both the encyclical and the speech are in error, it is possible that the encyclical be right and the speech wrong, that the encyclical be wrong and the speech right, or that both be wrong. Is it likely that both be wrong? No. The magisterium does not habitually err even in its non-definitive teachings, hence I would say that this is highly unlikely. Is it more likely that the Encyclical be wrong or the Speech? Well, while it is possible that either of them be wrong (since they are fallible), it is more likely that the Speech be wrong since the grade or degree of protection by the Holy Spirit is proportionate to the grade or degree of insistence in which the document seeks to bind us. It is for our protection and for the protection of the sublimity of the truth within the Church.
When viewed from this perspective, it is easily seen how “presentism” makes no sense. The Holy Spirit is the same today, yesterday, and tomorrow. When Pope Innocent III said something more solemnly and with a greater degree of insistence than Pope Leo XIII, it is safer to assent to what is said by Innocent III because the Spirit’s protection of Innocent III is greater than Leo XIII in this instance. Now, since the entire foundation for obsequium religiosum in the first place is the protection that the Spirit has in the midst of even non-definitive teachings, it is obvious that my obligations to such an assent would lead me to assent to the document of Innocent III over Leo XIII.
Why would it make sense that such teaching no longer flowed from the charism of truth just because I am separated from it by centuries? Does the truth change? Further, why must I assume that there is a greater strength of the Spirit today than yesterday? Hence, if there is a more authoritative document stated in the past and a less authoritative document stated today, how would I contradict my obligations to the truth and the hierarchy by assenting to the present over the past? None of this makes sense theologically and the method of Catholic theologians has always been the opposite of this.
Beside this error, there is another touching the authority of the Ordinary and Universal Magisterium. It is quite common for many to have a “minimalist” notion of the OUM. This often flows from a complete misunderstanding of tradition (cf., the above quoted article), understanding the consensus of the OUM in merely material terms, as if any agreement would constitute a consensus of the OUM, rather than understanding it in formal terms, i.e., with the same qualifications given to the infallibility of any other magisterial teaching (proper matter, mode of teaching, etc.). It is only a complete understanding of the OUM that would lead to properly distinguish between a common opinion, a common sentence, and that which is de fide by the OUM.
Due to this, many authors will interpret the OUM as only applying when there is such a consensus and there has never been an imperfection in such a consensus, i.e., that such a consensus, 1. Was explicit from the beginning of the Church (e.g., Feenyite argument on BOD), and 2. Was never contradicted in subsequent eras. This is to make up for the an over-multiplication of the number of teachings of the OUM that would come from understanding such in merely material terms.
Yet, this falls into the same error as the previous misunderstanding. What is the foundation for the OUM? The protection of the Holy Spirit against the entire Church preaching something as a truth of the faith that which is not. Does this somehow only apply to one era of the Church or to all eras? If there is such a consensus from 550-1700, why does it matter that there is disagreement from 1850-1875 or that there wasn’t such an explicit agreement between 400-550 that we can discern? Should I start witholding my assent to all teachings of the OUM due to the fact that it may be contradicted in a future era by some in the Church? Obviously, such a notion would be absurd.
After this lengthy introduction, I must get to the point. We are in an era of the history of the Church where many of the authoritative teachings of the past are in limbo. They have neither been repeated by the magisterium (outside of certain cases of the episcopal magisterium) nor manifestly contradicted by equal or higher weight teaching. What are we supposed to do with this? How is this even possible?
Luckily for us, Fr. Scheeben has treated the problem fully with his characteristic depth.
Scheeben’s Comments
In order to understand Scheeben’s treatment, we must understand the foundation for the distinctions he makes in order that we do not view these distinctions as purely arbitrary. First and foremost, Scheeben understands that there is a charism of truth given to the entire Church that is both negative and positive. Negatively, it prevents the entire teaching Church from falling into heresy. Positively, there is a preservation of the truths of faith in the teaching Church. From these two principles, we can draw out what is possible and what is impossible as to the preservation/non-preservation of these truths.
Yet, we must state more precisely these two categories in line with the essential end and character of the Church and its promises. As to the positive charism, we can distinguish between two types of truth, the most essential and necessary truths (e.g., the truths touching the Apostles Creed and Decalogue), and the rest of the truths (e.g., the more obscure questions of Trinitarian theology, Christology, more obscure moral questions, etc.). The former truths are so essential for the propagation of the faith and the preservation of charity in the learning Chruch that the teaching Church would fail in its essentials if such were not preached. The latter truths are not so essential that those essential ends of the Church would fail, but are quite useful to such ends.
Hence, on the part of the truth as to the positive charism, Scheeben states two conclusions.
First, “the most essential and most necessary truths must always be expressly and effectively attested and propagated in the Church and by the Church, if not by all members of the learning or even of the teaching Church, then still at least by the notorious testimony of the decisive organs.” (Handbook 1.1, n. 312)
Second, “the rest of the truths entrusted to the Church…[can be] so obscured or still remain so obscure that they are no longer known and acknowledged and professed in faith by all members of the Church, and consequently depending on the circumstances are even denied by one part, but also are not asserted with complete firmness by the other part.” (ibid.)
Hence, Scheeben draws forth two proportional conclusions as to the subjects who will preserve these truths.
First, it is possible that “a part of the deposit not only may not be expressly known and acknowledged in the entire body of the Church, but also may not be attested expressly and effectively in a sufficiently firm way by the authoritative organs, without the thread of Tradition being broken as a result.” (ibid.)
In this first case, the knowledge of this may be lost within the learning Church. Hence, the ordinary laymen do not hear this truth taught in catechesis, sermons, etc. The foundation for this is a certain weakness on the part of the teaching Church. Today, it is clear that there are many of the truths of the faith that are unfortunately under this form of neglect.
In the second case, which happens even more often than in the first case, it is possible that “in one part of the Church many truths that are attested effectively and expressly in an adequate way by the authoritative organs too nevertheless are not acknowledged and professed decisively and expressly by all members of the Church.” (ibid.)
Does this mean that those truths are somehow completely lost? No, not at all. Scheeben states that these truths are “attested and handed down at least implicitly and habitually by the Church in the treasury of truth that she preserves and protects.” (ibid.)
What does this mean?
First, these truths are still contained virtually in other truths that are preserved, i.e., one could draw out the conclusion from what is preserved in the Church, “implied or contained…as the core in the doctrines that are expressly attested by the Church.” (ibid.)
Scheeben lists four ways in which this can happen, “1) the more general truths, which imply other particular ones; 2) those that are principles, which imply others that are effects or consequences, 3) complex truths that include others as presuppositions or parts, and 4) practical truths that are dependent on other theoretical truths, or vice versa.” (ibid., footnote)
Second, these truths are still contained within the various different witnesses that are passed down continually by the Church. To give an example, let’s take some of the moral doctrines passed down by St. Alphonsus who preaches them as certain, but are completely denied or rejected by most modern theologians, no longer present in catechisms, etc. While these may not be expressly preached, the contemporary Church still passes down the works of St. Alphonsus and recommends that her children read and study his material. Hence, there is still a documentary preservation of the truth, “in the record of revelation preserved by the Church or else in the written monuments of the early Tradition, in such a way that at a later time they can be brought forth from the treasury and developed through careful reflection and with the assistance of the Holy Ghost.” (ibid.)
The important part of this is that such is passed down in tradition in such a way as to be able to be brought forward for a future judicial judgement or in such a way as to bring about common agreement. Hence, Scheeben uses the following image, “figuratively speaking, after they were or became shackled and hidden in the river of Tradition, they must be able to come again to the fore therein freely and openly under the animating breath of the Holy Ghost moving over the waters.” (ibid.)
Now, things are different on the negative side of things. While, positively, we can speak of the interruption of tradition (as we have explained above), negatively, such cannot be the case. For, it is quite a different thing to omit certain doctrines actually, yet still pass them down in a certain habitual mode, and another thing to expressly deny such a teaching which would completely exclude the possession of the teaching.
From this, we can draw a number of different conclusions about the completeness or perfection of Tradition.
First, “the integrity of Tradition essentially for all times is absolutely complete only on its negative side; on its positive side, however, it is only substantially and relatively complete.” (ibid., n. 313) Hence, while we affirm that all truths are always passed down, when we consider this negatively, we understand that it is so integral as to never deny such a truth universally, whereas when it comes to the positive grasping of such, we understand that it does not need to happen actually, but could happen implicitly and habitually. Something analogous happens with the completion of precepts, a negative precept binds always, whereas a positive precept only requires the promptness and willingness to complete the precept when placed in necessary circumstances.
Second,
the continuity of Tradition unconditionally and absolutely admits no interruption, much less a complete rupture, with respect to the habitual possession and the comprehensive assertion of the deposit; it does however allow a temporary interruption or rather suspension—nevertheless only a partial (with respect to the object) and usually only a particular suspension (with respect to the subject)—with regard to the actual use and the explicit assertion of the deposit; it is therefore likewise only one-sidedly absolutely, and on the other side merely relatively complete. (ibid.)
This may sound complicated, but is actually quite easy to understand. We can say that the entire Apostolic deposit is always possessed by the Church because, 1. Error does not overtake the entire Church, but can only overtake parts, 2. When there is the absence of any truth in the explicit preaching of the teaching Church, there is still the habitual possession of that same truth, in the principles actually preached and/or in the documents passed down.
Third,
the universality of Tradition requires unconditionally and for any given era that the whole living Tradition in all its organs never falsify or deny the deposit; it does however allow that a part of the deposit may be falsified or denied by a part of the Church that does not define the faith of the whole, or else that temporarily it may actually be attested neither by the entire community nor by a decisive part with complete firmness and certainty but is only habitually held. (ibid.)