On Non-Catholic Miracles

A Theological Study

Introduction

One of the most popular objections to Catholic miracle claims is drawn from supposed miracles performed in non-Catholic contexts. The line of reasoning is easy to see: if you claim that miracles confirm a religion, and miracles are performed by those of other religions, you must either be an indifferentist (conceding that all religions are true) or place other miracles under such a degree of scrutiny that you refute your own claims. From this, the objector will conclude that miracles are of no value for the authentication of the revelation of the messenger.

We can take this and form a conditional syllogism: if multiple religions perform miracles, then they have no demonstrative force; multiple religions perform miracles; therefore, they have no demonstrative force.

Traditionally, it was quite common to attack the minor premise—i.e., that multiple religions perform miracles—only conceding Catholic miracle claims. For example, Fr. Garrigou-Lagrange states:

No miracles are seen in Protestantism, nor any hope for miracles. Luther said: “Miracles must not be required by us, who deny free choice of the will.” And Calvin wrote to the king of France: “Those who demand miracles from us act wickedly.” He said that his doctrine does not stand in need of miracles, for he was preaching the Gospel of Jesus Christ, not a new gospel for which faith would need to be solidified through signs. Likewise, no true miracles are found in Photianism, and those that are sometimes brought forward as having been performed on behalf of the separated church and against the union of the Ruthenians with the See of Peter are not facts of such a nature as to require a supernatural cause. Ioannes Martinov, an expert in Russian matters, affirms with certitude that these miracles are not at all supernatural.

Yet, what if certain of these miracles are authentic? Abstracting from the existence in fact of these miracles, would the existence of such miracles contradict the claims of Catholicism and the demonstrative force of miracles? To put it another way: what if, as a matter of argument, we conceded the minor premise that “multiple religions perform miracles”? Would this refute Catholicism? Are we forced to accept the conditional that “if multiple religions perform miracles, then they have no demonstrative force,” as many enemies of the Church assume?

Some Principles

To better comprehend the solution to this problem, we must first understand the nature of a miracle. A miracle is a type of sign—it is some sort of action that points outside of itself to another truth. Hence, theologians will speak of miracles as tied to “proving” something, i.e., demonstrating some truth. Therefore, the medievals (cf. ST II-II, Q178, A2) would ask the question of “whether miracles could be performed by the wicked.” In response (after excluding the cases when such acts are performed by demons), they would put forward a distinction: insofar as such miracles are meant to demonstrate the truth of the message, conceded; insofar as such miracles are meant to demonstrate the holiness of the person, denied.

Hence, in Question 79 of the 83 Questions, St. Augustine gives a three-fold distinction as to the performance of miracles: the miracles of magicians, the miracles of bad Christians, and the miracles of good Christians (cf. ST I, Q110, A4, Rep2). In his line of argumentation, he assumes that genuine miracles performed by the power of Christ occur among both bad Christians (which include “schismatics and heretics”) and good Christians. The fundamental reason why miracles can be performed by both groups is that both groups possess the “signs of public righteousness,” e.g., the “name of Christ,” “Christian words,” and “Sacraments.” The analogy given for this is the honor due to the emperor’s signs when possessed by a usurper. In this case, the signs are not possessed with legal validity, yet they are still shown honor on account of the emperor for whose honor they are wielded.

St. Thomas, following this tradition in ST II-II, Q178, A2, makes a three-fold distinction on the part of the miracle performed, distinguishing between demonic “miracles” (which either exist purely in the intellect or have a natural cause), miracles that confirm holiness, and miracles that confirm the truth preached. Hence, he writes:

Some miracles are not true but imaginary deeds, because they delude man by the appearance of that which is not; while others are true deeds, yet they have not the character of a true miracle, because they are done by the power of some natural cause…

True miracles cannot be wrought save by the power of God, because God works them for man’s benefit, and this in two ways: in one way for the confirmation of truth declared, in another way in proof of a person’s holiness, which God desires to propose as an example of virtue.

In the first way miracles can be wrought by any one who preaches the true faith and calls upon Christ’s name, as even the wicked do sometimes. In this way even the wicked can work miracles…

In the second way miracles are not wrought except by the saints, since it is in proof of their holiness that miracles are wrought during their lifetime or after death, either by themselves or by others. (ST II-II, Q178, A2)

Yet the most important comment for our purpose comes in the responses to objections. In the third objection, St. Thomas poses an objection based on God’s veracity, arguing: “Miracles are divine attestations… Now God cannot bear witness to a falsehood. Therefore it would seem that wicked men cannot work miracles.” (ibid., Obj3) Interestingly, this objection takes almost precisely the same form that many anti-Catholic apologists present this dilemma in; they argue that if the supposition that “miracles cannot bear witness to a falsehood” is true, why, then, do we see miracles done by non-Catholics and in non-Catholic contexts—on the supposition, of course, that such truly occur? St. Thomas replies as follows:

Miracles are always true witnesses to the purpose for which they are wrought. Hence wicked men who teach a false doctrine never work true miracles in confirmation of their teaching, although sometimes they may do so in praise of Christ’s name which they invoke, and by the power of the sacraments which they administer. If they teach a true doctrine, sometimes they work true miracles as confirming their teaching, but not as an attestation of holiness. (ibid., Rep3)

St. Thomas, rather than denying the major premise (as the Protestants do), distinguishes the minor premise and therefore denies the sequence of the argument. St. Thomas lucidly points out that “a falsehood” needs to be taken in a formal rather than a material sense; a sign verifies the truth of the aspect which it presents and points toward, not the total object materially taken. Thus, for example, if I confirm that “Jay Dyer’s opinion on x is true,” I am not saying that “Jay Dyer is true” as if each and every position he has stated is true—rather, I am merely confirming this or that aspect of Jay Dyer (i.e., what he said in this case is true) rather than the entire body of what he said materially taken. In the same way, St. Thomas concedes that a miracle cannot verify a falsehood formally (i.e., in pointing to the truth of the false preaching), but denies that a miracle cannot verify a truth which materially or incidentally has falsehood attached to it (i.e., in pointing to the truth preached by a false prophet).

This can be illustrated by an example. Let us say that Christ and St. Peter performed the same miracle. Why, in this case, is Christ confirmed to be God by this miracle, while St. Peter is not confirmed to be God by this miracle? Clearly, the reason is that Christ performed this miracle as a sign confirming His preaching that He is God, whereas St. Peter performed his miracle as a sign confirming his preaching that he is an apostle and Christ is God.

Since, therefore, Christ said that he is the Son of God and equal to God, the miracles which he did confirmed this doctrine of his. And for this reason, Christ was shown through his miracles to be God. Yet Peter, although he did the same or greater miracles, was not proven to be God. Rather, through them it was also proven that Christ was God, because Peter did not preach himself, but Jesus Christ, to be God. (QII, Q4, A1, RepSC4)

Here we see that other factors are incidental to a miracle’s demonstrative value. A miracle is a sign pointing to the veracity of a claim. Now, a sign points to that which it signifies, having no necessary relation to that which is outside its significatory value. Therefore, a miracle only has a necessary relation to the truth which it is meant to verify, not to that which may be materially or incidentally attached to it. Hence, it did not matter whether Peter performed the same miracles as Christ or even greater miracles, or whether Peter was in the midst of denying Christ or dying for Christ; all that mattered was the consideration of what the miracle was essentially related to in its significatory value.

To give an example from the history of the Church, we can look to St. Vincent Ferrer. In the midst of his preaching, St. Vincent performed many miracles. In fact, he was so prodigious in the performance of miracles that it was estimated he performed five miracles a day throughout his entire ministry preaching across Europe. Yet this stands in tension with a well-known fact of his life: his opposition to the validly elected Pope and his support for multiple antipopes. Now, what if we were to reason thus: if someone performs a miracle, it supports the truths that they present; now, St. Vincent performed many miracles; further, St. Vincent presented the truth of the papacy of Antipope Benedict XIII; therefore, miracles supported the truth of the papacy of Antipope Benedict XIII.

In light of what we have seen, how ought we to respond to this objection? We ought to distinguish between what a miracle is meant to signify and what a miracle is not meant to signify. A miracle is meant to signify the truth for the sake of which it is performed, not every judgment ever uttered by a man, the system that he subjectively holds, the grounds upon which he holds the truth, or any other incidentally related factor. Hence, the miracles of St. Vincent were meant to signify the truth of the Gospel he preached, not every opinion of St. Vincent.

The Solution of the Problem

With this, we can apply these principles to the question at hand. As a matter of argument, concede the veracity of non-Catholic miracles. With this subsumed, can the following be maintained: (a) the demonstrative value of Catholic miracles, and (b) the falsehood of non-Catholic religions?

First, it is denied that there is any necessary connection between hypothetically conceding the veracity of some non-Catholic miracles and a lack of demonstrative value in Catholic miracles. In any system of belief, there are some truths that are unique and constitutive (e.g., the infallibility of the Pope), while there are other truths that are common (e.g., the existence of God). Now, in order to demonstrate the truth of a certain system, it is not sufficient to demonstrate those truths that are common (since such could hypothetically exist under a number of different views), but only those unique and constitutive truths (which could only exist with the truth of the entire system, as “political animal” could only exist with human nature).

Hence, we place the demonstrative value of miracles under a distinction, yet we in no way deny its demonstrative value.

Second, it is denied that there is any necessary connection between hypothetically conceding the veracity of a certain miracle and the truth of non-Catholic religions. For we can distinguish between the system of beliefs held as a whole and the individual beliefs held within it. As to the first, it would obviously be problematic for a Catholic to concede genuine miracles performed on behalf of a system of belief presented as a whole (e.g., a miracle performed to verify the claims of Islam) or a miracle specifically meant to verify the status of certain individuals as divinely appointed legates (e.g., a miracle performed to verify Muhammad’s status as a prophet). As to the second, however, we must place this under a distinction as well: on the one hand, certain truths of a system are constitutive of that system, such that to affirm the judgment is to affirm the entire system; yet, on the other hand, other truths are commonly held. Now, while the former would imply the truth of the entire religion (e.g., “Joseph Smith is a true prophet” implies “Mormonism is true”), the same cannot be said of the latter (e.g., a Baptist, challenged by atheists to perform a miracle to witness to the existence of God, performs such a miracle). There is no necessary connection between the affirmation of a certain truth and the complete veracity of one’s thought or preaching.

Objection. Does this not concede the entire argument to anti-Catholics who deny the demonstrative value of miracles?

Response. We only claim the demonstrative value of miracles under the distinction presented. We agree with the anti-Catholics that “a Catholic performed a miracle; therefore it necessarily follows that Catholicism is true” is not demonstrative, since the truth of Catholicism may only be connected materially or incidentally with the miracle performed. Likewise, just as many falsehoods are materially or incidentally connected with true miracles (e.g., the denial of Christ by St. Peter alongside St. Peter’s miracles), so also may the system subjectively held by one performing miracles be connected with the miracle in a merely material or incidental way.

Hence, miracles are only demonstrative in one of two ways: (α) if the truth for which the miracle is performed is a truth unique to or constitutive of the system; (β) if the truth of the system is so connected with the truth verified, the mode of verifying, the person who verifies, or the conditions under which verification exists, as to imply the truth of the system itself.

Objection. Doesn’t this contradict St. Thomas’ doctrine who teaches that “wicked men who teach a false doctrine never work true miracles in confirmation of their teaching?”

Response. We can reply to this objection in one of three ways. First, one may concede that St. Thomas simply erred on a matter of fact (i.e., that a true miracle has never been performed by a false teacher). Second, one may conceded that such is the case actually and in reality by the providence of God (i.e., that a false teacher never actually performs a miracle in witness to the truth), but deny that such could not happen hypothetically and by the absolute power of God.

Yet, neither of these two interpretations are satisfying. For, if we continue reading, we see that St. Thomas writes that “although sometimes they may do so in praise of Christ’s name which they invoke, and by the power of the sacraments which they administer.” Now, the praise of Christ’s name and affirmation of the power of the sacraments includes a certain profession of and verification of truth. The same can be drawn from the teaching of St. Augustine who includes heretics and schismatics under the “bad Christians” who can perform miracles. For the solution of this, note that it is quite common for Medievals to speak commonly when they wish to indicate that something is the case reduplicatively. Hence, to say “wicked men who teach a false doctrine never work true miracles in confirmation of their teaching” is not to be taken as indicating that they can never work miracles in confirmation of true doctrine (as in the cases that Ss. Thomas and Augustine conceded), but that they can never work miracles in confirmation of ‘their teaching,’ i.e., their teaching considered reduplicatively insofar as it is properly theirs, which is the same as ‘false doctrine.’