Penal Substitution: A Catholic Dogma?

The Scholastic Doctrine

A note for the reader. I began to research and write this article a while ago. As I expanded my notes more and more, I realized that I could not fit all the information into a single article. I needed to break it up into a series (lest I post a small book on Substack). This first article sets the stage for the reader, introducing the main theses that concern the doctrine of “penal substitution” as the tradition defines it. In the following articles, we will return to these theses and expand on them in much more detail.

Since you will not be able to read this in one go, but will have to follow along over the next few weeks, you will be forced to subscribe!

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Introduction

The topic of “penal substitution” has been controversial as of late. The controversy runs along a few distinct lines, both among co-religionists and between members of distinct groups. Among Catholics, the most popular exponent of the doctrine in the modern era is Erick Ybarra, who has put together an extensive florilegium on the topic titled He Bore Our Punishment: Discovering Penal Substitution in the Church Fathers and Beyond.

While I have been asked about the topic countless times, I have never written on it extensively, for a number of reasons. With a topic of such weight and delicacy, I was firmly convinced that I should not be hasty in giving my own exposition. Further, I sought out certain obscure treatments of this question by authors of no small repute in order to better acquaint myself with the doctrine of the more recent scholastics.

At last, I feel somewhat prepared to give a treatment of this question, following in the footsteps of authors of every sort: preachers, ascetical writers, scholastic theologians, and exegetes. Most surprisingly, the theologians who prepared the schemata for the First Vatican Council even drafted a document touching on this topic (although the document was never promulgated, owing to the abrupt suspension of the council).¹ Equally curious is the debate that took place in the twentieth century, in which the eminent scholastics Fr. Christian Pesch, S.J. and Fr. Édouard Hugon, O.P., and the equally renowned patrologist Fr. Adhémar d’Alès, S.J., upheld the traditional place of penal expiation in the doctrine of Christ’s satisfaction against the criticisms of Abbé Jean Rivière. This was followed by the exegetical work of Alexis Médebielle and the scholastic work of Jesús Solano, along with countless other studies vindicating the traditional doctrine along many lines.

Unfortunately, Rivière was taken as an authority on the redemption by Fr. Philippe de la Trinité (who cites him by name), whose work appeared in English in 1961 as a criticism of the (putative) excesses of many different preachers and ascetical writers. This would stamp the doctrine with infamy in the English-speaking world. Even more unfortunately, the defenses of Pesch, d’Alès, Hugon, and others have been completely forgotten.

Fr. d’Alès summarizes the sense of the tradition in which these defenders stand, the tradition in which I myself will also stand:

“In order to guard against their [i.e., the Lutherans’] impious excesses, must we renounce a notable portion of the Christian heritage? The theory of penal substitution answers too well to our instincts of justice, it has too strong attachments in Scripture and in tradition, it has too often inspired preachers of the divine judgments and broken the souls of sinners, to disappear easily from our pulpits.” (Études 135 [1913], pp. 184–185)

Yet, before I begin, it is important to give a number of clarifications so that the reader may enter upon this study with the proper dispositions for understanding the tradition.

First Clarification. As in many areas of theology, the words we use are taken in an “acquired” sense. Terms often carry a sense among creatures that is unfitting when applied to divine and supernatural realities. Therefore, it will be necessary to strip some of the terms we use of certain aspects of their ordinary meaning, so as to impose nothing unfitting on the passion of Christ. As Fr. d’Alès put it, while the principle of penal substitution is “unacceptable as a general thesis and in strict law,” it “takes on an entirely different value with regard to the Redemption” (ibid., p. 180).

From this, the reader should conclude that he ought to pay very close attention to the various clarifications that the tradition provides when treating this doctrine. Often, one gathers the wrong notion when he takes a term in its ordinary sense without stripping away the aspects that come along with its creaturely mode. For example, the word “punish” or “punishment,” taken simply, carries the idea of something inflicted against the will of the one punished. Yet in the case of Christ this is not so, owing to the superabundant charity that aligned his will with the suffering inflicted upon him. Therefore, many authors clarify that “punish” and “punishment” are not taken according to the aspect under which they exist among natural realities.

Second Clarification. Following from the first clarification, it is important to consider the purpose of the author in treating this mystery. This is especially important in a topic like the passion, which is so often the subject of homilies and meditations that are (a) meant for a non-technical (i.e., lay) audience and (b) framed according to certain rhetorical conventions meant to move the audience to certain affective acts (e.g., sorrow) in light of the mystery. Therefore, many authors leave unsaid the distinctions that would clarify the notion. This does not make what they say false or in any way misleading, since these distinctions are tacitly accepted insofar as such authors intend to adhere to the sense of the Church and of theologians in expounding this mystery. What it does mean is that their statements are of less scientific value. The fact that they did not explicitly state these distinctions ought not to lead either to (a) the acceptance of a crude understanding of what is said or (b) an unfair and harsh rejection of what was said, as if these distinctions were not latent or implicit. For this reason, it is important to consider the scientific aspects of this mystery in light of the scientific treatments that theologians have given to this problem, rather than pretending that scholastic precision is to be found in devotional or homiletic expositions of this doctrine. That would be quite unfair. For more, cf. d’Alès, “Rédemption,” Dictionnaire apologétique de la foi catholique IV (1922), col. 571.

Third Clarification. It also follows from the first clarification that a multiplicity of images must be used in order to explain the supernatural reality. Since each of these images, taken apart, is inadequate to represent the full sublimity of the passion, the sacred writers, the Fathers, and the theologians use a number of different images, each highlighting one aspect in a dim manner, so that, taken together, they give us a clearer understanding of the mystery. Therefore, images such as sacrifice, ransom, example, punishment, conquest, etc., are used, each with its own value in providing an understanding of this mystery. It is inappropriate and un-Catholic for anyone to take one of these images and set it against another, as if they were mutually exclusive. This tendency to set the images against one another follows from the tendency to consider terms in their created and natural sense without properly clarifying the force of the term when applied to supernatural mysteries. For more, cf. St. Thomas’s treatment of these figures in ST III, q. 48, aa. 1–6.

The Theses

Another point of clarification must be made: one ought to consider and judge each thesis in the sense in which the tradition takes it. Many understand something like “penal substitution” in a cartoonish manner. They define penal substitution in a number of different ways, drawing from countless theologians within and outside the Catholic tradition, writing in a variety of contexts. Therefore, I must begin by setting out the several theses that make up the doctrine before I go on to explain and quote. In order that the reader may properly understand what is said throughout the article, it is vital to understand the whole before descending into the details of the particular theses, explanations, and quotations. A proper understanding of the matter resolves most objections.

Thesis I

Poena (punishment) properly and simply so called (poena simpliciter, formaliter, vindicativa) requires (a) an afflictive evil, (b) against the will of the sufferer, (c) inflicted by a judge passing sentence, (d) in vengeance of the sufferer’s own fault.

Note. St. Thomas’s account of what belongs to the notion of punishment (De malo, q. 1, a. 4) explicitly includes (a), (b), and (d): punishment is suffered “for something that one has committed,” it is contrary to the will, and it consists in a passion. Later Thomists compress these into a formula such as Billuart’s: malum punitivum et afflictivum, inflictum contra voluntatem passi in vindictam sui peccati (De peccatis, diss. VII, a. 4). Later authors make (c) explicit, although it is implicit in the earlier authors. In my opinion, the development of (c) is one of the most important lines in clarifying this question and its sense is the most obscure in traditional authors.

Thesis II

We deny that Christ was punished properly and simply so called, insofar as (b), (c), and (d) do not apply to Christ in their proper and simple senses. First, the sufferings of Christ were not against the will of Christ simpliciter, but were voluntarily accepted. Second, the sufferings of Christ were not inflicted by God as a judge passing sentence upon him, but were inflicted by men: by his persecutors among the Jews, whose rulers delivered him up, and by the Gentiles, through whose hands his passion was completed (ST III, q. 47, aa. 4–5). Third, there was no fault in Christ for which the sufferings were inflicted. Therefore, we deny that the penal satisfactions (the poenalitates) of Christ had the formal character of punishment properly so called.

Note 1. The distinction between the notions of poena simpliciter and poena satisfactoria is important because they repair the violated order of justice in distinct modes. Poena simpliciter repairs the violated order of justice insofar as it is inflicted and endured, while poena satisfactoria repairs it precisely insofar as its acceptance and endurance proceed from the free will of the one suffering. In the first case, justice is satisfied regardless of the dispositions of the one suffering; in the second, justice is satisfied by the moral quality of the one suffering through his suffering.

This is often lost on modern readers, who do not properly distinguish either between the offense caused by sin and the malice caused by sin (Gonet, De peccatis disp. VIII a. 3) or between the stain of guilt and the obligation of punishment that inhere in the sinner. Many imagine that the primary purpose of punishment is the moral reformation of the one punished. With this assumption, we lose vital doctrines touching purgatory, jurisprudence, and, in this case, the passion of Christ. On purgatory, many understand it primarily (or even exclusively) as a moral reformation of the faults of the holy souls. On jurisprudence, many understand judicial punishments as ordered primarily toward the reformation of the individual. On the passion of Christ, many eliminate the penal aspect of the atonement, understanding it simply as an act meriting grace for the faithful. Along with this, acts of penance lose their satisfactory value, and hell’s punishments seem empty and cannot be understood in light of the justice of God.

While it is true that the voluntary acceptance of the punishment perfects the punishment (for it is a greater thing for punishments to be purgatorial, both repairing the offense and healing the malice), this does not pertain to the essence of punishment. It is in light of this that we are able to understand most profoundly the passion of Christ and the necessity of his suffering. While God certainly could have given grace without Christ’s meriting, or forgiven sins without Christ’s propitiating, there is no reparation of the order of justice and no expiation of the punishments due to sin without Christ’s voluntarily suffering and offering that suffering to the vindictive justice of God.

Note 2. This distinction between the two senses of punishment (clearly given by St. Thomas) was presented in an adnotatio to the first schema De doctrina catholica (cap. XIV), which the preparatory theologians drafted for the First Vatican Council:

“Nor therefore was the man Christ punished in that sense in which punishment properly signifies an evil inflicted on the guilty in vengeance of a fault contracted by him. . . . If, then, by the name of punishment is signified a laborious satisfaction for the offenses of men, whose head and surety Christ was constituted, he certainly bore punishments for us and in our stead” (Mansi 50, cols. 106–107).

Note 3. By “as judge” we mean: as a judge inflicts punishment upon one who is guilty. We do not deny that God ordained that Christ should bear this penalty (Thesis III) or that this proceeds from his justice; we deny that God passed sentence upon Christ as upon a guilty man.

Thesis III

We affirm that Christ can be said to be punished in the sense of a “satisfactory punishment” (poena satisfactoria), insofar as the afflictive evils suffered by Christ fulfill the notions of (b), (c), and (d) in an improper sense. First, the sufferings of Christ were voluntary simply speaking (simpliciter), yet involuntary relatively speaking (secundum quid), insofar as they were against the natural inclination of human nature (voluntas ut natura) to flee afflictive evils, so that they may be said to be involuntary considered in themselves (in se) but voluntary according to the circumstances of the act (in casu). Put another way, they were involuntary according to Christ’s antecedent will but voluntary according to his consequent will. Second, the sufferings of Christ were not inflicted by God as a judge passing sentence on Christ; yet God concurred in the sufferings in four senses: (a) insofar as he permitted them to occur; (b) insofar as Jesus was delivered up by the preordination of God (Acts 2:23); (c) insofar as he inspired the will of Christ to accept the sufferings voluntarily; and (d) insofar as he withheld various consolations from Christ (not in his higher faculties, in which he had the beatific vision, but in their overflow into the lower). This is to be understood both permissively and positively, contrary to those who teach that God merely permitted the passion of Christ so that we can say Christ was “truly cursed by God, because God ordained that he should endure this punishment in order to free us.” (Super Gal., c. 3, lect. 5, n. 150) Further, while God did not afflict Christ by passing sentence on him, the passion of Christ was offered to God’s vindictive justice (which is the aspect under which he is judge). Third, there was no fault in Christ for which the sufferings were inflicted; yet the sufferings were undertaken for the sake of fault by the union of charity, i.e., for our faults, and therefore they include the notion of fault in the sufferings of Christ.

It is for this reason that we deny punishment simpliciter, insofar as none of these notions is verified simpliciter, yet we concede punishment secundum quid, insofar as these notions are verified secundum quid: involuntary as against human nature, offered to God as judge, and undertaken for the sake of the fault of another.

Note 1. There is a dispute among Catholic authors over whether the terms “punish” and “punishment” should even be used, in light of the distinction between poena properly taken and poena improperly taken. Yet the more ancient usage confirms this practice (as Pesch shows at length in Das Sühneleiden unseres göttlichen Erlösers; d’Alès, in his De Verbo Incarnato, lib. III, th. XXI, gives a lengthy overview, along with copious references to secondary sources), and such a dispute is over a word rather than over the sense. Therefore, the question is of little worth to our consideration, which is scientific in nature. It should be noted that the annotation to the first schema proposed for Vatican I explicitly distinguished the senses, and both its denial and its acceptance are given in qualified forms: Christ is not punished in the sense in which “punishment properly signifies,” and he is punished in the sense of “a laborious satisfaction for the offenses of men” (cf. also Franzelin, De Verbo Incarnato, th. XLVII, § I).

It should also be noted that many eminent Thomists remark on the (apparent) absence of the term from St. Thomas. Yet there are a number of texts that should be considered before judging hastily on this matter. St. Thomas’s testimony in his Commentary on Galatians is sometimes cited: “And in this way Christ was thought to be cursed, when he hung on the cross, because he was being punished with an extraordinary punishment” (Super Gal., c. 3, lect. 5, n. 150). Yet some may explain this, in continuity with the remainder of the passage, as St. Thomas treating the state of Christ with respect to the exterior appearances of his passion in the understanding of the Jews. The same language is used in his Commentary on Psalm 16, where the case is clearer: “Spiritually, this is said about Christ, who was punished between the thieves like a malefactor” (In Ps. 16, n. 1). Therefore, this text is ambiguous. Moreover, it should be noted that the sentence from Galatians stands within St. Thomas’s exposition of the curse as an evil of guilt, which he says is verified of Christ “only in the estimation of the Jews,” so that the punishment spoken of is that which men inflicted.

Yet there seems to be another text, which is indisputable, where St. Thomas writes: “By baptism man is incorporated into Christ and made his member; therefore, the punishment that Christ underwent is reckoned to him as satisfaction. . . . And therefore God in Christ punished those sins” (In IV Sent., d. 4, q. 2, a. 1, qc. 2, ad 1). Someone may object to this text that the object of this punishment is “sins” rather than Christ. To this it must be said that the concrete subject in which these sins were punished is Christ, since these sins could never be punished in themselves, or in their guilt, or in the obligation to punishment, or in those who committed them. Therefore, God is here said to punish, and that in which he punishes these sins is Christ, namely, in the satisfactory punishment which Christ bore (cf. ST III, q. 69, a. 2, ad 1). While this satisfactory punishment “diminishes something of the notion of punishment” (ST I-II, q. 87, a. 6), it does not remove it altogether. Many have read “diminishes” as if St. Thomas taught that it removed the notion altogether, yet this seems impossible given the qualification that it diminishes “something,” which is not said when a notion is removed entirely, but only when it is applied in a less proper or relative sense, which is exactly what those defending the term argue.

Note 2. When we speak of the “permission” of the sins of the killers, we have to be careful not to confuse this with the will that God has toward the passion of Christ. Some speak as if God only permitted the passion, negatively and permissively, rather than willing it positively. This is an error, owing to two misunderstandings. First, these authors do not understand that we ought to distinguish between the passion of Christ (which was essentially a good) and the sins of the Jews (which were moral evils). Second, they do not understand the difference between a moral evil and a physical evil. Evil is never willed by God per se, but physical evils (e.g., afflictive evils as punishments) are willed by God per accidens on account of some good (which, in this case, is the redemption of mankind).

To free myself from accusations of blasphemy, I will simply give the words of Solano:

“The Father not only permitted but also willed this concrete expiation of Christ through his passion and death. . . . The passion and death of Christ had the very grave sin of the Jews as its proximate cause. But God only permitted this sin. However the passion itself was good, ‘and this was by an absolute preordained will, just as it was also willed by Christ himself with an absolute will’ [Suárez, De mysteriis vitae Christi, in III, q. 46, a. 10]. However, lest an absolute volition of this kind of Christ’s passion on the part of God be badly understood, it must be noted that God cannot will per se physical evils and evils of punishment, that is, by willing them as they are in themselves, but only per accidens, that is, by ordaining them to a good that has a greater value than the good prevented by those evils. However, he does will them, and does not just permit them, while he only permits moral evils.” (Sacrae Theologiae Summa IIIA, On the Incarnate Word, n. 681)

How exactly do we explain the coherence between the mere permission of the sins of the Jews and the absolute willing of the passion? This is explained according to the different systems of the divine decree and free will set out in De Deo Uno (i.e., the Molinist, the Thomist, etc.); therefore, it is outside the scope of this article, which does not concern itself with such questions.

Thesis IV

The satisfaction which Christ offered to the Father has, as an essential element, expiation, i.e., “penal compensation offered to the vindictive justice of God” (Solano, n. 668), which includes some material suffering dignified by some moral quality, without which there could not be condignity and sufficiency in an intrinsic manner.

Note 1. This is precisely the point on which the twentieth-century quarrel was most heated. Pesch and his followers taught as Catholic doctrine that Christ “rendered satisfaction in the strict sense by bearing for men the punishment due to sin” (Praelectiones dogmaticae IV, n. 415, ed. 4–5 [1922], p. 243). Rivière, on the other hand, held that the suffering of Christ played “only a secondary and accidental role” (in a letter printed in Revue thomiste 21 [1913], p. 204). For Rivière and his followers, what was primary and essential in satisfaction was the “moral element” of the passion, i.e., the act of submission and love on the part of Christ (Le dogme de la Rédemption: Étude théologique [1914], pp. 181–182).

Contrary to this, it is to be firmly held that the penal element (while not absolutely necessary for the forgiveness of sins, the meriting of grace, etc.) was necessary in order for there to be a condign satisfaction for sins offered to the vindictive justice of God (Solano, n. 669). It should be noted that the suffering we hold to be necessary for such an end is not the suffering of his whole passion, but any degree of suffering on the part of Christ, although it was supremely fitting for Christ to suffer and die in the manner that he did.

As Scheeben notes: “Christ could have merited grace and glory for us without suffering for us, whereas suffering is essentially required for satisfaction. For without self-renunciation, self-denial, self-abasement, God’s ravaged honor cannot be restored” (The Mysteries of Christianity, § 67). St. Thomas teaches that “satisfaction must be penal” (In III Sent., d. 20, q. 1, a. 4, qc. 2, ad 4) and that one satisfies for another “by taking on himself the punishment due to the sin of the other” (ST III, q. 14, a. 1); cf. Compendium theologiae I, cc. 226–227.

As to the terminology of “through” versus “in” suffering, Pesch’s statement stands:

“It is all the more surprising that even certain Catholic theologians, out of fear of these attacks, strive to change at least the manner of speaking and advise that one ought to say: Christ suffering redeemed us (Christus patiens nos redemit), but not: Christ redeemed us by his passion (Christus passione sua nos redemit). But one must hold to the manner of speaking which Scripture, the Fathers, the theologians, the councils have sanctioned: Christ redeemed us by his passion, blood, death.” (Pesch, Compendium theologiae dogmaticae III, n. 134 d, ed. 5 [1935], p. 75)

Note 2. We say that this is an “essential element,” but not that it is the primary element. In fact, this element is secondary. The suffering is, as it were, the matter, while the principle is charity, the habit of soul from which Christ is inclined to will to satisfy for another and from which the satisfaction has its efficacy (ST III, q. 14, a. 1, ad 1). Therefore, it is not secondary in the sense of “accidental,” but as that which is less principal within what is essential.

Thesis V

Satisfaction is not per se necessary for the forgiveness of sins by God, yet it is supremely fitting.

Note. Satisfaction is not necessary simply and absolutely, since God could have forgiven sins without injustice. Yet there is some hypothetical necessity, insofar as God has willed a certain end. First, on the supposition that God requires condign satisfaction, there must be a satisfier of infinite dignity. Second, on the supposition that God requires a satisfaction strictly so called, there must be one who voluntarily suffers penal afflictions. Third, on the supposition that God wills that there be expiation before his vindictive justice, there must be penal afflictions offered to his vindictive justice.

Thesis VI

The penal defects were not contracted by Christ, but voluntarily assumed by him.

Note. Here we do not mean all penal defects, but only those which are compatible with his fullness of grace and knowledge, since “No one offers satisfaction to God by being deprived of grace, or by being ignorant of God, or by the fact that his soul is in a state of disorder, even though such afflictions are punishment for sin; man can satisfy only by enduring some pain in himself and by undergoing loss in external goods” (St. Thomas, Compendium theologiae I, c. 226).

Thesis VII

Christ did not suffer the pains of hell, the pains of the damned, or the sense of divine wrath toward him, because Christ satisfied for the reatus poenae by a penalty that is equivalent in value but not identical in kind, since the value of the satisfaction is from the dignity of the person and the charity of the offering, not necessarily from the species of the penalty.

Thesis VIII

Christ did not substitute for us insofar as the very reatus of guilt or punishment passed to him, but insofar as he was our head and voluntary surety. Therefore, we say that Christ was substituted for us insofar as Christ’s satisfaction is vicarious (and thus can be said to be “ours”).

Note 1. This substitution is explained at length by St. John Paul II in his General Audience of October 26, 1988.

Note 2. By the reatus of punishment we mean the liability to punishment which arises from one’s own guilt. We do not deny that Christ, as our surety, took upon himself the debt of satisfying for us and the penalties due to our sins.

Thesis IX

Christ made an act of propitiation toward God, which is rightly said to placate or appease his wrath; yet we ought not to say that the wrath of God fell on the Son. The relation of Christ and his passion to the wrath of God is ascending (i.e., from Christ to God), not descending (i.e., from God to Christ).

Note 1. It is for this reason that we say that Christ’s satisfaction was not an exercise of the vindictive justice of God toward Christ, but an act of commutative justice of Christ toward the vindictive justice of God. As an analogy, the action of a debtor toward a creditor is an exercise of commutative justice toward the creditor, while the action of a judge toward the debtor who does not pay is an act of vindictive justice. Christ acted the part of the debtor as our voluntary surety.

Note 2. While we deny that the wrath of God fell on the Son as on its object, as though God were angry with Christ or punished him as one guilty, the decree, the command, and the delivering up to the passion do descend from God in his justice. This explains how we can speak of God as “judge” in a certain sense, insofar as (a) Christ offered his satisfaction to God’s vindictive justice, and (b) God’s concurrence was exercised through the attribute of justice.

Thesis X

Christ’s satisfaction was of itself, and not by extrinsic acceptation, a condign satisfaction according to the whole rigor of divine justice; therefore, through the passion of Christ, God’s justice was truly satisfied and not waived.

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1. First schema in Mansi 50, cols. 69-70; clarifications are made in an adnotatio (note 33) in cols. 106-107: “Vicarious satisfaction is declared, namely one rendered in our place. Christ the immaculate Lamb certainly did not take upon himself, nor could he, our sins themselves formally, so that they should be his; nor therefore was the man Christ punished in that sense in which punishment properly signifies an evil inflicted on the guilty in vengeance of a fault contracted by him. But Christ himself, by his human will also, made himself surety before God to satisfy the offended God for the fault and punishment of the whole human race. If then by the name of punishment is signified a laborious satisfaction for the offenses of men, whose head and surety Christ was constituted, he certainly bore punishments for us and in our stead. In this sense in almost innumerable places of holy Scripture God is said to have laid on Christ our sins and iniquities, and to have made him sin, i.e. a victim for expiating sin. Because the genuine concept of satisfaction and redemption is perverted not only by wholly impious men but also by some out of ignorance, the same dare to affirm that according to the notion of vicarious satisfaction an innocent is punished for the guilty against justice. Against such errors, then, an explanation of the doctrine is necessary, by which all Catholic faithful profess that this very act, by which God delivered his Son for us, is no less of infinite justice than of infinite mercy toward us, in which all God’s other mercies toward the fallen human race are founded, and on which they depend.” The reformed schema is given in Mansi 53, cols. 171–176. It is to be noted that the first schema already said that Christ “truly satisfied for us” (vere pro nobis satisfecisse; Mansi 50, col. 70), and that when the reformed schema was laid before the Deputation on Faith, the insertion of “truly and properly” (vere ac proprie) was requested on 17 March 1870, the formula then adopted by the Deputation for its draft canon, which was never put to the Council, being vere et proprie satisfecisse (Mansi 53, cols. 204, 228, 237).