On the Infallibility of the Disciplinary Laws of the Church

A Scholastic Treatment

“In what pertains to the substance and morality of a law which the Roman Pontiff commonly proposes as a rule of morals to be followed, it would be heresy to assert that the Church can err, so as to permit or command something harmful, or contrary to good morals, or to natural or divine law.” (John of St. Thomas, Tract. de auctor. Summi Pontif., disp. III, art. 3)

Introduction

Lately, I have been getting quite a few questions about the nature of the infallibility of the disciplinary (and liturgical) decrees of the Church. Many of surprised to learn that it is Catholic doctrine that the Church not only can teach the “primary object” of Revelation infallibly, but also can and does present certain “secondary objects” of Revelation with infallibly, usually enumerated by the theologians as “theological conclusions,” “dogmatic facts,” “disciplinary decrees,” “the constitutions of religious orders,” and “the canonization of saints.”

While many are aware of the endless quarreling between individuals over the infallibility of canonizations (cf., my video here), the other areas in which the Church claims infallibility are largely unexplored in our circles. Notoriously, these other objects of infallibility are quite unknown outside of those with a unique interest in ecclesiology. For example, I distinctly remember many conversations with Protestant and Catholic students of theology who are genuinely shocked when I tell them about the infallibility of dogmatic facts.

The recent questions (and quarrels) about the secondary objects of infallibility concern the infallibility of disciplinary decrees, which is quite easily misunderstood. I do not wish to “jump in the fray” of such debates. Perhaps it is far better to write something that can be of use beyond the limited circumstances of these debates. Beyond this, in imitation of our devout fathers in the faith, during this holy season of Lent, we ought to rightly observe “God’s truce,” keeping a serenity incompatible with public disputation. Absent a more explicit and concrete treatment of the issue and the refutation of specific arguments of those who oppose the Church, I trust that sanctified reason saturated by prayers for the Divine Light will guide you in applying these principles.

Question I. What is a Secondary Object of Infallibility?

Answer. A secondary object of infallibility refers to those objects presented by the Church that are not infallible for their own sake (primarily and directly), but for the sake of something else (secondarily and indirectly). These are the so-called “second paragraph” truths of the professio fidei. In the 1983 Code, there were originally no corresponding canons that related truths of this nature. Yet, this lacuna was resolved by St. John Paul II in his Apostolic Constitution Ad tuendam fidem, which expanded CIC 750 and 1371 (with corresponding changes to the Eastern Code of Canon Law). The CDF explained in more detail the issue in the Doctrinal Commentary on the Concluding Formula of the Professio fidei that accompanied the changes.

Generally, the relevant magisterial texts will refer to those “historically or logically” connected with the deposit of faith. Hence, these objects are not, in themselves, necessary as the primary objects are, but are necessary due to their connection with something else. Hence, for example, the primacy of the Roman Pontiff is something that is a primary object of infallibility. As a matter of faith, it can be said to be necessary to adhere to for its own sake. Yet, what good would be adherence to the primacy of the Roman Pontiff if we did not know who the Roman Pontiff is? Hence, the personal identity of the Roman Pontiff is not necessary for its own sake (directly and primarily), but for the sake of upholding something that is a matter of faith (i.e., the primacy of the Roman Pontiff).

These must be general facts necessary for upholding some primary object. Hence, whether this eucharist is valid or that pastor has legally acquired jurisdiction are not general facts necessary for upholding some primary object. Thus, these are quite obviously fallible. On the other hand, due to the universal necessity of adhering to the Roman Pontiff (or some Ecuemnical Council), there is a strict and universal necessity in that identity in order to uphold the primary object. It suffices for me to have general moral certitude of things like the validity of the sacraments I am receiving, but infallibility is required for the identity of the Roman Pontiff. Hence, while both are “secondary objects” insofar as it bears some relation to the deposit of faith, only the one consists of secondary objects of infallibility insofar as it is general rather than particular. (For more about this, cf. Fr. Francisco Marin-Sola’s Homogeneous Evolution of Catholic Dogma, Ch. V, Sec. 3).

Hence, we can make a three-fold distinction, primary objects, secondary objects, and non-objects. The first can always be judged by the Church in an infallible manner. The second can always be judged by the Church (e.g., the Church can investigate and judge whether this priest has been validly ordained), but only infallibly when it has some general bearing (e.g., the Church can infallibly judge whether such and such a sacramental form in this priest’s ordination is valid). The third does not fall within the scope of the Church’s judgement. Hence, Ven. Pius XII teaches that such an object “that neither directly nor indirectly touches faith or morals…the Church leaves to the free discussion of experts.” (Humani generis, n. 30)

Salaverri distinguishes secondary objects into three kinds: “A. Speculative truths logically connected either consequently [i.e., theological conclusions] or in a presupposed way with the revealed truths [i.e., preambles of faith]; B. Dogmatic facts whether simply such [e.g., the Council of Trent] or especially doctrinal [e.g., the heresy of Jasenius’ propositions]; C. Dispositive decrees about discipline in general, and in particular on the canonization of Saints and on the approbation of religious Orders, which are said to be connected with revealed truths in a purposeful way, because they help very much to obtain the end of revelation which is the sanctification of souls.” (Sacrae Theologiae Summa, De Ecclesia, n. 700)

Here, we treat those of the third category. These dispositive decrees are either general dispositive decrees (e.g., the Breviary, the Code of Canon Law, etc.), the canonization of saints, or the approbation of Religious Orders. It is important to note the reason or foundation for this infallibility since this will restrict the scope of the infallibility by the principle that the necessity of the end restricts the necessity of the means. Since the end of such dispositive decrees is “the sanctification of souls,” the restriction of the means will follow suit, as I will explain below. This is quite distinct from the infallibility that we consider in speculative truths or dogmatic facts, which has the truth of the matter as its object.

Question II. What is a Disciplinary Decree?

Answer. A disciplinary decree is a precept that is given by the Church intended to direct the life of the faithful. These can either be universal or particular depending on either the authority who promulgates such a decree or those persons for whom the decree is intended. Further, such decrees can either be positive, as issuing a command, or negative, as giving a certain permission.

First, a decree can be positive and universal. Such are commands issued for the universal Church that directs the faithful in general to order their lives in such a way. An example of such a universal positive decree is the canonizations of saints for the universal Church. Further examples would the editio typica of the various different liturgical books of the Church and the Code of Canon Law.

NOTE: It is important to note here a distinction that will come up later. As to the universality, we are also adding a certain supremacy. It is not enough for an authority that is universal to issue some decree (e.g., a Roman Congregation), but also that the authority be supreme both in agent (the Roman Pontiff or Ecumenical Council) and in a supreme mode (as a command with the relevant promises and penalties). In many cases, certain acts are understood as universal due to one or another factor, yet not in its full sense.

Second, a decree can be positive and particular. Such are commands issued either by the universal Church intended only for a particular part of the faithful or by a certain particular authority in the Church for his part of the Church. An example of the former is the old form of canonizations by the Pope for particular areas of the Church (e.g., the canonization of St. Simon of Trent for the diocese of Trent, Bl. Charlemagne for the diocese of Aachen, etc.) and of the latter is the current practice of the declaration of a servant of God by the Bishop of a diocese or a penitential day approved by an episcopal conference or ordinary. As to liturgical books, an example of the former would be translations of the official liturgical books promulgated by the universal Church, which are approved by Rome, yet only intended for a particular portion of the faithful. An example of the latter would be a certain devotional work written by a Bishop or Episcopal conference for use in ecclesiastical functions.

Third, a decree can be negative and universal. Such commands are not, properly speaking, commands, but only give permission for a certain practice to exist in the universal Church. Properly speaking, this is the nature of beatifications which allow for the veneration of such a saint in the universal Church without commanding the act of veneration (which formally constitutes canonization, according to Pope Benedict XIV, cf. Pesch, Praelectiones Dogmaticae, Tom. I, Pt. II, n. 547). Here, it seems to me one could place the various liturgical practices officially permitted for the universal Church which are not commanded by the Church (e.g., communion on the hand, altar girls, Fiducia supplicans, etc.). It is important to remember that the official permission given for these acts are to be distinguished from any tacit permission or toleration that may arise.

It seems like there is a strong connection as to the second and third categories of decrees. This is evidenced, for example, by Benedict XIV’s comment that the “old form” of particular canonizations (referring to St. Simon of Trent) is equivalent juridically to a beatification (as, consequently, permitting such for the universal Church under the proper conditions).

Fourth, a decree can be negative and particular. These are permissions either given by the Holy See for a particular area of the Church or by a particular authority for his area of competence. Examples of these would include the various different fasting indults given by either the universal authority or by particular authorities.

The material division of such decrees are given by Salaverri: “Disciplinary decrees in general are: either a) juridical, which are ordained to determine, enforce and vindicate the rights and offices of the faithful; or b) liturgical, which are prescribed to order divine worship and the administration of holy things; or c) magisterial, which are disposed to promote ecclesiastical instruction and to moderate the preaching of evangelical doctrine.” (ibid., n. 704)

Most theologians only give a material distinction between juridical and liturgical decrees (cf., the many theologians below).

Question III. How are these Protected by the Holy Spirit?

Answer. Infallibility refers to a certain incapability to err. Now, when we usually use the term, we are referring particularly to the inability to to err in the truth of something. When we say “the hypostatic union is an infallible dogma,” we mean that it is a truth of faith that is infallibly true. Do we mean the same thing when speaking about the infallibility of disciplinary decrees? Not exactly. We are referring to its inability to err for its particular end. As we saw above, the end of a disciplinary decree is the sanctification of souls. Hence, the infallibility of disciplinary decrees is particularly an ability to provide those means that objectively lack what is ordinarily necessary for the sanctification of souls and to avoid those mean that objectively contradict those means necessary for the sanctification of souls.

NOTE: Admittedly, most theologians simply reiterate the latter kind of infallibility (of a negative sort) and only mention the former kind of infallibility (of a positive kind) in passing.

To better understand this teaching, it is helpful to give a three-fold distinction between infallibility as to the end, objective infallibility as to safety, and subjective infallibility as to safety.

When we refer to “safety” we are speaking of something positive rather than something simply negative. For something to be “unsafe” is to provide harmful means to some end. If I do not give the proper directions to the grocery store, I am simply lacking the means to the end, I am providing a simple negation. If I give directions to the store that goes over a mountain pass that could easily kill the passenger, I am adding something positive that is incompatible with the end.

Hence, when we specifically speak of the infallibility of disciplinary decrees, we are referring to the infallibility of the end, i.e., that such disciplinary decrees provide those means necessary for the end of ordinary sanctity and, consequently, lack those means objectively contrary to the end. It is important to remember that there are disciplinary decrees that specify the end further, e.g., the approval of religious orders goes beyond ordinarity sanctity, approving that their rules are also apt for perfection, “the way of living according to a certain Rule is commended as apt to acquire perfection according to the evangelical counsels.” (Salaverri, ibid., n. 706) On the other hand, when we speak of infallible safety, we neither affirm nor deny that such means are there, but at least exclude those means which work against the end intended by the decree. The former includes the latter, but not vice versa.

Further, we can distinguish between that safety which is objective and that safety which is subjective. For something to be objectively safe is for that thing to be free from dangers positively excluding the end, abstracted from considerations of conscience. For something to be subjectively safe is for that thing to be free from those dangers positively excluding the end when considered in union with the rules of conscience.

Here, we must be especially careful to consider this question in accordance with the objective laws of conscience in mind and with that which is clear and certain from the teaching of the Church.

First Conclusion. It is certain that the infallibility as to the end must be affirmed for positive and universal disciplinary decrees.

This first conclusion is the primary object of this article. When the theologians speak of the “infallibility of disciplinary decrees,” they do not refer to any disciplinary decree whatsoever, nor any disciplinary decree that comes from the Holy See, nor any positive disciplinary decree that comes from the Holy See whatsoever. Rather, the theologians refer specifically to those disciplinary decrees that are both positive and universal, such as the editio typica of the liturgical books promulgated and approved for the use of the entire Church.

Further, they do not mean any infallibility whatsoever, but only the infallibility as to the end intended, i.e., that the means sufficient for the end will be present in such liturgical books.

Further, the establishment of such decrees are formally an act of the power of ruling, although it supposes the power of teaching insofar as the disciplinary decrees are commands to do certain acts that touch faith or morals. Hence, following this, Salaverri teaches that these decrees must both be licit (neither conta legem, nor praeter legem, but positively iuxta legem, i.e., in St. Thomas’ classification, neither against the law of a higher power, nor outside the scope of their power, but within their power) and free from errors against faith or morals: “a) the Church has the power to prescribe all of them, b) that the observation of the universal precepts of the Church is in harmony with the doctrine of faith and morals and suitable for obtaining the end of the Church.” (ibid., n. 703)

Lastly, as pointed out by Schultes and Dorsch, we speak of the law substantially, rather than modally. Hence, Schultes lists the accommodation of the law to circumstances, the proportion of penalties, the application of the law, and the execution of the law as modal properties (cf., below). Dorsch also lists the factual presuppositions in making the law (e.g., whether there needs to be a reform of such and such a law, whether such crimes are actually occuring, etc.)

The theologians commonly prove this thesis with two arguments, a priori from theological principles and a posteriori that the Church has actually claimed such a prerogative for herself.

First Argument. “The end of the infallible Magisterium demands those things that are necessary in order to obtain the end for the life of the faithful in the Church without error. But in order to obtain the end for the life of the faithful in the Church without error, infallibility concerning the disciplinary decrees purposefully connected with the truths of revelation is necessary. Therefore, the end of the infallible Magisterium demands infallibility concerning the disciplinary decrees in general, which are purposefully connected with revealed truths.” (ibid., n. 722)

Second Argument. The magisterium has claimed such infallibility in a number of different cases.

Generally, Pius VI in Auctorum fidei, condemning the errors of the Synod of Pistoia, writes the following: “The prescription of the synod…includes and submits to a prescribed examination even the discipline established and approved by the Church, as if the Church which is ruled by the Spirit of God could have established discipline which is not only useless and burdensome for Christian liberty to endure, but which is even dangerous and harmful and leading to superstition and materialism,—false, rash, scandalous, dangerous, offensive to pious ears, injurious to the Church and to the Spirit of God by whom it is guided, at least erroneous.” (D 2678)

Particularly, we have the condemnation of the Greeks against inclusion of the Filioque in the Creed (D 691), the condemnations of the Hussites (D 1200, 1258) and Protestants (D 1728-1732) against communion in one kind, and the various different decrees of Trent on the rites and ceremonies of the mass (D 1613, 1645, 1657, 1745, 1746, 1757).

Although, this can be easily demonstrated unto the age of the Fathers by simply pointing to the numerous cases (Infant Baptism, Purgatory, etc.) where the universal discipline of the Church was used to demonstrate the truth of a matter of faith.

Objection. Were there not errors in the Roman Breviary?

Reply. With Benedict XVI (De servorum Dei beatificatione et beatorum canonizatione, lib. IV, part II, cap. XIII, nn. 7–8) and Benedict XIII (Dissertatio de Reliquiis S. Bartholomaei, art. VII), I reply by distinguishing, errors of fact, conceded, errors of faith or morals, denied.

Although, from this, it is not to be concluded that the Roman Breviary lacks all authority in such matters. As Benedict XIII relates, “the Roman Breviary is indeed of the greatest authority in those things which of themselves pertain to ecclesiastical worship; yet it is of lesser authority in private facts or deeds which are reported incidentally in the lives of the saints, so that no efficacious argument can be drawn from them, especially where more ancient monuments are opposed. For the Church itself, which uses them, does not judge whatever is inserted in its Breviaries to be of unshaken and infallible truth, since many times it has changed and corrected them for various times and occasions.” (ibid.)

For supposed errors concerning the application of Extreme Unction and the “rigorism” of the penitential system, cf. Straub, De Ecclesia Christi, vol. 2, th. 25, cor. 1-2

Second Conclusion. It is certain that subjective infallibility of safety must be affirmed for all positive disciplinary decrees, whether universal or particular, in accordance with the laws of conscience.

In order to properly understand this conclusion, it is important to remember the laws of conscience. It is safe to follow authority when one does not have a perception of the objective discordance between the precept of the authority and the precept of some higher authority. Disciplinary laws must follow these laws as well, at least providing for subjective safety when there is no discordance pressing the conscience.

Such is confirmed by the common opinion of moralists and formulated in two principles.

First, we ought to obey all those commands “in which no species of sin can be judged to be present.” (St. Ignatius of Loyola, Constitutions)

NOTE: It is important to remember that one is not obligated to obey in those indifferent matters (praeter legem) where the power of the prelate does not extend, even while obedience is the safer option. St. Thomas teaches this in many places, “the subject is neither bound to obey nor bound not to obey,” (Sent.II.D44.Q2.A2) “a subject is not bound to obey his superior if the latter command him to do something wherein he is not subject to him.” (ST.II-II.Q104.A5)

Second, that even when obedience to such commands (i.e., those commands where we do not judge sin to be present since “we must obey God rather than men” Acts 5:29 and “the dictate of conscience binds more than the precept of a prelate” Sent.II.D39.Q3.A3.Rep3) involves sins in the objective order, obedience frees us from incurring sin in the subjective order. Hence the principle of Bl. Denys that “in dubiis, an sit contra Præceptum Dei, standum est præcepto prælati; quia, etsi contra Deum, attamen propter obedientise bonum non peccat subditus.” (In 2 Sent., d. 39, q. 3)

As Bl. Denys the Carthusian (ibid.) and St. Alphonsus Liguori (Theologia Moralis, bk. I, tr. I, ch. I, n. 12-13) extensively prove, this is the common teaching of the saints and theologians.

Objection. It seems odd to refer to such a principle as in any way “infallible” since in the thesis and explanation it is clearly admitted that there is a possibility of error.

Reply. It is conceded that such language is less proper. It can only be said to be infallible sub conditione, i.e., if sin is not perceived by the conscience of the one acting. Yet, despite how unclear the language may be, it is the terminology commonly used, thus it is used by accommodation.

Third Conclusion. It seems that it could only be probable that objective infallibility of safety could be affirmed for universal negative disciplinary decrees, yet it seems more likely that such is absent.

Here, it is very easy to confuse the objective infallibility of safety claimed for doctrinal judgements by certain theologians with an objective infallibility of safety for negative disciplinary decrees. Yet, there is a lack of parity between the two.

Negative disciplinary decrees can be motivated by two reasons. First, certain negative disciplinary decrees tolerate errors. Second, other negative disciplinary decrees are meant to also give a quasi-positive judgement that there is a freedom from error.

As to the former, it is obviously impossible to claim any sort of objective infallibility of safety since the very object of the disciplinary decree is to tolerate an error so that greater evils do not arise (as, e.g., a Catholic state may tolerate a certain false religion due to the evils which may arise from the removal of the religion).

As to the latter, it is possible to claim some charism that frees the Church from erring in her quasi-positive judgement that declares such disciplines free from errors against faith or morals. Yet, it seems more appropriate to treat whether or not such a charism exists when treating the doctrinal judgements of the Church since such judgements seem formally doctrinal.

Fourth Conclusion. It is certain that objective infallibility of safety is absent from particular negative disciplinary decrees.

If what is said in the third conclusion is kept in mind, then the fourth conclusion follows clearly and obviously. While it is possible (and some say probable) that there is some sort of charism defending the quasi-positive non-supreme judgements of a universal nature, such a charism has never been claimed for particular decrees and can with certainty be judged as absent.

This should be clear from a number of different examples, e.g., the almost infinite number of books given a nihil obstat or imprimatur, many of which contradict each other in the doctrine taught, both of which obviously could not be true. Or, the number of different local disciplines eventually condemned by the Church. Etc.

Scholium. On the Prudence of Universal and Positive Disciplinary Decrees

In order to avoid confusion, it is necessary to add a caveat that many students of ecclesiology may miss at first, although this will be mentioned at length in the quotes below.

While it is true that the doctrinal judgement connected with certain disciplinary decrees is infallible, it is not true that the prudential judgement connected with disciplinary decrees is infallible. The former considers the substance of the law and the latter considers the modal properties of the law. As an example from recent Papal news, if Alejandro Labaka is canonized, it would obviously be an abominable act, giving scandal to the faithful by his shameless behavior, yet as a doctrinal judgement, declaring that such and such a man is in heaven, it would be correct. As Salaverri states in relation to religious orders, “the concern is with a doctrinal judgment, whereby it is decreed: that such a way of living, looked at in itself, is suitable for acquiring evangelical perfection, and that this judgment cannot be wrong. It is not a question of a prudential judgment, concerning the opportunity or convenience, because of the extrinsic circumstances of admitting or permitting some Religious Order…” (ibid., n. 728)

Note that this is proportional with the end of each judgement, so that you do not misunderstand this quote. The end is the “cause of causes” and determines the substance of the precept. The canonization declares infallibly that such a saint is in heaven, and then worthy of our veneration (although, there are various secondary objects, which ought to be treated in another place). The approval of religious orders declares infallibly that such a rule is apt to acquire evangelical perfection. Disciplinary decrees in general are lawful acts that order the faithful to the profession of the true faith and the exercise of charity. The nature of the freedom from error is proportional to the primary end to which the act is ordered, while it may fail in certain secondary ends, such as its extrinsic suitability.

Excursus. Various Treatments by Theologians

Here, it is helpful to bring together the various different definitions given by theologians so that we can illuminate principles by authority. While I have followed Salaverri closely as a reference text widely known and easily accessible, other sources have not been lacking in my study of the issue.