The Two-Fold Necessity of the Sacraments

A Scholastic Treatment

I was recently asked about a certain text from the Roman Catechism: “This is a degree of contrition which few reach; and hence, in this way, very few indeed could hope to obtain the pardon of their sins…”

Based on this text, we can more intricately consider the nature of the necessity of the sacraments which often is only treated in our polemics with the Feeneyites.

First, there is a distinction between the reception of a sacrament in re and in voto. To receive a sacrament in voto is not simply to “desire a sacrament.” Rather, it is an act of the will which intends to obey God motivated by charity, “those who love me will keep my commandments.” This is either explicit insofar as we understand the obligation and specifically intend to carry out such a command when the opportunity presents itself, or implicit insofar as someone does not explicitly intend to carry out what is commanded, but still has such a pious affection of the will as to carry out what is commanded when it is made known unto them (cf. Suprema haec sacrae).

Second, certain sacraments are necessary merely by necessity of precept and others by necessity of means. Necessity of precept refers to a necessary obligation imposed by the command of a superior, which can be excused by invincible ignorance. On the other hand, that which is necessary by a necessity of means not only consists of a necessary obligation imposed by command, but also established a means which is positively necessary in order to acquire a certain end. This is vital for understanding the doctrine. In this case, invincible ignorance excuses one from carrying out the command, but invincible ignorance does not supply the means to acquire the end. Hence, something positive which supplies the means must also be included. Hence, theologians will distinguish between those things which are necessary by a necessity of means per se and those things which are necessary by a necessity of means per accidens (n.b., among earlier scholastics, this language is sometimes different). In the case of that which is per se, it is itself intrinsically linked with the nature of the end so as to essentially imply the end by its presence and essentially remove the end by its absence. In the case of that which is per accidens, the link between the act and the end is positively established, only implying/excluding the end by the will of another.

This leads us to two conclusions that follow upon these definitions. First, for those things necessary by a necessity of means per se, there is NO SUBSTITUTION possible for the end sought (e.g., grace, the theological virtues, etc. for salvation). Hence, the absurdity of those pseudo-theologians who pretend that a mere desire for faith (fides virtualis) can supply for faith. Second, for those things necessary by a necessity of means per accidens, there can be substitution insofar as that which is provided for in the sacraments in order to achieve the end is supplied in some other manner. It is in this way that St. Thomas and traditional theologians describe the baptism in voto, not merely in some external or positive manner, but insofar as the baptism in voto brings about those very same means within us that baptism brings about within us for such and such an end. Hence, baptism saves by the infusion of grace. The same infusion of grace is implied by baptism in voto. Therefore, by strict logical sequence, it follows that just as the infusion of grace saved by baptism in re, so also will the infusion of grave save by the baptism in voto.

By this, we can see more clearly both the errors of the Feeneyite pseudo-theologians and the Quasi-universalist pseudo-theologians. They both error on the same point, but in opposite directions. They both see the command to baptize merely in terms of some sort of positive precept, i.e., that God commands that baptism be necessary for salvation. The only difference between the two abominable systems is that they see the imputability of the lack of carrying out this command differently. The Feeneyites hold that the command is arbitrary, always imputable as a sin leading to damnation. The Quasi-universalist also hold that the command is arbitrary, but allow for invincible ignorance. Neither side understands the question, since they are only viewing the question from the perspective of baptism as a command rather than viewing is from the perspective of baptism as a means, which is clearly brought forward by Catholic theologians. Hence, baptism does not become an arbitrary command, but is first and foremost a means to an end and its value is essential and intrinsic, rather than positivistic and extrinsic. Therefore, as traditional theology has always concluded, when that salvific effect that baptism works within us to the end of salvation is communicated to us in a different manner, the same effect of salvation follows. Hence, even if the Feeneyite wanted to deny that such ever is the case, such would only be a consideration de facto, rather than a consideration de iure. Doctrinally, the Feeneyite would still remain a defender of the baptism in voto. Hence, to illuminate the real differences between these two bastardized systems of theology and Catholic theology, the following questions are able to bring the truth to light.

First, to the Feeneyite, on the condition that some individual possesses sanctifying grace without baptism in re, is that person justified? If no, then from whence does baptism gain its salvific force? If from its communication of sanctifying grace, then there is contradiction. If from the mere carrying out of a command, then the system is positivistic and extrinsicist. If yes, then the Feeneyite de iure concedes baptism in voto, even if they do not concede it de facto.

Their foolish system can also be broken on related matters, such as membership in the Church, explicit faith in different articles, etc., by the same line of reasoning.

Second to the Quasi-universalists, on the (theoretical) condition that some individual without original or actual sin does carry out the command of baptism, yet (per impossibile) he does not possess sanctifying grace, is that person justified? If yes, then this is Pelagian. If no, then baptism does not justify in virtue of it being a command to carry out, rather it justifies in virtue of effecting something necessary for the end established. Hence, something beyond invincible ignorance is necessary. Rather, what is necessary is that what baptism justifies in virtue of is also communicated to us. Although, the Quasi-universalists ordinarily err on other issues along the same line, e.g., the necessity of explicit faith.

Third, we can distinguish between physical necessity and moral necessity. Although, it might be better to speak of the distinction between what is necessary in principle vs. what is necessary in practice. In the first case, we abstract from the concrete conditions of men and simply speak of what is abstractly necessary, possible, etc.. Hence, we may say that it is possible that a man come to know the entire moral law in principle since he has the faculties to investigate such things. On the other hand, when we speak about what is necessary, possible, etc., in practice, we are taking into account the reality of the situation at hand in all of its concrete circumstances. Hence, in this case, we say that it is impossible to know the entire moral law by the principles of unaided nature, without the help afforded by divine revelation, the interior helps of grace, and the external direction of the Church.

Hence, with these three distinctions in mind, we are able to speak more clearly about the necessity of the sacraments (especially baptism and penance) and how this relates to baptism in voto, perfect contrition, etc.

First Conclusion. To receive baptism or penance in voto is absolutely necessary in principle in the economy of salvation.

Second Conclusion. To receive baptism or penance in re is morally necessary in practice in the economy of salvation.

The first clearly follows from the discussion above. Both sacraments are necessary not merely by precept, but also by means. Hence, invincible ignorance does not supply the end, but only excuses from the command. For, they are positive means for bringing about what is necessary to achieve a certain end. Hence, it follows that there is no salvation without the reception of such sacraments in voto, the means needed to be supplied by God (which is, definitionally, to receive a sacrament in voto). Whether this is the case de facto or merely de iure matters little.

The second is exactly what is confirmed in the quote above from the Roman Catechism. Perfect contrition is something that is achieved by very few. What else is this to say than the fact that such can be acquired in principle by everyone, yet only in practice by a few? God has established the sacraments for a reason. He wishes that we “be saved and come to the knowledge of the truth.” So, while he supplies the means to the other in other ways (as is evident for those who are saved with only baptism/penance in voto), he has established these ways in re for our salvation as means to effect means necessary for various ends which can only be received with great difficulty. It is in this way that we refute the Quasi-modernists who wish to reduce the necessity of actual membership in the Church and the actual reception of the Sacraments into nothing.

Ven. Pius XII: “Even though by an unconscious desire and longing they have a certain relationship with the Mystical Body of the Redeemer, they still remain deprived of those many heavenly gifts and helps which can only be enjoyed in the Catholic Church.” (Mystici Corporis Christi).