Cardinal Müller's SSPX Error

On Jurisdiction and Holy Orders

Introduction

Cardinal Gerhard Müller, former Cardinal-Prefect of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, recently said the following: “The authority to forgive sins is conferred by Christ Himself in the sacrament of Holy Orders, not by the Pope through his primacy of jurisdiction…”

This was in the midst of answering a question concerning the validity of sacramental confessions at SSPX chapels. Hence, this is simply a premise in the midst of a larger argument by His Eminence. In this article, I do not wish to question the conclusion that he draws from this premise, but the very premise itself: the idea that the authority to absolve is granted in ordination, rather than requiring that it be granted as an act of the power of jurisdiction.

It is important to remember that Cardinal Müller is a prince of the Church and a prominent theologian. It is better to assume that he has misspoken on this matter than to impute error. Yet, as I will note, this question is a much more detailed one than many commentators on the statement of His Eminence have realized. Hence, we ought to set this question forth in all its clarity.

The Power of Orders and Power of Jurisdiction

In order to understand the dispute, we must understand a basic distinction in sacramental theology.

a) The power of orders (potestas ordinis) is the power of administering sacred things, especially the sacraments. It is given by Christ in the sacrament of orders. This is something that consists in the sacramental character that permanently (”indelibly”) resides in the soul of the priest as a participation in Christ’s priesthood. The sacramental character gives the priest the ability to do things like consecrate the Eucharist.

While this potestas ordinis grants a participation in the priesthood of Christ and an ability to bless, consecrate, anoint, etc., it does not give the authority that might be possessed by a ruler or judge. The priest, from his orders, does not have the authority to command me to obey, rule my actions, or impose any sort of moral obligation on me towards him. Hence, there is a second power in the Church:

b) The power of jurisdiction (potestas jurisdictionis) grants a certain executive power. From this, there is a certain right to establish law and a corresponding obligation of others to obey. One is now able to command, to rule, and to judge over the flock over whom he has jurisdiction. This is most obvious when it comes to offices that grant jurisdiction in the external forum, e.g., a pastor over a parish, an ordinary over a diocese, or the pope over the Church. Yet, this can take a number of different forms, including power over the internal forum, e.g., acts of judging sins.

To give a stark example, the Papacy is an office that is constituted primarily by the power of jurisdiction, not by an order. It is for this reason that a layman, elected Pope, upon receiving the election, would still be Pope and have the power of jurisdiction, even without Holy Orders. This same distinction between election and ordination can also occur for parish priests and ordinaries of dioceses.

Further, this is also why many Protestant arguments pointing to a multiplicity of Bishops in Rome throughout her history do little in disproving the Papacy (since we do not claim a unity of those with x grade of Holy Orders in Rome, but a unity of one with the supreme power of jurisdiction in the Church).

The Possible Questions

It is clearly required that one who validly absolves be a priest (i.e., have the potestas ordinis), yet we can ask further questions about the potestas jurisdictionis.

First, does the priest even need the potestas jurisdictionis to validly absolve? Namely, whether the absolving priest needs both powers, or whether a priest can absolve with holy orders alone.

Second, is this potestas jurisdictionis dependent on ecclesiastical authority? This asks the further question about the instrument in granting the potestas jurisdictionis: is it something that is antecedent to the grant of the Church and given in ordination, or is it something that is consequent to the grant of the Church?

Third, what is the mode of dependence of the potestas jurisdictionis on the Church? This asks whether the Church causally confers the potestas jurisdictionis on the priest, or whether the Church merely removes an impediment to its exercise, which is partially caused by the potestas ordinis.

As we can see, the question of the relationship between the potestas jurisdictionis, ordination, and valid confessions is not so simple. While answering wrongly on some of these questions garners grave censures and constitutes teaching that is clearly contrary to the declarations of the Church, other questions have been answered differently by different theological schools.

The First Question

First, there is the opinion of the Protestants, who (for the most part) deny the distinction and hence do not believe that it is necessary. These are obviously incorrect.

Second, there is the opinion of certain pre-Tridentine theologians who so weaken the potestas jurisdictionis that they hold that it practically consists in declaring forgiven those sins that are already forgiven through contrition.

Third, Catholic authors after Trent universally hold that the potestas jurisdictionis is necessary for the validity of absolution.

The relevant documents of the Church will be contained among those cited concerning the second question.

The Second Question

First, there is the opinion of the Jansenists, who hold that the potestas jurisdictionis has no dependence on the Church, being given in the very ordination of priests itself.

Second, there is the opinion of a minority of Catholic theologians who hold that the potestas jurisdictionis is ordinarily dependent on the Church, but in certain cases (e.g., danger of death) the power of orders sufficiently grants jurisdiction. This was even held by some Thomists, such as Capreolus, Cajetan, Cano, and Soto.

Others say that in non-necessary matters, there is no notion of jurisdiction; hence, it is granted by the power of orders. Although there is significant disagreement, some holding it of venial sins alone, others of venial sins and previously confessed mortal sins, and still others of all sins when the confession is taken freely (i.e., when the law of the Church does not require it). The arguments given are various; hence, I will not recount and refute each of them.

Third, the common and certain opinion is that the potestas jurisdictionis is granted by the Church for all sins, both necessary and non-necessary. Doronzo states that the former doctrine on necessary matter is theologically certain due to the teaching documents of the Church, while the latter doctrine on non-necessary matter is common and cannot be denied without temerity.

This is taught by the Fourth Lateran Council (D 437), the Council of Florence (D 699), and the Council of Trent (Session 14, cap. vii; Session 23, cap. xv), along with the Roman Ritual and Code of Canon Law (e.g., in the 1917 Code, can. 872f). There is also Bl. Innocent XI’s rejection of the opinion that simple priests have the authority to absolve from venial sins without proper jurisdiction (Cum ad aures of Feb. 12, 1679).

Hence, the praxis of the Church (as recorded by Lateran IV) from the 8th century to the Council of Trent has generally been that one could not receive valid absolution from a priest who is not his own without proper permission (cf. St. Thomas, ST.IIISup.Q8.A4-5, ContraImpu.C4). Further, there is also the case of the reservation of certain sins to a higher grade (whether Episcopal or Papal), which has been continuously vindicated by the Church against many heretics who sought to deny this authority.

Trent places under anathema the teaching that the absolution of a sin reserved to the bishop, given by a simple priest, is valid. From this, it immediately follows that the jurisdiction to validly absolve comes from the hierarchy of the Church. For this reason, certain theologians declare the doctrine de fide, although (since it is a conclusion) it is better to follow Doronzo in his judgment that this is merely theologically certain.

Yet, the clearest example is found in Pius VI’s condemnation of the errors of Jansenism in Auctorem fidei: “The teaching of the synod, which declares concerning the authority for absolving received through ordination that ‘after the institution of dioceses and parishes, it is fitting that each one exercise this judgment over those persons subject to him either by reason of territory or some personal right,’ because ‘otherwise confusion and disturbance would be introduced’; since it declares that, in order to prevent confusion, after dioceses and parishes have been instituted, it is merely fitting that the power of absolving be exercised upon subjects; so understood, as if for the valid use of this power there is no need of ordinary or delegated jurisdiction, without which the Tridentine Synod declares that absolution conferred by a priest is of no value,—false, rash, dangerous, contrary and injurious to the Tridentine Synod, erroneous.”

The Third Question

There are three opinions as to the third question, each of which is held by Catholic authors. All concede that the Church grants the potestas jurisdictionis, yet each in a different way.

The first opinion holds that the Church simply removes an impediment so that the potestas jurisdictionis may be in act. Hence, according to this opinion, the potestas ordinis grants the habitual possession of the potestas jurisdictionis, but not the actual possession of such. Many authors hold with this opinion that, without the prohibition of the Church, the potestas ordinis naturally flows into act and grants the potestas jurisdictionis. Yet, since the Church has positively decreed that there be an impediment by a right given to it by Christ, there is an impediment that must be removed, the Church acting as an impediment or as a condition, yet not as a cause.

The second opinion, on the other hand, holds that the Church grants the potestas jurisdictionis as a cause mediating this power, but as completing what is in partial act already given in the potestas ordinis in an inchoate manner. Hence, the Church and potestas ordinis act as partial causes of the potestas jurisdictionis. This opinion, contrary to the first, holds the Church as a true cause; yet, contrary to the third, it holds that, antecedent to the grant of the Church, the potestas jurisdictionis is in partial act.

The third opinion holds that the potestas ordinis does not grant the potestas jurisdictionis in any way, whether habitually or inchoately. Rather, ordination simply grants the potestas ordinis, and the Church grants the potestas jurisdictionis. From this, it is concluded that there is a perfect distinction between the two powers. Yet, it should not be said that there is no relation whatsoever between the two powers. These authors hold that the potestas ordinis has a certain aptitude towards the potestas jurisdictionis insofar as the latter completes the former as providing the full and perfect power for the sanctification of men and the worship of God. This is the opinion held by the most eminent authors: St. Albert the Great, St. Thomas (ST.IIISup.Q8, ST.IIISup.Q17.A2.Rep2, ST.IIISup.Q19.A6, ST.IIISup.Q20.A1.Rep1, ST.II-II.Q39.A3, SCG4.C72, QXII.Q18.A1, etc.), St. Bonaventure, Suarez, Lugo, the Salmanticenses, Billuart, St. Alphonsus, etc.

Certain authors (e.g., Lugo) hold that the opinions seem to differ merely in manner of speaking insofar as an aptitudinal jurisdiction could also be described as an inchoate jurisdiction (although remote and not proximate), or, as the Salmanticenses and Billuart say, provides a moral, but not a physical, power of jurisdiction.

Conclusion

Unfortunately, the statement by His Eminence is not entirely clear. If, by this, Cardinal Müller meant to indicate that the potestas ordinis grants the potestas jurisdictionis in a certain sense (whether in an inchoate manner or habitually), then this is a minority opinion that is held by certain theologians. Yet, it is difficult to take it in this sense. For His Eminence quite clearly denies that it is given “by the Pope through his primacy of jurisdiction” and uses this to reject that the Pope could remove this power from the Society. Hence, without clarification, it seems quite clear that His Eminence has fallen into the error of those who affirm that the potestas jurisdictionis is given in act with the potestas ordinis, the opinion held by the Jansenists.