On Limbo and Sufficient Grace

A Study

The doctrine of the ‘limbo of the infants’ concerns the fate of unbaptized infants. The origin of its development follows a simple line of reasoning. It is necessary for the salvation of any person that they die in a state of sanctifying grace. Infants have been born in original sin, deprived of the gifts that were originally promised under the condition of obedience by their first father, Adam. Since salvation in the time of the Gospel can only ordinarily come to a man through baptism, either actually applied (in re), desired for themselves (in voto), or through martyrdom (baptismus flaminis), what happens to those infants deprived of these means? On the one hand, they are deprived of those ordinary means whereby salvation certainly comes to them, yet, on the other hand, they are freed from those actual sins which merit the punishment of sense (poena sensus).

In light of these principles, we are left with two options, either they go to a place where they are deprived of the vision of God, yet free from the punishment of sense, or they are extraordinary given graces. The second option was investigated by the International Theological Commission (a non-magisterial body of Catholic theologians) in their document The Hope of Salvation for Infants Who Die Without Being Baptized. While admitting that it is uncertain that they receive this extraordinary gift of sanctifying grace (systematically refuting each of the “other options” for ordinary means, such as baptism of desire), they argue that there are “good reasons for hope” from the nature of God, although these are merely probable reasons that do not give us certain knowledge: “We emphasise that these are reasons for prayerful hope, rather than grounds for sure knowledge. There is much that simply has not been revealed to us...What has been revealed to us is that the ordinary way of salvation is by the sacrament of Baptism.” (n. 102-103)

There are many who misconstrue the conclusion of this document, pretending as if it “overturned” the teaching on Limbo and expressed certainty about the fate of unbaptized infants, rather than developing along the same line the principles expressed by the great Fathers and Doctors of the Church.

Yet, there is one argument that many find to be conclusive (hence, giving certain rather than merely probable knowledge) as a refutation of the teaching expressed by the Fathers and Theologians. This argument can be stated as follows: we know that God has made salvation really and truly possible for all men, establishing sufficient means for the salvation of all; yet, in light of the doctrine of limbo, this would not be true for infants. Therefore, they conclude that this doctrine would contradict a certain principle of theology, hence granting certainty to its negation. From this, they would state, contrary to the ITC document, that it has been virtually revealed to us that there is a certain knowledge about the fate of unbaptized infants, rather than mere probable grounds leading to prayerful hope.

There are two ways in which we can tackle this objection, either refuting the major premise or the minor premise. The major premise has been refuted in two ways by theologians. First, there are those who reject the notion that sufficient grace has been granted to “all men.” These theologians (e.g., Vazquez) argue that the teaching on sufficient grace only applies to those above the age of reason, rather than all men whatsoever. This opinion has been largely rejected. Second, there are those who articulate the “possibility” of sufficient grace in a slightly different way. We can distinguish between the simple objective possibility of something from the subjective potency to achieve some end. If we are to articulate the “possibility” of sufficient grace in the former sense rather than in the latter sense, then it is clear that all infants have sufficient means. Yet, this does not seem like a satisfying position to hold. For, in this sense, we would not only hold that unbaptized infants have sufficient grace, but also the damned and the demons. Sufficient grace is something in the order of execution that is proportional to the will of God to save and the meritorious cause of the passion of Christ intended for all men. If we were to articulate sufficient grace in this manner, the proportion would be lost with these two doctrines.

Hence, we ought to concede the major premise, and tackle the minor premise. Have truly sufficient means been given to infants who die without baptism? Yes. This question was first treated in detail by St. Prosper in his De Vocatione Omnium Gentium. He answers the question by arguing that baptism itself as a means of salvation is that sufficient means to save those infants. It was really possible for parents to seek baptism for their children, hence it was really possible for these infants to achieve salvation. St. Prosper argues,

This subtle but correct way of understanding our problem is confronted by a great difficulty in the case of infants. Infants have not the use of reason by which they can understand the mercies of their Maker and be enabled to approach to the knowledge of truth. It would not seem right to blame them for neglecting the help of grace, when they are by their nature in such a state of ignorance that they are unable (and there can be no doubt about it) to acquire any knowledge or to grasp any teaching. If, then, God wills all men to be saved, what is the reason why so great a number of infants remain deprived of eternal salvation, and why so many thousands of human beings at this tender age are not admitted to eternal life?...

If we ask, how it can be said that God wills all men to be saved, when He does not grant to all the time when they are able to receive grace in a free acceptance of the faith, I think we may believe without irreverence towards God and conceive without impropriety, that those human beings who live only a few days share in the kind of grace which has always been given to all nations.

For indeed, if the parents were to make good use of this grace, the children also would derive a saving help from it through them. In fact, all children depend for their birth and during the whole time of their infancy up to the age of reason on the decisions made by other men, and the guidance given them must come exclusively from others. Thus it follows that infants share the lot of those persons whose right or wrong dispositions decide their condition. Some of them happen to have the faith through the profession of faith of other people; in the same way some fail to have the faith on account of the unbelief or the guilty neglect of others. Though they themselves had no desire either of the present life or of the future, yet, just as their birth has become their own concern, so also the eventual privation of rebirth becomes their own. And just as in the case of adults it is obvious that some, in addition to the general grace which moves all human hearts in a more sparing and more hidden way, receive a special call with more excellent effects of grace, with more generous gifts, and with a stronger power; so also in the case of the countless infants the same election reveals itself. The election was not withheld even from the children who failed to receive baptism, when it was present in their parents; but it reached some children who were baptised, without reaching their parents. Thus it often happened that children were taken care of by strangers when their unbelieving kinsfolk failed them; and through strangers they came to receive regeneration when their own people would not have provided this for them. (bk. 2, ch. 20, 23)

This satisfies the objective exigencies of the question in relation to those infants who die without baptism. Salvation is really and truly made possible for them by the establishment of means that are presented in the ordinary manner by which they receive benefits. How could one argue that this is not truly sufficient? If a business provides healthcare that is truly and really sufficient for the entire family, is it said to be “insufficient” in virtue of the fact that it is received by the will of another, i.e., the parents? Clearly not. Further, the rejection of the true sufficiency of these means would refute arguments frequently made by the opponents of this doctrine. Many (with little reflection of the doctrine) argue that there is a certain “baptism of desire” through the will of the parents or the Church for the salvation of these infants. Is this means “truly sufficient” or not? If so, then that which is brought about by the will of another can be truly sufficient. If not, then the same argument applies against their own position.

Yet, there is a more obscure question that follows from this, what about those infants who are objectively incapable of receiving baptism due to their lack of bodily development? Those embryos in early stages of development are not apt to receive baptism, yet many hold that they truly have rational souls at this stage. While it would be possible to argue that the presence of the rational soul is only actual after the moment in which baptism is possible, such a response is ad hoc and unnecessary to uphold the doctrine.