The Natural Knowledge of God is VERY Important

Some Notes

Quite a few found my note from March 18th on the natural knowledge of God to be confusing. I find the content to be fruitful, especially in our evangelistic efforts toward groups that have access only to the knowledge of God that comes by nature.

First Principle. It is an error to say that our knowledge of God by nature comes through the direct and immediate perception of God or of the eternal ideas. This is the error of the Ontologists.

Second Principle. In truth, the knowledge that we have of God by nature comes from an indirect and mediate perception of God. It is indirect insofar as the first object of our knowledge is not God, but some creature from which we come to know God (e.g., a friend of a friend is known indirectly insofar as your knowledge of him comes through the testimony of your friend). It is mediate insofar as such knowledge proceeds by the ordinary process of reasoning.

Third Principle. While it must certainly be held against the Ontologists that our natural knowledge of God is indirect and mediate, this is not to say that there are not different degrees of natural knowledge, some more sublime (insofar as they are less indirect and less mediate) and others less sublime (insofar as they are more indirect and more mediate).

As we consider different aspects of such knowledge, our natural knowledge of God can differ in its naturalness, intimacy/sublimity, and objective certainty.

First, in its naturalness. That which is natural is that which works suaviter, i.e., in a manner to which our faculties are accustomed. It is the “gravitational pull” of our faculties toward some act and toward some end. It is the intrinsic ordering of our faculties. This is the way in which our faculties work without the benefit or perfection of education, but according to those acts with which they are endowed by nature.

The “naturalness” of the act of knowing God by nature increases or decreases generally insofar as the act is more or less mediate. That act is completely intuitive which is not mediated by any process of reasoning. While this is never true of our natural knowledge of God, this does not mean that certain forms of natural knowledge cannot approach nearer to such intuitive knowledge insofar as they are mediated by a less extensive process of reasoning. As an example, we can compare our sight knowledge of someone with seeing them through a mirror, a photograph, and a painting. Obviously, it is only the direct sight of the person that is immediate; yet the media of a mirror, a photograph, and a painting differ in their proximity to direct sight, some being more and others less mediate.

The most natural act is that which operates in a spontaneous manner. The faculties are so intrinsically ordered to such an act that, without any process of reflection, they issue forth in such-and-such an act. Hence, when we smell cooking, our faculties are so accustomed to conclude that food is present that we spontaneously arrive at such a conclusion. When we hear a loud sound downstairs, we are accustomed to spontaneously conclude that there is danger, without a process of reflection. Our smell and hearing cannot immediately perceive such things (as they are beyond their proper objects), but the process is so natural that it goes completely unnoticed, and we often incorrectly identify the two acts as one, when in reality they are distinct.

It is in this way that there are acts of knowing God by nature that are more natural than others. For the sake of scientific rigor, theologians discuss different arguments and proofs for the existence of God; yet the primordial form of the knowledge of God in the hearts of men is that spontaneous, natural, and quasi-intuitive form, where the deduction is so slight and so natural that our intellects proceed from premise to conclusion without reflection. Thus, when we perceive the dependence, goodness, and beauty of created things, we do not perceive the Creator directly; yet the knowledge of Him issues forth in a manner that is natural, spontaneous, and unreflective.

The error of the Ontologists is that they considered such knowledge in an understandable, yet erroneous way. Just as we often identify two acts as one due to the natural way in which one proceeds from the other, so also did the Ontologists confuse the spontaneous emergence of the knowledge of God with knowledge that is completely immediate.

Second, in its intimacy and sublimity. As noted above, our natural knowledge of God is mediate and indirect. Its mediacy can be more or less natural depending on its spontaneity (this concerns the subjective medium of such knowledge). Yet we can also consider it from the perspective of its objective medium, insofar as it relies on an indirect object for our knowledge. God is not directly perceptible outside of the beatific vision. However, this does not mean that the object cannot differ in two respects: first, insofar as the object by which we know has a greater likeness to the thing known; second, insofar as the object by which we know has greater proximity to us. The first concerns the sublimity of the knowledge, and the second concerns its intimacy.

First, that knowledge of God which proceeds from more sublime objects will itself be more sublime. To contemplate a man in a painting is quite different from contemplating a man in a photograph—the photograph has a greater likeness to the man than the painting. Likewise, in our natural knowledge of God, those more sublime creations of His hand more luminously reflect God than those less sublime. Hence, it is one thing to contemplate Him in the eternal ideas of truth, goodness, and unity, and another to contemplate Him in creatures that involve greater degrees of dissimilitude. It is one thing to contemplate God in man as the image of God, and another to contemplate the vestiges of God in other creatures. The most sublime object (which comes to us only by divine revelation) is found in our knowledge of the affections of the Most Sacred Heart of Jesus, especially as expressed in the Psalter, communicating His prayers during the Passion.

Second, that knowledge of God which proceeds from a more intimate object will be more intimate. This is evident from experience. To know a person through the medium of the written word is quite different from knowing him through the spoken word, which is in turn different from personal presence. These degrees of knowledge differ accidentally insofar as there is a greater or lesser degree of proximity in the objective medium of the knowledge. The same is true with the knowledge of God. It is one thing to know God through the contingency of created things, and quite another to know Him intimately by taking as one’s starting point the effects of God sustaining, ruling, and guiding the soul. Both are mediate and indirect (insofar as they follow essentially identical processes, requiring us to draw a conclusion from an object that is not God), but it is evident that the latter is superior in certain respects.

The intimacy with which God is known through the “interior mirror” of the soul is called by certain Fathers and theologians “feeling.” This description combines both spontaneity and intimacy. To “feel” something implies the intimate presence of the object to the knower. We do not “feel” things that are distant and removed from us, but those that are close to us and operating upon us. Furthermore, when we “feel” something, the process is natural and spontaneous. The knowledge effected by such “feeling” is so immediate in experience that the procession from one act to the other goes largely unnoticed and is only later clarified through scientific reflection.

Third, in its certainty. Here we must distinguish between objective (or scientific) certainty and subjective (or personal) certainty. The more directly and naturally we perceive an object, the greater will be our adherence to it. Thus, it is one thing to perceive the heat of fire by touching it, and another to know it through the testimony of another. Those who have touched fire adhere to its heat with greater subjective certainty, because they have experienced the effect within themselves.

However, this differs from scientific or objective certainty. A chemist can explain with greater precision the causes of heat and combustion, thereby attaining a more objective certainty. While both forms result in adherence to the object, the former produces a more immediate adherence quoad nos, whereas the latter provides objectively certain reasoning that is more suitable for demonstration and disputation.

To give another analogy: facial recognition is less certain than DNA identification. Thus, if we wish to establish objectively the identity of a deceased person, DNA testing provides greater objective certainty. Yet facial recognition is more immediate and intimate; hence, the family of the deceased will adhere more firmly to that evidence than to DNA results.

These two forms of natural knowledge (one greater in intimacy, spontaneity, and subjective stability, and the other greater in objective clarity and scientific rigor) each have their proper place in Catholic theology and praxis (whether pastoral or apologetic). For this reason, the Fathers often spoke more of the former, while the Schoolmen more often spoke of the latter, although this distinction is not absolute.