A note for the reader. I began to research and write this article a while ago. As I expanded my notes more and more, I realized that I could not fit all the information into a single article. I needed to break it up into a series (lest I post a small book on Substack). The first article of this series set the stage for the reader, introducing the main theses that concern the doctrine of “penal substitution” as the tradition defines it. The rest of this series will be a deeper explanation of these theses. This second article begins with an explanation of the effects of sin.
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Introduction
In the first article of this series, I set out the broad outline of the doctrine of Penal Substitutionary Atonement in its Scholastic form. In the remainder of this series, I will simply be explaining how these theses cohere in a synthesis. It is important to note that, when the authors write on Penal Substitution, they are treating the coalescence of different doctrines taken from other tracts of theology and applying them to the question at hand. They are taking theses from the tract on grace, the tract on sin, the tract on the Incarnation, the tract on God, and many others in order to apply these theses to the question at hand.
Unfortunately, the way in which most readers study a question is one of isolation. The same unfortunately applies to many writers. From this perspective of isolation, they are not able to understand how a doctrine fits into the entire synthesis, and they are able neither to resolve questions concerning a doctrine nor to understand entirely its meaning and foundation. To avoid this, I must treat this doctrine with especial care and sometimes dwell on issues that may not seem related to the problem at hand in order to give a sufficient explanation to the reader. For the reader, this will involve patience and a discipline that shuns quick and easy solutions.
Interestingly, what we will see in this article is that a precise consideration of each of these effects of sin and their manner of removal verifies Catholic dogmas that may seem quite disconnected from satisfaction: purgatory, penance, eucharistic sacrifice, justification, etc. From these considerations, the profound unity of the work of Christ and its vital connection with the ‘Catholic system’ stands forth in all its sublimity.
So, where do we start? While some may be tempted to begin with considerations of justice, God, redemption, or the passion itself, none of these is able to provide us with a foundation for considering our problem, logically speaking. To know where to begin, we must remember the axioms that “that which is first in intention is last in execution” and “the end is the cause of causes.” Therefore, when considering the passion under this particular aspect of the removal of sin, we must begin by considering sin, for unless we consider sin and its effects, we will never understand the other matters which are ordered to the removal of sin.
When we treat sin in this fundamental article, we can consider it in two ways: either in itself and in its effects, or in its removal in general. Clearly, the consideration of sin in itself and in its effects comes first, insofar as we will be apt to consider the removal of sin and its effects once we have learned the character of sin and the character of the effects of sin. After we have adequately treated the removal of sin and its effects in general, then we are able to treat the removal of sin and its effects particularly in the work of the passion. After we consider the passion as a particular instrument that removes sin and its effects as its proximate end, we will be able to consider various questions touching the passion historically and analyze how it verifies the concepts laid out in our general treatments.
The Order of the Article
We can consider sin and its effects either from the side of the sinner who commits the sin or from the side of God against whom the sin is committed. From the side of the sinner, there are three effects: the diminution of the good of nature, the stain of guilt, and the obligation to punishment. From the side of the one against whom the sin is committed, there is one effect: offense. When authors wish to distinguish the first category from the second category, the former is simply called the “malice of sin,” while the latter is called the “offense of sin.”
Therefore, there will be two parts to this article. First, we will treat the three effects of sin on the part of the sinner. Second, we will treat the effect of sin on the part of the one sinned against.
Part 1. The Three Effects of Sin on the Part of the Sinner
The most relevant preparatory study to understanding this doctrine concerns the “effects of sin.” St. Thomas treats this in Prima secundae, qq. 85–87, distinguishing three effects: the diminution of the good of nature, the stain of sin, and the debt of punishment.
The Diminution of the Good of Nature
The first (q. 85) of these concerns those defects that are contracted due to original and actual sin which diminish those goods which flow from nature, whether of the body (e.g., death, sickness, etc.) or of the soul (e.g., the loss of the proper ordering of the appetites). On this first point, it is to be noted that the diminutions of the good of nature are inflicted as a punishment for sin. Yet, in the case of Christ, some of these penal defects (i.e., the ones that are not contrary to the perfection of Christ’s humanity, as, e.g., ignorance would be) are voluntarily assumed by Christ in order to redeem mankind. We will return to this first effect when we treat Christ’s penal defects and the material aspect of satisfaction which corresponds to this effect of sin.
These defects can be either of the soul or of the body. When we consider the defects of the soul, we must consider the original state of man, wherein the lower powers of the soul were subjected to the higher power (reason), and reason was subjected to God. By refusing subjection to God in sinning against Him, Adam lost this original justice for himself and for the entire human race; fittingly, the reason that refused subjection to God will now have to suffer from the lower powers refusing subjection to it, causing disorder within the soul. Each of the four powers of the soul (reason, will, irascible appetite, concupiscible appetite) is now in a certain way destitute of its proper order, which is referred to as the wounding of nature:
Inasmuch, therefore, as reason is destitute of its order to the true, there is the wound of ignorance; inasmuch as the will is destitute of its order to the good, there is the wound of malice; inasmuch as the irascible is destitute of its order to the arduous, there is the wound of weakness; inasmuch as concupiscence is destitute of its order to the delightful as moderated by reason, there is the wound of concupiscence. (ST I-II, q. 85, a. 3)
The same principle follows when we consider the defects of the body. The proper order of man not only demands that the lower powers of the soul be subjected to the higher, but also that the body be subjected to the soul. Original justice brought about rectitude of order between the body and soul, so that the body and soul were to be united without corruption, i.e., an immortality that was free from bodily death. Further, the rectitude was so perfect as to subject the bodily members perfectly to reason and to keep the body free from the bodily defects that lead to death. Yet, when original justice was taken away, what followed was the rebellion and corruption of the bodily members against the soul and, ultimately, bodily death, which was inflicted upon us as a punishment for sin:
The sin of our first parent is the cause of death and all such like defects in human nature, insofar as by the sin of our first parent original justice was taken away, whereby not only were the lower powers of the soul held together under the control of reason, without any disorder whatever, but also the whole body was held together in subjection to the soul, without any defect. Wherefore, original justice being forfeited through the sin of our first parent; just as human nature was stricken in the soul by the disorder among the powers, as stated above, so also it became subject to corruption, by reason of disorder in the body. Now the withdrawal of original justice has the character of punishment, even as the withdrawal of grace has. Consequently, death and all consequent bodily defects are punishments of original sin. (ST I-II, q. 85, a. 5)
This is important to consider for two reasons. First, we ought to remember that the evil of punishment is not only something that is inflicted upon individuals for their personal sins, but is also something that falls upon the entire human race as ordained by divine justice. Second, which is even more important, we have to remember that wherever these exist, they have the character of punishment. Therefore, certain authors speak nonsensically when they teach that every punishment, whether eternal or temporal, is removed by Christ in this life. What we suffer in our body has the character of punishment inflicted upon us by God in chastisement for our personal sins and for what remains in us from Adam as the sin of nature. Even baptism, which removes the whole debt of punishment (both eternal and temporal), does not remove the penal inflictions (even while it removes their reatus). Penal afflictions can exist without actual sin (as they do in infants), without the debt of punishment (as they do in the newly baptized), and even without any sin whatsoever (as they do in Christ). Therefore, it is important to consider this as a distinct effect of sin, apart from the stain of guilt and the obligation to punishment.
Christ voluntarily assumes these penal defects in order to make penal satisfaction for sins as our surety. God permits these to remain even in those without an obligation to temporal punishment, in order that we may be conformed to Christ, who had these same penal defects, and win a crown of glory by conquering these afflictions (cf. ST III, q. 69, a. 3). We will return to this later when we consider in more detail the question of the temporal punishment remaining after the remission of sins.
The second and third effects require a much longer treatment, both in themselves and in their relation to one another, and to these we now turn.
The Stain of Guilt (Macula Culpae)
The Stain in General
The second (q. 86) of these, the macula culpae, concerns the privation of the soul’s splendor that follows upon the sinful act and remains after it. St. Thomas explains the name from its use in bodily things, where something bright loses its brightness by contact with something else:
Now the soul of man has a twofold brightness: one from the shining of the natural light of reason, by which it is directed in its acts; the other from the shining of the divine light, namely of wisdom and grace, by which man is also perfected for acting well and fittingly. Now there is, as it were, a certain touch of the soul when it adheres to some things by love. But when it sins, it adheres to some things against the light of reason and of the divine law. Hence the very detriment of brightness arising from such contact is metaphorically called a stain of the soul. (ST I-II, q. 86, a. 1)
From the outset, it is important to clarify a common misconception. Since we often speak of such a stain as a “privation” (which is the absence of a due perfection, e.g., as blindness is to sight), some understand the macula culpae as a mere privation, so as to denote merely the absence of sanctifying grace. Yet, if this were true, one of the consequences of this would be absurd. For, if the macula culpae denoted a mere privation of sanctifying grace, then the stain of different sins in the soul would not differ from one man to another, nor would it differ from one sin to another. Yet, since the macula culpae denotes the adherence to things against the light of reason, we know that the macula is diverse for diverse sins, since diverse sins involve an adherence to distinct creatures in distinct modes. Therefore, St. Thomas concludes that it denotes a privation with order to its cause, so that diverse sins diminish the brightness of the soul in diverse modes, yet without denoting something positive:
The stain is neither something positive in the soul, nor does it denote a pure privation: it denotes a privation of the soul’s brightness in relation to its cause, which is sin; wherefore diverse sins occasion diverse stains. It is like a shadow, which is the privation of light through the interposition of a body, and which varies according to the diversity of the interposed bodies. (ST I-II, q. 86, a. 1, ad 3)
This qualification will become important below, since it is what allows the school to explain how one sinner is more stained than another, though the privation of grace, considered in itself, is one and the same in all.
The consideration of the macula culpae is important in order to explain what remains of the sin after the act of sin has passed. How is the soul continually affected by this transgression? While the first effect of sin explains the punishments imposed for the sin and the third effect explains the obligation to punishment incurred by sin, this second explains the effects for the soul in itself. Catholic theology determines that, even after the act has passed, the stain remains. Even if a man were to forget about the act or were to regret the act, this stain bitterly clings to the soul, defiling him. The only way to remove this stain is by what theologians term “sanctifying grace,” which formally removes this privation. Just as darkness cannot continue so long as light is present, so also the stain of guilt cannot continue so long as sanctifying grace continues:
The stain of sin remains in the soul, even when the act of sin has passed. The reason is that a stain, as has been said, implies a certain defect of brightness through withdrawal from the light of reason or of the divine law. And therefore as long as a man remains outside this light, the stain of sin remains in him; but after he returns to the divine light and to the light of reason, which is done through grace, then the stain ceases. But although the act of sin by which man departed from the light of reason or the divine law ceases, nevertheless man does not at once return to that in which he had been: there is required some movement of the will contrary to the first movement. (ST I-II, q. 86, a. 2)
The analogy that St. Thomas frequently gives for this process is that of local motion. When we move away from something, we do not ipso facto return simply because we stop moving away from it. In a similar way, just because we have stopped the act of sinning does not mean that the stain is eliminated. Further, just because we forget about our journey or regret it, it does not mean that we are any closer to our original location. Rather, what is needed is a contrary motion that brings us back to our original location, a return journey. In this case, it is sanctifying grace. Further, just as our return home by a contrary motion ipso facto excludes our being away from home, so also sanctifying grace ipso facto excludes our having the macula culpae.
Among later theologians, the macula culpae is referred to as “habitual sin” (peccatum habituale), i.e., the state of being a sinner that remains after the sinful act has passed. The Salmanticenses note that St. Thomas never uses this phrase, but always speaks of the same reality under the name of the stain:
The stain (we speak of the stain of mortal sin) is, in reality, not distinguished from what we call habitual sin: it is the same privation of grace, which is called “stain” because it takes away the brightness and beauty which came from the assistance and shining of the divine light, and leaves the soul soiled and unclean; and it is called habitual sin because it is the terminus of the actual sin and remains when that is past, as aversion in facto esse from the last end, and it denominates its possessor habitually a sinner. (Salmanticenses, Cursus theologicus, Tr. XIII, in I-II q. 86, n. 4)
The same identification is common among Thomists, for good reason. The habit stands between act and power, disposing the faculty towards making certain acts with facility. Therefore, the man with the habit of cooking will have his intellect and bodily members well disposed for cooking, so as to perform the act well and with ease. Further, a privation reduces to the same genus as its perfection, as the privation of an act reduces to the genus of act and the privation of a habit reduces to the genus of habit. Now, when we articulate the macula culpae, we are describing the privation of the soul of some habit (i.e., sanctifying grace) in relation to its cause (i.e., actual sins); therefore, there is no better term than habitual sin, “habitual” expressing the genus to which the privation reduces and “sin” expressing the cause of the privation.
What Formally Constitutes the Stain
While all Catholic theologians agree that something remains after the act of sin by which a man continues to be a sinner until he repents, there is a famous dispute over what this is, i.e., what formally constitutes the stain. The positions may be reduced to three.
First, Bl. Scotus holds that after the act of sin nothing real remains in the sinner, neither absolute nor relative, positive nor privative, by which he is called a sinner. What remains in the sinner is only a relation of reason, insofar as the sinner is considered by God and ordained to punishment on account of this act of sin. Therefore, he concludes that the offense, stain, and obligation to punishment are one and the same in reality, differing only by the aspect under which they are considered (cf. Scotus, Ordinatio IV, d. 14, q. 1; also Durandus, In II Sent., d. 42, q. 3). As an illustration, he compares this to a man who offends a great prince. After the offensive act, nothing remains in the offender, but there is something in the prince, who ordains the man to punishment on account of the offensive act.
Second, Suárez and some later authors hold that the stain is constituted by something morally in the soul of the offender, rather than something physical. This moral constituent (formally speaking) is the continual aversion from God as the last end, which is the “voluntary deformity” which remains in the soul. In one ordained to a supernatural end, this includes the privation of grace and charity, which is the material element of the stain (cf. Suárez, De vitiis et peccatis, disp. VIII).
Third, the Thomists hold that the stain is the privation of sanctifying grace (which is the root of the soul’s supernatural brightness) as caused by the actual sin. Billuart gives the received formula of the school:
The stain of mortal sin is the privation of the brightness of grace, or what is the same, of grace itself, connoting the preceding actual sin by which it is caused. … If the stain consisted in the privation of sanctifying grace without respect to the actual sin that causes it, since the privation of such grace is one, indivisible, and of the same species in all, it could not be explained how the stains are many, diverse, and unequal. But, granted that the stain consists in the privation of grace with respect to the actual sin by which it is caused, and the actual sins are many, diverse, and unequal, it is excellently explained how the stains are many, diverse, and unequal. (Billuart, De peccatis, diss. VII, a. II)
The first position is to be rejected for a number of different reasons. First, an ordination to punishment is willed because a man is a sinner, and not vice versa; just as a man is ordained to the punishment of the law because he is a breaker of the law, and is not a breaker of the law because he is ordained to the punishment of the law. God’s ordination to punishment cannot be the cause of a man’s being denominated a sinner, since such an ordination already supposes that he is a sinner. The stain of sin is, as it were, a medium between the act of sin and the obligation to punishment, effected by the act and the foundation for the obligation. Second, even if the ordination to punishment were not decreed, the soul would still be stained and have habitual sin; therefore, the ordination to punishment cannot be the basis for the stain. Third, the damned incur new stains, and habitual sin is further radicated in their souls eternally, yet they do not demerit (since only the wayfarer merits and demerits). Fourth, in justification, while there is a remission of guilt and removal of the stain, the ordination to punishment still remains vis-à-vis temporal punishments. Fifth, and most importantly, the stain of guilt is an evil of guilt, while the ordination to punishment is an evil of punishment. Now, whereas the evil of punishment is a certain good that can be produced by God, the same does not apply to the evil of guilt. Therefore, it is incoherent to teach that these are both distinct aspects of the same thing. Man is not a sinner from the divine will, but he is obligated to punishment by the divine will (cf. Cajetan, In I-II, q. 86, a. 2). Lastly, while not directly condemned, this position is less in accordance with the condemnation of proposition 56 of Baius: “In sin there are two things, the act and the reatus; when the act passes, nothing remains but the reatus, or the obligation to punishment.”
The second opinion arrives quite close to the position of the Thomists, insofar as it holds that the material element of the macula is the privation of sanctifying grace and charity. Yet, it goes too far in assigning a moral element on top of this. For, just as a man is not called just and is not justified by some moral perseverance in an act, but by the presence of a certain habit (i.e., sanctifying grace), so also is a man not called unjust due to some moral perseverance in an act, but by the privation of a certain habit (i.e., the privation of sanctifying grace). Yet, it seems as if there is little difference between the positions (especially when compared to the position of Bl. Scotus). For, even the Thomists admit that the moral permanence of the past act makes the privation voluntary and culpable.
Three Consequences
First, the stain is in the sinner’s own soul, and it is a privation of grace in order to his own act. Therefore, it is the one thing in sin that cannot, by its very nature, be transferred to another. On this point, it is to be noted that the stain of guilt is NEVER said to be taken by Christ. While there are disputes on how we articulate the use of poenae vis-à-vis Christ and His Passion, there is no dispute on this point. Christ could not be deprived of grace, nor could any act of his be the cause of such a privation; and, as we will see, even the obligation which he took upon himself as our surety was not the reatus of one guilty, but the obligation of one who freely undertook to pay another’s debt.
Second, the stain is distinct from the obligation to punishment. The obligation to punishment follows upon the stain while the stain remains; yet the obligation can remain in some way after the stain is removed. This is precisely what we must now consider in the third effect of sin. This is why we say that the macula stands between the act and the obligation to punishment, effected by the act and the foundation for the obligation to punishment. In a similar way, we can say that sanctifying grace stands between God’s justification of the soul and His promise of eternal life, the effect of the former and the foundation for the latter. Therefore, just as we are formally constituted unjust by the privation, so are we formally constituted just by the presence.
Third, as I indicated on the second point, this notion of the macula culpae is quite important for the notion of justification, insofar as the sanctifying grace which is merited by Christ is formally and immediately opposed to this stain. Now, reader, draw out the implication of making the stain really identical to the ordination to punishment on the part of God, and you will see the effects in how we articulate the removal of this in the act of justification. Out of reverence for Bl. Scotus, I will not draw what could be consistently drawn.
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