Against the New Laxism
The Synthesis of Moral Errors
It is common today to use the term “laxist” as a pejorative for someone who has low moral character, not paying close attention to their own conformity to the law of good morals. It is meant to indicate someone who is morally lazy. On the other hand, the term “rigorist” has a similarly practical bent, indicating that someone is so stringent in their effort to conform to the moral law as to become pragmatically useless. Whereas the “laxist” is a morally lazy, the rigorist is a moral workaholic.
Yet, in Catholic Theology, when we refer to someone as a “laxist” or a “rigorist,” we do not at all mean to impugn their character, or make a judgement about their own diligence in conforming to the moral law. Rather, the terms are meant to indicate how moral judgements are formed. These are known as “moral systems.” “Laxism” and “rigorism” are not meant to indicate an excess of defect in moral effort, they are meant to indicate a speculative error about when and how we can act without sin.
When we are certain about a moral prohibition or command, it is obvious that we are obligated to either omit the act (in the case of a prohibition) or perform the act (in the case of a command). This is quite obvious. Yet, it is also obvious that there are times in which we are not sure about the moral character of an act. In this case, we have a “doubting conscience.” When such a “doubting conscience” occurs about moral prohibition/command, what are we supposed to do?
In the last five centuries, theologians have had much to say about how a doubting conscience can be healed, forming systems such as compensationism, laxism, probabilism, equi-probabilism, probabiliorism, tutorism, etc. Yet, there is a “new laxism” (which can be called “hyperlaxism”) that is quite popular among Catholics today, which attempts to jump the ship altogether by simply denying that such a conscience needs healing. Under their system (if it can be called such), the “doubting conscience” stands for them as an infallible guide, alongside the teaching authority of the Church.
For the new laxists, a conscience can only be rendered practically certain by the teaching authority of the Church. If there is a certain command or prohibition of the Church, then the conscience binds. Otherwise, the conscience is doubtful. With this error in place, they deny the (universally held) premise that it is unlawful to follow a doubting conscience (cf., McHugh and Callan, Moral Theology, n. 640f).
In this way, they surpass the errors of the old laxists. Previously, all moral theologians were in agreement, laxist, rigorist, and everyone in between, that a doubting conscience could not be followed. Hence, there was common ground between all parties involved. Yet, the “new laxism” goes a step further than any of the old laxists, refusing to even grant this ground.
Paradoxically, this new laxism has a darker side that brings it to the side of rigorism. On the one hand, the new laxists follow a doubting conscience. Yet, on the other hand, they believe that a doubting conscience can only be healed by the most rigoristic standards. Many of the new laxists demand that they be shown an infallible determination of the Church in order to render the conscience certain. The conscience cannot be made certain by evident reason, the plain sense of scripture, the authority of the saints, the consensus of moral theologians, or even the non-infallible judgements of the Church. While some will concede one or other of these means (e.g., many will allow for the authority of a pastor), this is only an inconsistency in following to its logical conclusion what is preached by the New Laxists.
The effects of this new laxism are monstrous on the spiritual life. Simultaneously, it begets a conscience that is scrupulous and a conscience that is tepid. The conscience becomes scrupulous insofar as the new laxism advocates for obedience to a doubting conscience. The man becomes tepid insofar as the new laxism casts the obligations of conscience onto few aspects of his life. Beside all this, the man becomes rigid insofar as he imagines the conscience only bound by the strictest laws of rigor. Hence, on the one hand, he cannot imagine that another has been bound in conscience where he has not, unless that man is a rigorist and an extremist, or at least a scrupulant. Yet, on the other hand, anyone who dissents from him is viewed as immoral and lax.
