St. Thomas and the Sinfulness of Concupiscence

A Key Distinction Missed

Explanation

Theologians commonly distinguish between two kinds of passions that tend toward evils, involuntary and voluntary. The first kind are often called “antecedent,” i.e., antecedent to the deliberation of reason and the consent of the will, and the second kind are often called “consequent,” i.e., consequent to the deliberation of reason and the consent of the will. Further, the first are often called “first motions of the soul” and the second “second motions of the soul.”

Yet, there is a further distinction among the first kind of motions that needs to be further elucidated in order to have a more accurate understanding of the matter at hand.

The first kind of motion is distinguished by theologians between “first-first motions” (motus primo primi) and “second-first motions” (motus secundo-primi). They are placed within the same genus on account of the fact that, absolutely speaking, both kinds of motion precede the full deliberation of reason and the full consent of the will. Yet, they are distinguished from each other insofar as the first-first motions precede absolutely all deliberation and consent whatsover, whether actual or virtual, whereas the second-first motions precede the full deliberation of reason and the full consent of the will, yet are consequent to the partial deliberation of reason and the partial consent of the will.

An insufficient distinction between these two types of motion can easily confuse those considering the effects of original sin in both the baptized and unbaptized. From the outset, it is clear that the “first-first” motions can be no sin whatsoever. For, while they tend toward an evil object, they lack any deliberation or consent whatsoever. Hence, it necessarily follows that such motions can in no way be regarded as sin formally speaking, but only as sinful in some relative sense, i.e., fundamentally, causatively, and materially. Yet, the second species of such motions BOTH contain the notion of an objective disorder AND have present the two other pre-requisites of a truly human act, i.e., the deliberation of reason and the consent of the will. Hence, they ought to be considered as sinful in a formal sense. Yet, due to the defect in the deliberation of reason and the consent of the will, i.e., as merely partial, the sinfulness can never reach beyond the degree of veniality.

In the dogmatic tradition of the Church and the writings of the theologians the former is well established. The Council of Trent defined that the fomes peccati (i.e., the habitual state effected within us due to the fall which inclines us to sin) is not to be regarded as formally sinful in the baptized, but only in the sense that they are an effect of sin and incline to sin. It is from this text that the theologians have argued for the conclusion that the first-first motions are not properly speaking sins in the baptized. This is further extended to the non-baptized in the condemnations of the 50th and 51th propositions of Baius. The former thesis is de fide and the latter thesis is certum.

Yet, the distinctions given by St. Thomas are much more precise and favorable to a clearer apprehension to the question at hand than that of later authors. Rather than distinguishing them on the basis of the more or less accidental or material division of the motions themselves in relation to the deliberation of reason and consent of the will, he gave the most profound and fundamental distinction on the basis of the source of the motions themselves in our faculties. From this more profound division, he was able to draw the natural and necessary division of the morality of the acts on a primary foundation of bedrock, rather than the less profound light shined on it by the later division.

For St. Thomas, the “first-first” motions are those motions which proceed from those faculties which are not under the control of the higher faculties (e.g., corporal dispositions of the body, vegitative motions, etc.), whereas the “second-first” motions are those motions are from those faculties which are under the control of the higher faculties (i.e., the internal senses proper to the passions). From this perspective, the Angelic Doctor is able to draw this conclusion and judgement in a more consistent line. For, it ought to be remembered that sins are not only considered as commissions, but also as omissions as well. One does not only sin in violating a precept by contradicting it positively, but also in not fulfilling a duty negatively, “whoever knows what is right to do and fails to do it, for him it is sin.” (James 4:17)

In light of a clear anthropology, we understand that there are certain faculties over which the higher faculties have control and other faculties over which the higher faculties do not have control. Hence, in the former case, to be able to hinder a motion toward an evil object and yet to be slack in this duty is to omit a duty in the moral order and thus to sin. In the latter case, such a motion would not enter into the moral order whatsoever and therefore would be no sin whatsoever. The former case is a case of an “indirectly voluntary” act and the latter a case of an “absolutely involuntary” act.

Yet, does this contradict the magisterium of the Church? Not in the slightest.

1. The Council of Trent spoke of the fomes peccati in the baptized. The fomes peccati consist of certain habitual dispositions rather than acts. How could St. Thomas’ doctrine contradict the Tridentine teaching when they speak of completely different things?

2. The condemnation of Baius may seem more difficult to resolve. The 50th proposition of Baius is that “the evil desires to which reason does not consent, and which man endures unwillingly, and prohibited by precept.” Would St. Thomas not contradict this doctrine in his explanation of sins of omission in relation to such acts of the passions? The 51st proposition of Baius is that “Lust, or the law of the members, and evil desires of it, which men suffer unwillingly, are true disobedience of the law.” The same could be said for this as well. Yet, the contradiction is merely apparent. If we consider the qualifications present in each, it becomes clear, especially “unwillingly” in each proposition. For Baius, the motions that he speaks about are involuntary absolutely speaking, yet for St. Thomas the motions are only involuntary secundum quid, being indirectly voluntary.

An interesting corollary from this is that (while I would find such a position erroneous), it would not be against the teaching of either document to affirm that the first motions (as acts) which are indirectly voluntary are mortally sinful in the unbaptized. For, the two propositions only touch the questions of, 1. The habitual disorder which brings about the first motions in the baptized, and 2. Absolutely involuntary motions in the unbaptized.

Let’s turn to the fundamental texts from St. Thomas.

Texts of St. Thomas

A number of texts illuminate this doctrine which I will present singly below in order to aid in the apprehension of this doctrine.