On Public Debates on the Faith

The Traditional Scholastic Doctrine

cf., St. Thomas Aquinas, ST.II-II.Q10.A7, 2Tim.C2.L2.n59-62; Suarez, De Fide, Disp. XX, Sect. 1; Perrone, Praelectiones Theologicae, De Virtutibus Fidei, Spei, et Caritatis, Pars Prima, Cap. X, Art. 1; Gotti, Theologica Scholastico-Dogmatica, De Infidelitate, Questio Tertia, Dubium Primum

Introduction

For many moderns, the question of whether one should dispute with heretics or not seems like an obvious one. It seems quite obvious that we should frequently engage in such disputation in order to refute their errors and bring people into the Church. Yet, the theologians are much more wary about allowing for such disputes. At times, the Church has even officially given laws about disputation with heretics.

As noted by Genesio Ludovico a Matre Dei in his Praelectiones in Universam Theologiam Moralem*

It was forbidden to laymen by Alexander IV [n.b., in Quicumque de hæreticis], under penalty of excommunication, to dispute with unbelievers about the truths of the faith. The same was decreed concerning unlearned clerics, on account of the danger of subversion. For this reason, if a layman is well-versed in Sacred Scripture and Theology, he does not sin if, for the aforesaid reasons, he disputes with unbelievers.[1]

It is important to note that this canonical legislation does not apply after the imposition of the 1917 Code of Canon Law. The 1917 code replaced the old penalties with the following canon,

Let Catholics beware lest they have debates or conferences, especially public ones, with non-Catholics without having come to the Holy See or, if the case is urgent, to the local Ordinary. (Can. 1325, §3)

For a history of the Canonical regulations on this point, it is helpful to refer to Kelleher’s Discussions with Non-Catholics: Canonical Legislation. To my knowledge, the 1983 Code of Canon Law does not present a similar canon. Yet, it is important to remember that laws which are not “on the books” can still teach us how to behave in certain difficult circumstances and may reveal perpetual moral principles. Hence, it is often beneficial or even necessary to have moral conformity with an abrogated law whose penalties in the juridical sphere no longer apply since its penalties in the moral sphere are often still in effect, at least in a more general form.

Canonists and theologians distinguish two types of disputation as to the audience, private and public. Kelleher writes,

By reason of the listeners present, this type of disputation may be of a public or a merely private character. A disputation is public if it overflows the limits of the private or family circle; this will be determined by all the circumstances, the challenge, the acceptance, the organization, and especially the attendance and the extent to which the meeting becomes known. A private disputation is one which remains within a small circle of a few persons or families, without becoming generally known. The effect of this division upon the morality of disputations will be discussed shortly. (pg. 1)

Further, it may be distinguished as to the end intended,

This type of disputation may be material, dubitative, or formal. In a material disputation the champions on both sides are Catholics, and both have the same end in view, namely: the confirmation, clarification, and explanation of the true Catholic teaching...

A dubitative disputation may be held between a Catholic and a non-Catholic, or between two Catholics. In the former case the Catholic party, not altogether certain in his faith, is seeking to discover which teaching is correct. In the latter case this lack of conviction characterizes at least one of the Catholic parties. It is obviously illicit for a Catholic to participate in such a disputation, for by the very fact that he doubts one of the dogmas of faith he is a heretic. This procedure is contrary to the natural law at all times.

In a formal disputation one of the disputants is a Catholic, the other a non-Catholic. In such a disputation the Catholic champion is firmly convinced of his stand and is earnestly seeking to win approval of his teaching from his adversary and the audience. (pgs. 1-2)

Here, we can clearly lay out the state of our question. In the case of a material disputation, obviously, there is no issue at hand and such disputes (as St. Thomas treats in his “objections”) poses no opposition to natural, divine, or canon law. As Perrone teaches, “this is undertaken for no other end than that beginners may be exercised in a sort of shadowy combat, so that from this they may be found strong and vigorous in true battle for engaging with enemies of the faith, just as is customarily done in other arts, especially military ones.” (n. 556) Suarez labels this as the disputation which is done in the schools “for the sake of exercise, for sharpening wits, and for acquiring facility in disputing and teaching.” (n. 1) Per se and considered in itself it is “is useful and morally necessary for acquiring both doctrine and the use of it” (ibid.), yet, this may be sinful incidentally insofar as those disputing might do it in a spirit of quarreling or for their own glory.

Further, it should be noted (following Suarez) that one should not engage in material disputation in defense of falsehood, both for the sake of possible scandal and the sad fact of experience that “through such disputations one arrives at an affection for such doctrine.” (n. 1)

In the case of a dubitative disputation (which is really a subdistinction of formal disputation, cf., Suarez, n. 2), it is obviously sinful in all cases. To entertain positive doubt against a dogma of the faith is a grave sin and to entertain it publicly is to add the possibility of scandal to such a grave sin. Any participation in such a public spectacle would be a complete mockery of the faith. Catholics doubting the faith ought to be admonished in private, not debated in public. As Perrone teaches, “if it were undertaken from doubt of the disputant, so that the matter would be brought into disputation as doubtful, so that truth might be elicited through it, it would be intrinsically evil in matters of faith, and is proper to heretics, and it would be wrong for Catholics to admit even slight disputation about articles of faith.” (n. 558) Suarez (n. 2) cites copiously in favor of the illegitimacy of dubitative disputation from the fathers, ecclesiastical law, and even civil law.

Yet, it is the last case that poses a perennial difficulty. Is it lawful for a Catholic to hold a public, formal disputation with a heretic? Obviously, to answer this question with a “yes” or “no” would be completely inappropriate. As Joseph Mayol points out in his Praeambula ad Decalogum, such disputes have occured frequently throughout scripture and in tradition, Our Lord, St. Stephen, and St. Paul against the Jews, St. Athanasius against the Arians, St. Augustine against the Pelagians and Donatists, etc. [2] This is established by Perrone from scripture, the fathers, and reason itself (n. 559-563) Yet, we can also see that there are clear instances when this would be sinful. So, how are we to answer this question?

In order to answer this generally, we should hold as the first principle that this action can only be licit when one is able to judge that the end of the act will be certainly achieved. In this case, it would be a well-founded hope that those who hear the disputation will be overwhelmingly edified with any possibility for scandal being remote, incidental, and far outweighed by the edification. For, the entire reason for such disputations is “to the honor of faith itself and greater knowledge of it, to the conversion of heretics and the confirmation of Catholics.” (Suarez, n. 7) Clearly, if such ends could not be reasonably hoped for, the entire reason for the disputation would be lost and it would be turned against its proper end.

While this is helpful as a general principle, in order to determine a question usefully, it is helpful to give general guidelines for those circumstances that ordinarily result in such results and thus can be reasonable grounds to carry out the act. As St. Thomas writes,

Those who wish to speak about human actions only universally deceive themselves, because they cannot fully arrive at the truth; just as if someone where content to understand what that virtue is through which the soul is well disposed, or through which man is at work justly, or something else like this, and desired to understand nothing more about virtue: he would deceive himself, and have an imperfect and non-advantageous understanding of virtue. For those who calculate the virtues specifically, as Gorgias did, speak much better than him who speaks only in general about what the reason for this thing is, because acts are about particulars. Whence, also, those things that belong to acts must be studied as particulars. (Polit.Bk1.L10)

Commonly, the theologians will distinguish between three conditions/circumstances when it comes to public disputation, on the part of the disputant, on the part of the hearers, and on the part of the mode or manner of acting. This distinction (at least the first two parts) go back to St. Thomas’ treatment in ST.II-II.Q10.A7, and the third part of the distinction can be derived from St. Thomas’ treatment in ST.II-II.Q10.A7.Rep1 and 2Tim.C2.L2.n59-62. Suarez, on the other hand, gives a four-fold distinction that only materially differs from St. Thomas, “on the part of the faithful person disputing, on the part of the heretic with whom he disputes, on the part of those before whom he disputes, and on the part of the manner [of disputing].” (n. 8)