On Thomism, Calvinism, and the Freedom of the Will
Some Notes
Yesterday, I posted a brief note on Calvinism and Thomism. The article briefly laid out a difference given by Reformed and Catholic authors alike between various types of freedom and how each respective side would articulate their view of sin and grace in relation to these various types of freedom.
In this article, I want to explain these distinctions in a bit more detail. Before we begin, it is important to note that this discussion is about what is sufficient for the concepts of merit and demerit for man in a state of fallen nature. The question we are asking is NOT whether there are cases where men have greater or lesser degrees of liberty. Rather, the question we are asking concerns how grace affects the will as to merit and how the fall affects the will as to sin.
Keep in mind as a principle that we speak of some act as free insofar as that act lacks some degree of necessity. Also note that necessity differs from infallibility insofar as necessity denotes the potency of dissenting (i.e., indifference), whereas infallibility denotes the certainty of the outcome. The former denotes the mode whereby something is done; the latter denotes the certainty with which it is done. To give an analogy, the human authors of Sacred Scripture act in such a way as to infallibly record the inspirations of the Holy Spirit, yet they do so in a manner that is free.
From this, we speak of two kinds of freedom broadly: libertas a coactione and libertas a necessitate. Each one of these removes a different form of necessity.
The former—called liberty from coercion—refers to freedom from external constraint. Hence, for example, if someone is forced to stab another person, they lack libertas a coactione. Now, we can also state this positively as well. While there is no extrinsic principle necessitating such and such an action, this does not deny that there is an intrinsic principle necessitating such and such an action. Hence, for example, a man with the beatific vision has no extrinsic principle necessitating that he love God, yet he DOES have an intrinsic principle necessitating his love for God. To put the negative libertas a coactione in a positive form, we call it a libertas spontaneitatis, i.e., a freedom of spontaneity. Hence, it is something that flows forth necessarily and spontaneously from our natures. Now, to affirm an intrinsic principle necessitating such and such an action is to make a certain denial, i.e., the denial of a proximate potency of dissenting. Even animals have this sort of freedom, explicable in purely mechanical terms, of a certain nature (e.g., the nature of a dog) combined with certain circumstances (e.g., hunger, a good), resulting in the spontaneous action of the beast towards what its nature tends (e.g., eating). There is no indifference here rooted in judgement between finite goods, but only the internal compulsion of nature.
The latter—called liberty from necessity—refers to freedom from both external and internal constraint. The man in the beatific vision, constrained to love by the compulsion of his nature, lacks libertas a necessitate. He is not externally compelled by any force, but is internally compelled by the perfect good placed before him. On earth, the perfect good is not placed before his intellect; rather, his intellect discerns various partial goods that it proposes to his will. This judgement becomes the root of freedom in the man. The man possesses the proximate potency of dissenting. This is called the liberty of indifference, owing to the condition of the will of man towards what is to be willed. Whereas in the libertas spontaneitatis the nature of man is intrinsically fixed towards the object, the libertas a necessitate is called the libertas indifferentiae insofar as the will of man stands indifferent towards various partial goods.
There is a gulf of difference between these two states of freedom. The former is the freedom of the beatific vision, internally compelled to such and such an act. The latter is the freedom of those with infallibly efficacious graces, physically premoved in such a way as to maintain and establish the proximate potency for dissenting.
From this, we can better understand the condemnations of the Church on this matter. Jansen’s third proposition was condemned: “For merit and demerit, in the state of fallen nature, libertas a necessitate is not necessary for man; libertas a coactione is enough.” Here, it is important to recall what was said at the beginning of the article. The question is not about whether or not libertas spontaneitatis exists, but rather what form of liberty is sufficient for a meritorious or demeritorious act for man in a state of fallen nature.
This obviously has serious implications for our doctrine of grace and sin. The Jansenistic and Calvinistic doctrine (cf. Institutes of Elenctic Theology 10.3) held that there was a true libertas a coactione when acting meritoriously under the influence of grace or acting demeritoriously under the influence of original sin, but that there was not a true libertas a necessitate. Hence, they held that freedom was formally constituted by rational spontaneity rather than by indiffernce.