The Infallibility of Disciplinary Laws: Classical Sources

St. Robert Bellarmine and John of St. Thomas

As an extension of my article from Friday on the infallibility of the disciplinary laws of the Church, I wanted to provide some of the classical treatments of the issue in English for those who want more material.

There is a harmful assumption that many people have whenever a controversial issue like this is addressed: namely, that this is simply a “manualist” position, guided by the authors of third scholasticism in the period between the Vatican Councils.

While it is certainly true that a true and proper development occurred during this time, the motivations for these developments were not a departure from the past. First, these authors were guided by the rapid expansion of the use of the papal Magisterium, which went beyond the old _Bullarium_ form and developed into a papal Magisterium largely concerned with a proliferation of encyclicals and allocutions touching on nearly every issue imaginable. Second, these authors were guided by the rapid expansion of historical scholarship and new access to primary sources that had not been available under second scholasticism in the post-reformation period.

Some of these authors attempted to provide “new solutions to old problems” (many of which were later excluded by the Magisterium of the Church in the aforementioned encyclicals and allocutions). But on issues of central importance, it is clear that these authors simply repeated the teaching of the “old authors,” using the new tools at their disposal to provide a more secure foundation, both magisterially and scientifically.

Here, I want to provide the “classical” authors who comment on this issue (St. Robert Bellarmine and John of St. Thomas) in order to give you the foundational treatments that these later authors follow.

St. Robert Bellarmine

Source: De Romano Pontifice, lib. 4, c. 5 (From the Fr. Baker Translation)

The third proposition can be this: Not only can the Sovereign Pontiff not err in decrees of faith, but also he cannot err in precepts of morals, which are prescribed for the whole Church, and which are concerned with things necessary for salvation, or with things which are per se good or evil.

We are saying, first of all, that the Pontiff cannot err in those precepts which are prescribed for the whole Church, because as we said above, concerning precepts and particular judgments, it is not absurd that the Pontiff may err.

We add, secondly, which are concerned with things necessary for salvation, or with things which are per se good or evil, because it is not erroneous to say that the Pontiff in other laws can err, that is, by establishing a superfluous law, or one that is less discrete, etc.

Now we will explain the whole matter with some examples. It cannot happen that the Pontiff would err by prescribing some vice, like usury, or forbidding some virtue, like restitution, because these things are per se good or evil; and it cannot happen that he would err by prescribing something against salvation, like circumcision, or observing the Sabbath, or by forbidding something necessary for salvation, like Baptism or the Eucharist. But that he would command something which is neither good nor bad essentially, nor contrary to salvation but which is useless, or that he should prescribe it under a very severe penalty–it is not absurd to say that this could happen, although it is not the role of subjects to pass judgment on these matters, but simply to obey.

Now the proposition is proved, and first of all, that the Pope cannot err in precepts of morals necessary for salvation, because then the whole Church would be seriously injured, and she would err in necessary matters, which is contrary to the promise of the Lord in John 16:13: When the Spirit of truth comes, he will guide you into all the truth. This is to be understood (at the very least) to be about the truth necessary for salvation.

Secondly, because then God would be failing his Church in necessary matters, since he commanded her to follow the Pontiff, and he permits the Pontiff to err in necessary matters. But certainly if God is not lacking in any way concerning necessary matters, how much less regarding his Church?

Now it is proved that the Pontiff cannot err in morals that are per se good or evil. For then the Church could not truly be said to be holy, as it is called in the Apostles’ Creed. For, she is said to be holy especially because of the holy profession, as we have shown elsewhere, because indeed she proclaims a holy law and profession, which teaches nothing false, and prescribes nothing evil.

Secondly, because then necessarily she would also err concerning the faith. For, the Catholic faith teaches that every virtue is good, every vice is evil. But if the Pope erred by prescribing vices, or forbidding virtues, that is, by prescribing some work, which would really be evil, but not manifestly evil, or by forbidding a work of virtue, but not manifestly a work of virtue, the Church would be bound to believe that vices are good and virtues are evil, unless it wanted to sin against conscience. For in doubtful matters the Church is bound to accept the judgment of the Sovereign Pontiff, and do what he prescribes, and not to do what he forbids. And lest by chance she should act against conscience, she is bound to believe as good what he prescribes, and evil what he forbids.

John of St. Thomas

Source: Tractatus de Auctoritate Summi Pontificis, disp. 3, art. 3 (From Osvaldo R. on Academia)

WHETHER, IN PROMULGATING LAWS FOR THE UNIVERSAL CHURCH AND IN APPROVING RELIGIOUS ORDERS, THE POPE CAN ERR?

I. In this matter the common opinion of the theologians is that the Pope cannot err in the laws which he proposes to the universal Church and which are ordered to the common good. St. Antoninus, Part III, title 12, chapter 8, §2, teaches this as something of faith, and Cano, book 5 of De Locis, chapter 5, says that it is very close to faith. To these agree Fr. Bañez in the earlier commentaries on question 10, doubt 6; Molina, book 2 De Justitia, disputation 325; Bellarmine, book 4 De Romano Pontifice, chapter 5; Suarez, in his work De Fide, disputation 5, section 8, number 7; Torres, disputation 16, doubt 2, who especially attacks Cajetan on this point.

In order that this doctrine be more clearly understood, there are two opinions in this matter. The first is that of Cajetan, volume 2 of the Opuscula, treatise 6, chapter 2, where, treating of the contract of the Monte di Pietà and whether it is usurious, he holds that the determination of moral questions-such as whether this contract is usurious or not belongs incidentally and not simply to the Pope’s judgment, namely because to the Pope is promised all truth that is necessary for salvation, but not every naturally knowable or moral truth; if what is necessary is not necessarily known for some reason, or if it is not grasped by all, then it will pertain to the judgment of the Church. Hence he says that just as, in matters of faith, the authority of the Supreme Pontiff outweighs all reasoning, so above him in knowable matters reason, strengthened by the natural light, has precedence.

This is Cajetan’s opinion-not that which Torres, in the place to be cited, attributes to him, namely, that he said that the definition of Leo X in the Lateran Council, by which he defined the Monte di Pietà as not usurious, was not a definition of faith. Cajetan does not say this in that treatise, nor could he say it, since he wrote that treatise long before Leo X and the Lateran Council.

II. Magister Soto agrees with Cajetan in book 6 De Justitia, question 1, article 6, where he says that Leo X did not approve all the conditions of that contract of the Monte di Pietà, but only insofar as they were not contrary to the sacred canons; and he adds the same doctrine of Cajetan, that although the Pope has supreme authority for making laws, moral questions that are naturally knowable and that are not deduced from Sacred Scripture–such as whether such contracts are usurious or not–do not seem to pertain to the Pope. Soto adds, however, at the end of that article that it is not expedient that all usurious contracts be defined as matters of faith, if they are such, because they depend solely on philosophy, and the Holy Spirit intends only to expound Sacred Scripture to the Church and to sanction necessary laws. For this reason Soto seems to admit that in necessary laws the Church is infallibly guided by the Holy Spirit, just as Cajetan holds that the Holy Spirit teaches her all truths necessary to salvation. Thus, they do not seem to be opposed to the common opinion, nor should Torres have been so surprised by their doctrine.

III. Therefore the second and common opinion of theologians is that which we recounted at the beginning of this doubt. In order that its foundation be considered, it must be noted–what Fr. Suarez in the place cited and Fr. Bañez also remark–that it is not an inconvenience that the Pope can err in some circumstances of the laws that he establishes, for example, by multiplying precepts, or imposing excessive rigor or penalties; but he cannot err in the very substance and morality of the law, by sanctioning something contrary to honesty of morals or to natural or divine law.

Thus, in the laws proposed by the Church we can distinguish either their morality, as it were, on the side of their object, or their application to persons here and now, or their circumstances–for example, their rigor or penalties, and so on. These last two belong rather to prudence, to the application and direction of the law, than to its substance.

IV. We therefore say that in what pertains to the substance and morality of the law which the Pope proposes in common as a rule of morals to be followed, it would be heresy to assert that the Church can err, so that she would permit or command something pernicious or contrary to good morals or to natural or divine law. The foundation is that it belongs to the authority of the Pope to feed the sheep of Christ, who are fed not only with the doctrine of faith but also with the rules of morals; therefore, just as he cannot err in feeding the sheep as regards faith, so neither can he err in feeding them as regards rules of morals.

Hence the Lord said in Matthew 23: “The scribes and the Pharisees sit in the chair of Moses; therefore all things whatsoever they shall say to you, observe and do.” But to observe and do pertains to morals; therefore, if all those things are to be observed, it is necessary that they not be pernicious and contrary to law and good morals. Likewise, it is of faith that the Church is holy; therefore it must be that she does not err in rules of morals. For if she admitted something dishonest and evil as a rule, she would not be holy. If, however, the Church cannot err in rules of morals, neither can her universal head err in this respect, insofar as he is head; for the universal authority of the Church is in the head, and the Church must follow his doctrine.

Finally, rectitude of morals is no less necessary for salvation than certitude of faith; therefore, just as the Pope, by his supreme authority, cannot err in handing on certitude of faith, neither can he err in handing on moral rectitude. Just as, if in moral doctrine about the sacraments, such as the prohibition of giving Communion to the laity under both species, he erred, this would be a pernicious error; because if the religion of the sacraments, which depends on their cult, is destroyed, faith itself is destroyed.

V. Nevertheless, as to prudential application to individual persons or in judgments or about the circumstances of laws, there is no inconvenience that the Pope may err, because these depend in common on the fallible testimony of men, as St. Thomas teaches in Quodlibet 9, the last article. And it is clear from Scripture that the steward placed over the Church can be an unfaithful one, as is gathered from the parable in Matthew 24: “But if that evil servant shall say in his heart, ‘My lord is delayed, and shall begin to strike his fellow servants,” etc.; and in 1 Corinthians 4: “Let a man so account of us as of the ministers of Christ and stewards of the mysteries of God. Here now it is required among the stewards that a man be found faithful.” It is therefore not repugnant that in exercising his stewardship the Pope be unfaithful and imprudent; but stewardship pertains to application.

Finally, this is gathered from chapter Si Quando, De Rescriptis, where the Pope says: “Either reverently fulfill our mandate, or, through your letters, put forward a reasonable cause why you cannot fulfill it; for we will patiently endure if you do not do what has been suggested to us by a wicked insinuation.” From this text is founded the doctrine that it is lawful for subjects to petition the Pope not to receive certain laws issued by him, and thus it is presupposed that in these matters he can err imprudently on account of bad application, arising from ignorance or malice.

And in chapter A Nobis, number 2, De Sententia Excommunicationis, it is said that the judgment of the Church is sometimes led by opinion, which often deceives and is deceived. It is therefore clear that in imposing penalties or applying laws or in forensic judgments and in matters that depend on information or the truth of a fact, the Church can be deceived and therefore that the laws of the Pope are often derogated from or revoked by himself or by another Pope. In those laws, however, which are proposed to the whole Church–as those promulgated in a General Council or those incorporated into the body of canon law–a prudential error is more difficult to admit, because of the general approbation they have; and therefore they cannot be derogated from unless special mention is made of them, as is clearly gathered from chapter Ex Parte, De Capellis Monachorum, and chapter Finale, De Poenitentiis et Remissionibus, in the Sext; and this is the common opinion of the doctors whom Sanchez cites, book 1 De Matrimonio, disputation 26, number 7.

VI. From what has been said I infer that the Pope cannot err in the approbation of some religious order; and one who said the contrary would at least be considered rash and scandalous and proximate to error. For St. Thomas, in Opusculum 19, chapter 4, immediately before the solution of the arguments, says: “In canon law, Question 25, question 1, it is said that it is not lawful for anyone without peril to his state to presume to change the divine constitutions or the decrees of the Apostolic See. Therefore, since through the Apostolic See certain religious orders have been instituted, anyone who endeavors to condemn such a religious order clearly renders himself damnable.” So far St. Thomas.

What exactly St. Thomas understands by “damnable” he does not explain, but he seems to be speaking of a doctrine that is damnable, and thus at least proximate to error. Recent authors follow St. Thomas in the place cited above, and Azorius, volume 2, book 5, chapter 7, where he notes the temerity and erroneousness of the opposite against Magister Cano, book 5 De Locis, chapter 5, who very boldly asserts that some orders have been approved by the Church not only uselessly but even harmfully. But this is rightly subject to censure.

The foundation is taken from what has been said: for, in approving some religious order, the Church proposes it to all the faithful as a rule and way of perfection, in such a way that it is free to anyone to follow it, not only as something pertaining to the common precepts but as pertaining to the counsels and to perfection. Therefore, if the Pope erred in such approbation by proposing something harmful and useless as a true and legitimate rule of religious perfection, the Church would be deceived in a matter of great importance; because something would be proposed to all the faithful as a rule of holiness, whereas there would be no holiness in it. For any faithful can enter a religion that has been approved, as a certain way of perfection.

But it would be a great inconvenience that something be proposed as an exemplar of holiness and as a rule of perfection to the whole Church and to anyone who wishes to enter it, in which perfection is not found, but rather something harmful; just as it would be an inconvenience that someone be proposed as a saint who is not a saint, since he is proposed as an exemplar to be imitated by the whole Church. In the same way a religious order is proposed as a rule to be followed by all, and whoever enters it professes perfection. It would therefore be a great inconvenience that something of this kind be proposed which is in fact harmful and does not tend to perfection. And this conclusion is to be understood, like the one set forth above concerning the approbation of religions, as to their substance–not only as regards the three substantial vows, but also as regards the goodness and morality of the rule itself and of the statutes approved for it as conducive to perfection–whatever may be the case about the circumstances of religious orders or their multiplicity, which are not in themselves connected with the substance and goodness of an approved religion.

SOLUTIONS TO THE ARGUMENTS

VII. You will object, against the conclusion set forth above, with the argument of Cajetan and Soto: that only what is deduced from Sacred Scripture or apostolic traditions–that is, from the written or handed-down word of God–pertains to the infallible judgment of the Pope; for what is not contained in these sources, at least implicitly and in itself, cannot be defined explicitly and for us. But moral laws, as regards their goodness and morality, are not deduced from Scripture or apostolic tradition but from physical and moral reason and from the nature of such things; and such laws are promulgated by the Pope according to occasions and times. Therefore, the definition concerning such laws–that they are good and that no error can be mixed into them–does not make it a matter of faith that there can be no error in them.

VIII. And the argument is confirmed because, in this reasoning, we said that canonization of saints is not of faith, no matter how much the Pope defines it, because it is not a definable matter nor deducible from Scripture or from the tradition of the saints as regards this particular person who is declared a saint. Therefore, likewise, it will not be certain and of faith that a particular law–or any other law, which has been promulgated by the Pope–contains no error.

IX. The answer is that it is true that the Pope cannot define anything as of faith unless it is contained in Scripture or tradition; for the Pope cannot establish a new faith, nor are new revelations made to him; he can only explain those things that are contained in the faith and propose those things as of faith for us. For this reason there is a sure rule that those things which are not deduced from Scripture or apostolic tradition cannot be defined as of faith; and this is, as it were, a certain sign for knowing whether something is defined as matter of faith or not–namely, whether it is defined as deduced from Scripture or tradition.

Nevertheless, Magister Cano, book 5 of De Locis, chapter 5, §Nonne igitur, adds other signs for recognizing what in the definitions of councils is to be taken as matter of faith, such as if those who say the opposite are judged heretics, or if it is commanded that what is defined is to be received under anathema, or if it is expressly said to be to be accepted as dogma of faith by Catholics, or if the opposite is judged to be contrary to the Gospel or apostolic tradition.

X. This being supposed, in the present case we say that the Pope, in moral matters, can proceed in two ways. In one way, only by commanding some law and proposing it to the Church as a rule. In another way, by declaring in particular some moral matter, for example, that such a contract is evil or good and that such matter is a sin or not.

When the Pope proceeds in the first way, he does not define as of faith, nor does he define in that law a determinate matter as true; but only this is of faith, that the morality of such a precept or rule is not evil; and this is of faith in virtue of that universal principle: that whatever is set forth ex cathedra must be observed and done, and because the sanctity of the Church cannot fail and consequently neither can moral rectitude, which depends on law. Thus, in the same way, it is of faith that “every man is mortal” and that “this man is mortal.”

In the same way, it is of faith that every moral law of the Pope is good and that the morality of this particular law is good, although the matter that is commanded is not defined as true in particular as something to be believed. For truth is one thing, morality another; the latter is certainly not evil, whereas nothing is defined about the truth of the matter.

When, however, the Pope proceeds in the second way, then he defines concerning the truth of that morality, namely by determining that this is a sin or not, that this is a simoniacal or usurious contract, and so on. Although this depends in large part on natural principles of law, it does not depend on them precisely insofar as they are natural, but also insofar as they are handed down in the Decalogue, in Scripture, and in those things that are said in Scripture about usury or simony. For from those principles, according to the understanding of the Church and of the saints, it is deduced how this or that is usurious or simoniacal, sinful or right; and thus we deny that it is deduced from purely philosophical principles, but rather from those contained in Sacred Scripture.

For Sacred Scripture contains principles of morality, both in the Decalogue and in the Law and in the doctrine of the Gospel, where many moral precepts are taught; and from conformity with those principles it is deduced that something is of good or evil morality.

XI. To the confirmation it is answered that the matter of canonization of saints is not sanctity or moral rectitude absolutely and in itself, but as applied to this person, who is determined and judged to be holy because of the good works which he is proven to have done; and although concerning sanctity or moral rectitude in general it is possible to give certitude of not erring as something of faith, nevertheless concerning rectitude in particular and as applied to this person there cannot be such certitude; it suffices that it pertain indirectly and in a reduced way to faith, as we explained in the preceding article. The reason is that the rectitude of a moral law is rectitude in general, since law only determines it in universal; such rectitude and sanctity in general can be immediately deduced from Scripture, and error in that matter would be contrary to the sanctity of the Church herself, which depends on the law she follows. The application, however, of such rectitude to this or that person in particular can neither be deduced immediately and of itself from Scripture nor does it pertain in this way to the sanctity of the Church as a whole, but is, as it were, an example left to the Church for imitation.

XII. Second it is objected that various popes seem to have erred in handing on some laws contrary to good morals or to divine law. For in chapter Cum Essent, De Testamentis, Pope Alexander III says that it is foreign to divine law and to the institutions of the holy Fathers and the custom of the Church that wills should not be valid unless they are made before seven witnesses; and yet this is established as a custom among many Catholic nations. Likewise, in chapter Licet, De Sponsa Duorum, the same Alexander III determines that after a woman has been married to someone by legitimate consent she cannot marry another; and if she does and carnal intercourse follows, she must be separated: “Although,” he says, “our predecessors judged otherwise.” Therefore his predecessors erred in this.

Moreover, it is clear that the second marriage cannot stand while the first husband lives. Likewise, Pope Stephen VI invalidated all the acts of Pope Formosus, his predecessor, and commanded those ordained by him to be ordained again–which is to have an opinion contrary to the sacrament of orders.

XIII. Lastly, in chapter Per Venerabilem, who the legitimate children are, the Pope teaches that the law of Deuteronomy is not abrogated, which is false; and in chapter Laudabilem, De Conversione Infidelium, it is said that Pope Coelestine III determined that by the heresy of one spouse the marriage is dissolved. And in the Extravagant Exiit, De Verborum Significatione, Pope Nicholas IV defines that perfect poverty, which Christ followed, does not admit ownership of goods either in common or in particular. The contrary of this is taught by Pope John XXII in the Extravagant Ad Conditorem and the Extravagant Quia Quorundam, and he defines it to be heretical to say that Christ taught such poverty. Therefore one of these popes erred, and consequently our conclusion remains overturned both in fact and from our own experience.

XIV. The answer is that in the texts cited nothing is taught as law that is contrary to good morals. For in chapter Cum Essent, De Testamentis, nothing contrary to moral goodness is taught: it is indeed foreign to divine law that seven witnesses be required for a will as something necessary–not because it is contrary to it, but because it is not from it nor very conformable to it, although it is not contrary; and therefore the Pope reproves that custom of seven witnesses. Nor is it repugnant that a custom once reproved later revive and prevail among some nation.

Some canonists, however, say that in that text the Pope is speaking only of wills in pious causes or with regard to those who are temporally subject to the Roman Church, not of all the faithful. But they still must explain how the Pope says that this is foreign to divine law.

In chapter Licet, De Sponsa Duorum, the Pope does not explain how his predecessors judged otherwise–whether because they so judged according to their private opinion and explanation as private persons, or whether they judged in this way as issuing sentence ex cathedra; likewise, whether they judged differently in the substance itself of the matter in question or in some accidental matter, for example, in the mode of making the separation of the second marriage or compelling the woman to return to the first. Therefore we can say that those predecessors either thought differently only according to private judgment and not according to law, or thought differently only in some accidental matter.

XV. As to the act of Stephen against Pope Formosus, it is answered that Stephen did not err in handing on any law, but only in fact, because from hatred of Formosus he wanted to ordain again those ordained by him, as he said, simoniacally, or because he thought that they had not been rightly ordained as to the substance of the sacrament, or because, in hatred of Formosus or of his simony, he did this; and if he did wrong, he nevertheless did not hand on any law or definition about this. Thus it was only a personal sin. The invalidation of all the acts of Formosus was also a defect in fact, not in a law promulgated by him.

To what is said in chapter Per Venerabilem, the answer is that the Pope does not say that the ancient law is absolutely not abrogated, but that Deuteronomy, because it is the first law, must be observed–that is, fulfilled–in the New Testament, especially in those things which are there figured, as he shows by the passage of chapter 17 which he cites: he clearly speaks, as to the letter, of that testimony of Deuteronomy 17: “If you see a difficult and ambiguous judgment, go up to the place which the Lord your God will choose,” etc.; and he says that this is also to be understood of the Apostolic See. Therefore Deuteronomy is not observed in the New Testament by the force of that law, as if it now remained, but because many things decreed there are moral laws or figures of things that are to be fulfilled in the New Testament. It is clear, however, from the doctrine of St. Thomas, First Part of the Second Part, question 104, article 3, that only those precepts of that law which were figurative and ceremonial fail in the New Testament; the moral and judicial precepts, and those things which were signified by those figures, could not fail. What, therefore, is decreed in Deuteronomy must be observed in the New Testament, as it were, by fulfillment or imitation, not by the force and obligation of the law, when the Lord says: “I have not come to destroy the law but to fulfill it.”

XVI. As to what is alleged from chapter Laudabilem–that the marriage is dissolved by the heresy of one spouse–this is not found in that text, although it is said that this was once contained in the ancient decretals and that Castro says he saw it in book 1 De Haeresibus, chapter 4. Perhaps, however, because that text was not Pope Coelestine’s, or was not received as a pronouncement ex cathedra, but only as his private judgment, it was removed from the decretals.

Finally, as to what is alleged from Pope John XXII, the answer is taken from the doctrine of Turrecremata, book 2 De Ecclesia, chapter 112, and Bellarmine, book De Romano Pontifice, chapter 14, where the statements of those popes are reconciled. They explain that in what Pope Nicholas IV thought, namely that the poverty which possesses nothing in common or in particular is more perfect and meritorious, he defined nothing; he only explained his own opinion. John XXII did not directly impugn this, but only renounced the right that the Roman Pontiff was said to have to possess all the goods of the Friars Minor.

As to what is said about the poverty of Christ, Nicholas and John do not disagree. Nicholas says that Christ sometimes followed that poverty in which nothing is possessed in common or in particular, and sometimes admitted ownership in common, because “Judas carried the money bag.” John XXII asserts that it is heretical to say that Christ never had anything of his own; and this is very true and not contrary to the earlier assertion.

XVII. Lastly, it is objected that the excessive number of religious orders induces great confusion in the Church of God, as is said expressly in chapter Finale, De Religiosis Domibus, and the same is found in chapter Primo of the same title in the Sext. Therefore many religious orders are approved uselessly and harmfully; otherwise, their multiplication would not cause great confusion. Likewise, the rules of many orders have been approved which afterwards have been rejected by the Apostolic See itself, as the order of the Fraticelli, approved by Pope Coelestine V, was revoked by a privilege of Pope Boniface VIII in the Extravagant Sancta Romana, De Religiosis Domibus; and the order of the Humiliati was suppressed by Pope Pius V in a particular bull; the order of the Templars by Pope Clement V, and similarly others have been condemned. Therefore, in approving the rules of such orders it is not certain that the Pope cannot err; otherwise they would not have been abrogated without reason.