Marriage and Concupiscence

Interpreting 1 Cor. 7 with St. Thomas

Introduction

As happens every few months, there is another debate on Catholic Twitter about the marital debt. To get it out of the way immediately, no I do not think that it is necessarily sinful to engage in the use (nor was this the teaching of Ss. Augustine and Thomas, contrary to certain interpreters). No, I do not deny the reality marital debt (which would be a serious error, if not flatly heretical). No, I do not deny that pleasure may be legitimately sought in the marital act (which is at least against certain authoritative pontifical teachings, especially Ven. Pius XII).

The foundation of a Catholic discussion on this topic obviously concerns the interpretation of 1 Corinthians 7, which has been treated with clarity by Pope St. Gregory the Great in his epistle to St. Augustine of Canterbury (answer to Q. 10).

Further, this question was admirably treated by a certain anonymous author in a work titled Sensa sanctorum ecclesiae doctorum ac patrum circa usum matrimonii (which has been partially translated into english) as a response to Pius VIII’s call for a renewed sense of marital chastity in his encyclical Traditi humilitati. The question obviously arose of what marital chastity even meant, so the author attempts to draw together the most authoritative sources in order to give a synthetic treatment on a number of issues.

Other documents of importance from the ecclesiastical magisterium includes the condemnation of the laxist thesis by Bl. Innocent XI that “the act of marriage exercised for pleasure alone is entirely free of all fault and venial defect.”

Further, there is the lengthy discourse by Ven. Pius XII where he, while recognizing the permissibility of pleasure in the act properly done, exhorts the faithful for many paragraphs not to fall into a hedonistic behavior in relation to the use in his Address to Midwives.

Obviously, no treatment would be complete without the mentioning the masterful treatment of concupiscence given by St. John Paul II from September 3, 1980 to December 10, 1980 (and even further) where he clearly warns towards the “lust of the eyes” and “adultery in the heart” that an immoderate lust towards ones wife can express (which he was mocked by the media for at the time).

Further, we have more general statements of the same matter less directly in the exhortations towards periods of continence during times of fasting, preparation for the eucharist, etc., by the Catechism of Trent, the traditional rite for Matrimony, etc. This is summarized by Bl. Innocent XI:

In the case of married persons, however, let them seriously consider this, since the blessed Apostle does not wish them to “defraud one another, except perhaps by consent for a time, that they may give themselves to prayer, “let them advise these seriously that they should give themselves more to continence, because of reverence for the most holy Eucharist, and that they should come together for communion in the heavenly banquet with a purer mind.

Yet, it is not my intention here to provide some sort of positive, dogmatic treatment of the concept of matrimonial continence. This would require a great degree of research, especially in the many papal homilies of the medieval era, bulls of the post-reformation era, etc., that treated this topic. Nor do I think such a treatment would be helpful as an introduction to the topic. Rather, what is necessary is a more synthetic treatment of the topic providing a synthesis that respects what is both common among theologians and with certain details that “fill out” the synthesis from St. Thomas (with due notes of positions not universally held). It is from this fruitful, yet brief, synthesis that one can develop a framework for understanding these questions.

On Concupiscence

In its broadest sense, concupiscence is a motion of the appetites towards a sensible good. While in common parlance it signifies a motion toward sexual enjoyment, it does not have this exclusive significance in the Latin language.

As I explained at length here, motions of concupiscence can be divided into “first-first” motions, “second-first” motions, and “second” motions. The first type of motions are involuntary, e.g., to be hungry. The second are indirectly voluntary due to a lack of custody over the senses, e.g., when sensing an object pleasurable to the sight. The third are voluntary, e.g., to directly will taking pleasure in something. The first are without sin because sin must be voluntary. The second are venially sinful since it is a sin of omission and hence somewhat voluntary. The third are either without sin or venially or mortally sinful depending on the object.

A helpful distinction to make is the distinction between antecedent and consequent passions. The first sort are those first motions that precede an act of reason. Hence, it may either be first-first or second-first. The second sort are those motions that are consequent to an act of reason, i.e., motivated to it. The former are said to make an act “less voluntary” and the latter make an act “more voluntary,” hence either decreasing or increasing the merit or demerit of an act depending on whether the act is good or evil. As an example, to give alms on the basis of an act of sentimentality is less meritorious than giving it on the basis of charity. It is important to note the qualification “on the basis of.” Let’s say someone wants to give an alms on the basis of charity and they form certain affections of pity for the individual in order to increase the fervor in which they do such an act. Rather than decreasing the merit, it would be a sign and means of increased voluntariness and hence a MORE meritorious act. Although, it is obvious that, on the other hand, one could be immoderate in this, increasing passion to such a degree as to “overtake” the true motive, i.e., charity.

In consistently drawing out the Thomistic doctrine, we are able to clearly delineate how pleasure relates to sin. First, if pleasure is the motive for the act, then it is sinful since it is irrational. Second, if pleasure is antecedent, but the motive is good, then it decreases merit, but does not change the object. Third, if pleasure is consequent and moderated, then it increases the merit of the act as increasing the fervor towards the good object. Fourth, if pleasure subsumes the good end, then it is immoderate.

Hence, applied to sexuality, we can easily see how the cases would function.

First, if the pleasure is directed towards an evil object as a consequent motion, then it is grave.

Second, if the pleasure is directed towards an evil object as an antecedent motion, then it is light (due to the lack of perfect deliberation).

Third, if the pleasure is the motive for the act, then it is a sin (per Bl. Innocent XI). But, as is commonly taught, it is only venial if directed to wife as wife and only mortal if directed as wife as simply a common woman (where one would copulate with any woman).

Fourth, if the pleasure is antecedent, but the object is good, it is a good act, but merit is decreased.

Fifth, if the pleasure is consequent and the object is good, then it increases the merit of the act (per Ven. Pius XII).

Sixth, if the pleasure is consequent and the object is good, yet immoderate, then it can effect the act in proportion to the gravity of the immoderation (per Ven. Pius XII).

While this may sound very “abstract,” it is quite useful in explaining the text of St. Paul and providing a hermeneutic for understanding the logic of the teaching of the Church on this matter.

The Ends of the Act

The “purpose” of the act is manifold and whether such a purpose is good or evil will determine (in union with the above considerations) whether the act is good or evil.

Traditionally, the ends listed before the Baroque era were three (or four),

1. Procreation

2. The Debt

3. Concupiscence

This answers the question of “why is the act done?” In the first case, the act is done for the begetting of children. Everyone agrees that an act done with ones wife for this purpose, far from being a sin, is actually an exercise of the virtue of religion (in begetting children for the glory of the Trinity, per Pius VIII).

In the second case, there is some dispute (to put it lightly). Everyone agrees that paying the debt when requested is an act of justice since this gives to ones spouse what is due to them.

Yet, the request of the debt is where there is some controversy. The more traditional position is that the request of the debt is motivated by concupiscence and hence fits under the “pleasure alone” of Bl. Innocent XI, which would make it venially sinful. This seems more in accord with what was laid out earlier about the nature of second-first motions of concupiscence.

Yet, certain more recent authors will distinguish between two forms of the request of the debt (cf., the work from the anonymous author). First, some will request merely out of a firm understanding of their own weakness and liability to fall into sin. They say that this is either lightest of sins or not a sin at all. Some will state both simultaneously. Second, some will request the debt not out of a concern for their own weakness and liability for sin, but for the mere satisfaction of that second-first motion of concupiscence. This form (they claim) is what the earlier fathers and doctors (including Pope St. Gregory I) condemned, not the first form. Such will either be a venial sin if it stays within the “goods of marriage” or mortally sinful if it exceeds such “goods of marriage.”

The cautious language of theologians like Bl. Denys the Carthusian seems to tend in this direction, “from the time a wife becomes pregnant until her purification after childbirth, it is not fitting to seek it; yet it is not forbidden to do so if there is a danger of falling into carnal sin with another person.”

Yet, here is where things get a bit complicated in the history of moral theology. Sanchez lists 6 purposes,

1. The good of offspring

2. The payment of the debt

3. The avoidance of fornication

4. The health of the body

5. Veneral pleasure

6. Any other extraneous end (e.g., the signification of the union of Christ with the Church or human nature)

Obviously we have already went over the common doctrine for 1, 2, 3, and 5, but what about the other ends?

Most theologians (although there is disagreement) say that the sixth end would not be sufficient, since this can be sufficiently acquired through other means, simply expressing the finis operantis rather than the finis operis, hence while it may express goodness of end, it does not sufficiently express goodness of object (which is necessary for a good act), both of which are necessary for an integrally good act. Although, this is a complicated question where full agreement was not reached.

The fourth end is interesting insofar those theologians who invented it had an ingenious way of getting around the critique of the sixth end. These theologians while denying that such an end was formally intrinsic, would say that it is virtually intrinsic.

To make this more concrete, they would say that the health of the body immediately tended towards simple health, but it mediately tended towards the good of offspring insofar as it tended to prepare the body for the bearing of children. Similar considerations could be had toward other seemingly extrinsic ends. Hence, if one copulates with their spouse, they would argue that this tended to the union of spouses. Such union would aid in the governance of children and hence be truly “procreative” since procreation is not only the production of children, but also their governance, which relies on the union of spouses.

While such solutions are interesting and require serious consideration, it seems to make fodder of the earlier doctrine, especially in the manner in which the Fathers and Medievals interpreted the very text of Sacred Scripture. Thus, it should be approached cautiously.

Reading 1 Corinthians 7 in Light of the Above

If we are able to apply the above distinctions to the question of the teaching of the marital debt in scripture (and tradition!), we are able to see the contours of a clear reading and note some points of exegetical disagreement.

He begins by saying,

It is good for a man not to touch a woman. But for fear of fornication, let every man have his own wife, and let every woman have her own husband.

He begins by affirming the statement that “it is good for a man not to touch a woman.” Here he affirms the good of abstinence. It is for this reason that while he “wishes that all men be as he,” it is, realistically (in the language of the schools, “consequently”), not possible for many men and women due to the imperfection of their continence.

It is important to note that this is about the good of abstinence, NOT merely about the good of celibacy. Continence is expressed in abstaining from sense pleasures in general, celibacy refer to a permanent state of such abstinence. This can be clearly reasoned from what is said below about periods of abstinence, along with the Catholic teaching on the presence of concupiscence and the elevated end of grace.

Thus, the justification for choosing what is “less ideal” absolutely speaking (in the language of the schools, “antecedently”) is for some danger relatively speaking (“consequently”), i.e., fornication. To take a husband or a wife is for the purpose of not falling into the evil of mortal sin. It is important to note this since this is a principle that will be axiomatic in understanding the passage. When the burning of concupiscence places one in fear of fornication, it is better to satisfy this in requesting the debt. This, of course, does not exclude the possibility (and, in the text, the actuality) that when one is not in fear of such fornication that they eliminate it by other means, e.g., prayer, the sacraments, mortification, etc.

The debt is meant to save from fornication, NOT to save from every motion of concupiscence. The conclusions drawn above make this clear. To engage in the use simply to satisfy an antecedent motion of concupiscence without the danger of fornication is outside of the scope of the passage. As we saw above, such is commonly regarded as venially sinful.

As St. Thomas teaches on this passage,

Carnal desire remains alive in believers even after baptism, although it does not rule, it impels men especially toward venereal acts on account of the vehemence of their pleasure. And because it requires greater virtue to conquer this desire entirely than can belong to men, according to Matthew: not all men can receive this saying (Matt 19:11), it is necessary that this desire be in part yielded to and in part mastered.

Each of these must be held in harmony and not confused as some interpreters are liable to do. To “yield” to such a desire is not the same as mastering such a desire. Theological reason confirms this, along with experience and the conclusions of natural science. To yield to a certain pleasure is to habituate the seeking of such a pleasure. To destroy a pleasure is to mortify such, not to yield. Yet, it is far, far better to yield to a pleasure than to be destroyed by such a pleasure, as we will see below when discussing the “burning.”

St. Paul continues,

Let the husband render the debt to his wife, and the wife also in like manner to the husband. The wife hath not power of her own body, but the husband. And in like manner the husband also hath not power of his own body, but the wife

Here, he establishes the true right that is given in marriage. The husband and wife have obligations to each other. The husband is bound to render such a debt in fear of fornication to his wife and vice versa.

Continuing,

Defraud not one another, except, perhaps, by consent, for a time, that you may give yourselves to prayer; and return together again, lest Satan tempt you for your incontinency.

The ruling principles of this passage were already laid out above and lead to an ease of interpretation. We already saw that it is both “not good for a man to touch a woman” and there is also “fear of fornication.” Each of these must be held in harmony, as the mastery and the yielding must be held in harmony.

The mastery is expressed in “for a time that you may give yourselves to prayer” and the yielding in the “return together again, lest Satan tempt you for your incontinency.” The prayer heals the concupiscence that we feel within ourselves, the “law of the flesh,” and the returning together assures that one is not “burnt” by mortal sin by fornication or other sexual sins.

As a practical matter, these rules will be proportioned to the ascetical state of the spouses. Would it be good that “every man be as me” so that they practice that good which is to “not touch a woman?” Yes. But there is “fear of fornication,” hence when this arises, it is necessary to “return together” so as not to be “burnt.” Yet, it is also to be remembered that such “fear of fornication” is present as a certain, concrete moment that depends on the state of the individuals. What if there is no fear of fornication? Then the entire logic for the debt disappears and one can abstain for they are not in danger of those temptations of Satan. This is expressed as a “will” which goes beyond the “concession.” This is all confirmed by the principles of theological reason which were explained above.

As St. Thomas points out, such “fear” is for those who are weak, yet loses its reason for those who are strong, i.e., are not in danger of falling into such fornication. He writes,

Satan’s temptation should not be feared by the strong, about whom it is said: I write to you, young men, because you are strong, and the word of God abides in you, and you have overcome the evil one (1 John 2:14). But he should be feared by the weak. Hence he says, through lack of self-control, that is, for your incontinency, as a result of which the devil overcomes man by tempting, and he is inclined to tempt

To understand this in a more profound way, St. Thomas, following St. Augustine lists three goods of marriage,

Matrimony has three goods. The first is that it is a function of nature in the sense that it is ordered to the production and education of offspring; and this good is the good of offspring. The second good is that it is a remedy for desire, which is restricted to a definite person; and this good is called fidelity, which a man preserves toward his wife, by not going to another woman, and similarly the wife toward the husband. The third good, insofar as the marriage is contracted in the faith of Christ, is called the sacrament, inasmuch as it signifies the union of Christ and the Church

These can be labeled as the natural, ascetical, and mystical goods of marriage.

As to the first, this is even elevated by grace. In the New Covenant we do not only produce children in order to satisfy our obligations of our species and our nation, but even for the good of the Church, to produce children for the glory of the Trinity.

As to the second, this acknowledges the continual presence of the effects of original sin, so that we are not “burnt” by mortal sin. In this way, marriage is meant to save us from the fires of hell.

As to the third, this acknowledges that marriage goes beyond a mere purpose of avoiding sin, but even (as a sacrament) gives the graces to acquire perfection, which goes beyond obedience to the commands even to the (spirit of) the evangelical counsels. This brings us into the mystical life whereby we are detached from such pleasures of sense which draw us earthward. In this way, marriage is still able to make us “as” St. Paul in avoiding not only fornication but even having that “good” of “not touching a woman” in the discipline of the passions that comes by “prayer,” while recognizing the “danger of fornication” that is so constantly presence among us earthen vessels.

Continuing,

But I speak this by indulgence, not by commandment. For I would that all men were even as myself: but every one hath his proper gift from God; one after this manner, and another after that. But I say to the unmarried, and to the widows: It is good for them if they so continue, even as I.

Here, we reach the most controversial of the passages from St. Paul. Certain theologians have brought forward the weighty objection to the traditional doctrine that God does not indulge sin, even venial sin. Yet, the contrary is taught by Pope St. Gregory the Great “what is just and right is not indulged: what he spoke of as indulged he showed to be a fault” and flows from good moral theology.

For, where one is morally certain that he will fall into one of two sins (i.e., either fornication or the yielding to the flesh in matrimony), he is required to choose the lesser of the two. In this case such is the latter as a venial sin, rather than a mortal sin. St. Thomas answers this objection precisely,

The Apostle seems to be speaking in an unsuitable manner, for concessions are concerned only with sin. Therefore, by the fact that the Apostle says he is speaking by way of concession, he seems to express that marriage is a sin...

Concession can be taken as regarding guilt...In this sense, concession refers to the conjugal act, accordingly as it has venial guilt attached to it along with the good of matrimony, without which it would be mortal.

Further, he here reiterates what has been repeated as a central axiom, that “I would that all men were even as myself,” which has been sufficiently explained above.

From all of this, St. Thomas draws a set of conclusions that are against the falsehood that many level against the Fathers that it is impossible to engage in the use without sin. This was already stated clearly by Pope St. Gregory (and constantly stated by St. Augustine against Julian the Pelagian),

Lawful copulation of the flesh ought therefore to be for the purpose of offspring, not of pleasure; and intercourse of the flesh should be for the sake of producing children, and not a satisfaction of frailties. If, then, any one makes use of his wife not as seized by the desire of pleasure, but only for the sake of producing children, he certainly, with regard to entering the church or taking the mystery of the body and blood of the Lord, is to be left to his own judgment, since by us he ought not to be prohibited from receiving it who knows no burning though in the midst of fire. But, when not the love of producing offspring but pleasure dominates in the act of intercourse, married persons have something to mourn over in their intercourse.

St. Thomas gives the traditional distinctions,

Hence it should be noted that the conjugal act is sometimes meritorious and without any mortal or venial sin, as when it is directed to the good of procreation and education of a child for the worship of God; for then it is an act of religion; or when it is performed for the sake of rendering the debt, it is an act of justice. But every virtuous act is meritorious, if it is performed with charity. But sometimes it is accompanied with venial sin, namely, when one is excited to the matrimonial act by concupiscence, which nevertheless stays within the limits of the marriage, namely, that he is content with his wife only. But sometimes it is performed with mortal sin, as when concupiscence is carried beyond the limits of the marriage; for example, when the husband approaches the wife with the idea that he would just as gladly or more gladly approach another woman.

In the first way, therefore, the act of marriage requires no concession; in the second way it obtains a concession, inasmuch as someone consenting to concupiscence toward the wife is not guilty of mortal sin; in the third way there is absolutely no concession.

Lastly, the language from St. Paul that they “continue as I” must be carefully considered. For, as we saw from the beginning, to the axiom that “it is good for a man not to touch a woman” and the subordination of the entire reason for the concession as “fear of fornication,” it is clear that, simply speaking, he is not referring to celibacy, but of continence. Hence, this will is ideal, absolutely speaking, i.e., antecedently, that men abstain. Such abstaining can happen either temporarily, i.e., “for a time,” or can happen in a permanent manner when there is no danger to be incurred. Such fulfills the will of the Apostle where there is no need for the concession. Yet, where, consequently and relatively, there is need, it is to “defraud one another” not to engage in the use when requested. Such would be to tempt God.

This is seen in the final verse of the section which is “but if they cannot not contain themselves, let them marry. For it is better to marry than to be burnt.”

Here, to “be burnt” is to fall into fornication. To interpret it as simply to feel certain motions of concupiscence would be contrary to the context of the passage and against simple theological reason, as established above. To indulge habituates us to seek the pleasure rather than to destroy such a pleasure. Hence, it is a “concession” where and only where there is “fear of fornication.” If one is “warmed,” they are able to cool the warmth by prayer and mortification, yet if they are “burnt,” they are destroyed by mortal sin. Hence St. Thomas,

Then he gives the reason, saying, **_it is better to marry than to be burnt_**, that is, be overcome by concupiscence. For concupiscence is a harmful heat; therefore one assailed by concupiscence is warmed but not burned, unless he is overcome by concupiscence and destroys the water of grace.

It should be noted that the Apostle uses a helpful comparison here, for it is good to marry, although it is a lesser good. But to be burned is an evil. Therefore it is better, that is, more tolerable, that a man should have the lesser good than incur the evil of incontinence.