A Thomistic Guide to the Trinity

Gonet's Treatment

Around a year ago, I wanted to go over again some texts on the doctrine of the Trinity to keep my memory fresh on the topic. As part of this, I wanted to translate Jean’-Baptiste Gonet’s Manuale Thomistarum, since it is meant to provide a basic and succinct treatment of the topic. I thought it would be a helpful work to teach from or to print.

Well, when my daughter was born this summer, I never resumed my translating. Hence, the tract remained partially translated, covering: (a) the truth of the Trinity, (b) the knowability of the Trinity, and (c) on the Divine Processions. While I did end up finishing Charles-Rene Billuart’s treatment in his Summa Summae for my Complete Course in Thomistic Theology, Gonet’s treatment is FAR superior in every way possible. Perhaps I will finish it in the future, but here is what I have so far (unedited). Apologies on the excess parentheses. I just include as much as possible before editing.

INTRODUCTION

This mystery is not undeservedly called by [St. Gregory] Nazianzus “the most sacred enigma,” whose perfect understanding must be deferred until the clear vision of God. Hence, it is not without purpose that in the Gospel it is said that someone came by night to his friend and asked: “Friend, lend me three loaves” [cf. Lk. 11:5], which is nothing other than the knowledge (cognitionem) of the Trinity, which is the true food of the soul, as [St.] Augustine teaches, in Sermon 29 de Verbis Domini. Truly, he comes by night because the investigation of the three Persons in Unity is obscure and shadowed, so long as we are in this mortal life, and belongs more truly to the Blessed than to those still journeying here below. This perhaps was also indicated under a mystery in Genesis 18, when it is said that Abraham was at the door of the tabernacle, when he saw three and adored one, just as when the soul then begins to behold the unity of nature in the Trinity of Persons, when, placed at the final moment, it departs from the tabernacle of the body. Wherefore Augustine fittingly says, Book 7 of De Trinitate: “The Trinity is to be held by faith, until He shines forth in our hearts, who says through the Prophet: ‘Unless you believe, you shall not understand’ [Isa. 7:9].” Therefore, in the thorough investigation (pervestigando) of this mystery, the anchor of faith must be held firmly, whence, before we engage the scholastic difficulties and dispute with the scholastics concerning the processions, relations, and the Divine Persons and their properties, so that the faith and truth of so great a mystery may be more firmly established in our hearts and the principal errors of heretics against it may be shattered at the threshold of this Treatise, we have judged that certain points concerning its truth and cognoscibility ought to be set forth, by way of preamble to the scholastic difficulties.

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CHAPTER 1. ON THE TRUTH OF THE MYSTERY OF THE MOST HOLY TRINITY

The faith of this mystery consists principally in this: that we firmly believe and profess one God subsisting in three Persons; whence, in order that the truth of this may be established, there must first be proved the real distinction and plurality of the Persons, against Sabellius; and then their consubstantiality, against the Arians and Macedonians.

§ I. There is in God a real distinction of Persons.

This truth is, in the first place, insinuated three times in the first chapter of Genesis. First, when it is said: “In the beginning God created heaven and earth” (Gen. 1:1); for in Hebrew, it is rendered “Elohim created,” that is, “the Gods” or “the Judges.” By the word “created” (which is in the singular number) the unity of the Divine nature is designated, and by the word “Elohim” (which is in the plural number), the plurality of the Divine Persons is designated. Second, by the following words: “Be light made. And light was made. And God saw the light that it was good” (Gen. 1:3–4). For, as St. Thomas notes in ST.I.Q74.A3.Rep3, the Person of the Father is insinuated in God saying “Let there be light;” the Person of the Son, in the word by which it is said; and the Person of the Holy Spirit, in the complacency whereby “God saw the light that it was good.” Third, when it is said later in the same chapter: “Let us make man to our image and likeness... And God created man to his own image and likeness” (Gen. 1:26–27). For that alternation between plural and singular number is no obscure signification of the mystery of the Trinity. This is confirmed even by what the Jews respond, namely that God spoke with Himself and, stirring Himself to action, said: “Let Us,” etc. Thus, [St.] Basil, in the Ninth Homily on the Hexaëmeron said that “their words contain a manifest absurdity. Where is the smith, the carpenter, the shoemaker, who, without help and alone before the instruments of his trade, would say to himself; let us make the sword, let us put together the plough, let us make the boot? Does he not perform the work of his craft in silence? Strange folly, to say that any one has seated himself to command himself, to watch over himself, to constrain himself, to hurry himself, with the tones of a master!”

The same truth is proven by the words of the Prophet in Psalm 32: “By the word of the Lord the heavens were established: and all the power of them by the spirit of his mouth.” For by the name “Lord” is understood the Father, whose is the Word, and who operates through the Word, the first Person of the most holy Trinity. The Word, by whom all things were made, is the Son, the second Person. Finally, the third is the Spirit of the mouth of God, to whom, in a singular manner, the perfection of divine works is attributed. Hence [St.] Jerome remarks: “The majesty of the Trinity is most clearly declared in these words: Lord, Word, Spirit of the Lord.” And [St. Gregory of] Nyssa, in Oratio Catechetica, Chapter 4: “By these words, the mystery of truth is established, which dictates that the Word is to be spoken of according to essence, and the Spirit according to hypostasis.” The same mystery is expressed in Psalm 66, where it is said: “May God have mercy on us, and bless us: may he cause the light of his countenance to shine upon us…May God bless us: and all the ends of the earth fear him.” [cf. Ps. 66:2, 8]. Concerning which [St.] Jerome also says: “May God the Father bless us; Our God, the Son—for He is indeed our God. And Isaiah says: ‘And thou shalt call his name Emmanuel,’ that is, God with us [Is. 7:14]. Our God bless us: God the Holy Ghost. See the mystery of the Trinity contained within a single verse.” But lest, in naming God, one should suppose that three Gods were being spoken of, he immediately added, thereby insinuating unity, “And let all the ends of the earth fear him.”

Finally, Isaias 6: “Holy, Holy, Holy, the Lord God of hosts” the Seraphim cry out, one to another. In this, the Trinity of Persons is designated by the thrice-repeated name “Holy”; and the unity in essence is signified by the singular form of the words “the Lord God of hosts”. Hence, St. Ambrose speaks splendidly in Book 2 of de Fide ad Gratianum: “What means this threefold utterance of the same name ‘Holy?’ If thrice repeated, why is it but one act of praise? If one act of praise, why a threefold repetition? Why the threefold repetition, unless that the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are one in holiness? The seraph spoke the name, not once, lest he should exclude the Son; not twice, lest he should pass by the Holy Spirit; not four times, lest he should conjoin created beings [in the praise of the Creator]. Furthermore, to show that the Godhead of the Trinity is One, he, after the threefold ‘Holy,’ added in the singular number ‘the Lord God of Sabaoth.’”

The same truth is clearly declared in the New Testament, especially in Matthew 28: “Baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost” (Matth. 28:19). And in First John 5: “And there are three who give testimony in heaven: the Father, the Word, and the Holy Ghost” (I Ioan. 5:7).

Nor is the subterfuge of Sabellius of any value, who says that those things in Scripture which signify a distinction of Persons ought not to be referred to a diversity of the persons themselves in se, but rather to a difference of offices or actions of the same Persons, as though the same Person, insofar as unbegotten and the principle of creation, is called the Father; insofar as incarnate, is called the Son; and insofar as sanctifying the creature, is called the Holy Ghost, this, as it were, by a kind of extension or diffusion of the same person into various effects. This evasion, I say, does not hold: first, because Scripture in various places admits a true Paternity and Sonship in God, as is evident from that passage in First John 5:20: “That we may be in his true Son”; but where there is true Paternity and Sonship, there must be a distinct Suppositum or Person, since these are relatively opposed. Hence the excellent saying of Tertullian in Contra Praxean, Chapter 10: “In order that I may be a husband, I must have a wife—not be my own wife. So too, in order that I may be a Father, I must have a Son; I am not my own Son.” Further, because Scripture places generation and procession within the Divinity as prior to all created things, and prior to both the Incarnation and the sanctification of creatures: for the Son is said to be begotten before the day star [cf. Ps. 109:3], and Divine Wisdom to have proceeded from the mouth of the Most High before all creatures [cf. Eccli. 24:5], and theWord to have been in the beginning with God, and that through him all things were made [cf. Ioan. 1:1,3].Therefore, within God Himself there is a true and real distinction of Persons, and not merely a difference in connotation or in relation to ad extra effects, or to the Incarnation. Thus, Pope [St.] Leo the Great speaks excellently in Epistle 93 [15]: “the Catholic faith acknowledges the Trinity of the Godhead to be of one essence (ὁμοούσιον) in such a way that it believes the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost indivisible without confusion, eternal without time, equal without difference: because it is not the same person but the same essence which fills the Unity in Trinity.”

The same truth can be proposed by a threefold congruency. First, it is necessary that in God there be found perfect friendship, since this is a simple perfection, unmixed with any imperfection. But friendship cannot be preserved without a real distinction between the one loving and the one loved, since it implies mutual love and equality, as the Philosopher teaches in the Book 5 of Ethics, Chapter 3. Hence Gregory says in Homily 17 in Evangelia that charity cannot exist with fewer than two; therefore, there is in God a real distinction of Persons.

Second, the supreme good must communicate itself in the highest mode. But without a real distinction of Persons, the supreme communication of God cannot be preserved, since a real distinction is required between the one who communicates and the one to whom the communication is made. Therefore, a real distinction of persons must be admitted in God. Hence [St.] Cyril in Book 2 of the Thesaurus wrote that “there cannot be perfect Deity, unless it have a Son, and bring forth from itself its own fruit.”

Third, God is most perfectly felicitous; and since there is no perfect joy nor true felicity without societas, there must exist in Him a true and perfect societas. But if the real distinction of Persons is removed, there can be no perfect societas in God, since creatures are dissimilar to God and have not existed from eternity. As St. Thomas argues, “although the angels and the souls of the saints are always with God, nevertheless, if plurality of persons did not exist in God, He would be alone or solitary. For solitude is not removed by association with anything that is extraneous in nature; thus anyone is said to be alone in a garden, though many plants and animals are with him in the garden. Likewise, God would be alone or solitary, though angels and men were with Him, supposing that several persons were not within Him.” (ST.I.Q31.A3.Rep1) Therefore, a plurality of persons in God is to be admitted.

The arguments of the Sabellians were drawn from those places in Scripture where God is said to be “alone.” For example, Deuteronomy 32: “See ye that I alone am, and there is no other God besides me” (Deut. 32:39). But to this it is easily answered: that the term “alone” removes from God only the plurality of gods, not the plurality of Persons, who subsist in one and indivisible essence. Hence the excellent statement of Bernard in Book 5 of De Consideratione: “Nor do we forsake this profession of the Unity by our upholding of the doctrine of the three Persons, since, when we speak of the Trinity, we do not mean a multiplicity of gods any more than in speaking of unity we imply loneliness. Wherefore, when I speak of One I am not disturbed by the consideration of number, which does not multiply the essence, nor change it, nor divide it. Again, when I speak of three things, if I view them as one, whatever the three things may be, I am not proved wrong. Nor, if I speak of the three Persons of the Godhead, am I obliged to confound the Persons, or reduce the three to the One.”

§ II. The Consubstantiality of the Divine Persons Shown by Scripture

Concerning the First Person [of the Trinity], no one has ever doubted that He is truly God; for, as Augustine says Book 2 of De Trinitate: “The Father is God, as even all heretics concede.” Therefore, what remains is only the proof of the divinity of the Son against the Arians, and of the Holy Ghost against the Macedonians; and once these are proven, the consubstantiality of the Divine Persons will be maintained.

First Conclusion. The second Person of the Trinity is of the same substance and nature as the Father.

First Proof. This is proven first from that passage in John 10, where Christ, speaking of Himself, says: “I and the Father are one” (John 10:30). That He is speaking of unity of essence is clear from the immediately preceding words: “My Father, who hath given them to me, is greater than all” (John 10:29); for nothing surpasses all things except perfect divinity. Hence Augustine, in Sermon 56 De Verbis Domini, says: “Let the Arians hear that He said ‘one’; let the Sabellians hear that He said ‘we are’; and let neither group, by denying either equality or distinction, be found vain.” Certain interpreters of Scripture rightly observe that Christ, in saying “I and the Father are one,” named Himself before the Father, a construction which might appear to exhibit a kind of discourtesy, were it not that He said this to overturn that heresy which He foresaw would arise in the Church: namely, that which claimed the Father was prior to the Son in time, dignity, and power.

Second Proof. This is proven secondly from those places in Sacred Scripture in which Christ is called “true God” (1 John 5:20), “great God” (Titus 2:13), and “God over all” (Romans 9:5). For these passages clearly declare that He is God not by participation, adoption, or imitation, but by His own nature, and therefore equal to the Father and consubstantial with Him. Hence the Apostle says in Philippians 2:6: “Who being in the form of God, thought it not robbery to be equal with God.” And in Psalm. 109:1, in order to signify the same equality of the Son with the Father, the Son is said to sit at the right hand of the Father: “The Lord said to my Lord: Sit thou at my right hand,” as [St.] Augustine noted in that very place. [St. John] Chrysologus also acutely observed in Sermon 58 that just as in that Psalm the Father says to the Son: “Sit thou at my right hand,” so too the Father is said to sit at the right hand of the Son: “The Lord at thy right hand” (Ps. 109:5), in order to denote that between the Father and the Son there is an equal degree of honor. He stated, “thus the Son of God sits at the right hand, in such a way that the Father does not sit at the left: for the divine confession is unique and singular, wherein the heavenly power admits nothing left-handed.”

Third Proof. The conclusion is proven thirdly from that passage in John 1: “In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God” (John 1:1). For, as Ambrose excellently says in Book 1 of De Fide Trinitatis: “In this short passage our fisherman has barred the way of all heresy. For that which was ‘in the beginning’ is not comprehended in time, is not preceded by any beginning. Let Arius, therefore, hold his peace. Moreover, that which was ‘with God’ is not confounded and mingled with Him, but is distinguished by the perfection unblemished which it has as the Word abiding with God; and so let Sabellius keep silence. And ‘the Word was God.’ This Word, therefore, consists not in uttered speech, but in the designation of celestial excellence, so that Photinus’ teaching is refuted. Furthermore, by the fact that in the beginning He was with God is proven the indivisible unity of eternal Godhead in Father and Son, to the shame and confusion of Eunomius. Lastly, seeing that all things are said to have been made by Him, He is plainly shown to be author of the Old and of the New Testament alike; so that the Manichæan can find no ground for his assaults. Thus has the good fisherman caught them all in one net, to make them powerless to deceive, albeit unprofitable fish to take.”

The arguments of the Arians were of no real weight, for they argued in this way: The Father is said to be greater than the Son, John 14: “The Father is greater than I” (John 14:28); and in First Corinthians 15, the Son is said to be subject to the Father (cf. I Cor. 15:28); and in Philippians 2, He is said to be obedient to Him (cf. Phil. 2:8); and in Mark 13, Christ says that He does not know the day of judgment (cf. Marc. 13:32); and in John 5, that He can do nothing of Himself (cf. John 5:19). But these statements, they say, are incompatible with the equality and consubstantiality of the Son with the Father. Therefore, they conclude, the Son is not equal to the Father, nor consubstantial with Him.

Truly, if this argument proved anything, it would prove that the Son is not supreme over all creatures, as the Arians claimed, since in Hebrews 2:9, Christ is said to be lower than the angels. Just as, therefore, from this it does not follow that Christ is inferior to the angels, except only according to the ratio of human nature: so also, from the fact that the Father is said to be greater than the Son, and the Son to be subject and obedient to Him, one can only infer that the Son is not equal to the Father according to His humanity, but not that He is not equal to Him according to His Divinity. As for what is added concerning the day of judgment, it must be said that Christ is said not to know it as the Legate of the Eternal Father and Teacher of the Nations, that is, with respect to its public disclosure, but rather as something kept “under seal” and not to be revealed to others. In this way of speaking, we often use the phrase when, having been asked about things we have received in secret, we respond that we do not know them. Hence Hilary in Book 10 of De Trinitate says: “This profession of not knowing is not a weakness of ignorance, but a dispensation of silence.” To the passage in John 5, St. Thomas responds “the words, ‘the Son cannot of Himself do anything,’ do not withdraw from the Son any power possessed by the Father, since it is immediately added, ‘Whatsoever things the Father doth, the Son doth in like manner;’ but their meaning is to show that the Son derives His power from the Father, of Whom He receives His nature.” (ST.I.Q42.A6.Rep1) In one word, it is signified that Christ has power through generation, not as an ungenerated Person, like the Father.

Second Conclusion. The Holy Ghost is true God, and therefore consubstantial with the Father and the Son.

First, He is said to create the world and to fill it: “Thou shalt send forth thy spirit, and they shall be created.” (Ps. 103:30) “For the spirit of the Lord hath filled the whole world.” (Sap. 1:7) Second, He is said to establish the heavens and to adorn them: “By the word of the Lord the heavens were established; and all the power of them by the spirit of his mouth.” (Ps. 32:6) “His spirit hath adorned the heavens.” (Job 26:13) Third, He is said to search the deep things of God: “The Spirit searcheth all things, yea, the deep things of God.” (1 Cor. 2:10) Fourth, He is said to have a temple, which belongs to God alone: “Know you not that your members are the temple of the Holy Ghost?” (1 Cor. 6:19) Fifth, He is said to speak through the mouths of the Prophets and the Saints: “For prophecy came not by the will of man at any time: but the holy men of God spoke, inspired by the Holy Ghost.” (2 Pet. 1:21) Sixth, He is said to be the beatitude of the angels: “The Holy Ghost being sent down from heaven, on whom the angels desire to look.” (1 Pet. 1:12) Finally, in the Acts of the Apostles, the Holy Ghost is plainly called God. For Peter said to Ananias: “Why hath Satan tempted thy heart, that thou shouldest lie to the Holy Ghost?... Thou hast not lied to men, but to God” (Act. 5:3–4).

Against the divinity of the Holy Ghost, Macedonius principally opposed two arguments: First, that which is founded on Romans 8:26: “The Spirit asketh for us.” But if He were God, He would not ask, but would give. Second, that which is founded on John 16:13: “What things soever he shall hear, he shall speak, and the things that are to come, he shall shew you.” But he who must hear and be instructed in order to speak to others is not God, for God has no need of instruction. Therefore, the Holy Ghost is not God.

To the first objection, the response is given from Augustine, Epistola 121, that Paul asserts the Holy Ghost “maketh intercession for us” because He teaches us to ask; whence he immediately adds in the same place: “The Spirit also helpeth our infirmity” (Rom. 8:26). Or it may also be said, with St. Thomas, on this very passage of the Apostle, that the Holy Ghost is said to intercede, that is, He makes us intercede; just as it is said in Genesis 22:12, “Now I know that thou fearest God,” that is, I have caused it to be known.

To the second objection it must be answered, with Basil in Book 1 of Contra Eunomium, that the Holy Ghost is said to hear from the Father and the Son the things which He speaks, not by way of instruction or discipline, as from an inferior to a superior, but through the communication of the divine essence and scientia, which He has received from the Father and the Son through His eternal procession.

CHAPTER 2. ON THE COGNIZABILITY OF THE MYSTERY OF THE TRINITY

First Conclusion. The mystery of the Trinity is not able to be known (posse cognosci) by the light of natural reason.

Proof from Scripture and the Fathers. It is said in Matthew 11:27, “No one knoweth the Son, but the Father: neither doth any one know the Father, but the Son, and he to whom it shall please the Son to reveal him.” Hence Pope [St.] Hormisdas, in his Epistola ad Iustinum Imperatorem, writes: “The secret of the Trinity could not be investigated by the nature of any visible or invisible creature.” By which words he clearly declares that no human or angelic intellect can, by natural light alone, ascend to the cognition (cognitionem) of this mystery, indeed not even to suspect it. As a type of this reality, in Ezechiel 10 the throne of the Most Holy Trinity is said to be set above the heads of the four living creatures; for (as some interpreters of Scripture note) the sublimity of this mysterium transcends the fourfold grades of created knowledge: namely, sensitive, typified by the ox; imaginative, typified by the lion; rational, typified by the man; and angelic, typified by the eagle. Wherefore, the Prophet adds in the same place: “When there was a voice from above the firmament, that was over their heads, they stood and let down their wings” (Ezech. 1:25). And St. Gregory explains that when we reflect on angels, the voice is still said to come from the firmament, not above the firmament; but when the mind considers the power of the divine nature and its other attributes (and the same must be said concerning the plurality of Persons), “the voice is from above the firmament,” because it apprehends that reality which transcends even the understanding of angels by its incomprehensibility.

Proof from St. Thomas. The second proof is from the reasoning of St. Thomas in ST.I.Q32.A1. God cannot be known by us naturally except through creatures; for we know nothing about Him a priori or per causam, but only a posteriori, and through effects produced by Him. But from created effects we cannot arrive at knowledge of so great a mystery: therefore, this mystery cannot be known by us through natural light. The major is evident. The minor is proven from the fact that created effects do not proceed per se from God as Three, but insofar as He is One; because they proceed from Him per se by reason of omnipotence, in the mode of proximate power, and by reason of divinity, as the radical principle. Hence, just as effects produced by an artisan, for example, a painted panel by a painter, do indeed manifest his skill and craftsmanship, since they proceed from and depend upon that per se; yet they do not manifest his color, shape, stature, garments, and the like, which do not per se contribute to the production of the work, but are only present per accidens and concomitantly in the artisan as he acts according to art: so too, although from the inspection of creatures and the skillfully ordered structure of this world we may come to know the infinite wisdom, power, and divinity of that supreme Artisan, yet from them we cannot arrive at knowledge of the Trinity.

First Objection. In created things there shines forth many vestiges of the Trinity, from which we may come to a knowledge (cognitionem) of this mystery. Hence, some of the ancient philosophers had some knowledge (notitiam) of it. For Trismegistus said: “The Monad begot the Monad, and reflected its own ardor into itself”; in which words there clearly seems to be expressed the generation of the Word and the procession of the Holy Spirit. Augustine also reports in Book 7 of the Confessionum that he had read in the books of the Platonists many things pertaining to knowledge (notitiam) of the Most Holy Trinity: for example, that which John writes concerning the eternal generation of the Word: “In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God” (John 1:1).

Response. I respond that although certain vestiges of the Trinity may indeed shine forth in created things, nevertheless, apart from divine revelation, human reason is not able to attain any knowledge (notitiam) of it, nor even the slightest suspicion. For, as St. Thomas teaches in Sent.I.D33.Q1.A1.Rep2, all similitudes which can be drawn from creatures to explain this Mystery bear more dissimilitude than similitude; therefore, they lead the intellect away from the truth of this Mystery more than they lead it into the truth. Thus Dionysius, in Chapter 13 of De Divinis Nominibus, writes: “No number, nor unity, nor productiveness, nor any other existing thing, or thing known to any existing thing, brings forth the hiddenness, above every expression and every mind, of the Super-Deity Which is above all superessentially.” Therefore, if any of the ancient philosophers had some knowledge of it, they drew that knowledge either from Sacred Scripture and the books of the Prophets, or from the verses of the Sibyls, or even from the revelation of demons, who, at the first instant of their creation, possessed the faith and revelation of this Mysterium. That they at times spoke of it to men is indicated by the response of Serapis, who, when asked by Thulis, the king who reigned in Egypt, who was more blessed than he, is said to have replied (as Suida reports, and as cited by Ludovicus Vives in Book 10 of De Civitate Dei): “In the beginning is God, then the Word, and the Spirit. These three are added: these three are coeternal, and tending to one.”

Second Objection. By natural light it is known that the highest perfection is to generate one like oneself; therefore, by the same natural light it will be manifest that generation, and consequently the production of the Word, is found in God. Likewise, it is evident by natural reason that the good is self-diffusive, and therefore that infinite good, such as God is, can diffuse and communicate itself infinitely. Hence, since only the communication of the divine nature ad intra is infinite simpliciter, it can be demonstrated by natural reason that God communicates His nature ad intra to another suppositum; and consequently, that there are multiple Persons in God.

Response. I deny the antecedent. For natural reason dictates that generation cannot occur without a division of nature and substance, into the one generated and the one generating, and consequently not without imperfection. Therefore, that generation is a simply simple perfection, and that it involves no imperfection in its concept, this we do not know with certainty except through divine revelation, by which we are taught that in God there is a Son begotten of the Father before all ages, and that He is of the same substance and nature with Him. As to what is further added, namely, that by natural light it is known that infinite good ought to communicate itself infinitely, it must be said: by natural reason it is known that infinite good can be communicated infinitely, with respect to the mode of communication, namely by producing things from nothing, which requires infinite power; but not with respect to the thing communicated, namely the divine nature itself. For although God ad intra can communicate it, yet this power which He has of communicating Himself ad intra cannot be apprehended by our own powers, because the very cognition of these principles does not suffice for us, consulting only natural reason.

Second Conclusion. While the Mystery of the Trinity is above [natural reason], it is not contrary to natural reason.

Proof. As St. Thomas argues in SCG1.C7, although the truth of the Christian faith exceeds the capacity of human reason, nevertheless, those things which natural reason has introduced (indita habet) cannot be contrary to the truth of faith. For those things that are naturally implanted (sunt insita) in reason are known to be most true; and likewise, that which is held by faith, since it is divinely confirmed, it is impious to believe to be false. Therefore, since only the false is contrary to the true, it is impossible that the truth of the Mysteries of the Faith should be contrary to principles known naturally: therefore, although the Mystery of the Trinity is above reason, it is nevertheless not contrary to natural reason.

Objection. This Mystery conflicts with that well-known principle, known by natural light, which is the very foundation of all syllogistic art: “things which are identical with a third are identical with one another” (quae sunt eadem uni tertio, sunt eadem inter se). For the Divine Persons are really identical with the essence, and yet are really distinguished from one another: therefore, the Mystery of the Trinity is not only above [natural reason], but also contrary to natural reason.

Some [i.e., Suarez and Vazquez], in order to extricate themselves easily from this difficulty, respond that the aforesaid axiom holds only in created things, not however in God, in whom, on account of His infinitude, the same numerically one nature can subsist in three Persons really distinct from one another. Hence [St.] Cyril of Alexandria, Book 11 in Ioannem, says: “If there were nothing at all to separate or create a distinction between us and God, we might then apply the analogy of our own case to the things which concern God; but if we find the interval betwixt us to be something we cannot fathom, why do men set up the attributes of our own nature as a rule and standard for God, conceiving of that Nature Which is not bound by any law in the light of our own weaknesses, and so suffer themselves to be guilty of doing a thing which is most irrational and absurd?” But this response is merely an evasion, and a closing-off of the proposed difficulty, not a solution. For that principle, as was stated in the objection, is the chief and almost sole foundation of the entire syllogistic art: for it infers from the identity of the extremorum [i.e., the major and minor terms] with a third term [i.e., the middle] in the [major and minor] premises an identity with each other in the conclusion. But the syllogistic art applies no less in the case of God than in creatures: therefore, the truth of the aforesaid principle also remains. Therefore, the solution is to be rejected.

First Reply. I respond with St. Thomas (ST.I.Q28.A3.Rep1) that the philosophical axiom is universally true when the extrema are identified with a third [both] in re et ratione; but not so when they are identified realitier [i.e., in re] with the third, yet distinguished from it in ratio [and] implying an opposition of relation, for by reason of such an opposition the extrema can be identified realiter with a certain middle, and nevertheless differ realiter from each other. And thus it occurs in the present matter: although the divine relations and Persons are identified realiter with the essence, yet because they are distinguished from it virtualiter, and by a reasoning which involves a relative opposition among themselves, they are distinguished realiter from one another, even though they are the same as the essence. This can be illustrated by two examples. The first is given by St. Thomas in the cited place: although action and passion are only distinguished modaliter from motion [i.e., by a minor real distinction], yet they differ realiter from each other by a major real distinction (distinctione reali maiori), on account of the opposition they bear to one another. And if motion were of such perfection and amplitude that it could identify realiter both action and passion with only a distinction of reason (distinctione rationis), nevertheless action and passion, by reason of the opposition they bear, would still be distinguished realiter from one another. The second is taken from the properties of being [i.e., the transcendentals]. If, per impossibile, the three properties of being (i.e., one, true, and good) while preserving perfect identity with the ratio of being in which they are transcendently included, were to possess among themselves a relative opposition, then by reason of that opposition they would be distinguished realiter from one another, even though they would differ only rationally from the ratio of being.

Nor are the two objections (instantiae) valid which can be made against this solution. [First Instance:] Wisdom and goodness in God are distinguished from the essence by reason, just as Paternity and Filiation are; and yet they do not differ from each other realiter. [Second Instance:] Likewise, it is correctly inferred that Peter is an animal, from the fact that he is the same (idem) as man, from which, nevertheless, Peter-ness and animality are distinguished by reason. Therefore, even if the extrema [i.e., major and minor] differ from the third [i.e., middle] by reason, it is rightly inferred that they are identified realiter with one another, because they are identified realiter with the third. But, I say, these objections (instantiae) do not hold. To the first [instance], St. Thomas responds in Sent.I.D2.Q1.A5.Rep4: “Although wisdom does differ from the other attributes according to its account (secundum rationem), still it is not opposed to any other attribute. For wisdom is compatible with goodness, life, and the other attributes in the same subject. And therefore it does not have the character of distinguishing (rationem distinguendi) supposits of the divine nature, which opposite relations do have. But just as divine wisdom really makes the effect of wisdom on account of the truth of its account (propter veritatem rationis), which remains in God, so too a relation makes a true distinction on account of the true account of relation (propter relationis veram rationem), which is preserved in God.”

By these words he first makes known (insinuat) the difference that exists between goodness and wisdom on the one hand, and on the other hand between Paternity and Filiation, which consists in the fact that, although [wisdom and goodness] differ from the essence according to reason, just as Paternity and Filiation do, nevertheless, relative opposition is not included in their formal ratio (ratione formali), as the relations [of Paternity and Filiaton] do, and, therefore, [wisdom and goodness] do not differ realiter from each other, as Paternity and Filiation do.

Next, he indicates the fundamental reason (rationem fundamentalem) why the divine relations, despite their real identity (reali identitate) with the essence, are distinguished realiter from one another: namely, it is proper to an infinite rei to identify res with itself while preserving their formal rationes (rationibus formalibus), just as the formal ratio (ratio formalis) of wisdom, which is to know things (res) through their highest causes, is most perfectly preserved in God, notwithstanding its real identity with the essence, so too the formal ratio of relation must be perfectly preserved in Him, notwithstanding the real identity of that relation with the divine nature. But the proper ratio (propria ratio) and essence of relation is to be opposed to its correlate, and to be distinguished realiter from it. Therefore, although the divine relations and persons are identified realiter with the essence, nevertheless they are distinguished realiter from one another, by reason of the relative opposition which they possess. From this, the response to the second objection (instantiam) is clear. Peter-ness and animality are not distinguished from man by a reason (ratione) that imports relative opposition, as Paternity and Filiation in the divine are distinguished from the essentia. Thus, while it is rightly inferred that Peter is an animal, from the fact that Peter-ness and animality are identified reality with man, on the other hand, it does not rightly follow that the Father and the Son are identified realiter with one another, from the fact that Paternity and Filiation are the same realiter with the essence and differ only rationally.

Second Reply. The aforementioned philosophical axiom, on which the art of syllogistic reasoning rests, holds true only in those cases where [the major and minor] are the same with a third [i.e., the middle] adequately, not when they are the same only inadequately with a third. Now, the relations which constitute the divine Persons are not identified with the divine essence adequately, but only inadequately. A thing is said to be inadequately identified with something when it is not the same as everything with which that thing is identified, nor is that something with which it is identical merely the same as that thing (nec identificans est idem cum solo identificato). But each personal relation is so identified with the divine nature, that it is not identified with the other personal relations with which the essence is identified; and likewise, the nature is not so identified with one relation that it is not also identified with the others. Thus, for example, the distinct parts of the body are present to one third thing, namely, to the rational soul, without being present to each other: for the foot and the head are immediately and proximately united to the soul, but are distant from each other, because, evidently, they are not united to the soul adequately, but only inadequately, inasmuch as the soul informs not only those parts but also the other parts of the body and is united to them. Likewise, Christ is present in multiple hosts and altars, which nevertheless are not present to one another: because He is not present to those altars and hosts adequately, since He is present to many others as well. Similarly, the Divine Persons are identified with the essence, without being identified with one another, because they are not identified with [the Divine Essence] adequately, but only inadequately.

From what has been said, you will understand the reason why this syllogism is not valid: “This God is the Father; this God is the Son; therefore, the Son is the Father,” not per se from the fact that the form of the expository syllogism (syllogismi expositivi) fails in this mystery, but from the fact that such a syllogism is defective due to the lack of perfect distribution of the term “God,” which, although it is absolutely singular, nevertheless, on account of the real communicability of the divine nature to the three Persons, the [term ‘God’ becomes] quasi-universal (aequivalenter universalis). Hence, for it to be perfectly distributed in the premises, the syllogism should be formed as follows: “Whatever is God is the Father; whatever is God is the Son; therefore, the Father is the Son” and then both the Major and the Minor [premises] would be false, since the Holy Spirit is God, and yet is neither the Father nor the Son.

CHAPTER III. ON THE DIVINE PROCESSIONS

​​The processions of God ad intra are the foundations of the divine relations, by which the Persons are constituted. Hence, before we treat of the the divine relations and Persons, we must first treat of the divine processions.

§ I. Whether, and how many, processions there are in God?

First Conclusion. Ad intra processions are really in God.

First Proof. This is evident from Sacred Scripture. For Christ says in John 8:42, “I proceeded forth and came from God”, and in John 15:26, “The Spirit of truth, who proceedeth from the Father.” Likewise, in Scripture, the First Person is often called the Father, and the Second the Son. But it pertains to the very ratio of a Father to generate, and of a Son to be generated: therefore, in God there is a real procession, by which the Father generates, and the Son is generated.

Second Proof. Reason also confirms this. First, because the Divine Persons are distinguished solely by relative opposition, as is stated in the Council of Florence; but the relative opposition of the Divine Persons is founded upon the origin of one from another. Secondly, because, as St. Thomas argues in ST.I.Q27.A1, whoever understands, from the very fact that he understands, produces a word; hence, since God is intelligent, indeed, in the highest degree (gradu) of intellectuality, He must produce a Verbum in His cognition: not, indeed, in order to understand (for this is already posited as possessed through essential cognition), but because He understands, and in order that, out of the infinite intellectual fecundity, He may communicate His knowledge (notitiam) to another, that is, to the Word itself, and speak Him.

But in order that the force of this congruence may be better perceived, and that an objection (instantia) commonly raised to the contrary may be resolved, it must be noted that when St. Thomas says that whoever understands, from the very fact that he understands, produces a word, this is not to be understood of just any act of intellection (for, the production of a word does not belong to the ratio of intellection as such, as is evidence in the beatific vision, in which the blessed produce no word [cf., ST.I.Q12.A9]), but rather of that connatural intellection by which every intellectual creature understands itself. Therefore, the force of this congruity lies in this: since intellectual creatures, even the most perfect, produce a word in every act of connatural intellection, it is fitting that God, who is in the supreme degree (gradu) of intellectual natures, by His connatural cognition, which is His own self-cognition, likewise produces a Word, not from need (indigentia), but from fecundity.

First Objection. It is repugnant for a being that is a se to proceed from another (ab alio); but each Divine Person is a being a se, therefore, one cannot proceed from another (ab alia).

Reply. I distinguish the major: that it is repugnant to a being a se to proceed from another (ab alio), if it be by procession from another as a cause, I concede the major; but if it be from a principle of origin, with all dependence and causality excluded, I deny the major. Hence, when it is said that each Divine Person is a se, or has being a se, this is true if the phrase “a se”, or “to have being a se,” excludes an extraneous principle (principium extraneum), i.e., of another nature; but it is false if it excludes a real principle of the same nature: for in this way, only the Father is a se, since He alone is unbegotten and unproduced.

Second Objection. A procession cannot be understood without a dependence of the one proceeding on the one producing (procedentis a producente); since to proceed from another (ab alio) is to be unable to be (non posse esse) without that other. But a Person in God is not able to depend on another (ab alia): therefore, neither can one proceed from another.

Reply. I deny the major; and to the proof of the major, it does not suffice, for true dependence of one upon another, that the one cannot exist without the other. For one relative cannot exist without the other, and yet it does not depend upon it, since relative things (relativa) are simultaneous by nature. But, in addition, it is required that the one cannot exist without the other by reason of subordination (ratione subordinationis), which necessarily requires a diversity in nature. Therefore, although in God the Person proceeding cannot exist without the Person producing, nevertheless He does not depend on the producer; because the essence of both is the same, differing only in the mode of possessing it (modo habendi): for the Person producing possesses it a se, while the [Person] proceeding possesses it from another (ab alio).

Third Objection. Between the Divine Persons there cannot be priority and posteriority, since they are coeternal; but procession necessarily involves an order of prior and posterior between the producing Person and the produced Person; therefore, there cannot be procession between the Divine Persons.

Reply. Although among the Divine Persons there cannot be a priority of duration, there can be a priority of origin, which suffices for the procession of one from another. For the light of the sun emits brightness from itself (ex se), and yet the sun is not prior in time to its brightness, but only prior in origin or in nature. Hence, the Divine Word is called the splendor of the Father, because He proceeds from the Father as light from the sun, and is coeternal with Him.

Second Conclusion. There are only two processions in God, one per intellectum, by which the Word is begotten; the other per voluntatem, by which Love is spirated.

Proof. Procession in God is not according to a transient action (actionem transeuntem), but [according to an] immanent (immenentem) [action]. But in God, who is the most perfect intellectual agent, it is only possible for two immanent operations to be found there, namely, intellection and volition, which are distinct virtualiter. Therefore, it is only possible for there to be two divine procession, one per intellectum, the other per voluntatem.

Objection. This argument only proves that in God it is only possible to posit a procession per intellectum and [a procession] per voluntatem, but not that there cannot be in the in the Divine intellect many cognitions, from which multiple words may arise, or multiple volitions, from which multiple loves may be spirated.

Reply. If there were multiple processions in the Divine intellect, from which multiple words may arise, are they going to be diverse specifically or only numerically (specie vel numero tantum diversae)? Not [specifically], since the Divine intellection and speech is one by a specific unity. Not [numerically], since a numerical distinction only arises either from matter or from a subject; but the divine processions and their termini lack matter and subject since they are per se subsistentes. Further, because numerical distinction only arises from limitation; hence, the divine nature, because it is not limited, is not able to be multiplied numerically. But the divine processions, and their termini are not limited entities, therefore, they are not able to be multiplied or distinguished merely by number.

Further, since the Divine Word is infinite and comprehensive, and the adequate terminus of the divine cognition, and since through it the eternal Father knows the [Divine] essence, attributes, [and] relations, [along with] all possible creatures, there cannot be but one [Word]. As St. Thomas admirably explains in Ioan.C1.L1.n27: “Our word is imperfect, but the divine Word is most perfect. Since we cannot express all our conceptions in one word, we must form many imperfect words through which we separately express all that is in our knowledge. But it is not that way with God. For since he understands both himself and everything else through his essence, by one act, the single divine Word is expressive of all that is in God, not only of the persons but also of creatures; otherwise it would be imperfect.”

Confirmation. Among the Angels, the more some excel in dignity, the fewer species and words they use to express their own concepts; therefore, since God attains the highest summit of intellectuality, with one most perfect Word He manifests all the secrets of His infinite wisdom. Hence the Prophet says: “God hath spoken once, these two things have I heard” (Ps. 61:12). For God speaks once, because He has uttered and continually utters one Word from eternity; but the Prophet hears two things, because in this one Word the Father has declared all things.

§ II. What is the principium quo proximum of the Divine Processions?

Durandus holds that the divine nature is not only the radical, but also the proximate and immediate principium [quo] of the divine processions, on account of its fecundity, which belongs to it by reason of its infinitude. Others teach that [the] principium [quo] is solely the absolute perfection; others, solely relation.

First Conclusion. The divine nature, as pre-understood (praeintellectam) by the intellect and will, is not the principium quo proximum et immediatum of the divine processions, but rather the intellect and will of God.

First Proof. This is seen from the fact that Scripture, the Councils, and the Most Holy Fathers commonly call the second person of the Most Holy Trinity the Word and begotten Wisdom; whereas they call the third Charity and Love; but these names pertain to intellect and will. Therefore, the intellect and will are the immediate principium [quo] of the divine processions. Nor is the objection valid which Durandus raises, namely, that those expressions are metaphorical: first, because Cyril, in Thesaurus, book 4, chapter 5, says, “God chose the name Word, because it is the most proper.” Hence, St. Thomas in ST.I.Q34.A1.Rep1 calls Origen the source of the Arians for saying that the Son of God is not properly the Word, but only metaphorically. Further, because if it were permitted to interpret those places of Scripture in which the second person is called the Word in a metaphorical sense, then even those in which He is called Son could be twisted into a metaphorical sense. And thus, an occasion would be given to heretics to evade all the testimonies of Scripture through tropical and metaphorical senses.

Second Proof. One must philosophize about divine things by way of analogy and similitude to created things, excluding imperfections. But in created things, to understand and to will do not proceed immediately from nature, pre-understood in its powers and faculties, but rather from intellect and will; therefore, [so also] in God. Nor is one able to say that the difference between God and creatures is that creatures, due to the finitude and potentiality of their nature, require proximate principles in order to act; whereas God, on the other hand, due to the infinitude and most perfect actuality of the Divine Nature, does not require the concurrence of proximate principles in order to act. One is not able to say this because, while the concurrence of proximate principles distinct realiter from nature is repugnant to the infinitude and purity of the divine nature, nevertheless, the concurrence of proximate principles which are only distinct virtualiter from the divine nature, and identified realiter with it, is not repugnant. Now, intellect and will in God differ only virtualiter from the divine nature; therefore, it is not prejudicial to the infinitude and purity of the divine nature that the divine processions are from intellect and will as from a proximate and immediate principle (principio proximo et immediato), and from the divine nature only radicaliter and mediate.

Third Proof. This can further be proven from the absurdities (inconvenienti) that follow from Durandus’ opinion (sententia). For, if the divine nature, as pre-understood to the intellect and will of God, is the immediate principle of the divine processions, one is not able to assign a reason for why there are only two processions in God, why one ought to proceed from the other, why the Word only proceeds from one person, and why the Holy Spirit proceeds from two [persons]. Finally, there would be no reason why one procession should be generation and not the other, since both persons proceed from the same nature and in the same mode [on this supposition]: all of which is utterly repugnant to the truth of the mystery of the Trinity.

Objection. Durandus responds that just as it is permitted for properties to emanate immediately from nature, nevertheless one emanates prior to another, and one, through the mediation of the other, results from nature; so likewise, even if the divine processions arise immediately from the fecundity of the divine nature, nevertheless a sufficient reason can be assigned for their order, why one supposes the other, and why, through the mediation of the one, it is fitting that it pertain to God.

Reply. But this solution is not sufficient (non valet). First, because properties [differ from operations insofar as] they do not require that they flow forth from principle principles through a medium, as operations do; whence, although in order to assign an order of emanation among properties, it is not necessary to recur to prior proximate principles, on the other hand, it is necessary in order to assign an order of prior and posterior among operations. Secondly, because even though a finite nature can be the root (radix) of finite perfections, one of which is prior to another, because it is its cause, just as rationality is the root (radix) of the capacity to admire and to laugh (admirativi et risibilis), nevertheless, if a nature is infinite, no reason can be given for why [its fecundity] is not exhausted (exhauriatur) by one procession, but well through two [processions]. Therefore, from the divine nature strictly taken (praecise sumpta), which is infinite, a diversity of processions cannot arise; rather, one must recur to the proximate principles, namely intellect and will.

Second Conclusion. The intellect and will of God are not the principium quo proximum et immediatum of the generation of the Word and production of the Holy Spirit, except insofar as they are modified by the relations of paternity and active spiration, which such relations connote.

Proof. The fundamental reason for the conclusion is as follows. If the principium quo proximum et immediatum of the generation of the Word and the production of the Holy Spirit were to consists in the intellect and the will adequately considered, or in any absolute perfection [whatsoever], determined or connoted by no relation, then, since all the absolute perfections of the entire Trinity are common, it would follow that the power to generate and spirate would be found in all the Persons of the Most Holy Trinity, and, therefore, it would immediately follow (subindeque) that the Son would be able to generate another Son and the Holy Spirit would be able to spirate or produce another Holy Spirit. Whence, since in God all that is possible [actually] exists, the Son would de facto generate another distinct Son, and the Holy Spirit would spirate another Holy Spirit, and thus there would be in God more persons than three, which is repugnant to the Catholic faith and utterly destroys the mystery of the Trinity.

What is said of the intellect and will of God, must also be said of the divine nature for the same reason (proportione servata). For it is not the first and radical principle of the divine processions, except insofar as modified by the relations; otherwise, as it is in the Son, it would have the ratio of the radical power to generate; and insofar as it is in the Holy Spirit, [it would have] the ratio of the radical power or principle to spirate. Just as, therefore, in created things we see that the same form, insofar as it is in diverse subjects, and is modified in them in diverse modes, produces different effect, e.g., heat generates flesh in animals, not in fire, and in women produces milk, and not in men; and grace in us, since we are persons outside [of God] (persona extranea), constitutes adopted sons, [whereas] in Christ, who is a Divine person, it does not, so also, proportionally, must the same be understood in the present case. For the Divine essence, insofar as it is in the Father, and is modified by the relation of Paternity, has the ratio of the radical power of generation, and the first and remote principium quo of divine generation; but the same essence, insofar as it is in the Father and Son, and as modified by the relation of [active] spiration, has the ratio of the radical power of spiration, and is the first and remote principium quo of the production of the Holy Spirit. Whence, St. Thomas proposes this objection in QDePot.Q2.A1.Obj13, “if, in God, the Father begets, he must do so in respect of his nature. But the nature is the same in the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. For the same reason, then, both the Son and the Holy Spirit will beget.” He responds to this argument, saying “although he same nature is in Father and Son, it is in each by a different mode of existing, that is, with a different relation. Consequently, it does not follow that whatever befits the Father through his own nature befits the Son.”

Third Conclusion. The principium quo, whether proximate or remote, of the divine processions is not merely the relation alone.

Reason. The reason is that the principium quo of the generative or productive action is that in which (in quo) the one generated or produced is assimilated to the generator or produced, since the intention of the agent is that the one produced be assimilated to himself in the principium quo by which he acts. But, in God, the person produced is assimilated to the person producing in that which is absolute, not that which is relative. Therefore, it is not the relation, but in an absolute perfection connoting relation (perfectio absoluta connotans relationem) that the principium quo of the divine processions [is to be found].

Confirmation. If Paternity, e.g., were the generative power in the eternal Father, and the principium [quo] of divine generation, then either it would be such under the express concept of the Paternity, as it is an exercised relation (relatio exercita); or under the formal ratio of the hypostasis, an would have the ratio of subsistence and personality. But neither can be said, therefore, the principium quo of divine generation is not able to consist in the relation alone. The first part of the minor premise is clear because Paternity, under the express concept of the exercised relation, is founded upong generation, and according to the mode of our conception presupposes it, and consequently also presupposes a generative power in the Father, i.e., the principium quo of generation. As to the second part [of the minor premise], it is proven from the fact that the principium quo of any production must be active, at least as it is quo; yet a relation, insofar as it has the ratio of personality, or the form of hypostasis, is not active, even as quo, but is the pure terminus of nature, constituting it under the ratio of person. Hence, although under this ratio there is a necessary conditio for action, or rather, an intrinsic mode completing the power of acting, it is not, however, the principium quo of generation or spiration. Whence [St.] Anselm, in Monologian, chapter 2, when speaking of the Holy Spirit, says “the Father and the Son emit so great a good not from their relations, which are many, but from the essence itself, which is one.” Further, [St.] Dionysius in De Divinis Nominibus says that “the Father is fontal Deity, but the Lord Jesus and the Spirit are, if one may so speak, God-planted shoots, and as it were Flowers and superessential Lights of the God-bearing Deity.”

First Objection against the First Conclusion. [St.] Hilary in De Synodis says that “to all creatures the will of God imparted His substance, but to the Son, nature gave it.” Further, [St.] Augustine in Book 15 of De Trinitate, Ch. 20, says that “The Word through whom all things were made is the Son of God by nature.” Therefore, from the Holy Fathers, it would seem that the procession of the Word in the divine order is immediately from nature, and not from intellect.

Response. I deny the consequence, for those Holy Father only intend to teach against the Arians that the Word does not proceed from the free will of God, as creatures as produced, but that its production is natural and necessary. Hence, they take the term “natura” in the sense of that which is opposed to that which is free (libero). Or, if they mean that the procession of the Son is from the nature of God as from a principle, they speak of the radical and remote influence, through the medium of the intellect as proximate power.

Second Objection against the First Conclusion. We ought to philosophize about divine things by analogy and similitude with created things. But the generative power does not pertain to creatures by reason of intellect. Therefore, neither [does it so pertain in the case of] God.

Response. We ought to philosophize about God by analogy and similitude with the created things [that are] more perfect, such as those which are spiritual and intellectual. The generative power does pertain to these by reason of intellect. For, the production of the created word is a certain intellectual generation because, as is commonly said, “from the object and power, knowledge (notitia) is born (paritur), and “partus” signifies generation.

Objection against the Second Conclusion. If the principium quo of the Divine Processions does not consist adequately in absolute perfections, but, rather, in absolute perfections (i.e., intellect or will) as connoting the relations of Paternity and active spiration by which they are modified, then it would follow that the generative power is not in the Son since there is not the relation of Paternity in him. But, this cannot be said, therefore neither [can the condition be said]. The logical sequence (sequela) of the major [i.e., the conditional affirmation] is evident. The minor [i.e., that the conditional cannot be said] seems to be established from the fact that the generative power is a kind of perfection. [Thus,] if it were not in the Son, then he would not be equal to the Father in perfection, which is repugnant to the equality of the Divine Persons.

Response. A full response to this difficulty will be given below, when we treat of the equality of the Divine Persons. To briefly reply for now, although the generative power is not in the Son, it does not follow that there is in Him the defect of any perfection that is in the Father; because to be able to generate (posse generare) and to be able to be generated (posse generari) are two offices/functions (munia) which are differ in relation and do not differ in perfection among Divine Persons. For the same absolute perfection, connoting the Paternity, gives the ability to generate (posse generare), and connoting the Filiation, gives the ability to be generated (posse generari).

Objection against the Third Conclusion. The principium quo of generation is that by which (a quo) the Father is denominated as “able to generate” (potens generare). But, the Father is denominated as having an ability toward generation (potens ad generandum) by the relation of Paternity. Therefore, [relation] is the principium quo of Divine generation. The major is clear. The minor is proven in that the proper denomination (denominatio propria) arises not from a common form, but from the unique (propria) [form]. But, the denomination of “able to generate” (potentis generare) is most unique (proprissima) to the Father. Therefore, it does not arise from the essence, which is common, but from the Paternity, which is unique (propria) to him. Whence Athanasius, in Dialogo Primo de Trinitate, says that the Pater generates (gignit) by hypostasis, and creates by command.

Response. I concede the major. I deny the minor. To the proof [of the minor], I distinguish the major, a proper denomination (denominatio propria) ought not to follow from a common form, taken in its undifferentiated commonality (communitate relicta), I concede the major; as appropriated, I deny the major. I concede the minor and deny the consequence.

Therefore, this argument only proves that the denomination of “able to generate” (potentis generare) does not befit the Divine nature taken in an absolute sense (absolute sumpta), but as modified by the relation of paternity, which we explained in the second conclusion. Hence, when [St.] Athanasius says that the Father generates by hypostasis, this is not to be understood of the principium quo proximum or [principium quo] remotum of generation, but only taken as the completion of the principium quo, whether proximate or remote, connoting the relation of Paternity, by which it is modified and completed. From what has been said, it follows that the terminus quo of the divine processions is something other than that which is absolute in re, connoting relation. This is clear for the same reason which we showed for the principium quo, for in the terminus quo ([i.e.,] formal [terminus]), the terminus of the production must agree with the one producing; but in the relations such agreement does not occur, whereas [such agreement] is found in the absolute. Therefore, the absolute, connoting relation, is the formal terminus of the Divine Processions.

§ III. Why is one of the divine processions generation, but not the other?

It is a truth of the faith (de fide) that, besides the procession of the Word, which is a true generation , as is clearly gathered from various places in Scripture, there is another procession, that of love, or of the Holy Spirit. For, as St. Thomas explains in ST.I.Q37.A1, “just as when a thing is understood by anyone, there results in the one who understands a conception of the object understood, which conception we call word; so when anyone loves an object, a certain impression results, so to speak, of the thing loved in the affection of the lover; by reason of which the object loved is said to be in the lover; as also the thing understood is in the one who understands” Therefore, just as it is inferred probabiliter that there is in God a production of the Word from the fact that God understands, as we showed above, so likewise it can be concluded probabiliter that there is another procession in God by way of love, from the fact that God loves.

Valentia, who finds this reasoning unsatisfactory, says that, although the beloved ought to be present within the lover by inclination, nevertheless, some terminus does not need to be produced by the created will, which is a “pondus” [weight, gravity, etc.] and inclination toward the beloved; for the presence of the object is sufficiently brought about through the act of love, which is the actual inclination.

But, on the contrary, just as the object of intellection is not formally present to the intellect by the very act of intellection, but through another terminus produced by it, which is its express image and similitude, so also is the object of love not formally present to the lover by the act of love, but by another terminus produced by it, which has the ratio of an impulse or “weight” (ponderis) including it toward the beloved. Just as [St.] Augustine says in Confessionum, bk. 13, ch. 9: “Amor meus pondus meum; amore feror quocumque feror” (“My love is my weight; by love I am carried wherever I am carried”).

With this presupposed, we inquire into the reason why the ratio of “generation” pertains to the one procession [of the Word] and not to the other procession [of Love] when the definition of the generation of living things is the “origin of a living being from a living being, in similitude of nature” seems to apply no less to the procession of the Holy Spirit than the production of the Word. This difficulty appeared so great to the Holy Fathers that [St.] Ambrose, in De Fide ad Gratianum, chapter 3, says: “To know the distinction (discretionem) of generation is impossible for me;” and [St.] Augustine, in Contra Maximinum, book 3, chapter 14, exclaims in wonder: “To distinguish between that generation and this procession, I do not know, I am not able, I am not sufficient.”

However, the Scholastic theologians have devised reasons to explain this aenigma. Only two modes of speaking will be treated here, which seem more probable (probabiliores), passing over the others for the sake of brevity. The first teaches that the production of the Word is generation, but not the procession of the Holy Spirit, because [the Word] receives, in virtue of his generation, a “second nature, and the power to produce another Divine suppositum, whereas [the Holy Spirit] because he produces nothing within God. But this opinion (sententia) displeases many and is rejected. First, because the similitude required in the begotten person to have the ratio of generation is not in [that which is] relative, but in [that which is] absolute. But the similitude in the fecundity to produce another supposit is not in the absolute taken as such (absoluto praecise), but in the absolute together with (adjuncta) a relation in obliquo and de connotato, as was said in the preceding sections. Therefore, this is not necessary for the ratio of generation.

Second, even if the Son were not productive of the Holy Spirit, he would still be the Son, and, accordingly, his production would still be true generation. Therefore, the ratio of generation does not pertain to the production of the Son precisely from the fact that he receives a fecund nature and the power to produce the Holy Spirit. The consequence is clear. The antecedent is proven. The Son of God, according to [St.] Augustine, De Trinitate, [Book 7], ch. 2: “He is the Son by which He is the Word, and He is the Word by which He is the Son.” But if the Son did not produce the Holy Spirit, he would proceed in the same mode by intellection, as he now proceeds, and thus he would be Word since a word is nothing other than the intrinsic terminus of intellection. Therefore, he would be the Son, even if he did not produce the Holy Spirit. As a confirmation, if, per impossibile, the power to spirate was taken from the Father, he would nevertheless remain Father by the power of generation. Therefore, the Son would also remain Son even if He does not produce the Holy Spirit. The consequence is clear because it is repugnant for the Father to be without the Son; therefore, if the power to spirate were removed from the Father, He would remain Father, and the Son would remain [the Son] as well, even if He did not produce the Holy Spirit.

Third, for true generation it suffices that nature, under the concept (sub conceptu) of nature, be communicated to the produced terminus; but, the true concept of nature in its full rigor is preserved, even without the power to produce another suppositum: therefore, the true ratio of generation is also [preserved]. The major is evident from the definition of the generation of living things. The minor is shown. It is not of the ratio of nature that it has its principle in another (in alio), or in an order to another (ad allium), but it is sufficient that it be a principium of motion in that in which it is, as is evident in the nature of the heavens and Angels, in which the most ratio of nature is found, yet without productive power, even radically, of another supposit. Therefore, the concept of nature is found in its total rigor even where there is no productive power for another, namely, by the fact that it is the root (radix) of other operations, whether immanent or transient. I add that, if the power to produce another suppose were part of the quidditative concept of nature, the Holy Spirit would not be of the same nature with the Father and Son, since in him there is not the power to produce another Divine Person, as there is in the Father and Son. Further, the Son would not be of the same adequate nature as the Father, since the Divine Nature, as it is in the Father, is both generative and spirative, whereas, as it is in the Son, it is only spirative.

The second mode of explanation proposes that the production of the Word is generation, but not the production of the Holy Spirit, because although the Divine Nature is communicated to both, nevertheless the Son proceeds according to the mode of Image, whereas the Holy Spirit does not, since He stands in the mode of an impulse of one loving toward the beloved thing. But this opinion (sententia) too does not seem to reach the mark of truth. For the ratio of image is something consequent upon passive generation, and it is posterior. Therefore, one cannot prove a priori that the procession of the Word is generation, and that the procession of the Holy Spirit is not, merely because the Word is the image of the Father and the Holy Spirit is not. The consequence is clear. The antecedent is proved because among men (in humanis), the son is first generated from the Father, inasmuch as he is produced similar in nature to him, before he is said to be the father’s image, which follows from the former. Further, because in Divine things (in divinis), we first understand the Person of the Son as generated, before we understand the relation of image. For as [St.] Augustine says in Book 7 of De Trinitate, cap. 2: “In that He is born, He is understood to be Word, and Image, and Son.” As St. Thomas teaches in ST.I.Q40.A4, “origin, in the passive sense, simply precedes the personal properties of the person proceeding.” Further, he adds in the same place in the reply to the third objection, “Nativity…in the order of intelligence, precedes filiation.” For, origins are conceived by us as the foundations (fundamenta) of the relations. Therefore, we first conceive the Person of the Son to be generated because the Divine Nature is communicated to Him in virtue of His procession before we conceive in him the relation of Image. Hence, we can only gather a posteriori and not a priori that the Divine Word is begotten and Son, and not the Holy Spirit, because the ratio of Image applied to the one and not the other, just as it is rightly inferred that a horse is not a rational animal because it is not risible. But here we are inquiring into the a priori reason why the production of the Word is generation, and not the procession of the Holy Spirit, which is what remains to be explained.

Conclusion. The proximate and immediate reason why the procession of the Word is generation, and not the procession of the Holy Spirit, is because the Word proceeds in the similitude of nature (similitudinem naturae) by virtue of its procession, rather than the Spirit. The first and radical reason is to be sought in the fact that the Word proceeds by way of intellection (fit per intellectum) whereas the Spirit proceeds by way of volition (per voluntatem). The first part is proven in that actions which terminate at the same terminate are diversified by diverse modes of proceeding and tending towards the [terminus], as Philosophers commonly teach and illustrate with diverse examples. Therefore, the production of the Word and procession of the Holy Spirit are distinguished on account of their diverse modes of tending to the terminus; and one has the ratio of generation, but not the other, because the one tends in the similitude of nature formally (formaliter) and by virtue of itself, but not the other, even though the Divine Nature is communicated by both.

This reasoning is confirmed and further illustrated by the example used by St. Thomas in SCG4.C13 where he says that if a man could produce another man in two ways, namely, by generation, or from his own flesh, by a power granted to him by God, he who was begotten by generation would be called son, not the other, even though both would be similar in substance, solely on account of the different mode of proceeding. For this same reason, Abel is called the son of Adam, but not Eve who was formed from his side; because, although human nature was communicated to both, it was not in the same manner: to Abel by a generative and assimilative act, but not so to Eve. Similarly, therefore, although the Holy Spirit receives the Divine Nature from the Father and the Son, because he does not receive it in virtue of or from the mode of His procession, as the Word does, his production does not have the ratio of generation, as does the procession of the Word.

From this, we are able to easily prove the second part of the conclusion. For, the reason why the Word proceeds in similitude of nature in virtue of its procession, rather than the Holy Spirit, is because the one proceeds by intellection (per intellectum), and the other proceeds by volition (per voluntatem). Therefore, the first and radical reason why the procession of the Word is generation, and the procession of the Holy Spirit is not, is that the former is through intellection (per intellectum), whereas the latter is through volition (per voluntatem). The consequence is clear. The antecedent is proven by the reason given by St. Thomas in ST.I.Q27.A4: “The procession of love in God ought not to be called generation. In evidence whereof we must consider that the intellect and the will differ in this respect, that the intellect is made actual by the object understood residing according to its own likeness in the intellect; whereas the will is made actual, not by any similitude of the object willed within it, but by its having a certain inclination to the thing willed. Thus the procession of the intellect is by way of similitude, and is called generation, because every generator begets its own like; whereas the procession of the will is not by way of similitude, but rather by way of impulse and movement towards an object. So what proceeds in God by way of love, does not proceed as begotten, or as son, but proceeds rather as spirit; which name expresses a certain vital movement and impulse, accordingly as anyone is described as moved or impelled by love to perform an action.”

By these words, he clearly declares that the Divine Word has that which [causes it to] (habere quod) proceed in the similitude of nature by virtue of its procession, but not the Holy Spirit, because the Word proceeds by intellection, and the Holy Spirit [proceeds] by volition. For the Intellect, as it abstracts from created and uncreated, is assimilative, because intellection takes place by the assimilative of the power with the object, as is taught [by Aristotle] in De Anima; and thus, in its most perfect analogate, namely, the Divine intellect, there is an assimilation of most perfect similitude, which is identity in nature. But, on the other hand, the will is not an assimilative power, because the unique (proprius) mode of the operation of the will is not by assimilation to the object loved, but by inclination and propensity toward it. Therefore, no matter how much the perfection of will increases, it will not produce a similar terminus as its principle or object from its proper ratio (propria ratione), but rather will have the most perfect impulse toward it.

Objection. The intellect only seeks to be assimilated to the object in intelligible and intentional esse, not, however, in natural and entitative esse; but, it pertains to the ratio of being begotten and Son to be assimilated to the producer in nature and entitative esse: therefore, it is not rightly inferred that the Divine Word is begotten and Son, from the fact that he proceeds by way of intellection (per intellectum).

Response. Created intellects, because they are imperfect and produce [their] word from indigence, are only able to assimilate the terminus with the object in intentional and intelligible esse. Yet, the Divine Intellect, because it is most perfect, and does not produce its Word from indigence but from infinite fecundity, it is not only able to assimilative [the terminus with the object] in intelligible esse, but truly in natural and entitative esse. This is especially the case because in God intelligible and natural esse are identified [with each other] without any virtual distinction, since the divine nature is constituted by its most perfect and actual [act of] intellection, as we showed above in Tract I, Chapter 3.

Objection. Just as it is proper (proprium) for an intellect to produce a similitude as the terminus of its intellection, so also is it proper for the will to produce, as the terminus of its love, the union of the lover with the thing (re) loved. Hence, St. Thomas (ST.I-II.Q28.A1.Rep3) teaches that three types of union belong to the ratio of love: one from which it (a qua) it proceeds, which is the union of similitude, which is the cause of love; another in which it consists, which is a kind of impetus and impulse toward the thing (rem) loved; and, lastly, another which effects or desires, i.e., the real union which the lover seeks to have with the thing loved (amata). Therefore, just as the most perfect intellect produces a most perfect similitude, so also does the most perfect will produce a most perfect union. Now, just as a most perfect intellectual similitude implies an identity in nature under the concept of nature, so also does a most perfect union. Therefore, it is not rightly inferred that the Divine Word rather than the Holy Spirit is begotten and Son from the fact that He proceeds by way of intellection (per intellectum) rather than by way of volition (per voluntatem).

Response. Although [it is true that] the more perfect the love, the more perfect the union ought to be, such always remain within the line of love, not outside of it. But, identity in nature is outside of the line of the will and love, yet it is not outside of the line of the intellect and the intellectual similitude because will in God, since it is an inclination of the Divine Nature, is consequent upon it, whereas intellect in God, since it is that which is first conceived in God and is the root (radix) of Divine operations, or of the attributes pertaining to operation, does not suppose nor is it consequent upon the Divine Nature, but constitutes it. Hence, although in God the most perfect intellectual similitude implies an identity in nature under the concept in nature, the same is not implied from the most perfect union of love; for this only implies the most perfect inclination of the Divine Nature, which is constituted by intellection.

§ IV. Another objection is resolved.

Objection. The Holy Spirit has the Divine Nature in virtue of its procession and origin; therefore, His procession is no less [said to be] generation than the production of the Word. The consequent is clear from what was said above.

First proof of the antecedent. The Holy Spirit has the Divine Nature from His procession and origin, since he does not have such from Himself (a se), but from the Father and Son, from which He proceeds. Therefore, He has such in virtue of His procession and origin.

Second proof of the antecedent. The Holy Spirit, in virtue of His procession, is communicated the Divine existence (existentia), since production terminates in esse; but, the Divine existence (existentia) is not even virtually distinguished from the [Divine] nature: therefore, in virtue of His procession, the Holy Spirit is communicated to the Holy Spirit.

Third proof of the antecedent. The Father and Son, in producing the Holy Spirit, intend to produce something of the same (simile) nature, and not only in [certain] attributes. Therefore, the Holy Spirit, in virtue of His origin, has the Divine Nature. The consequent is clear. The antecedent is proven: every agent intends to produce something similar (simile) to itself, not only in the proximate principle by which it acts (in principio proximo agendi), but especially in the radical [principle], e.g., fire does not only intend to produce something similar (simile) in heat, but also in its substantial form [i.e., fire], and the parents (pater) do not only intend to assimilate their child in the generative power, but especially in [human] nature. But, the Divine essence is the radical principle (principium radicale) of the production of the Holy Spirit, just as the will is the formal and proximate principle. Therefore, the Father and Son, in producing the Holy Spirit, intend to produce something of the same (simile) nature, and not only in [certain] attributes.

Fourth proof of the antecedent. The Holy Spirit, in virtue of its procession, proceeds as God; therefore, in virtue of His procession, He receives the Divine Nature. The consequent is clear. The antecedent is proven: the Holy Spirit, in virtue of His procession, proceeds as He is, but He is formally God; therefore, in virtue of His procession, He proceeds as God.

Fifth proof of the antecedent. The Holy Spirit proceeds formally as a Divine Person; therefore, as one having the Divine Nature. The consequent is clear. The antecedent is proven: the Holy Spirit, in virtue of his procession, possesses relative subsistence, by which Divine Persons are constituted; therefore, He proceeds formally as a Divine Person.

Response. I deny the antecedent. To the first proof, I concede the antecedent and deny the consequence. Not everything that belongs to the terminus produced by procession is communicated in virtue of (ex vi) the procession, but only that which is the ratio formalis for terminating the procession. Therefore, since the divine nature is not the ratio formalis for terminating the procession of the Holy Spirit, but is something that is identified with the ratione formali for terminating, namely, with the ratione of love or impulse, which is what formally terminates. From this, it follows that the Holy Spirit has the divine nature from his procession and origin, but not in virtue of (ex vi) his procession and origin.

To the second proof, the divine existence is communicated to the Holy Spirit as a general condition which is required for every production, but not as the formal terminus of his procession, which is love or impulse.

To the third proof, I deny the antecedent. To its proof, the major is only true when the agent acts in virtue of a power proximately destined to communicate nature; but when it acts in virtue of another power, it intends a supreme similitude of itself in the proximate principle. Hence, since in divine things the intellect is the power which is per se primo destined for the communication of nature rather than the will, the Father and Son, in producing the Holy Spirit by volition (per voluntatem), do not intend a similitude in nature formally in virtue of (ex vi) such a production, while the Father, by intellection (per intellectum), produces the Son in such a manner.

To the fourth proof, I deny the antecedent. For, the Holy Spirit in virtue of (ex vi) his procession does not proceed formally as God, but as the love of God. To the proof of the antecedent, I distinguish the major, the Holy Spirit in virtue of (ex vi) his procession proceeds as he is (ut est) under every formality which he is (formalitate qua est), I deny the major; under some [formality], I concede the major. Conceding the minor, I deny the consequence. This solution is able to be illustrated by two examples. The first is in the case of a man who is generated and a man who is created to whom the same exact predicates apply with respect to esse, yet which terminate according to diverse formalities, the one generated and the other created, the latter under the common ratio (sub ratione communi) of created being, and the former under some more particular ratio (sub aliqua ratione peculari) of being. The second is the case of the existence of the body of Christ the Lord in the Sacrament by transubstantiation. For, although in the Body of Christ there is the rational soul which vivifies and animates, nonetheless it does not terminates in transubstantiation formally under the ratio (sub ratione) of vivifying or animate, but only under the ratio (sub ratione) of body.

To the fifth proof, I deny the antecedent. To the proof, the Holy Spirit posses in virtue (vi) of his procession relative subsistence by which (per quam) he is constituted as a person, but not formally as that which constitutes him as a person, because the person is constituted by relative subsistence as modifying the nature. For, the Holy Spirit does not have this formally in virtue of his procession as modifying the nature, but precisely as modifying the love or impulse toward the beloved object. Hence, the Holy Spirit does indeed formally proceed as subsistent in love, but as truly subsistent in the divine nature, only materially and identically, on account of the identity of the divine nature with the divine love.