On Justification and Imputation
Stapleton Against the Protestants
Introduction
What is the best polemical work on justification?
Most of the scholastic treatments of the topic are simply not good for the purpose for which most people are asking. These treatments often focus more on disputes between theologians and arguments from reason than they do on positive grounds. They are also limited in the detail with which they recount the various positions within Protestantism and are often content with recounting one or two positions in a hasty way.
There is a significant advantage to reading mystical/spiritual theologians on the topic of justification and the supernatural organism. This allows the reader to understand the topic of justification in a more synthetic and organic manner than if they were to read the disputations of the scholastics concerning various school positions. As a personal note, one of my initial exposures to Catholic teaching on justification (outside of the works of St. Thomas) was Fr. Garrigou-Lagrange’s treatment in The Three Ages, which was when I began to understand the matter from a more profound and unified perspective. Yet, there are also significant disadvantages to this method. The authors of mystical theology are not primarily concerned with a polemical treatment of the matter, and citations of positive sources are given merely for illustration or application.
Finally, there are the positive sources themselves on the matter. There have been many very good commentaries on the Pauline Epistles (the greatest of which was written by St. Thomas, whose interpretation seems more angelic than human). Yet, these authors follow the exegetical method, not treating the matter systematically and often discussing matters outside the interest of the reader concerned with polemics. Another option would be to read the works of St. Augustine (whose writings on this matter are quite clear), such as De continentia, De spiritu et littera, and De fide et operibus. Yet, even this has its difficulties, since those reading such works do not have the conceptual framework necessary to compare the clear writings of the Doctor of Grace with the systems proposed by Protestant and Catholic authors.
Hence, we are relegated to polemical works—but which ones? There are many to this effect: Cajetan’s De fide et operibus, Soto’s De natura et gratia, Vega’s De iustificatione doctrina universa, Ravesteyn’s Apologiae against Chemnitz, etc. Many hold that the greatest work ever written against the Protestants was St. Bellarmine’s De iustificatione in his De Controversiis. I am quite sympathetic to this view. I become especially more sympathetic to it when combined with Fr. Erbermann’s excellent response to Gerhard, Ames, and others in defense of St. Bellarmine (learn more here).
Yet, I believe that the greatest work on the topic that I have come across is Fr. Thomas Stapleton’s Universa iustificationis. Fr. Stapleton’s excellence comes down to two points: method and orthodoxy.
Stapleton’s method is to treat a certain issue synthetically and then analyze the opponents’ positions in light of their root causes. This leads us away from logomachy and toward a true resolution of the problems at hand, while also completely uprooting the opponent’s entire error rather than offering the many partial refutations given by others, which allow for a resuscitation of the error with every new objection. In contrast, Fr. Stapleton virtually resolves all the errors at once.
Further, Fr. Stapleton follows the strict line of Augustino-Thomistic orthodoxy. Other authors in the era were willing to “innovate” on the tradition in order to provide some sort of middle ground between error and truth; yet, a half-truth is simply error. Despite the best intentions, the foolishness of this project was exposed from both sides, simultaneously failing to bring the heretics over to the side of Catholic truth and exposing themselves to the danger of heresy through words contrary to the Tridentine decree. Fr. Stapleton is clear in his orthodoxy and his commitment to the teaching of the Church along Augustino-Thomistic lines. If Fr. Stapleton states a position, you can be sure that he is giving no quarter to the Protestant position.
In this article, I want to give an exposition of his treatment in Book Seven on the issue of imputation and how Catholics envision the role of the righteousness of Christ in our justification. In order to do this, I want to divide this article into two parts:
The effects of Christ’s righteousness in general
Arguments against imputation
Part 1. The Effects of Christ’s Justice/Passion
While the phrase “righteousness of Christ” might seem quite simple, there are a variety of meanings that can be given to it. First, it is clear that there is a righteousness that is present in Christ’s divine nature and a righteousness that is present in Christ’s human nature. Christ’s divine righteousness is the uncreated attribute of His justice, which is purely actual and infinite. Christ’s human righteousness can be considered either habitually (and then as an accident perfecting the soul) or actually (and then in reference to the distinct acts of love that proceeded from the will of Christ). Christ’s habitual righteousness was so full and perfect that it never increased, yet His actual righteousness can be said to increase as He performs more distinct acts of love.
The distinction between the righteousness of Christ’s humanity and divinity is quite important when considering the causes of our justification. While the righteousness of Christ’s divinity is the efficient cause of our justification in an authoritative and originative manner, the righteousness of His humanity is the efficient cause of our justification as an instrumental and meritorious cause.
Yet, it is important here to make a note before we continue. While we can describe Christ’s righteousness as the “righteousness of His humanity,” such a way of speaking is less proper. Since supposits (persons) are subjects, not natures, it is better to speak of the acts, passions, and attributes of the whole person, who is a divine person. It is for this reason that all the acts of Christ are dignified infinitely, as the acts of a divine person (even if such acts are not always done by the divine nature).
Generally, we can say that the righteousness of Christ is the principle of our justification. The word “principle” refers to that from which something proceeds. There is no righteousness that comes to us except from Christ as the source, fount, and origin. Yet, it is to be recalled that justification brings about multiple effects due to the multiplicity of the aspects of change that must be wrought within us and the multiplicity of our defects. Hence, it must be affirmed that different aspects of the righteousness of Christ concur in different modes to the effecting of our justification in its multiple aspects. For this reason, the debate with the Protestants is not so much whether the righteousness of Christ is the sole, adequate, and entire principle of our justification, but in what mode the different aspects of Christ’s righteousness bring about the distinct effects of justification within us.
Before, we spoke briefly about the excellence of the righteousness of Christ, which is perfect and excels that of all men. In this sense, we speak about the righteousness of Christ as the exemplar of our justification; the righteousness of Christ is that perfect form of both habitual and actual righteousness that any righteousness we have will have as its model, especially in the Most Sacred Heart of Jesus. The Pelagians erred in completely restricting Christ’s causality in our justification to this exemplarity (i.e., that Christ is simply a model for the imitation of all believers). It is, of course, not incorrect for us to speak of our justice as imitating Christ, yet it is incorrect to completely restrict Christ’s causality in our justification to an instance of exemplar causality. The Protestants also erred on this point, but more about that later.
Beyond this exemplar causality, there also needs to be an effective or efficient concurrence of Christ in our justification, bringing about the effect of justification within us by some virtuality within Him. Now, efficient causality can be distinguished on the part of the principle, on the part of the effect, or on the part of the act. On the part of the principle, while Christ is a single subject of the acts of His humanity and His divinity, the principle by which (principium quo) He operates in either case is distinct, the former operating by His human nature, the latter by His divine nature. Now, as we went over above, the righteousness of Christ is distinguished into the righteousness of His divinity and the righteousness of His humanity (which is either actual or habitual). The former operates principally, by its own power and authority; yet, since it is created and participated, the righteousness of His humanity can only act as an instrument of the divinity. Hence, we speak about the divinity as the principal efficient cause of justification and the humanity as the instrumental efficient cause of justification.
Yet, we can go further than this. It is one thing to be the principle by which some subject operates (whether as the principal efficient cause or the instrumental efficient cause), and it is yet another thing to be that on account of which the effect comes about, which is called the meritorious cause. The meritorious cause is something in the genus of efficient cause, since it is something that concurs as a principle of the effect. Here, we are able to more precisely indicate Christ’s causality in our justification insofar as we can distinguish particular acts that merit particular effects of justification.
Generally, Christ’s actual righteousness merited for us the entire effect of justification, both the communication of grace and the remission of sin, just as Adam, by his actual disobedience, merited for us the entire effect of original sin: the guilt and corruption of original sin. While the entire life of Christ merited our justification, we especially speak about His Passion and death as particularly meriting the effects of justification.
This Passion justified us in a threefold way (the first two of which are common with earlier genera of causes). First, since the Passion was an act of the humanity of Christ conjoined to His divinity, it functioned as an instrumental cause in our justification. Second, since the Passion was a voluntary act, it functioned as a meritorious cause in our justification. Third, from its particular character, it justifies us by way of sacrifice and by way of redemption.
We denominate the Passion of Christ as a sacrifice insofar as it is something directed toward God, and as a redemption insofar as it brings about some effect within us.
a) A sacrifice is an offering made to another of some lovable thing. In relation to God, our sacrifices have four ends: adoration, thanksgiving, impetration, and propitiation. The fourth is the most important, as a sweet-smelling aroma to God that renders Him “propitious” toward our sins, willing to forgive the offenses committed.
b) Redemption is as distinct as the effects of sin removed in us by the Passion. Now, there are two effects of sin within us that must be removed by the Passion: the stain of sin and the punishment due to sin. Hence, there is a twofold effect of the redemption of Christ: redemption from sin and redemption from the punishment due to sin. The redemption from the punishment of sin is sometimes called “satisfaction.”
In this way, Christ becomes a full and adequate cause of our complete justification in the bestowal of grace and removal of sin in all the modes necessary for this end on His part and in all the necessary effects on our part. Stapleton summarizes:
Christ, then, is in this sense our righteousness: that he is the universal principle of our righteousness, and that in two ways. First, as the head of us all, by way of a spiritual influence into all his members. Second, as the Word incarnate, through whom all things have been restored, just as through the eternal Word all things were made. Again, he is our righteousness by way of merit, because in him and through him all our righteousness is accepted by God. The righteousness of Christ is likewise ours exemplarily, inasmuch as every righteousness worthy of the name must be conformed to it. Furthermore, by way of merit Christ’s righteousness again justifies us, because it merits for us the communication of the grace by which we are righteous, Christ himself, for this very cause, doing and suffering all things for us, that God might confer upon us such grace and righteousness. Finally, Christ is our righteousness because through his passion he reconciled us to God and satisfied for us, two things that necessarily had to precede the obtaining of righteousness (Heb. 9), but besides this, he redeemed and freed us from the very servitude of sin, cleansing our consciences by his shed blood (Jer. 31; Ezek. 36); that is, paying a price which, being accepted according to God’s will, God gave his law in our hearts, and caused us to walk in his commandments according to the Spirit, not according to the flesh. (Rom. 8)
Part 2. Arguments Against Imputation
It is only with this set forth that we are able to see the error of the Protestant formulation. The Protestants go further than what we set out above about Christ’s work in the genus of efficient cause and further posit that Christ’s very own qualities are in some way a formal cause. The formal cause is that cause which immediately communicates its own entity to the subject and denominates it to be such a thing (Zigliara); e.g., through the accidental form of whiteness, we become white. Hence, they teach that, in some way, the internal righteousness that is caused by Christ within us is insufficient to free us from the servitude of sin. Therefore, they conclude that we need an extrinsic form that makes up for what is lacking within us. By some intrinsic form, we are denominated as “non-righteous” (since the intrinsic form of righteousness infused within us is partial and inadequate), yet by the addition of some extrinsic form (Christ’s personal righteousness), we can be denominated as “righteous” when considered in its totality.
From what was taught above, we see that this is an error that principally touches the work of Christ. While Catholics place the entire work of Christ in the genus of efficient cause, the Protestants place the work of Christ partially in the genus of efficient cause (as bringing about a partial and imperfect righteousness within us) and partially in the genus of formal cause (as an extrinsic form that denominates us as righteous). Hence, many Catholic authors will distinguish between “formal imputation” and “efficient imputation.”
It is here that we are able to, without equivocation, analyze how the term “imputation” can or cannot be used by Catholics and lay down a general principle. If imputation is taken in the genus of formal cause, so that the total and adequate effect of Christ’s Passion is only such by extrinsic denomination, then it is non-Catholic; yet, if imputation is taken in the genus of efficient cause, so that Christ’s Passion adequately terminates in its effect, then it is Catholic. For example, we can speak of the “non-imputation” of sins insofar as the punishment for sin is removed on the part of God by propitiation and on our part by satisfaction, both of which are by the efficient causality of Christ. Yet, if by “non-imputation” someone were to posit that the punishment for sin is removed on the part of God by propitiation, yet deny that it is removed on the part of man by satisfaction (or vice versa), then his view would be erroneous.
I want to emphasize this last point since many Protestants cannot seem to understand this teaching. As referenced above, there are many effects of the Passion of Christ, whether with respect to the guilt of sin or its punishment, whether on the part of God or on the part of man, whether as God or as man, etc. In order for the total and adequate effect of justification to come about, each of these is necessary and integral to the effect. Hence, when we name one or another effect (e.g., the infusion of grace), we still require the other effects for the total, adequate, and integral effect to come about. For example, it is for this reason that many Catholic authors require God’s mercy at the final judgment alongside the inherent justice that we have. The infusion of justice and its formal effects within us cannot justify if, per impossibile, it is separated from the other effects of justification (in this case, the propitiation of God by Christ) in the line of efficient cause (how could it?).
Yet, we must deny the Protestant understanding of imputation, which holds that what Christ effects by His Passion is insufficient to justify us; hence, they posit that we are only adequately just by extrinsic denomination.
It is for this reason that many of the texts brought forth by Protestants against the Catholic view of justification lack demonstrative value. It is one thing to say that a certain effect of justification is insufficient of itself to adequately justify when abstracted from the other effects (e.g., sanctifying grace), yet it is a completely different thing to say that the formal effect of what is placed within us by the work of Christ does not denominate us as just without some extrinsic form. To put it another way, it is one thing to say that human life requires a body and soul in order for us to be alive and yet quite another thing to say that our life does not properly denominate us as living without the aid of some extrinsic form. In a similar way, it is one thing to say that a certain effect of justification (e.g., sanctifying grace) is not sufficient of itself without other conditions being present within us (e.g., the non-imputation of punishment), and yet another thing to say that a certain effect of justification does not have its formal effect in an adequate manner but requires an additional, extrinsic form in order to denominate us with such a quality.
To make a more relevant analogy, we can look at the mechanics of original sin. It is quite true that the possession of original sin is required on the part of man; yet, to be punished, it is equally necessary that there be the justice of God willing to punish. In a similar way, it is quite true that the possession of sanctifying grace is required on the part of man; yet, to be justified, it is equally necessary that there be the mercy of God willing to forgive. In either case, the intrinsic form is adequate, and the other conditions act as conditions for the application or continuance of the form rather than as a distinct formal cause.
Note. The Protestants assert some intrinsic form that abides within us. Hence, it is improper to speak of “pure imputation.” The difference concerns the perfection of this form. Catholic authors hold that this form essentially and intrinsically denominates one adequately as just, whereas Protestant authors posit that some extrinsic form is necessary as a co-cause, with the intrinsic form inadequately influencing the effect.
Against this teaching on imputation, Stapleton gives ten arguments, which I will recite and evaluate seven of them, along with adding some additional notes:
