On the Sinfulness of Concupiscence

Some Theses

Note. ‘Concupiscence’ primarily signifies the motion of the soul towards some sensible good. Yet, in theological parlance, it has taken upon itself a certain unique significance.

α) First, we can abstract from the soul’s termination in a specifically sensible good and refer generally to the pleasure of possessing the good, whether the object or act be sensitive or not. This sense does not concern us here.

β) Second, ‘concupiscence’ can be taken either in a habitual sense or an actual sense. In a habitual sense, it refers to a certain disordered inclination of the soul towards sensible goods. Such habitual concupiscence is communicated from Adam to all his descendents and is the material part of original sin (whether proper or improper). Actual concupiscence refers to the disordered motions of the soul towards some sensible good from the sensible part of the soul. For the clarification of this:

γ) Third, actual concupiscence can be divided into first motions and second motions depending on their relation to the will. First motions are those motions of concupiscence that are antecedent to the will. Second motions are those motions of concupiscence that have their principle in the command of the will. The first are generally called “involuntary motions” and the second are called “voluntary motions.”

δ) Fourth, the first motions are distinguished into “first-first motions” (motus primo primi) and “second-first motions” (motus secundo-primi). This distinction is based on a simple fact. Certain motions are outside the scope of the will and hence are absolutely involuntary, e.g., motions of hunger, thirst, etc., due to having its origin in a natural principle. On the other hand, other motions do come under the indirect influence of the will and hence are voluntary in a sense, i.e., insofar as the will can control the sensible appetites so as to prevent these motions. I explain this in more detail here.

In De Malo, St. Thomas distinguishes between motions simply coming from the disposition of the body and motions coming from the exercise of the sense powers. In the first case, it is obvious that such “biological” motions are in no way voluntary, but are far removed from the powers of reason. Yet, in the second case, reason can exercise some influence over the motions that arise from their exercise. Hence, it enters the moral order (i.e., those acts in relation to the will):

Since sense perceptions affect sense appetites, and yet sense appetites are powers belonging to bodily organs, the movements of sense appetites can arise in two ways: in one way from the disposition of the body; in the second way from sense perception. And the disposition of the body is not subject to the command of reason, but every sense perception is subject to the command of reason. For reason can forbid the exercise of any power of sense perception, especially in the absence of something perceptible by touch, which sometimes cannot be removed. Therefore, since sin belongs to sense appetites insofar as they can obey reason, the first movements of sense appetites, which arise from the disposition of the body, are not sin, and some call these movements primo primum. And the second movements, which sense perceptions arouse, are sin. For reason cannot in any way avoid the first movements, and reason can avoid some but not all second movements, since reason, turning its attention from one thing, encounters another, from which an illicit movement can arise. (QDeMalo.Q7.A6.Rep8)

This is explained in more detail in St. Thomas’ Commentary on the Sentences where he distinguishes between natural and sensitive appetites:

A natural appetite, such as that for food, is one engendered not by the imagination, but by the very disposition of natural qualities by which natural powers carry out their actions. But this motion is not subject or obedient to reason in anything. Hence neither can there be sin in it, and so here it is not discussed. However, the sensitive appetite is that which follows from prior imagination or sensation. And this is called the ‘motion of sensuality.’ (Sent.II.D24.Q3.A1, cf. Rep2, QIV.Q11.A1)

Hence, sometimes authors distinguish between “the first motions of sensuality” and “natural motions,” the former of which are “always venial sins” and the later “without sin.” St. Thomas connects the two sets of terminology, which might be confusing:

All the first motions ascribed to sensuality, as the words of Augustine assert, are a sin. But the preceding motions, which we have called ‘natural’ above, which do not follow the imagination, but only the action of natural qualities, lack the ratio of sin, insofar as we can take as true the statement of those who say that motus primo primi are not a sin, but that motus secundo primi are a sin. In this case by primo primos motus we understand natural motions, and by secundo primos motus we understand motions of sensuality, in which sin can exist as in a subject. (Sent.II.D24.Q3.A2)

This becomes important in Christology in articulating the “blameless passions” present in the humanity of Christ. Further, this is important in Mariology as to the question of whether and how the fomes remain in the Blessed Virgin (cf., ST.III.Q27.A3, ST.III.Q27.A4.Rep1, Sent.III.D3.Q1.A2.qa1, Sent.III.D3.Ex, CT.BookI.C224-225, Jerem.C1.L3, as I explain in an old article here).

Second motions are called “directly voluntary.” Second-first motions are called “indirectly voluntary.” First-first motions are called “involuntary.”

It is important to note that the second-first motion in no way requires that there be consent on the part of the will, whether express or tacit. Rather, what is required is that the will in principle can act upon the faculty so as to resist the inordinate motion and omits the obligation:

In is not said to be in sensuality on account of reason’s interpretative consent. For when the motion of sensuality precedes reason’s judgment, there is neither an interpreted consent nor an expressed consent; but from the fact that sensuality can be subject to reason, its own act, even if it precedes reason, has the notion of sin. (QDeVer.Q25.A5.Rep5)

Hence, as we shall see, we ought to call such motions sins of omission (cf., Sent.II.D24.Q3.A2.Rep2 and other places below).

First Thesis. Inordinate second motions of concupiscence are sinful.

The reason for this is clear and quite easy to understand. A second motion of concupiscence is a motion of concupiscence that is brought about through the commanding power of the will. In this way, the lower faculties act as the instruments of reason and participate in the character of the act of the will. Hence, if the command of the will is inordinate, then the motion participates in this disorder as a voluntary act, taking upon itself the character of sinfulness found in the act of the will. For more, cf. ST.I-II.Q74.A4, QDeMalo.Q7.A6, etc.

Second Thesis. Inordinate second-first motions of concupiscence are sinful.

The reason for this is less clear and requires more explanation. Here, the distinction between second-first motions and first-first motions is important. After the fall, we are subject to the habitual disorder of concupiscence. This disorder of sensuality continues to remain in act even after regeneration and continually maintains habitual dispositions that provide the internal occasion for sinful acts, like any other vice of the moral order. Now, if such motions were completely and simply involuntary, clearly they would lack the notion of sin. Yet, such is not the case. Natural motions and motions of sensuality are distinguished insofar as the will has no control over the former motions, but there is a certain control over the latter and hence a corresponding obligation:

An act of the natural appetite is not subject to the command of reason, just as neither an act of the other potencies of the vegetative soul, and for this reason, fault cannot consist in an act of such an appetite, just as there is not fault in man’s hunger or thirst…But an act of the sensitive appetite is subject to the command of reason because reason coming before it can command it or even impede it, and thus such a motion can already have the character of fault. (QIV.Q11.A1)

The wills of the regenerate are able to prevent these inordinate motions by grace, although even the unregenerate have the physcial potency (strictly speaking) to prevent individual motions. Hence, we are able to individually prevent each inordinate motion and have an obligation to prevent such inordinate motions (‘thou shalt not covet’). Therefore, even while such motions are not motions that proceed from the command of the will, they are still somewhat voluntary insofar as there is an ability and obligation to prevent these motions of concupiscence flowing from the habitual disorder of the fomes: “movements of sense appetites are venial sins because the will can prevent them.” (QDeMalo.Q7.A6.Rep2) In this way, they are sins of omission. This process is described by the Angelic Doctor in a number of different places (ST.II-II.Q158.A2.Rep3, QDeMalo.Q7.A6.Rep8, Sent.II.D24.Q3.A2.Rep4, QIV.Q11.A1.RepSC2, etc.):

This corruption of the fomes does not hinder man from using his rational will to check individual inordinate movements, if he be presentient to them, for instance by turning his thoughts to other things. Yet while he is turning his thoughts to something else, an inordinate movement may arise about this also: thus when a man, in order to avoid the movements of concupiscence, turns his thoughts away from carnal pleasures, to the considerations of science, sometimes an unpremeditated movement of vainglory will arise. Consequently, a man cannot avoid all such movements, on account of the aforesaid corruption: but it is enough, for the conditions of a voluntary sin, that he be able to avoid each single one. (ST.I-II.Q74.A3.Rep2)

It is important to remember, as pointed out in the controversy over the fomes peccati in the Blessed Virgin mentioned above, that these motions must be inordinate (i.e., contra legem). For these motions to be praeter legem is not sufficient to be sinful.

Third Thesis. Inordinate second motions of concupiscence are either mortal or venial sins, inordinate second-first motions are only venial sins.

From the first thesis, it is clear that second motions of concupiscence simply participate in the full character of the act of the will. Hence, they will be either be virtuous or vicious insofar as the will commanding them is virtuous or vicious. It is for this reason that we can speak of acts of sensuality that are mortal sins (I say to you that every one who looks at a woman lustfully has already committed adultery with her in his heart). For more detail, cf. ST.I-II.Q74.A4.Rep1, QDeMalo.Q7.A6, QDeVer.Q25.A5.Rep1-2, Rep11-12, etc.

On the other hand, second-first motions are something imperfect in the genus of morals insofar as it does not involve the full advertance of reason. It is for this reason that they are (at most) venial sins:

Man does not do perfectly himself what he does without the deliberation of reason, since the principal part of man does nothing therein: wherefore such is not perfectly a human act; and consequently it cannot be a perfect act of virtue or of sin, but is something imperfect of that kind. Therefore such movement of the sensuality as forestalls the reason, is a venial sin, which is something imperfect in the genus of sin. (ST.I-II.Q74.A3.Rep3)

St. Thomas argues similarly in QDeVer.Q25.A5 and other places.

This is clear when we consider what a mortal sin is in the proper sense. A mortal sin turns the creature away from God as its last end. Now, the sense faculties consider only sensible objects in the termination of its own proper motion (cf. Sent.II.D24.Q3.A2.Rep3). Hence, whereas reason can terminate in God deliberately as the last end, the sense faculties can only be subordinated to such an end by the order of reason (which only occurs by second motions of concupiscence, unless we consider second-first motions as consented to in certain cases). Hence, the sense faculties can only participate in the character of merit or mortal sin by the ordering of reason, whether in acting toward the end or in abolishing the end. Yet, sense faculties can order toward the created object that is sensed. Now, this has the character of venial sin and in no way excludes ordination to the last end per se. Hence, even those motions of concupiscence that precede reason can have the character of venial sin. It is in this way that St. Thomas argues in De Malo:

Mortal sin consists of turning away from the ultimate end ordained by reason, and sense appetites cannot reach so far…And when reason commands movements of sense appetites, as is evidently the case regarding one who wills to lust for something mortally sinful, such movements are mortal sins, but we attribute them to reason commanding them, not to the sense appetites. (QDeMalo.Q7.A6)

This is also something that applies for infidels as well (QIV.Q11.A2, Rom.C8.L1.n597f, etc.).

Fourth Thesis. Inordinate second-first motions are ‘venial’ as to its genus, yet can be described as ‘mortal’ under a different aspect, i.e., insofar as it is punished by eternal condemnation in the reprobate.

I already explained this in detail here.

Fifth Thesis. When we resists the first motions of concupiscence by grace, there is merit.

Not only is reason related to motions of concupiscence as commanding (second motions) or as permitting (second-first motions), but it can also resist such motions by the power of grace:

When an illicit movement belongs to a sense appetite, reason can be related to it in three ways. Reason can be related to the illicit movement of a sense appetite in one way as resisting the movement, and then there is the merit of reward and no sin. And reason is sometimes related to the illicit movement as commanding it. For example, when one deliberately arouses the movement, there will be mortal sin if the illicit object belongs to the genus of mortal sin. And reason is sometimes related to the illicit movement as neither prohibiting it nor commanding, but consenting to it, and then there is venial sin. (QDeMalo.Q7.A6.Rep6)

Hence, the difference between merit and venial sin is found in whether the motion has been resisted or has not been resisted, as has been described so often above:

It has incomplete dominion in those acts which do not proceed by the command of reason, though the will could have impeded them, so that in this way, they are subject to the will in a certain way, as regards the acts’ being impeded or not being impeded. (Sent.II.D24.Q3.A2)

Yet, as was covered above, we cannot resist all of these motions. Hence, we constantly must seek forgiveness of our sins and beg for help to have the graces to resist such sins.

Sixth Thesis. The first-second motions are damnable in the infidels due to their annexation with the guilt due to original sin, yet are not mortal sins.

Here, it is helpful to apply the distinctions that were necessary in the fourth thesis. It is one thing for something to bring about some effect in virtue of its own power and quite another thing to simply participate in some effect due to an annexation with it (e.g., human acts merit supernatural beatitude due to their annexation with the motion of the Holy Spirit, ST.I-II.Q114.A3). Venial sins in the reprobate do not, by their own power, bring about eternal punishment, yet they are said to be punished with eternal punishment in the reprobate. In a similar way, first-second motions of concupiscence are not said to bring about eternal punishment by their own proper power, but they are punished with eternal punishment due to its union with the guilt of original sin in the reprobate. It is in this way that St. Thomas interprets the Augustinian formula that concupiscence is dissolved in its guilt, but continues in its act for the regenerate. St. Thomas writes,

If this passage refers to first movements experienced by those not in Christ Jesus, such stirrings are damnable according to the condemnation due to original sin, which still remains in them and from which those in Christ Jesus have been freed. But this does not mean that a new condemnation is added on account of such stirrings. (Rom.C8.L1.n599.3)

It is important to note that this damnability is not a damnability as to actual mortal sin, but a damnability as to original sin. It receives the damnability of its habit rather than a new damnability on account of the motion:

An act proceeding from such a habit does not have a new reason for condemnation added to the reason for condemning the habit. Accordingly, the first motions in unbelievers, inasmuch as they proceed from original sin, do not receive the condemnation due to mortal sin but only to original sin. (Rom.C8.L1.n599.4)

Further, this condemnation/damnability is not considered as united to itself and to its own act (otherwise, how would the just have first-second motions that are not damnable?), but as to the fact that its principle is in original sin with the attached guilt annexed to it:

In another way, we are able to consider [first motions of concupiscence] according to their principle, which is original sin; and in this mode they are not able to have more of the ratio of sin than original sin has, because an effect, as such, cannot be greater than its cause. However, original sin in the infidel remains both secundum culpam and secundum poenam; in the faithful, however, it remains secundum poenam, but is taken away as to culpam…For this reason, these motions of sensuality in the faithful are indeed venial sins insofar as they are personal acts; but insofar as they arise from original [sin], they do not pertain to damnationem culpabilem, but only to a certain poenalitatem. In the infidel, however, insofar as they are personal acts, they are likewise venial sins; but insofar as they are derived from original sin, they have something of damnationis culpabilis, not according to the ratio of an actual mortal sin, but according to the ratio of the damnation which belongs to original sin. (QDeMalo.Q7.A8)

It is for this reason that Thomists hold that second-first motions in the infidel are punished with both eternal punishment of loss (insofar as it proceeds from original sin) and eternal punishment of sense (insofar as it is an actual sin that is not remitted before death). An example of this can be found in Mariales’ commentary on De Malo.

It is in this way that we clearly understand the statements of the Holy Fathers that concupiscence is damnable in the unregenerate, but not damnable in the regenerate. For, in the regenerate, the damnable guilt due to concupiscence in not present insofar as the guilt due to original sin is not annexed to it. Yet, in the unregenerate, the damnable due to concupiscence is present insofar as the guilt due to original sin is present as annexed to it.

As Mariales states in his commentary on QDeMalo.Q7.A8,

Although they assert that infidels are damned on account of the movements of sensuality [i.e., second-first motions] (even those not consented to), nevertheless they do not say that damnation comes to them on account of the movements of sensuality taken precisely in themselves…Rather, they intend that it comes on account of those movements insofar as they are rooted in original sin (not remitted by Baptism). That is to say, the Fathers hold that unbelievers are damned on account of the original guilt (culpa) annexed to them [second-first motions]. (cf., QIV.Q11.A2.Rep1)

How this avoids the doctrine of Baius is explained well by Fr. Pedro Lumbreras, O.P. (the author of the 24 Thomistic Theses) in De Sensualitatis Peccato, Commentarium in Iam IIae, q. 74, aa. 3 et 4 and by Scheeben in the Book 4 of his Handbook, along commonly with Thomists on ST.I-II.Q89.A5. This is also explained by moralists, e.g., McHugh and Callan, Moral Theology, n. 129.

Lumbreras explains the difference as Baius’ proposition rejecting the fifth proposition,

These propositions, however, were condemned, and our thesis appears close to them. But to one who considers carefully, there is no affinity between our proposition and the Baian propositions. For Baius speaks of desires or movements of concupiscence which man suffers unwillingly. We, however, speak of desires or movements of concupiscence which man, though able to restrain them, nevertheless does not restrain, and therefore does not suffer unwillingly.