Sexual Morality and the Unmarried

Some Principles

Earlier today, I released a video titled No, You Can’t Kiss Your Girlfriend. This was in response to a video done by the Theology of the Body Institute on YouTube, a channel dedicated to spreading Christopher West’s interpretation of Catholic Sexual Ethics.

Obviously, as is the nature of such videos, there was pushback. That is to be expected. Unfortunately, much detail is lost in the medium of a video, which would otherwise clarify controverted points. Hence, in this article, I hope to highlight a few points that might be less clear on the issue of sexual ethics and the unmarried. Two notes before I begin.

First, I will be using McHugh and Callan’s Moral Theology for most of the citations where I can. It is quite accessible to English readers, allowing for everyone to helpfully reference the sections quoted.

Second, most of my treatment of this question will seem quite “abstract.” This is by design. It is quite dangerous for anyone to, by rigorism, bind the conscience where it is not bound by God. The moralists refer to this act as paving the road to hell due to the principle that an erroneous conscience binds and he who acts against conscience sins.

Certain questions related to this topic require moral estimation, i.e., an understanding of one’s own dispositions and the circumstances in which one finds himself. Hence, to speak in particulars or absolutes can give the wrong idea. Although, this is not to say that such is necessarily inappropriate as designating a general rule to which exception applies or as assuming the bad dispositions it prohibits. Even Sacred Scripture itself speaks in this way, Turn away thine eye from a shapely woman. (Sir. 9:8)

As a last note, remember that it is important to heed the warning of many moralists. To think about such matters can itself be an occasion of sin. Hence, it is important to consider whether your reading of this article has a just cause, or is done merely for curiosity.

Definitions

First, there is a distinction between internal and external acts. Internal acts are those concerned with the faculties of the soul. More particularly, we are concerned here with venereal pleasure. External acts are those concerned with the acts of the body.

Second, there is a distinction as to the external acts between the principal act and secondary acts. The principal act (also called ‘consummated’) concerns those acts ordered per se to generation (intercourse) or the organs of generation. The secondary acts (also called ‘non-consummated’) concern those acts ordered per accidens to generation, i.e., those “secondary or non-consummated external acts (e.g., looks, conversations, touches, embraces, kisses), which are related to the principal act as being an enticement to it, its preparation, or its external sign and accompaniment.” (McHugh and Callan, n. 2486)

The secondary acts are called per se indifferent, since they can either be performed for good or for evil, depending on the end and circumstances of the act. (Ibid., n. 2513)

Third, as to the internal acts, we must distinguish between venereal and natural pleasure. Venereal pleasure concerns the enjoyment that accompanies or prepares for generation. This is often described as the “stirring of spirits serving generation.” Natural pleasure simply concerns the connatural good of the sense involved, “the higher sensible pleasures, on the other hand, are produced by a sensible object, not on account of any relation to venereal or gustatory delight, but on account of a perfection in the object that makes it suitable to the sense (e.g., the enjoyment derived from beautiful scenery, classical music, fragrant roses, or downy or velvety cloth).” (Ibid., n. 2461).

Fourth, danger of sin is either proximate or remote, depending on the individual and circumstances involved. Proximate danger of sin involves “moral certainty that in given circumstances sin will be committed, either because the generality of mankind falls in such cases (absolute danger), or because in them a particular individual has always fallen (relative danger).” (Ibid., n. 258) Remote danger of sin is present where there is a lesser likelihood that sin will be committed, “and does not exclude a serious and well-founded probability or expectation to the contrary.” (Ibid.) There is a mere possibility of sin where there is “the conceivability but unlikelihood that it will result from a certain set of circumstances.”

To expose oneself to danger of sin can either be lawful or unlawful. It is lawful “if this can be done according to the laws of prudence, for otherwise absurdities would follow.” (ibid., n. 261) As the moralists frequently repeat, if we were bound to avoid all danger of sin, then we would have to leave the world. It is unlawful if one imprudently exposes oneself to danger of sin without just cause. Here, it is important to invoke the principle of a proportionately grave justification, which requires moral discernment. If one exposes himself to danger of sin with a proportionately grave cause, then it may be prudent, otherwise it is imprudent.

In the case of an unlawful exposure, it is a mortal sin when one “rashly exposes himself to the proximate danger of grave sin, or to what he foresees will become proximate danger.” (ibid., n. 260) It is a venial sin when one “rashly exposes himself to the remote danger of grave sin or to the proximate danger of venial sin.”

Obviously, in the case of an exposure to the mere possibility of sin, there is no sin. (ibid., n. 262)

In the case of a lawful exposure, the following rules are ordinarily given by the moralists: “(a) that the one who exposes himself to the danger of sin be sure that his motive is good (viz., that he firmly intends to avoid the sin to which he may be tempted and to accomplish only the good he desires); (b) that the action he performs and which involves the danger is necessary, and bears a correspondence in importance to the gravity of the sin and the proximity of the risk; (c) that means be employed (e.g., prayer, pious thoughts, spiritual reading, and the use of the Sacraments), which will so reduce the danger that one has confident assurance that the danger will be encountered safely.” (ibid., n. 261)

Theses

One will be hard pressed to deny any of the aforementioned definitions. They are common among Moralists and invoked from time to time by the Church in her teaching. It is only necessary to apply these principles to the question at hand.

NOTE: While it is possible to draw up theses for the married as well in light of the clear distinctions given above, this goes beyond the scope of this article. Hence, I will restrict my comments to the unmarried.

Since, as we went over above, these secondary acts are per se indifferent, we cannot determine whether they are good or evil except by recourse to good or evil circumstances. Here, we will consider two: the intention of the act and the danger of the act.

Thesis I. For the unmarried, to perform secondary external acts with the intention of venereal pleasure, or to consent to such pleasure is a mortal sin.

This is established by the authority of Pope Alexander VII. He condemned the thesis that “it is a probable opinion which states that a kiss is only venial when performed for the sake of the carnal and sensible delight which arises from the kiss, if danger of further consent and pollution is excluded.” (D1140)

First, it is condemned that such a position is a probable opinion. Hence, Catholics must hold such a position to be manifestly uncertain as a condemned thesis.

Second, it is condemned that such an act is venial. Hence, it is not sufficient to hold that such an act is light matter. Rather, one must hold that such an act constitutes grave matter (as theologians commonly hold for all violations of the 6th/9th commandment, ex toto genere suo).

The sense of the thesis is that such non-consummated acts cannot be done for the sake of venereal pleasure without mortal sin, as Viva makes clear in his commentary on this passage. While some commentators attempt to read this in a material way (i.e., x type of kiss is condemned), the foundation for the condemnation is the sinfulness of consenting to illicit pleasure.

α) It matters little what kind of act is being done (words, looks, kisses, touches, etc.) for the scope of the condemnation, as long as the act is being done in view of the venereal pleasure that will be derived from the act.

β) It matters little whether the pleasure consented to is intentional (i.e., I kiss in order that I enjoy illicit pleasure) or incidental (i.e., I kiss without such an intention, yet consent when it arises). While the condemnation only explicitly concerns the former, the line of reasoning about consent to venereal pleasure with equal force applies to the latter.

It is important to recall that this condemnation is restricted in scope. It does not judge on whether such acts can be done outside of the cases when one consents to or intends venereal pleasure. Hence, it is necessary to go beyond what is determined here, applying the other rules laid out above.

Scholium. On Natural Pleasures

A further question may arise here. It has been determined that intention of or consent to venereal pleasure is unlawful for the unmarried when performing such acts, but is it lawful to have the intention of or consent to natural pleasures? On this topic, moral theologians are divided and its determination is quite complex. Hence, I will simply note that there is controversy and move on from here.

Thesis II. For the unmarried, to perform secondary external acts in such a way as to expose oneself to danger of sin without just cause is unlawful.

For the understanding of this thesis, note that “danger of sin” here is not simply “danger of intercourse.” Rather, “danger of sin” is meant to (primarily) indicate the consent to venereal pleasure which may arise.

To give an example from the video I responded to (on the issue of ‘French Kissing’), proximate danger of sin which is absolute involves “moral certainty that in given circumstances sin will be committed…because the generality of mankind falls in such cases.” The generality of mankind consents to venereal pleasure when they perform such an activity. Hence, it is a mortal sin from the danger involved.

To illustrate this point further, let’s take the example of an unmarried couple being left alone in private for a short space of time. For most, this involves a remote occasion of sin, although for others (relatively speaking) the danger becomes proximate due to past sexual sins. In the former case (if there is no just and proportionate cause) it will be light, in the latter case it will be grave.

Lastly, let’s take the example of a simple conversation. In this case, there is only a mere possibility of sin, involving neither a proximate or remote danger of sin. Hence, it is not sinful and there is no unique justification required for the act.

Thesis III. For the unmarried, to perform secondary external acts which expose to danger of sin with just and proportionate cause is lawful, if sufficient precautions against sin are taken.

For those who have a more cursory understanding of the topic, this may come as a surprise. Yet, please note three things in particular.

First, the reason for exposure must be proportionate to the severity of the sin and the proximity of the danger. Hence, the danger in viewing a nude member of the opposite sex is obviously more proximate than simply making physical contact with another person on a decent part of their body. Therefore, the former is only excused in extreme circumstances (e.g., a doctor) while the latter is excused in less severe circumstances (e.g., handshake).

Second, the cause for exposure must be just. St. Alphonsus teaches (n. 417-418) that these acts can be done for a number of different sufficient reasons, including as a matter of duty, national custom, increased goodwill, etc., yet can be done for non-sufficient reasons as well, e.g., vanity, curiosity, etc. This is also considered by St. Thomas as well, “it is possible to do such things without lustful pleasure, either as being the custom of one’s country, or on account of some obligation or reasonable cause.” (ST.II-II.Q154.A4)

On the basis of the presence of the first and second, such acts are referred to as “necessary occasions of sin.” It is important to note that “necessary” is being taken in terms of “moral necessity,” which involves the avoidance of sufficiently grave harm or the acquiring of a sufficiently weighty good. Hence, e.g., bad co-workers can be referred to as a “necessary occasion of sin” for a man insofar as leaving his job will involve grave harm.

Third, sufficient precautions must be taken. Even if one has just and proportionate cause, it can still be possible to fall into sin. For an alcoholic to have just and proportionate cause to walk past the bar does not exclude the fact that he may fall into sin in the process. Hence, we are required to take sufficient precautions to avoid incitements to sin which may arise. The precautions are sufficient when one is morally certain that they will “so reduce the danger that one has confident assurance that the danger will be encountered safely.”

Scholium. On Necessary Occasions and Possibility of Sin

From this, the reader will conclude that there are two instances in which such acts will be appropriate. First, as (morally) necessary occasions of sin. Second, those acts which pose a mere possibility of sin, without involving either (relative) remote or proximate occasions of sin.

It is a reasonable question to ask whether the first category or the second category ought to be invoked in the majority of morally legitimate cases of secondary external acts. Some (more modern) authors seem to ordinarily justify these acts on the basis of the first category, arguing that the goods sought in such acts make them morally necessary as a preparation for marriage. Other (older) authors seem to almost entirely restrict the morally legitimate cases to the second category, arguing that such moral necessity is rare insofar as most of these acts can be substituted by other efficacious means.

Practically, these positions will look quite similar. Those who invoke the first category focus on the good intention of the act in external secondary acts. Those who invoke the second category focus on the relative freedom from danger necessary to act in such a way. It matters little which route one takes in considering the moral legitimacy of such acts, as long as those who invoke the first category are sure to also emphasize the obligation to “so reduce the danger that one has confident assurance that the danger will be encountered safely.”