Recently, Matt Hedges on Substack wrote an article titled “The Corruption of the Bread and Wine: ANOTHER Metaphysical Problem for Transubstantiation,” attempting to refute Catholic dogma about the Eucharist by appealing to the concepts of generation and corruption, citing my eminent authors, such as Capreolus, Soto, the Salmanticenses, John of St. Thomas, Franzelin, Doronzo, etc. He also made this into a YouTube video, titled “Transubstantiation is ABSURD,” on his channel (which includes a very handsome young man in the thumbnail).
Section 1. Fundamental Concepts
Generation and corruption are fundamental concepts in scholastic philosophy. Generation includes the transition of something from non-being to being. If a dark room is illuminated, then the room goes from non-being in a certain respect (the privation of light, i.e., darkness) to being in a certain respect (i.e., the accidental form of light). If a light room is darkened, then the room goes from being in a certain respect (i.e., the accidental form of light) to non-being in a certain respect (the privation of light, i.e., darkness). This leads us to a commonly invoked axiom: the corruption of something is the generation of another. The generation of light in the room is the corruption of the privation of light (darkness). Otherwise, corruption would not be distinguished from annihilation, and generation from creation.
Generation and corruption can be distinguished into accidental generation/corruption and substantial generation/corruption. In the former case, what is being generated/corrupted is a certain accidental form (in our case, light/darkness); in the latter case, what is being generated/corrupted is a certain substantial form, e.g., if we burn a piece of paper, the form of paper is corrupted and in its place the form of ash is generated.
The way that this generation/corruption occurs is by the action of some agent on the thing that is generated/corrupted (which we call the “composite”). In the case of our paper, fire acts upon the paper in order to corrupt the form of paper and cause the form of ash in the composite. The particular means used in order to generate/corrupt is the introduction of certain accidental forms in the composite in order to dispose the composite to “lose” the previous substantial form and “gain” the new substantial form. Fire infuses heat into the paper, which is ill-disposed to receive that greatness of heat; this causes the corruption of the form of paper, while, simultaneously, the heat is a proper disposition for ash to be generated. This is called “accidental transmutation” by scholastic philosophers.
There are a few important corollaries to this common-sense account that are drawn by Thomistic philosophers. First, generation and corruption are not instances of “motion” in the proper sense of the term, since motion exists between two positive termini. Second, generation and corruption are instances of mutation, which involves a privative opposition between the termini: in corruption, between a form and its privation; in generation, between a privation and its form. Third, mutation is something that happens instantaneously, with only an order of nature. While motion happens successively, mutation cannot happen successively with an order of time, since this involves the removal and induction of substantial form, which is necessary for the existence of the composite (if there were a time when it did not exist, then prime matter, which has no proper existence, would exist without substantial form; therefore, any priority/posteriority must be a quo).
This leads us to a clear philosophical account of what is actually going on in corruption/generation. When the agent induces sufficient dispositions for the corruption of the substantial form, prime matter is “stripped” of all forms (both accidental and substantial); upon this stripping, the prime matter, which has a desire for substantial form and cannot exist without it, immediately composes with substantial form, which, in the order of efficient causality, causes the accidental forms of the new composite, although, in the order of material and dispositive causality, the proper accidents are themselves dispositions for the substantial form. It is in this process that substantial form is “educed” from prime matter.
An interesting corollary to this account is that the accidents in the composite before corruption and the accidents in the composite after corruption are numerically distinct accidents. Therefore, for example, since the soul is the substantial form of the man, when a man dies, the accidents that are possessed by the man (e.g., color) after death are numerically distinct from the accidents that are possessed by the man before death.
Section 2. The Problem of the Eucharist
When we carefully look at this account of generation and corruption, a clear problem arises in the case of the Eucharist. The Catholic Church teaches that the substances of bread and wine do not exist in the Eucharist and that the Eucharistic Species exist without an ultimate subject. In this case, there is obviously no prime matter in the case of the Eucharistic Species, since only accidental forms exist and dimensive quantity inheres in no subject whatsoever. Now, this is no problem for the corruption of the species. There exists accidental corruption, and if the species are corrupted, then we can chalk it up to that. The same lack of controversy ought to exist over accidental generation.
On the other hand, there surely exists a problem with substantial generation. In certain cases, it is clear that there is substantial generation that follows upon the corruption of the Eucharistic Species. If a host burns up in a fire, then there is the substantial generation of ashes. It is here that the precise issue arises in our case. The substantial forms of things are educed from prime matter. In the substantial generation of ashes, the form of ashness is educed from prime matter. Yet, where does this prime matter come from? As we stated above, there is no prime matter in the case of the Eucharistic Species. Therefore, it would seem to follow that substantial generation is impossible in this case. On the other hand, it is obvious from experience that there is substantial generation in this case.
It is this precise difficulty that the Author touches upon in his article, although not stated with sufficient precision or clarity.
Section 3. Various Solutions
The easiest way of trying to avoid this problem is by rejecting the testimony of the senses and arguing that generation does not actually occur. While some ancient authors held to this first position, it is universally rejected by the theologians.
For this reason, the authors have always attempted to seek a solution to this problem by admitting that generation occurs. Therefore, a second position arose, arguing that the generation does not happen from the Eucharistic Species (which are annihilated), but from the surrounding air. While this solution is quite creative, it is equally defective. We ought to take as an axiom that we should not multiply miracles. Now, in this case, there would be two equally strange miracles. First, there would be annihilation, which is above the powers of any creature. Second, something would be generated without the proper accidental dispositions (e.g., the air does not create ash when fire is applied, but, in this case, such would occur).
From the rejection of these two positions, we gather two principles that will be key to the resolution of this problem. First, we must hold that true corruption and generation occur. Second, we must explain this case without the multiplication of miracles, explaining things either (a) by natural laws or (b) in virtue of the first miracle of consecration.
These actually give us the limits for determining which solutions are “probable” or “improbable.” Theologians, in their treatments of this matter, are careful not to harshly censure other opinions within these axioms, but clearly admit that any solution within these parameters is “probable,” with their own position as “more probable.” It is for precisely this reason that the entire project of Mr. Hedges is so silly, as I will explain later.
A third position was formed in the early scholastic period that explained this problem by arguing that there is some sort of “return” of the substance of the bread/wine when generation/corruption occurs. Many eminent authors explain this position in a benign way, arguing that it is simply a less distinct way of stating what we will state is the fifth position. Others simply deny this position, since it would pose insoluble problems. Either the substance of bread/wine exists before the corruption of the species or after; if before the corruption of the species, then the substance of bread/wine and the substance of body/blood exist together, introducing the error of consubstantiation; if after the corruption of the species, then bread/wine will exist without its proper accidents, which is repugnant.
It is important to recall that this position in its cruder form (i.e., not explained as the fifth position) is rejected by Catholic theologians. Many of the arguments given by Mr. Hedges in his article are aimed against this third position. The Author would have done better to pass over these in silence and equip himself with arguments against positions that Catholic theologians did not come to universally reject.
With all of the aforementioned positions removed, there remain two solutions to this matter.
We know that we ought not to multiply miracles. Therefore, theologians commonly hold that there is some sort of exigency at the last moment of the corruption of the species that makes the solution to this problem connaturally demanded, whether by some sort of sacramental law, law of providence, or in virtue of the miracle of consecration. Whichever way one explains this, this is not an instance of “multiplying miracles.”
In nature, there are certain cases where there is some exigency for the immediate action of God due to the dispositions for some act being posited. As an example, in the creation of the rational soul by God, when the proper dispositions for such a soul are formed in the fetus (whether immediately at conception or later, it does not matter in this case), it naturally follows that there is an exigency for the immediate action of God in the creation and infusion of the rational soul in the fetus. Cf. Suárez, In III, disp. 57, sect. 3, n. 8; Bellarmine, De sacramento Eucharistiae, lib. III, c. XXIV; Franzelin, Tractatus de SS. Eucharistiae sacramento, thes. XVI, schol. 1; Salmanticenses, disp. VIII, dub. V, § III, n. 55.
The scholastics (both Thomists and others) draw an analogy with the generation and corruption of the Eucharistic Species. God must immediately supply for whatever defect would follow, since there is some real exigency from the dispositions placed in the species. What is done to immediately supply the defect? Here, theologians are divided between two solutions. The most obvious solution would be that God immediately creates the prime matter necessary for the eduction of the following substantial form, naturally following the last instant of the existence of the Eucharistic Species. This is the fifth solution to the problem, commonly followed by Suarezians and (many) Scotists (and even Bl. Scotus himself according to some Scotists).
What are we to think of this solution? St. Thomas and many Thomists call this “probable.” There is no necessary repugnance with this solution. The only difficulty that makes this solution less fitting is the way in which dimensive quantity continues into the generated thing, which is unfitting (although not impossible).
Therefore, there is a second solution that is proposed. We need prime matter from which to educe the form. How are we to find this? From the dimensive quantity that is already there and is the subject of the accidental transmutation that is already occurring, which constitutes the dispositions. In this case, the dimensive quantity is the “vice-matter.”
How does this occur? This is what divides the Thomists. An older group of theologians (and a handful of Thomists) argues that the dimensive quantity itself is that from which the substantial form is educed and that the composite is a composite of dimensive quantity and substantial form. This is the fourth solution and is followed by authors of repute such as Henry of Ghent, Aegidius Romanus, and even Sylvester of Ferrara. Contrary to the claims made by Mr. Hedges, while this was held by Capreolus in his earlier exposition of the Sentences, he later changed to the position taken by later Thomists (In IV Sent., d. 12, q. 1, a. 3, § 3, ad arg. Scoti).
The problems with this position are many. Chief among them is the issue of how exactly we are able to say that there is a substantial composite without prime matter, which is precisely the question that we set out to solve. In this solution, there would be a monstrous composite of quantity and substantial form that can hardly be held without philosophical absurdities. Interestingly, it is precisely against this position (as held by Henry of Ghent) that Bl. Scotus and the Scotists set out their many arguments. Unfortunately, this is not precisely noted by Mr. Hedges in the second section of his article, where he marshals many arguments against the fourth solution that touch neither the fifth solution (taken by Scotists and Suarezians) nor the sixth solution (taken by the vast majority of Thomists).
The later Thomists ingeniously solve this problem in another way, which was commonly received in the school. Rather than arguing that dimensive quantity in its unaltered state takes the place of prime matter, they argue that there is an exigency induced by the accidental transmutation of the species so that God changes the dimensive quantity into prime matter so that the substantial form can be educed. This brilliant sixth solution (more Divine than human) avoids all the problems of the aforementioned solutions: it requires no multiplication of miracles and holds to what is most connatural; it does not require philosophical absurdities in quantity entering substantial composition; and it does not require any sort of annihilation of the species, but a true continuity between the corruption of the species and the generation of substantial form.
Section 4. On Mutation, Generation, and Corruption
Here, the Thomists come to another difficulty. In this case, how is the true and proper notion of mutation preserved? Mutation requires that there be a fundamental unity between the termini in corruption and generation. There must be a certain subject that is preserved throughout the mutation, a form that is introduced in generation, and a privation of this form introduced before generation. In the ingenious sixth solution, it is clear that there is a subject that is preserved throughout; for the very dimensive quantity that is the subject of corruption is divinely changed into the prime matter from which the substantial form is educed in generation. It is here that we also see the weakness of the fifth solution, which is not able to preserve as well the unity of subject between the corruption of the species and substantial generation.
The question arises, upon our close consideration of the problem, of whether we can say that there is truly a privation of the substantial form in this case. When we consider the Eucharistic Species, we see that there is no privation of the substantial form to be educed. Privation is some lack of a due perfection. Prime matter has an appetite for all forms; therefore, whatever substantial form is educed can be said to have had a privation under the other substantial form. Yet, the same cannot be said of quantity, which has no appetite for substantial form and no privation for it, but only a simple lack.
To this difficulty, there are four solutions that could be proposed.
The first solution argues that mutation is not of the essence of generation, but only of its connatural state. This is the simplest solution to the problem at hand. Mr. Hedges offers the following comment on this solution given by many eminent Thomists:
The Salmanticenses attempts to skirt around this difficulty by saying that this real mutation from non-being to being does not pertain essentially to substantial generation, but only in its aptitude. One may see at the outset how they continue to redefine the most basic concepts of metaphysics in order to save their doctrine. In taking this approach, they contradict other Thomists.
This response by Mr. Hedges is one of many instances of a mind that is quite shallowly formed in the principles of scholastic philosophy. When we define terms, there are times in which we include only those essential notes that are proper to them; yet, at other times, we include various notes that are present to the thing in its connatural state or even as it exists in some particular mode (e.g., including “accident” in the definition of a relation, even though it can exist as subsisting).
To question whether an aspect of a definition is an essential note (e.g., rationality in man) or a mere property flowing from the essence (e.g., risibility in man) is not an example of “redefin[ing] the most basic concepts of metaphysics”; it is an example of good scholastic philosophy. The Thomists who hold to this solution argue that this connaturality, as flowing from certain physical laws that are not strictly metaphysical, does not necessarily exist in every instance, because properties that are only physically necessary do not need to exist in something for it to be such a thing except aptitudinally. We use these same principles when analyzing the definition of things in such important doctrines as the Trinity, the Incarnation, the possibility of miracles, etc. If Mr. Hedges wishes to do away with all these as examples of “redefining,” that is his prerogative (irrational as it is), but he is not allowed to use these same tools when he expounds other issues.
I would like to bring three more points to your attention that significantly take away from the force of this article as a whole.
First, by my reckoning, he simply leaves out any other solution to this objection (which should be one of the central points treated in his article). Mr. Hedges spends quite a bit of time attacking solutions that were rejected by the schools and little time “refuting” the positions that are actually held within the schools. Why is this the case? If he is to cite John of St. Thomas on the essence of generation, why doesn’t he quote John of St. Thomas’ solution to this problem found in the same place? It certainly forces us to conclude that the arguments presented in the article are quite weak at sustaining his conclusion, since he leaves many solutions to this problem unanswered.
Second, following upon this, Mr. Hedges does not give any necessary reason for his objection. Shouldn’t this be his central concern? He seems quite aware that this point of whether mutation is of the essence of generation or its connaturality is disputed among the Thomists. He states that the former position is true, but he gives no argument for it whatsoever. What if I follow the Salmanticenses, Complutenses, and many others in denying that mutation is of the essence of generation? While he quotes John of St. Thomas, I do not take the position of John of St. Thomas on all issues. Therefore, his argument is quite unable to force his conclusion. Further, as mentioned in the first point, he does not give any of the resolutions given by Thomists that suppose that mutation is of the essence of generation; therefore, his conclusion does not follow. It does not even have the appearance of following for the casual reader.
Third, related to the first point, from my reading of his arguments, Mr. Hedges’ article lacks such thoroughness that it is nearly devoid of any refutation whatsoever of the fifth position. Admittedly, the reader must remember that it is a Protestant tradition to be terrified by Jesuits, so we must excuse our dear Author for his fault on this point. St. Thomas and the Thomists hold that this position is at least “probable.” Even if Mr. Hedges found some never-before-seen argument that demolishes the sixth position, we would fall back on the fifth position, which we do not hold to be impossible, but even hold to be probable.
The second solution argues that mutation is of the essence of generation, but that we are able to preserve generation by equipollence. Equipollence refers to the state in which there is such a strict similarity between two things that we consider them as one in preserving the logical force of either.
This is very easy to understand and is the exact solution posited by John of St. Thomas. When we speak of mutation, we are simply attempting to articulate some sort of change from one thing to another thing that happens with a fundamental unity between the two, that happens instantaneously, and that terminates in substantial form. All of this is true when we articulate the sixth solution. There is a lack of the substantial form before the mutation, there is a fundamental unity insofar as the dimensive quantity continues in the terminus by conversion to prime matter, and there is substantial form after the mutation. Clearly, by equipollence, there is no other name to give this process than “mutation,” since the privation is present virtually throughout the entire mutation insofar as the quantity is equipollent to prime matter in the Eucharistic Species.
I will await Mr. Hedges’ demonstration of why exactly this solution is not possible.
The third solution argues that mutation is of the essence of generation and that this is preserved by the concept of fundamental privation. While there is no formal privation of the substantial form in the Eucharistic Species, there is a simple lack of the substantial form before the conversion of the dimensive quantity. Now, since there is some obediential potency of the dimensive quantity to be converted to prime matter, we can speak of a privation that is fundamental and remote.
This solution can either be combined with the second solution or taken in isolation from it. If combined with the second solution, we would say that the force of formal privation and the force of fundamental privation are the same in either case; hence, we can equivalently speak of the one present in mutation as the other. This is similar to John of St. Thomas’ solution. If taken in isolation from the second solution, we can argue that the inclusion of privation in the definition of mutation abstracts from formal or fundamental privation, so that the full force of the definition is preserved without an appeal to equipollence.
Again, I will await Mr. Hedges’ demonstration of why exactly this solution is not possible.
The fourth solution argues that mutation is of the essence of generation and that this is preserved by the priority of nature (a quo, not in quo) present in substantial generation. The conversion of the dimensive quantity into prime matter implies that there is some sort of logical priority of the prime matter before the eduction of substantial form. Just as in ordinary generation and corruption, the prime matter is “stripped” of all form, whether substantial or accidental, so also in this case, the converted dimensive quantity stands “stripped” of all form, whether substantial or accidental. This is why Thomists note that there is some priority between generation and corruption (whether properly natural or logical does not matter at this moment). Now, in the case of the eduction of substantial form from the converted prime matter, the prime matter must stand in formal privation to the form educed. Therefore, we can truly verify the notion of privation in our case. In my opinion and the opinion of quite a few eminent Thomists, this last solution stands strongest insofar as it verifies the strictest definition of generation without any equipollence whatsoever.
Again, I will await Mr. Hedges’ demonstration of why exactly this solution is not possible.
Section 5. Individual Objections
It is to be noted from the outset that many of Mr. Hedges’ arguments miss the point in one particular respect. Rather than refuting positions commonly held among Roman Catholic scholastics (i.e., the fifth and sixth positions), he often provides refutations that merely touch certain minority positions that are commonly abandoned after the Baroque period (i.e., the third and fourth positions). To give just one example, we can note the various Scotistic arguments against the “Thomist position” given by Mr. Hedges in the second section of his article. While the Author frames these arguments as “arguments against the Thomistic view that are worth considering,” he fails to note that such a position is extremely rare among Thomistic authors. Many of those quoted as holding this position (Henry of Ghent, Aegidius Romanus) are not even “Thomists” in the strict sense of the term. Another author that is quoted (Capreolus) concedes the Scotistic arguments and then rescinds his previous adherence to the fourth position, holding to the sixth position. The only significant authority in the Thomistic school who holds to this position is Sylvester of Ferrara, who was heavily criticized by the later Thomists, both for holding something that is manifestly contrary to reason AND for holding something that careful exegesis of the texts of St. Thomas (especially in the Sentences Commentary) reveals to be against the mind of St. Thomas.
Therefore, in this section, I simply want to treat those individual objections that I believe may touch upon the sixth position (from my reading, almost none of them even touch upon the “probable” fifth position of the Scotists and Suarezians).
First Objection. “I will argue here that there is a very significant metaphysical problem posed for the Papists here, and also show how, interestingly enough, their theologians and apologists contradict one another vehemently in attempting to escape the argument and solve this problem. The very fact that they argue against one another poses the following strategy for us: we can turn the Roman scholastics and theologians against one another, and mount their arguments against each other in such a fashion as to destroy it from within.”
Response. This fails to understand the approach taken by the Thomists. As St. Thomas himself testified, the fifth position is something that is “probable,” which is also claimed by various Thomists. While they give arguments for why their position is more or less fitting, or why certain solutions to objections are not entirely correct, it is quite silly to claim that these realities are able to fashion tools to “destroy [Catholicism] from within.”
St. Thomas states that the other position is probable in three places. In Quodlibet IX, he states that the third position is a “probable position,” but calls the fifth and sixth positions “plainer” (Quodl. IX, q. 3, a. 1, ad 3). In his Sentences Commentary, he writes about the fifth position that “the opinion can with sufficient probability be sustained” (In IV Sent., d. 12, q. 1, a. 2, qla. 4). In the Summa, he holds that “this position might be sustained,” but ultimately rejects it (ST III, q. 77, a. 5).
This is something that is explicitly stated by later Thomists. The Salmanticenses state the following: “Before we answer this, one must know whether the prime matter which we have said God produces in the instant of generation comes to be by creation, or rather by conversion. In which difficulty the first can be probably sustained, and is insinuated by St. Thomas…But nevertheless it is far more probable that the production of such matter is the conversion of the quantity into that same matter.” (disp. VIII, dub. V, n. 57)
Gonet: “I answer briefly that, although St. Thomas in the place cited above left this undecided and indicated that both are probable, saying that it comes to be either by creation or by conversion, nevertheless it is more fittingly said to come to be from the quantity by conversion than to be created anew.” (disp. VI, a. V)
Billuart: “I answer that this is left undecided by the holy Doctor…and that each is probable. It seems, however, more fitting to say that it is produced by the conversion of the quantity into it.” (diss. I, a. VI, § II)
This is everywhere in the tradition on different solutions to this problem. St. Bonaventure was quite open-minded on this question, arguing that “it is not easy to disprove either [position],” since “each of the aforesaid ways of speaking seems probable enough” (In IV Sent., d. XII, p. I, a. II, q. 1). St. Albert the Great stated, “I prejudge neither [position]…and each can be said quite congruously” (In IV Sent., d. XII, a. 14).
In fact, certain doctors held that the two positions do not actually really differ (while I do not hold this, it illustrates the point). Gregory of Valencia: “Thirdly, some held that at the point of generation new matter is here divinely created. Which opinion St. Thomas…judges probable. And certainly this opinion does not seem to differ in reality from our own, which we explained before. For those who said that matter is created here would not have denied, in the thing itself, that that matter divinely succeeds to the quantity in the office of subject with respect to the dispositions to the form of the generated thing; and since the character of the conversion of the quantity into matter consists precisely in that, neither would they in reality have denied such a conversion here.” (t. IV, disp. VI, q. V, punct. IV)
To turn the argument against the Author, what are we to make of the various disagreements between Reformed scholastics in his tradition, some of which were so violent that they led to bloodshed and political unrest, overturning entire nations? What are we to make of the various disagreements between the Holy Fathers and other authorities that we hold in common? Do these destroy a system or a doctrine from within? Now, how much less does this destroy our Church and our dogma when Thomists hold the other position to be probable and merely fight over the best solutions to certain doubts? I believe that this method is far from admirable and is a species of intellectual laziness, refusing to seek demonstrative arguments for one’s doctrine, a false science that latches onto irrelevancies in order to bolster rhetorical prowess.
Second Objection. “(1) From the corruption of any subject the generation of another thing happens, there necessarily at least is matter, from the potency of which the substantial form of that [new thing] is educted, or ‘drawn out’, as it were. (2) But from the corrupted remnants of Eucharistic bread the generation of another thing happens, namely of worms: therefore there is necessarily there a matter from the potency of which their substantial form is educted. (3). But this matter is not the matter of the body of Christ: Therefore it is the matter of bread which remained unchanged.”
Response. The major premise of the first argument is conceded. The minor premise of the first argument is conceded. The first conclusion (and, consequently, the major premise of the second argument) is conceded. The minor premise of the second argument is conceded. The consequence of the second argument, and therefore the conclusion of the second argument, is denied.
The consequence is false, since there are distinct possibilities besides the matter of the body of Christ. In the fifth opinion, the creation of prime matter occurs by an immutable law due to some exigency following upon the corruption of the Eucharistic Species. In the sixth opinion, the change of the quantity of the bread into prime matter is done by Divine Power, with a similar law and exigency as the fifth opinion.
Neither of these two opinions is excluded by this argument; therefore, the conclusion does not follow from the premises enumerated.
Third Objection. “It is impossible for an accident to pass into the nature of a substance. Those things which do not belong to the same genus cannot be made from one another (for example, you cannot make a line from whiteness), as the Salmanticenses correctly point out: ‘From quantity and substantial form one cannot make a substantial composite that is a being per se.’”
Response. This follows in the line of material cause and in natural potency, which is exactly what the quotation of the Salmanticenses indicates, i.e., the matter with which substantial form composes must be reductively in the genus of substance (i.e., prime matter), or else there would be no substantial composite. This principle does not indicate that, by Divine Power, something could not be changed from one genus to another genus, or that obediential potency is lacking for such a case; for, if God can create something without a presupposed subject in creation, then, a fortiori, from a presupposed subject he can by his omnipotence change something from one genus to another genus; further, due to the entity of quantity, there is an obediential potency for such a conversion.
There is no reason why we couldn’t hold that, while there is no natural potency of quantity to become prime matter, there is an obediential potency for such due to its entity; just as there is no natural potency for the beatific vision in the human intellect, but, due to its extensive object, there is an obediential potency supposing the presence of Divine Power.
It can also be noted that this does not exclude the fifth position.
Fourth Objection. “Quantity is an accident, and matter is not. Quantity has no natural potency to educe a substantial form, for that pertains rather to a natural agent.
If that quantity were converted into the matter of the worm through conversion, and from it the substantial form of the worm were educed, it would follow that they lack quantity, which our very own senses inform us is completely false.”
Response. The first half of the argument only proceeds against the fourth position, which most scholastics (adhering to either the fifth or sixth) deny. In the fifth position and in the sixth position, the eduction of substantial form is from prime matter.
The second half of the argument is a philosophical abomination. As we covered above (which Mr. Hedges should know, since he quotes the eminent Grenier), prime matter is stripped of all substantial and accidental form by corruption and, in generation, the substantial form is educed, which causes, in the line of efficient cause, accidental forms numerically distinct from those before the mutation. Therefore, the issue with this argument is obvious. The worm would not lack quantity, because the quantity after a mutation is numerically distinct from the quantity before the conversion and is brought about from the substantial form. The same problem that he poses for the sixth opinion would destroy all true generation and corruption and negate the stripping of the prime matter as much as it refutes the sixth opinion. Or, if one wanted to hold Soto’s position (which is also held by the Suarezians), he could simply say that the conversion is not into bare prime matter, but quantified prime matter.
Fifth Objection. “If the matter is newly created, this takes place either in the first instant of the generation of the new substance (such as the ashes or worms), or before. It cannot be before, since, as I will say again below, there cannot be the simultaneous coexistence of the body of Christ with the substance of bread or whatever new form takes its place after its corruption. Also, Aquinas and the Thomists deny that any prime matter could actually exist apart from form. But the other alternative has its own problems as well. If the matter is recreated in the instant of generation, then what need is there for a natural agent to generate anything from it, since it cannot do so except from matter that is quantified (so that it is proportioned to the natural agent), which this is not? The only way out of that would be to say that the accidents inhere in matter without any medium in between, which is commonly rejected.”
Response. This is an argument that seems to be posed against the fifth position. This argument confuses logical and temporal order. While generation and corruption occur in the same temporal instant, there is a logical (or, according to some authors, natural) order between corruption and generation (which Mr. Hedges should know from Grenier, who explicitly says as much). The order of the various moments for the fifth position would be the corruption of the species (in which the substance of the body and blood ceases to be under the species, since they are as its “container”), then, in the same temporal moment, the creation of prime matter, then the eduction of substantial form. There is no temporal moment in which prime matter (whether under the Thomist or other reckoning) is devoid of substantial form, but there is a logical order (a quo) between these acts and a logical moment in which such occurs. If this argument, on the principle that prime matter has no existence apart from substantial form, were efficacious against the fifth position, then this would destroy any notion of substantial mutation, since this requires the stripping of prime matter of all substantial and accidental form.
In the second half, we see again the philosophical error of Mr. Hedges. What he does not understand is that, in the Thomistic reckoning of substantial mutation, there is a distinction between those prior dispositions that exist in the substance as corrupted and those proximate dispositions that exist in the engendered substance. These accidents are numerically distinct and, while the latter precedes the substantial form in the order of material and disposing cause, it succeeds it in the order of efficient cause, the proper accidental forms of the substance being naturally and necessarily effected by the presence of the substantial form.
The original accidents do not inhere directly in prime matter, either in the case of the Eucharist or in the case of ordinary acts of generation, because, in ordinary acts of generation, there is a stripping of the accidental forms that is demanded in virtue of the fact that accidental forms ordinarily inhere in something that is actual, which prime matter is not without substantial form. Funnily enough, if he took this to its logical conclusion, he would not even require a miracle for the existence of accidents without a subject in the Eucharist, since he would hold in ordinary generation that accidental forms exist with their own proper existence without any actuality in the line of substance (since prime matter is pure potency)!
While he accuses the scholastics of manifest contradictions, see how contradictory and confused the Author’s attempt is!
Sixth Objection. “The accidents of the newly generated composite would inhere immediately in the quantity itself as their subject (since a true metaphysical conversion requires that the ‘term-from-which’, i.e. that which is converted, ceases), rather than mediately through the quantity, as is the case with the accidents immediately after the consecration (on our opponents’ hypothesis). There can therefore not be any real and proper generation that occurs, on this viewpoint.
Some have attempted to reply that the subject of the mutation remains the same throughout, but according to a priority of nature rather than a priority of time. However, matter is not separated from form even according to such a priority of nature, and if quantity takes the place of matter, it still remains incapable of receiving a form.”
Response. The first half of this argument is simply incoherent. It is difficult to even understand the line of reasoning from the Author. It seems that he is attempting to argue against the fourth position, but understands that numerically identical accidents continue through substantial generation. In any case, nothing follows from this, since we do not concede the principle he is invoking, for accidental forms do not inhere in prime matter, but are stripped from it and come to be from the substantial form as effects in generation.
The second half of this argument touches upon a dispute between Thomists, but poorly reports the positions of the authors (even while he quotes the great Doronzo!). Whether we should speak of the stripping of matter as naturally posterior to corruption and prior to generation (a quo, not in quo) or the stripping of matter as logically posterior to corruption and prior to generation is disputed between Thomists, but everyone agrees with the stripping in principle. The Salmanticenses hold that as much as anyone else in the Thomistic tradition! Even if we were to concede the position of some Thomists that we should only speak of a logical priority, what does it matter? There is still priority, posteriority, and the stripping of matter, each of which refutes the objections given by the Author. The only place where this is relevant (as mentioned above) is the dispute over whether mutation enters into the essential definition of generation or not.
Seventh Objection. “The Salmanticenses attempts to skirt around this difficulty by saying that this real mutation from non-being to being does not pertain essentially to substantial generation, but only in its aptitude. One may see at the outset how they continue to redefine the most basic concepts of metaphysics in order to save their doctrine.”
Response. This objection was already treated above in the fourth section.
Eighth Objection. “Any approach, therefore, that requires the constant multiplication of various new miracles to get out of difficulties (as many of them do in this present situation) has to be rejected as a case of desperate special pleading.”
Response. Here we see the manifest inability of Mr. Hedges to argue against our position, which is quite unfortunate. Earlier in his essay he noted something that we noted above when treating the commonalities of the fifth and sixth positions: “albeit those of the latter opinion say that God does not perform a successive series of new miracles, but that this rather occurs by force of the miracle which has already been accomplished with the consecration. This is the opinion of such figures as Cardinal Franzelin, Gabriel Vazquez, and Suarez.”
This is not merely the opinion of “Cardinal Franzelin, Gabriel Vazquez, and Suarez,” but is something that is repeated by nearly every author in their treatment of this question. When such an act occurs, whether reducing the quantity’s obediential potency for prime matter to act or supplying such prime matter by an act of creation, it is in virtue of the miracle of consecration and not in virtue of a new miracle. The entire point of asking this question in the first place, and of the variety of positions, is to explain how this can occur without a multiplication of miracles and with the connaturality of the components preserved.
If there is a certain exigency present in creation, how is it a miracle for the immediate action of God to be present? Is it the “multiplication of miracles” when God infuses the rational soul into a sufficiently disposed human fetus? No, of course not; there is a certain exigency present in virtue of the sufficient disposition of matter for the creation and infusion of the rational soul. Why, then, is there this inconsistency in respect to Catholic explanations? If there is an exigency present (and there is, since the sufficient prior material dispositions exist in the species immediately before corruption), then how would this one involve the “multiplication of miracles”? Rather, this is something that is as natural as the creation and infusion of the rational soul in the fetus.
If there are any other objections in this article you would like to see me respond to, please comment below and I will get to them.