Introduction
In order to oppose the Protestant understanding of the rule of faith (sola scriptura), I have frequently employed arguments drawn from the nature of faith and of divine revelation. At times I have applied these to the canon of Scripture. The argument runs thus. In order for the canon of Scripture to be integrally known and believed by divine faith, the fact that these books are inspired must be revealed by God; for divine faith assents to nothing except on the authority of God revealing. Now, the fact that these particular books are inspired is not revealed in Scripture. Further, it is essential to Protestantism that only Scripture, and what is derived from Scripture, can properly induce the assent of divine faith. Therefore one of two things follows: either the canon is not known except by conjecture (as any supernatural fact must be, apart from revelation, since inspiration is internal and essentially supernatural); or it is known by faith, but on a revelation outside Scripture, which is to say by Tradition acting as a primary rule of faith.
Some of the less learned Protestants have answered this argument by denying the plain principles of revelation, faith and inspiration on which it rests, in ways contrary to Scripture, to right reason, and to their own theologians; and, what is graver than the absurdities they are driven to, several of them have embraced naturalism on the issue of inspiration.
But some of the more learned have devised a reply drawn from our own theologians. It runs as follows. St. Paul testifies that “all Scripture is God-breathed” (2 Tim 3:16), a universal proposition in which the inspiration of each book of Scripture is included. Now, when a universal proposition is revealed, both the universal and the particulars included under it can be held by divine faith. Therefore the inspiration of each book can be held by divine faith, and held from Scripture alone.
The minor is confirmed by the common opinion of Catholic theologians who hold, e.g., that a man would be a heretic if he said that “I was not born in original sin” since it is of divine faith that “all men were born in original sin.”
Often, those making this reply confuse this principle with a different and genuinely disputed question: whether a theological conclusion properly so called (a truth deduced from a revealed premise and a naturally known premise by a real inference, e.g., “Christ is risible”) is of divine faith. On this point, there are three opinions. First, some theologians teach that a theological conclusion is of divine faith when it is sufficiently drawn by the one investigating the matter so as to be certain and evident. Second, others teach that a theological conclusion is not of faith before the definition of the Church, but can be of faith after the definition of the Church. Third, others teach that a theological conclusion can never be of faith, whether before or after the definition of the Church.
We can easily see where the conclusion enters. If this statement about the universal is confused with the first position about theological conclusions, then it would follow from what was said above about the universal that any Christian, if he is adequately certain of the theological conclusion “John is a book of the bible,” then he would be adhering to something implicitly contained in Scripture (therefore, saving the rule).
In the past I answered the Protestant reply by fighting on this second ground by showing, with the majority of our theologians, why the habit of theology is really distinct from the habit of faith and why a conclusion reached by real inference cannot rest on the authority of God alone. That was unnecessary. The Protestant’s syllogism does not concern a theological conclusion at all. It concerns a particular under a universal (the first question, not the second). To see why, one must attend to what a universal is.
Extension, Comprehension, and the Universal
Any nature as it is in the intellect (the quiddity apprehended abstractly, prescinding from this or that individual) stands in two relations. The first is to its comprehension: the notes that are contained in the nature and the properties that follow upon it. The comprehension I have of man is animal and rational; these are what I grasp when I grasp what man is. The second is to its extension: the subjects of which the nature is predicable. The extension of animal comprises its species (man, horse, etc.); the extension of man, which is a lowest species, comprises individuals (Peter, Paul, etc). The scholastics call the nature considered in its extension the totum universale or totum logicum, and the subjects under it its partes subiectivae; the nature considered in its comprehension, whose parts are the parts of its definition, which is called a totum definibile or totum metaphysicum.
We must consider nature abstracted in two relations, i.e., in its comprehension and in its extension. If we determine these precisely, we can easily dissolve the objection
On Comprehension. What the nature comprehends it contains intrinsically and in act. The notes of the definition (animal, rational) are not something added to man; they are what man is, and the distinction between man and rational animal is only a distinction of reason, of the defined from its definition. For me to move from “man” to “rational animal” requires no proper discourse, but simply defining the term. All theologians agree that this is of faith and can be defined as such. The properties (e.g., risibility) stand somewhat differently: they are really distinct from the essence, as a proper accident from its subject, but they are contained in it virtually and radically, as the effect in its cause; and they are drawn out of it by real reasoning (i.e., proper discourse). Hence the scholastics say that the notes are contained in the nature actu implicite and the properties virtualiter. In this second case, we have a case of a proper theological conclusion that only proceeds under the light of virtual revelation. It is here that theologians dispute over whether a theological conclusion is of faith (the first position), can be of faith by definition of the Church (the second position), or can never be of faith (the third position).
There are thus two ways of passing from the nature to what it comprehends. When the passage is from the defined to its definition or to an essential part (from man to rational animal, from Christ is man to Christ has a body and a soul) the two terms differ only nominally, and the “reasoning” that joins them is not reasoning at all but the explanation of a term. Theologians variously call this improper or explicative discourse, improper reasoning, or the merely explicative conclusion. When the passage is from the nature to a property (from Christ is man to Christ is risible) the terms differ virtually, a new concept enters, and the inference is a real one so that the reasoning is called proper discourse, illation, or the truly illative conclusion.
This dispute right here has NOTHING to do with the objection that is given by the Protestants since the individuals that stand under a universal are not concerned with the comprehension of the universal. Therefore, we must judge differently on this matter.
On Extension. The comprehension of a nature is intrinsic to it, so that to alter the comprehension is to alter the nature; the extension is extrinsic, so that if one of the individuals apt to receive the nature ceased to exist, the nature as universal would be untouched. The reason for this is that the individuals are not in the nature as abstracted as the notes are. They are not contained in it in act; they are contained in it in potency, as the subjective parts in a potential whole in an indeterminate and confused manner. The nature as universal is the nature as communicable, not as communicated, therefore it necessarily follows that those apt to receive it do not exist in the abstracted universal in act, but only potentially. To verify that a note is in the nature I analyze the nature. To verify that an individual is under the nature I must make a second judgment, contingent and existential, that this thing exists and is a man. The universal, of itself, does not supply that judgment, but only supposes it. Therefore, we call this judgement the “verification” since it is verifying something that is supposed in the universal.
The Minor Premise in the Two Orders
With this in mind, we can now compare the office of the minor premise in each of these two orders (the order of comprehension and the order of extension), which will resolve the question and dissolve the doubt of the Protestant.
In the order of comprehension there are two cases. Where the minor is merely explicative, we do not go beyond what the major formally, though implicitly, contains. The conclusion is the major itself under a more or less precise determination, and the assent to the more detailed is the same as the assent to the less detailed, exceeded and exceeding only in the order of clarity (i.e., nominally). From this difference, no new grounds upon which the mind rests is included, but only a different degree of explication.
Where the minor is truly illative, we go beyond what the major formally contains to what it contains only virtually. In this case, there there is a new ground which determines the assent. The natural premise becomes a partial cause of the conclusion and the conclusion follows the weaker part (i.e., the natural premise, so that the assent is a mixed one, theological, not of faith. This is why many Thomists hold that, before the Church defines it, the theological conclusion cannot be assented to by divine faith however evident the inference; and why, after she defines it, it can.
In the order of extension there are also two cases, and here the theologians speak of the unconditioned (or absolute) and the conditioned (or hypothetical) universal. The universal is unconditioned when the identification of the suppositum as falling under its subject requires nothing beyond the explanation of terms (when to know that this thing is a man is, by the same knowledge and with the same certitude, to know that it is under “every man”). The universal is conditioned when its subject carries a restriction to the subject, e.g., “every infant validly baptized” includes “validly baptized” as a certain condition, “every man legitimately elected successor of St. Peter” includes “legitimately elected” as a condition, etc. In this case, the verification in the singular is not given by the mere identification of the suppositum, but only under some condition or hypothetical that must be verified outside the mere identification of the suppositum. To compare the two, when I say that “every man is born from Adam,” I am saying something about this man (since it is absolute), but when I say that “every host validly consecrated is Christ” I am NOT saying something about this host, but only about this host under some sort of condition or supposition (i.e., that it was validly consecrated).
Here we should note that it would be wrong to suppose that by “unconditioned” we meant that such was not conditioned in any sense of the term. This is to be denied since “every man is born from Adam” at least supposes the existence of such men in order to be verified. Rather, when we say that something is unconditioned/conditioned, we are asking whether the condition is something that is or is not really distinct from the very identification of the suppositum. Hence, in the case of “every man is born from Adam,” the very inclusion in the universal is really identical with the very identification of the man as man without any additional condition.
We have then four cases:
improper illation (the defined to its definition);
proper illation (the essence to its property);
the unconditioned universal (the universal to a suppositum whose inclusion is given with its identification);
the conditioned universal (the universal to a suppositum whose inclusion depends on a restriction not so given).
On these four cases rests four questions in theology.
First Question. Whether what is reached by improper illation is of faith. All agree that it is so that someone denying “Christ is a rational animal” would, de facto, be a heretic if he grants the definition.
Second Question. Whether what is reached by proper illation is or can be of faith. These are the three positions on the definability of theological conclusions explained above.
Third Question. Whether what is contained under an unconditioned universal is of faith. All agree that it is, and that it is so without any definition. He who denies that Christ died for him or that he is descended from Adam is a heretic, even while this is only universally presented in scripture.
The reason for the difference between this case and the second case is the difference in the office of the minor. In the second case the minor is a true cause of the conclusion, and so something human enters into the formal motive of faith. The assent to the conclusion is partially resolved into both God’s authority and human reason. In the third case the minor is a mere condition which does not add a motive to the assent of the conclusion, but merely removes an obstacle. This is implied by the very notion of a condition and its distinction from the cause (which is to be devoid of positive influence in the effect).
This leaves us open to an interesting possibility. Since the minor premise in such a case does not add to the formal motive of the assent to the conclusion, but only verifies a certain condition, then it would follow that our assent to the conclusion would follow the certitude that we have of the verification itself. This can be understood by way of a hypothetical. Let’s say that God gave you infallible natural certitude of the fact that “all men are risible.” In this case, the conclusion drawn concerning Christ would still remain as a theological conclusion that would not be able to be assented to by faith since natural reason would still enter the assent of the conclusion as formal motive. On the other hand, let’s say that God gave you infallible natural certitude that “this eucharist is validly consecrated.” In this case, since the minor merely acts as a condition, one would be able to assent to the conclusion “this eucharist is Christ” with divine faith since nothing natural enters the formal motive of the assent to the conclusion in such a case. This is true even in the case of strict moral certitude, as many theologians indicate, as we will treat in the fourth question.
Fourth Question. Whether what is contained under a conditioned universal can become of divine faith when the condition is verified (and by whom it can be verified). That it can, when the verification has strict moral certitude is commonly taught by theologians. For example, a baptizing priest has strict moral certitude of his intention to baptize, those watching the baptism do not have strict moral certitude of the priest’s intention to baptize since they have grounds for prudent fear of doubting that the priest did not have the correct intention. It is under this logic that we are able to understand dogmatic facts wherein the Church infallibly verifies the condition to be the case, hence allowing for the assent of faith to occur.
The Refutation of the Objection
Now we can see how ineptly the Protestant has argued from “all Scripture is God-breathed.”
It is plain, first, that his case has nothing to do with the comprehension of a nature. “This book is inspired” is not a note of, nor a property flowing from, the nature of a certain book; it is the predication of a nature as universal to an individual. This case therefore has NOTHING to do with the second question, the question of theological conclusions, on which he imagines the whole dispute to turn. It belongs to the order of extension: to individuals only potentially contained under the universal and extrinsic to it, reached only by a second judgment identifying the suppositum.
It is plain, second, that this case is not that of the unconditioned universal. It is not the case of anything falling under the nature of book (which would be absurd), but those books qualified in a certain sense, i.e., books as inspired by God. In this, we see that this entire question now revolves around the certitude we are able to have of the condition itself. My former arguments about the essentially supernatural and internal character of inspiration already resolved this question. The fact of inspiration is not something that can be known through natural or historical means unless the revelation of such a condition (which is outside of scripture) and proper certitude of such a fact excluding all prudent fear of doubt are supposed. The universal statement of St. Paul supplies neither of these. Therefore, it cannot be invoked in order to resolve the difficulty under which they perpetually labor.
From all this the Protestant syllogism is easily answered.
Major: St. Paul testifies that “all Scripture is God-breathed,” a universal proposition in which the inspiration of each book of Scripture is included.
Minor: When a universal proposition is revealed, both the universal and the particulars included under it can be held by divine faith.
Conclusion: Therefore the inspiration of each book of Scripture can be held by divine faith.
I distinguish the major. That the inspiration of each book is included in the universal actually, as a note in the comprehension of a nature, I deny; potentially, as a suppositum in the extension of a universal, I subdistinguish: as in an unconditioned universal, whose suppositum is identified by the mere explanation of terms, I deny; as in a conditioned universal, whose subject carries a restriction not verified by the identification of the suppositum, I concede.
I contradistinguish the minor. That the particulars can be held by divine faith if they are contained actually, as notes in a nature, I bypass (it is the second question, and irrelevant); if they are contained potentially, as supposita under a universal, I subdistinguish: if the universal is unconditioned and the suppositum’s inclusion is given with its identification, I concede; if the universal is conditioned, I subdistinguish again: if the condition is verified with a certitude excluding every prudent fear, I concede; if the condition is not so verified, I deny.
The root of the Protestant confusion is that he has collapsed two questions into one. It does not matter whether theological conclusions are of faith. Even were I to concede this in its most radical form, the case of a universal in its extension is untouched, because that case turns not on the strength of an inference but on the identification of a suppositum in a conditional universal, which it does not make for itself.