Defending the Sacrifice of the Mass

Against Protestant Attacks

Over the past few days, Sean Luke from Anglican Aesthetics and I have had a cordial back-and-forth over the sacrifice of the Mass in response to his article titled The Finite Roman Mass vs The Infinite Anglican Mass. The thesis of the article is that the Roman Catholic mass is “finite” insofar as we believe that its fruits of propitiaton are limited (insofar as we believe that temporal debt continues after the reception of the Eucharist). Yet, the Anglican view of the mass is greater insofar as they profess that the fruits of the mass are not limited in this way. Hence, Catholics believe that the mass is “finite,” whereas Anglicans believe that the mass is “infinite.”

While I will not be republishing the entire discussion (which can be read here), I think pointing to some broad outlines of the discussion and some of the ways in which the Scholastics shine in their treatment of the matter will be helpful to the average reader confused by some of the rhetoric against the efficacy and fruits of the Catholic Mass.

It will be helpful to address some preliminaries from the beginning.

First, we must distinguish between the dignity and fruits of the Mass. To the great shame of their school, a handful of theologians followed Bl. Scotus in his denial of the simply infinite dignity of the Mass. Yet, the Thomists and others rejected this position, arguing for its infinite dignity from the infinite dignity of the priest offering (Christ) and the victim offered (Christ). As the Salmanticenses give the state of the question, distinct from this question of dignity is the question of the fruits of the Mass. The dignity concerns our estimation of the meritorious act as considered in itself (i.e., in actu primo), whereas the fruits concern our estimation of the meritorious act as considered in its effects (i.e., in actu secundo).

Second, it is clear enough that the dignity of the Mass is infinite (contrary to the minority of theologians holding the opposite). Yet, concerning the fruits of the Mass, it is evident that these are limited. We can demonstrate this with a demonstratio quia (simply making evident its existence) or with a demonstratio propter quid (making evident both its existence and formal reason).

α) First, the fact that the fruits of the Mass are limited is evident from considering the effects of the Mass. The ends of the Mass are four: adoration, thanksgiving, propitiation, and impetration. Yet, it is evident that these ends of the Mass are actually limited. For these ends do not take place at all times, nor do they take place for all people, nor under all respects, nor with respect to all acts. Rather, it is clear that they are limited in accordance with the one offering. Example: The Church offers the Mass for the salvation of all men and the temporal welfare of the Church, yet many men are damned and the Church is often temporally harmed.

This consideration is so obvious, so spontaneous, that it should arise as a first thought when hearing such rhetoric. Unless one thought that the work of Christ effected all men, at all times, in all its effects, then, for him, the Mass is limited. To pose this question of the limitations of the fruits of the Mass as a distinctively “Roman problem” does not adequately understand the boat we are all in. The Roman theologians simply have the courage to accept by faith what is revealed and to seek understanding from this perspective.

Objection. To this, Sean objects: “Obviously the article was talking about its infinite propitiatory value as opposed to the Roman Mass’s limitation.”

Response. It is evident that everyone must admit the limitation of the propitiatory fruits as well. For it is evident that the propitiatory fruits of the Mass are limited in many ways, just as the propitiatory fruits of the Cross are limited as well. Remember, when we state things like “the Mass is limited in propitiatory fruits,” we are speaking of the act as considered in actu secundo rather than the act as considered in actu primo. In second act, i.e., as actually terminating in the propitiation of sins, the Cross and Mass are clearly limited. Otherwise: a) all men would have their sins forgiven; b) such forgiveness of sins would take place at the instant of the Passion; c) future sins would be forgiven as well. Many Masses include in their intentions the salvation of heretics, yet not all heretics are saved.

β) As to the propter quid of the limitation of the fruits of the Mass, this comes from the nature of a meritorious cause and the liberty of Christ. A meritorious cause is a type of efficient cause insofar as it is an extrinsic cause impressing upon the subject. Unlike the intrinsic causes (form, matter), it does not naturally produce its effect as limited by its nature. Rather, the meritorious cause brings about its effect freely, in the degree and to the extent that the cause pleases. Hence, Christ is supremely free to bring about the fruits of His Passion when, how, and to whom He pleases.

Upon this realization, the entire argument of Sean falls flat. It is illegitimate to argue from the infinite dignity of a meritorious cause in actu primo to the infinite dignity of its effects in actu secundo, since the cause is a free agent. Hence, while the Passion of Christ has the dignity to propitiate each of the sins of each man, He restricts the fruits of His Passion by His own free will.

Again, a meritorious cause does not act like a formal cause. A formal cause naturally expels all of its contraries (e.g., heat expels coldness), yet the same cannot be said of a free agent who is the meritorious cause of certain effects.

Analogy. Analogously, we can consider the supreme liberty of God in creating. Some heterodox theologians, considering the supreme goodness and perfection of God, concluded that God must necessarily create the most perfect world possible (hence, e.g., necessitating the Incarnation). Yet they are wrong, insofar as God is at liberty to terminate or not terminate the necessary act of His will with active indifference in the existence of anything that He creates. This is a supreme perfection insofar as He lacks any dependence on creatures.

The termination of God’s will in this or that creature does not add any intrinsic perfection to the eternal, necessary, immutable, and most good act of will. In a similar way, the ever glorious and most blessed Passion of our Redeemer and Lord gains no honor, no dignity, no worthiness from its termination in this or that object. Rather, its intrinsic dignity is derived from the supreme act of charity offered to His Eternal Father, an act of supreme worship. Hence, we can confidently say — and must ever say with never-ending glory to the Incarnate Lord — that His Passion would be ever glorious and supremely loveable even if it were not to redeem a single sinner. Even if the entire mass of men were to plunge into the depths of hell for eternity, and not a single Deo Gratias were derived from it, the Lamb who was slain would be supremely worthy of the perpetual adoration of all creatures.

Hence, we see that, far from an affront to the supreme dignity of the Passion of Our Lord, the Roman theologians, led by the light of Faith and ever vigilant to avoid the stain of heresy, have been ever careful to preserve it. From this, we see the fruit of Sean Luke’s rhetoric:

1. The liberty of the Incarnate Word is diminished insofar as He is not at liberty to restrict the degree in which the fruits of His Passion are communicated, which is an exercise of His supreme liberty and prudence.

2. The intrinsic dignity of the Mass is diminished insofar as it is not sufficiently achieved in actu primo, but also requires its termination in actu secundo.

Objection 1. Sean: “The limitation on the remission of temporal punishment doesn’t apply to the newly baptized so long as they have faith whatsoever… For the exact same reason this should apply in Baptism — since it is the life of Christ, who is the God-Man and thus whose life is always infinitely more lovely than sin is ugly — it should apply here.”

Response. Indirectly, this argument proves too much. Each of the ends of the Mass takes place in virtue of the infinite charity of Christ in His life and Passion, i.e., such is their meritorious cause. Hence, if we were to argue that propitiation takes place in an infinite degree for such and such an individual, then we would also have to argue the same for the other fruits of the Mass. Yet nobody admits this as a consequence. Hence, the argument fails.

Directly, this argument suffers from a confusion between the meritorious cause of our redemption (i.e., the Passion of Christ) and the formal cause of our justification (i.e., sanctifying grace). The former is restricted in its effects according to the degree appointed by Christ, as discussed above; hence no argument can be drawn from its nature. The only conclusion that could be drawn from the principle that “the life of Christ… is always infinitely more lovely than sin is ugly” is that such a life can merit the remission of sin in an infinite degree. This is disputed by nobody. Yet that it attain this effect to the same degree in actu secundo is an illegitimate conclusion, as discussed above. Second, if he means sanctifying grace (i.e., the gift as it terminates in the justified man), then the conclusion is false, since there is no formal opposition between sanctifying grace and temporal debt. Hence, from its very nature, sanctifying grace does not expel temporal debt.

Objection 2. This contradicts the view of SS. Thomas Aquinas, Robert Bellarmine, etc., that it is the limited devotion of the ministers which limits the fruits of the Mass.

Response. When reasons are assigned for things, we may assign either more proximate or more remote and ultimate reasons. Hence, e.g., when we speak of the justification of a man, we may speak of it either as from his faith (more proximate) or from the predestinating will of God (more remote and ultimate). In a similar way, we can speak of both the limitation of ministers and the sovereign will of Christ as reasons for the limited fruits of the Mass, yet the latter is ultimate. The liberty of Christ is exercised in accordance with the laws of prudence and in a reasoned manner. Hence, He limits the fruits of His offering in accordance with reasonable considerations (e.g., the devotion of the ministers). Hence, it would be better to speak of Christ limiting the fruits of His Passion in light of the fervor of the offerer than to speak of the fervor of the offerer limiting the fruits of His Passion.