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Introduction
The Other Paul recently did a live stream video, “A Response to Christian Wagner on Private Judgement,” which, as the name indicates, is a response to a certain video I released earlier this year titled “You CAN’T Just Work Off Your Interpretation...”
In this response, I believe that Paul correctly identified the point of dispute, i.e., whether theological conclusions properly so called add an additional motive to our assent. He also rightly noted that, in many of my videos, I seek to explain the general sequence of an argument while leaving unstated certain more extensive demonstrations of the principles I use or certain corollaries I could draw. I followed this practice in this video by explaining the sequence of how the Thomistic position on theological conclusions could be applied to Protestant theology without explaining in much detail why exactly the contrary position (taken by a handful of Catholic theologians, mostly of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and by the Protestant scholastics) is false, except to give general indications.
I do not think that this is problematic in principle. It is a practice commonly followed by scholastic theologians. In all honesty, it is actually sensible on the basis of the target audience of most of these videos. Most of my audience consists of Roman Catholics who have, in one way or another, received poor formation from certain formulations commonly given by apologists. As I have noted in many articles and videos, I believe that this poor formation poses a particular danger for these listeners. If the sequence of the arguments they have received is exposed, then, in some cases, they are shaken in a fundamental way. I have seen it happen many times. Therefore, I have chosen this path. Yet there is another path I can follow, which I will follow in this article, i.e., establishing these premises polemically rather than merely explaining them scholastically.
Unfortunately, I must bluntly admit that Paul’s treatment of the matter in that stream was not good. He frequently uses technical terminology in a sense that shows he does not know what the terms actually mean (e.g., “simple apprehension,” “motive of credibility,” “formal motive,” etc.) in key parts of his arguments. The arguments that he does give are either tu quoques that display a weak grasp of our doctrine on this matter, arguments against positions that I have never affirmed, examples that aren’t even relevant to the line of argumentation, or arguments formed with serious formal defects. Most of the two-hour-long stream is him repeating a distinction that I already grant (i.e., between the use of reason as an instrument and the formal motive of assent) along with a judicious misuse of the term “equivocates” (the irony of which I hope is lost on none).
This article will consist of four parts, followed by a brief conclusion. First, I want to lay out the state of the question precisely. On multiple occasions, Paul did not properly understand what the exact point of dispute is between us; therefore it will be helpful to lay out exactly which point I am attempting to argue from. Second, I want to define the terms that the whole dispute turns on (above all, the formal motive) and give a few clarifications of what I said in my original video. Third, I want to give the various demonstrations of the thesis that a theological conclusion properly so called, drawn from a premise of reason, is not of divine faith without the definition of the Church. Paul complained that I only defined my terms and never proved my premises; therefore, I will give the proofs of the entire scholastic tradition, Thomist and non-Thomist alike. Fourth, I want to take the particular examples and objections that he gave and explain them. Unfortunately, he didn’t really give any sort of argument against my main contention except to point to certain examples, so I am forced to just repeat the examples and explain why they don’t work.
The State of the Question
NOTE. It has become very popular to hand-wave arguments by speaking about “paradigms” or whatever. Paul does this to my video. Before I even begin to lay out the state of the question, I want to remind you that the state of the question is just me explaining what I am vs. what I am not defending. So no, me explaining what I mean isn’t “assuming paradigms” and not demonstrating my principles. This is simply me explaining what I mean by terms and how I distinguish them from one another. Once I have stated the state of the question, then I can go on to prove the thesis and respond to arguments against the thesis.
From the perspective of reason, we can distinguish the relationship of a premise to its conclusion in two ways. First, in reasoning from the comprehension of the term. Second, in reasoning from the extension of the term. In the comprehension of the term, we can distinguish again between reasoning from what is nominally distinct, e.g., the defined thing to its definition, the thing to an essential note, etc., and reasoning from what is virtually distinct, e.g., the essence to its properties. In the extension of the term, we can distinguish between reasoning from an unconditioned universal to a particular (e.g., “all men will die” to “I will die”) and reasoning from a conditioned universal to a particular (e.g., “every man dying in a state of grace will be saved” to “this man, who died in a state of grace, will be saved”).
A word on terminology, since I will be quoting a great many authors who do not all speak the same way. The vocabulary I am using here (nominal distinction, virtual distinction, unconditioned and conditioned universal) is Fr. Marín-Sola’s, and I use it because it is the clearest (La evolución homogénea del dogma católico, ch. I sec. II–III, nn. 23–35). Fr. Marín-Sola distinguishes three degrees of distinction between a conclusion and the principle from which it is drawn: the nominal distinction (one and the same concept under two formulae, e.g., “man” and “rational animal”), the virtual or conceptual distinction (two concepts, really identical in the object, e.g., “spiritual” and “immortal”), and the real distinction (two realities, e.g., “accident” and “actual inherence in a subject”).
“In the case of nominal distinction the concepts or the propositions are identical not only really but also logically or formally. In the case of real distinction the concepts or the propositions differ not only logically or formally but also really. In the case of virtual distinction the concepts or the propositions are logically or formally distinct, but really or objectively identical.” (ibid., n. 23)
Reasoning across the first is what he calls improper discourse, because “there are many oral acts, but only one intellectual act”; reasoning across the second or the third is proper discourse. (ibid., n. 27) Other authors say the same thing in other words. Suárez, Lugo, and the Salmanticenses call what is reached by the first degree “formally (though implicitly) revealed” and what is reached by the second and third “virtually revealed”; the Salmanticenses call the first kind of reasoning “improper or explicative discourse” and the second “proper or illative discourse”; Billuart distinguishes containment “by reason of signification” from containment “by reason of natural connexion”; Pesch distinguishes the “explicative” from the “rigorous” discourse; Garrigou-Lagrange and Schultes, following Marín-Sola, speak of the “formally implicit,” the “virtually inclusive” and the “virtually connexive”; Doronzo of the conclusion “improperly so called or merely explicative” and “properly so called or truly illative.” These are the same distinctions under different names. Whenever I say “proper theological conclusion” or “proper illation” in what follows, I mean Marín-Sola’s second and third degrees, the older authors’ “virtually revealed,” and nothing else. Whenever I say “nominally distinct” or “improper illation,” I mean the first degree, what the older authors call “formally implicit.”
All Catholic authors concede that both reasoning from what is nominally distinct and reasoning from an unconditioned universal can be of faith. There is no dispute here. The dispute is over reasoning from what is virtually (or really) distinct and from the conditioned universal (although we can distinguish here again between what can become morally certain in a strict sense and what cannot become morally certain in a strict sense). On the second point, the problem of the canon of Scripture takes central importance, since the fact of inspiration is a supernatural fact (a charism) that can be known only by divine revelation, because it cannot become morally certain in the strict sense by any natural means; yet “all Scripture is inspired” is a conditioned universal, since which writings are Scripture is precisely what the proposition supposes and does not assert. I have treated this elsewhere and will only touch on it below where Paul raises the canon.
From the perspective of the definition of the Church, we can consider something before the definition of the Church and something after the definition of the Church.
According to a minority of theologians, proper theological conclusions (i.e., reasoning from what is virtually distinct) can be assented to by faith even before the definition of the Church. This was the position of Vega, of Gabriel Vázquez, and of Melchior Cano in book VI of the De locis, a position he qualified in book XII (cc. 4–5). According to others, proper theological conclusions can be assented to by faith only if they are defined by the Church. This is the common position of the Thomists (Capreolus, Cajetan, Bañez, Zumel, John of St. Thomas, the Salmanticenses, Gonet, Ferre, Gotti, Billuart, Marín-Sola) and of Suárez and Lugo. Lastly, according to some, a proper theological conclusion can never be of divine faith, even after the Church defines it, but remains at most an object of “ecclesiastical faith.” This position began with Molina and is held in modern times by Franzelin, Pesch, Billot, Schultes and Garrigou-Lagrange. Since Paul made a great deal of the claim that my argument is “just Thomism,” it should be recalled that many of the aforementioned authors are not Thomists. The reader should also take note that the thesis common to the last two groups (that such conclusions are not of faith before the definition of the Church) is held by many Scotists and Nominalists as well (according to the testimony of Suárez). To call this a uniquely “Thomistic” thesis with “Thomistic” definitions is simply absurd.
On the issue of the conditioned universal, theologians are again divided. I am not aware of any who hold that the particular under a conditioned universal (when it is not morally certain in the strict sense by our natural powers) can be of faith before the definition of the Church. Therefore, theologians are divided into two camps. First, there are those who hold that the infallible promulgation of these particulars underlying the conditioned universal can be given the assent of divine faith. Second, there are those who hold that the assent is somehow different, distinguishing divine faith from ecclesiastical faith.
From the perspective of the propositions themselves, we can distinguish between those syllogisms which have two revealed premises and those syllogisms which have one revealed premise and one non-revealed premise. According to some, a proper theological conclusion can be of faith if both premises are revealed (since there is no additional motive added outside of divine revelation), whereas, according to others, the very mode of scientific reasoning is what excludes proper theological conclusions; therefore, even if both premises are revealed, the conclusion cannot be of faith. The former group places more emphasis on the additional motive added by the natural premise, whereas the latter group places more emphasis on the very process of reasoning.
As you can see, there are a number of different questions that could be asked when we consider the issue of “theological reason” and its relationship to divine faith. Paul notes in his reply to me that this is my argument’s “Achilles’ heel” and relies on an adherence to “a Thomist account of these prolegomena.” There are two points to be said to this (beside the explanation already given in the introduction).
First, while it is certainly true that there is a multiplicity of accounts of these problems among Catholic authors, the diversity on this question in particular is a bit overstated. For a theologian to hold that a mixed syllogism can receive the assent of faith before the definition of the Church is quite rare among Catholic authors of the past few centuries. There were holdouts, as I have said, but the other schools mostly agree with the Thomists on this point, and the Jesuits who wrote the classic treatments of the question agree with the Thomists entirely on the point that matters against Paul.
Second, even if the Thomists were alone in this endeavor, it wouldn’t make much of a difference. Let me give you a good analogy to a similar situation. Thomists have a particular argument from the nature of relative opposition in order to refute the Photian denial of the Filioque. Yet, famously, the Scotists (in their account of disparate relations in the Godhead) reject that this argument necessarily follows. Does this stop me from using this argument against the Photians? No. It shouldn’t. When I dispute with outsiders, I use reason (whether natural or theological) and commonly held authorities (e.g., Scripture) in order to refute their position. My position does not rest on the authority of my school (which they don’t accept); it rests on the validity of the arguments that are given by my school.
In fact, this dispute between Catholic theologians actually serves my argument. Scholastics have had to fight with the holdouts on both of these points for centuries. We have written extensive, detailed arguments refuting their position on this point. These arguments are the exact arguments that I can present to the Protestant in order to persuade him. Vega and Vázquez made the case for Paul’s position better than Paul did, and Suárez, Lugo and the Salmanticenses answered them. That is what the third part of this article is.
I find statements such as these (made in response to a clip of Kevin, whose remarks Paul played during the stream) to be seriously problematic: “Kevin here notes again this is just the Thomistic account; the other Roman schools are going to say something different. So they have a stronger burden, in that this isn’t just Roman teaching 101; this is a particular school within Rome that says this. So if you don’t accept the articulation of that school on this issue, the argument is kind of bunk.”
An argument follows upon the strength of its premises. It matters little whether there is or is not a dispute between Catholic theologians on a certain point. Therefore, it is beside the point whether there is agreement or disagreement if what I present follows. Hence, “if you don’t accept the articulation of that school on this issue, the argument is kind of bunk” is not true. My agreement or disagreement with this argument is not a matter of whether I am a Thomist or not a Thomist, but whether I find the arguments to be strong or weak.
From all this, gather that I will argue from the case of proper theological conclusions (i.e., not universal/particular or nominal) where there is a premise of reason (i.e., not two revealed premises, although this can be argued as well) before the definition (i.e., abstracting from debates on ecclesiastical faith). Stated as a thesis:
A theological conclusion properly so called, i.e., one drawn by proper illation from one premise of divine faith and one premise of natural reason, is not, before the definition of the Church, an object of divine faith, but of theology.
I must note this before I begin because Paul, unfortunately, seems far too attached to “the syllogism.” He seems to think that I am making my argument from the nature of syllogistic reasoning. Therefore, if he can find a syllogism where I assent to the conclusion on the basis of divine faith, he declares victory.
It is to be remembered that terms, propositions, and syllogisms are products of distinct acts of the intellect (simple apprehension, judgement, reasoning). Therefore, rather than looking at the external form that is presented to you, it is necessary that you actually inquire into what these various products are meant to indicate in the intellect of the one making such acts. A syllogism can be used to express wildly different things, everything from the transition from the definition to the defined, to the process of induction, to the transition from the universal to the particular. In a similar way, even a single term can have diverse significations and suppositions that make it impossible to communicate if we rest on the bare external form.
There were times in the stream where he played clips where I qualified quite precisely that I was speaking about the role of a premise in a syllogism that was meant to indicate scientific reasoning. Then, to “refute” this, he gives a number of examples that are not scientific reasoning.
I hope that what was laid out above expresses precisely what is meant when I state my thesis about proper theological conclusions.
A Definition: The Formal Motive
Since I am particularly critiquing the Protestant understanding of the theological conclusion on the basis of the formal motive, I need to treat particularly of the formal motive.
Throughout his video, Paul applied the term “motive” or “formal motive” to quite a number of different things. For example, he gives the instance of the investigation into the resurrection, saying that the investigation is the “formal motive” of the assent of faith in this case, before also saying that the authority of God is the “formal motive,” and then concluding that it doesn’t really matter which formulation is used because they basically mean the same thing.
It is quite unbelievable that he came to the conclusion that practically everything used in the reasoning process is basically the motive of the conclusion, which is how he “refutes” the argument I gave in my original video.
Here, it is important to recall what is actually meant by the “formal motive” of the assent to some proposition.
St. Thomas explains the formal motive at the beginning of his tract on Faith:
The object of every cognitive habit includes two things: first, that which is known materially, and is the material object, so to speak, and, secondly, that whereby it is known, which is the formal aspect of the object. Thus in the science of geometry, the conclusions are what is known materially, while the formal aspect of the science is the medium of demonstration, through which the conclusions are known.
If we consider, in faith, the formal aspect of the object, it is nothing else than the First Truth. For the faith of which we are speaking, does not assent to anything, except because it is revealed by God. Hence the medium on which faith is based is the Divine Truth. If, however, we consider materially the things to which faith assents, they include not only God, but also many other things, which, nevertheless, do not come under the assent of faith, except as bearing some relation to God, inasmuch as, to wit, through certain effects of the Divine operation, man is helped on his journey towards the enjoyment of God. Consequently from this point of view also the object of faith is, in a way, the First Truth, inasmuch as nothing comes under faith except in relation to God, even as the object of the medical art is health, for it considers nothing save in relation to health. (ST II-II q. 1 a. 1)
In any demonstrative science, the formal reason of knowing the conclusion is the medium of demonstration. In faith, the formal reason of knowing the conclusion is the authority of God revealing as the First Truth. The formal motive is simply that on which the intellect rests when it assents, that which induces it to make its act.
There is nothing wrong with saying that reason can be instrumental (as all our faculties can be instrumental in the process of reasoning); the exact point in dispute is the grounds or basis upon which one formally adheres to the judgement at hand. When my mother says “I love you,” my ears are acting instrumentally insofar as they capture the sound; yet when I am resolving this into the line of judgement so as to ask “what is the motive or grounds upon which I base my adherence to the fact that my mother loves me,” I do not explain this on the basis of my hearing. That is a necessary condition, but it is something material to the judgement. I can easily show this from a hypothetical. Let’s say that God internally impressed what data is received by my sense of hearing without my hearing entering into the process. Would I still have the same formal motive that moves my intellect to the fact that my mother loves me? Yes, of course. In both cases, I believe it on the basis of the testimony of my mother, whether this is received by hearing or by extraordinary sense impression. No matter how I shift the example, the formal motive remains the same.
How much clearer is it that my senses enter the process of reasoning as mere conditions and not as the formal motive of reasoning? While this is intuitive if we just turn in upon ourselves, this is also plain and evident from the process of reasoning. Can the greater come from the less? No, it cannot. If the senses formally entered in as true motives, true causes of the rational certitude of our conclusions, would not the greater come from the less? The indeterminate in a certain order into the determinate of a higher order? What use is there for the agent intellect?
When we are distinguishing between something that is “instrumental” in the process of reasoning and the “formal motive” in the process of reasoning, we are describing two things that could not possibly be more different. The instrument enters in only to communicate something to the intellect. My eyes in reading the page of Scripture exist only to communicate the words into my mind. The formal motive induces the intellect to adhere to the judgement and make its act. In certain cases, the intellect is induced by evidence contained in the proposition, which are those “self-evident” (per se nota) principles. In other judgements, the intellect is induced by the testimony of another, whether human (human faith) or divine (divine faith). In other judgements, the intellect is induced by the light of other principles illuminating a conclusion that can be drawn from their virtuality (scientific conclusion).
St. Thomas gives this precise division:
Faith implies assent of the intellect to that which is believed. Now the intellect assents to a thing in two ways. First, through being moved to assent by its very object, which is known either by itself (as in the case of first principles, which are held by the habit of understanding), or through something else already known (as in the case of conclusions which are held by the habit of science). Secondly the intellect assents to something, not through being sufficiently moved to this assent by its proper object, but through an act of choice, whereby it turns voluntarily to one side rather than to the other: and if this be accompanied by doubt or fear of the opposite side, there will be opinion, while, if there be certainty and no fear of the other side, there will be faith. (ST II-II q. 1 a. 4)
Garrigou-Lagrange lays this out quite well:
The motive of the assent of experience is sensible evidence [as abstracted by intellection]; the motive of scientific assent is the truth of the principle from which the conclusion is elicited; the motive of the understanding of principles is their intellectual evidence [i.e., as per se nota first principles]; the motive of opinion is a probable reason on account of which we assent with uncertainty and fear of erring. Faith, on the contrary, is a certain adhesion to the inevident object of some testimony, whence it cannot rest on any other motive than the veracity of the one testifying. (De revelatione, t. I, c. XIV a. 2 § I n. 2)
Where Paul speaks of “instrument” and “motive,” the scholastics speak of “condition” and “cause.” The condition is distinguished from the cause insofar as the condition does not positively influence the effect, while the cause does positively influence the effect. The role of the condition is to supply some necessary supposition that must be posited or removed in order that the cause may take its effect. Garrigou-Lagrange explains this quite well: “A motive or cause positively influences the effect, as fire by its action burns the wood; a condition, on the contrary, does not positively move or influence, but is necessary in order that the cause may influence, and only applies the cause actually acting to the patient, as the application of the fire to the wood.” (ibid., n. 3)
He gives three examples that illustrate this distinction quite well:
A professor, as proposing to his students the doctrine of St. Thomas, is only a condition; the motive is the authority of St. Thomas, not the authority of this professor. Again, the intellect beholds the truth of first principles on account of their evidence, and the explication of the terms in which the principles are expressed was only a condition. Again, the will is moved by the good itself, but cannot love it unless it be proposed by the intellect; this proposal is only a condition. (ibid., n. 4)
My eyes are a condition of my reading the canon list; they are not the cause of my assent to it. The explication of the terms of a revealed proposition is a condition; it is not a new motive. If you are to understand why Paul’s examples do not follow, then you must understand this distinction quite well. Paul’s entire stream is an attempt to blur this distinction in order to make every condition into a “sub-motive” (whatever that is supposed to mean) so that he can transform every real motive into a mere “instrument.”
I find Scheeben’s treatment of this issue (as on all matters of faith) to be particularly excellent. He is able to lay aside the type of loose usage and equivocation that underlies Paul’s entire treatment of this question:
In another sense, we sometimes call a motive for faith everything that in any way whatsoever influences faith itself or the genesis thereof, whether by inciting it, like preaching or reading, or by proving or indirectly determining its obligatory character, like the motiva credibilitatis, or by guiding and determining it instrumentally, like the rule of faith, or by producing, urging, and supporting it, like interior grace. In the narrower sense, however, the objective, direct, and independently operating motives are to be considered as motiva. (Handbook I.2, § 40 n. 668)
Everything that Paul calls a “sub-motive” is listed by Scheeben first. Yet, he refuses to name them “motives” in the proper sense since the formal motive, when speaking properly, is that which specifies the act. These are called “motives” insofar as they prepare the intellect for the act of faith, yet are not proper “motives” in the sense in which we speak because the formal motive is that which specifies the act and moves the intellect to properly assent. He continues:
They are a motive of the act of faith itself merely quoad exercitium [with regard to the exercise], not quoad essentiam [with regard to the essence] ... they function here not as an adequate, not even as an independent motive, but only instrumentally. Hence they determine a person to faith, without defining it internally in its essence; they support faith, without sustaining it internally; they pave the way to it, without producing it from themselves. (ibid., § 42 n. 756)
This distinction is not arbitrary, but spontaneously arises from interior reflection. There are motives to the exercise of the act that are not motives that essentially constitute the act. In the example of my adherence to the fact that my mother loves me, I can reflect on the process of hearing and the sensible pre-requisites to my intellectual judgement and see that these processes do not in any way enter into the essence of the act. For, were they not to exist, I would still be able to adhere to such a judgement. A thing can move me to make an act (quoad exercitium) without being any part of what the act is (quoad essentiam, or, as the Thomists say, quoad specificationem). The senses, the reading, the explication of the terms, the judgement of credibility, the Church’s proposal, etc., move me to the act of faith, or apply its object to me, but none of them is any part of the motive that specifies it and enters into its essence.
Here is where we are able to see, in a general and confused way, why exactly Paul’s insistence that the proper reasoning process does not enter the formal motive is so absurd. When we draw any sort of conclusion by a proper process of reasoning, the premises of the antecedent concur essentially in eliciting the assent to the conclusion. Each premise enters per se into the conclusion both as to the content of the conclusion drawn from them and as to the certitude that induces the intellect to rest in it. The premises in such a case are not mere occasions of assent, they are not mere conditions, they do not merely remove some sort of impediment, they are both what is assented to and why the intellect assents to it. It enters quoad specificationem. Paul’s examples, without exception, are things that enter quoad exercitium. That is why they are all beside the point.
Paul’s understanding of this matter cannot but strike me as one of pure empiricism. As I repeated above, the plane of reasoning is above the plane of sense. We begin with simple apprehension, which involves the abstraction of the concept from the state of sense data. Without this, we have no formal motive for our intellectual judgement. The phantasm existing in our minds is not yet in the order of reason, not yet fruitful for bringing forth the conclusion. How could it be? It must be abstracted. After this abstraction, we combine these concepts into judgements, which judgements are then ultimately used in the process of reasoning. How can Paul follow the philosophy of his own scholastic tradition and deny this? Does the formal motive for our assent stray from the order of reason existing in the intellect? I cannot see how this can be held.
The entire point of my argument isn’t based on just any kind of reasoning or on the nature of the motive in general, but specifically on scientific conclusions, where the conclusion’s entire force is taken from the antecedent. Let’s think about what the intellect is actually doing when we make a properly scientific judgement. We have one judgement that we have made on the basis of whatever sort of evidence is proportioned to it (e.g., “Christ is a man,” on the basis of divine authority); then we make another judgement with whatever sort of evidence is proportioned to it (e.g., “risibility is a property of man,” on the basis of human authority, e.g., my professor told me). Then what my intellect does in this case is that it recognizes that Christ is included under “man,” and therefore it draws forth the conclusion that “risibility is a property of Christ.”
Paul would like to hold that this conclusion is also on the basis of divine authority and that we can hold it by divine faith. He would say that the formal motive for my assenting to “risibility is a property of Christ,” the very principle that induces my intellect to assent to this, is divine authority. It is my argument that this is absurd. The intellect in this simple process that I outlined is taking something it knows by human faith (the authority of my professor) and then combining it with something that it knows by divine faith (i.e., the humanity of Christ). This isn’t a case adjacent to my eyes in reading the word of God, where my eyes do not induce my intellect to assent to what is read. In this case, the intellect is induced to the very judgement that “risibility is a property of man” by the authority of the professor. How is it anything but absurd to assert gratuitously (as Paul likes to accuse me so much of) that the motive of the authority of the professor simply disappears in the conclusion? In this, the lesser has produced the greater. The conclusion rests on the stronger part.
Let me give you an example. Let’s say a man gave a speech in a classroom. He begins by setting out some self-evident principles that the entire class accepts. Then, all of a sudden, he begins to quote a few of my greatest tweets. Then he draws a conclusion from a combination of self-evident principles and a few of my tweets, declaring, “These are, likewise, self-evident!” It would be absurd. He would be laughed out of the room. Yet this is what Paul tells us he can do. He says that we can have a conclusion whose motive follows the stronger part. He says that the lesser can produce the greater.
What “Thomisms” did I need to produce here to show the absurdity?
Inevitably, we are met with a flood of tu quoques from our opposition. You can find the answer to these in the objections. They are not difficult, but proceed from vague notions of things.
Some Clarifications
Here, I should present some important clarifications in order to understand what was said in my original video.
First Clarification. Paul states the following: “He’s simply saying private judgment is the inclusion of human elements, of rational elements, into the motive for why you believe something. It’s when it goes from simple apprehension to discursive reasoning, premises to conclusion.”
Here, there is an important point of clarification to disambiguate what I said. There are three acts of the intellect: simple apprehension, judgement, and reasoning. Simple apprehension concerns the apprehension of the quiddity of the thing (e.g., “man”). Judgement concerns the affirmation or negation of something about that thing (e.g., “man is an animal”). Judgement combines the simple apprehension of two terms (or what is equivalently two terms) by the copula “is” or separates them by the negation “is not.” Reasoning concerns the conclusion of a new judgement by the combination of two premises and the derivation of a third from these two premises (e.g., “All men are rational; Socrates is a man; therefore, Socrates is rational”).
Each of these three acts builds upon the last one, judgement upon simple apprehension, reasoning upon judgement. As to faith, I am not saying that faith is the simple apprehension of the quiddities of things. Faith is an assent, requiring affirmation or negation, e.g., “Christ is Lord.” Simple apprehension has no truth or falsity in it and nothing is assented to in it, so “the simple apprehension of divine faith” (a phrase Paul uses over and over) is a contradiction in terms.
St. Thomas explicitly says this, which should be evident to anyone who considers the case:
Our understanding has a twofold operation. There is one by which it forms the simple quiddities of things, such as what a man is, or what an animal is. This operation of itself does not involve truth or falsity, just as simple words do not. The second operation of the understanding is that by which it joins and divides concepts by affirmation or denial. Now, in this operation we do find truth and falsity, just as we do in the proposition, which is its sign. Belief, however, does not occur in the first operation, but only in the second, for we believe what is true and disbelieve what is false. (De veritate q. 14 a. 1 c.)
The particular point of critique concerns whether the combination of two judgements and the derivation of a third can possess the same motive when the motives are “mixed,” one judgement being upon the motive of divine revelation (e.g., “Christ is man”) and another upon natural reason (e.g., “all men are risible”). Whether the conclusion can have the same motive when the motives are not mixed (as would happen if both premises are divinely revealed) is a separate question and does not concern us here.
Second Clarification. Paul indicates in a few places that I do not hold that theological conclusions are revealed.
I am not stating that theological conclusions are “not revealed.” That is not my claim. Theology is a science that proceeds under the light of virtual revelation when it draws conclusions. This should be clear from the fact that, in logic, the conclusion of a syllogism is virtually contained in its premises.
Rather, the particular claim that is made is that virtual revelation requires that something outside the motive of divine revelation enter into the conclusion. I will give an analogy, taken from the rule of logic concerning quantity (I use it here only to illustrate the rule, not as an instance of proper illation, since the application of a universal to a singular is, as I explain below, not proper discourse). Let’s say we made the following syllogism: all men are mortal; Socrates is a man; therefore, Socrates is mortal. The conclusion is virtually contained in the major premise. Otherwise, the conclusion would not follow. Yet the conclusion is restricted by the minor premise and cannot extend beyond the minor premise: the conclusion follows the weaker part. Therefore, I cannot have an assent that is universal in the conclusion, but only singular. In a similar way, when I combine a premise of revelation and a premise of reason in a proper illation, the conclusion follows the weaker part, and the conclusion is formally of reason, since the “weaker part” in this case is the premise of reason. (I will state this axiom with more precision below; for now it is enough to see that the conclusion cannot be stronger than what it is drawn from.)
This has nothing to do with whether the conclusion is virtually revealed or not (it is), but whether the conclusion’s motive is something natural (formally yes, radically no; but the virtue follows what is formally the motive, not what is radically the motive, since virtues are specified by their formal motive).
Marín-Sola states this quite clearly, removing any suspicion that I deny that such conclusions are “revealed”:
“It is obvious that no thing can be of divine faith if it is not truly said by God; ... theological conclusions, if they are inclusive, are what God has truly said because they are included in what God has said; nonetheless, as long as they are not defined by the Church, they are what God said explicated by man.” (Evolución, n. 304; cf. nn. 168 and 301)
This is my position on the matter. As in any scientific conclusion, the object is there (lest we fall into “nominalism”) insofar as the antecedent enters into the conclusion virtually. The revealed premise is there since the conclusion is contained as property to essence. Yet, our access to it is not on the basis of God’s word alone (which, in itself, is simple). In order to get to this conclusion, we have to supply some sort of premise that per se concurs in the production of the conclusion on some different formal motive. Therefore, the assent that we give to the conclusion is theological, what God said explicated by man, not merely adhered to by man.
This should evidently show that I do not view theological conclusions as “not revealed.”
NOTE. It is to be noted that the motive of the conclusion does not follow upon discursion as such. St. Thomas notes that we may speak of a certain discursus wherever the intellect is moved first to one thing and from that to another. The relevant distinction is whether we know something in something or through something:
Properly speaking, to discourse is to come to the knowledge of one thing through another. There is a difference, however, between knowing something in another and knowing it from another.
For when one thing is known in another, the knower is, by one motion, directed to both. This is clearly the case when a thing is known in another as in an intelligible form. This kind of knowledge is not discursive. Moreover, in this regard, it makes no difference whether the thing be seen in its own species or in a different one; for sight is not said to know discursively when it sees a stone either by means of a species received from the stone itself or by seeing the stone’s species reflected in a mirror.
A thing is said to be known from another, however, when the motion to both is not the same, but the intellect is first moved to one and from this is moved to the other. Consequently, discourse takes place here, as it evidently takes place in demonstrations. For the intellect is first directed only to principles, then it is directed through the principles to conclusions. (De veritate q. 8 a. 15)
Woodbury applies this text to the difference between the formal and the instrumental sign: the concept is a formal sign, in which the thing is known “by the same act”; a spoken or written word is a conventional instrumental sign, bearing only a relation of reason to what it signifies, so that the intellect must be moved first to the word and from the word to the concept, and only in the concept, which is the formal sign of the thing, is the reality itself known (Logic, n. 63).
The point matters for what follows. If discursion in this wide sense were to require a new motive for the conclusion, then even the process whereby we understand what is spoken or written by conventional signs (i.e., language) would also require a new motive, which cannot be the case without an infinite regress of motives. Hence, while a plurality of movements is a necessary condition for a new motive, it is not a sufficient condition of itself for a new motive. What is required for a new motive is discourse in the strict sense, which St. Thomas distinguishes from the loose sense in the very article on whether God’s knowledge is discursive:
In our knowledge there is a twofold discursion: one is according to succession only, as when we have actually understood anything, we turn ourselves to understand something else; while the other mode of discursion is according to causality, as when through principles we arrive at the knowledge of conclusions. (ST I q. 14 a. 7 c.)
Only the second kind has a medium; only the second kind knows the one thing from the other as a conclusion from its principle; and therefore only the second kind can carry the motive of the prior cognition into the later one. The word on the page is not the reason I hold the proposition true; it is only that in which the proposition reaches me. The premise of a demonstration is the reason I hold the conclusion true.
Tournely summarizes this excellently: “The sole formal motive of the assent which is given to faith is divine revelation; discourse, reasoning, etc., is only a previous condition, or the organ and instrument which the human mind uses to discover what has been revealed.” (Praelectiones theologicae de Deo, Quaest. III a. II, Secunda conclusio)
Third Clarification. Paul states the following: “Let’s say I reason by good and necessary consequence to doctrine X. It wasn’t explicit in Scripture in as many words. I just saw: look, Scripture reveals this; it also reveals this; by necessary consequence, it means this as well.”
It is to be noted that this isn’t the particular point of critique that presses the Protestants most violently. It is a genuinely disputed point among Thomists whether a theological conclusion drawn from two revealed premises can be a matter of faith. Some Thomists argue that the very mode of reasoning in such a case adds an additional motive (and, therefore, that such cannot be of faith before the definition of the Church), while others argue that the mode of reasoning does not add an additional motive (and, therefore, that such can at least be of faith after the definition of the Church).
The point that particularly presses the Protestants concerns the mixture of a premise that is formally revealed and a premise that is of natural reason. In this case, one can easily see that reason is not simply acting as an instrument, but relies on the premise of natural reason as a motive, and this motive is transported into the conclusion.
Fourth Clarification. Since Paul’s two favorite examples (the resurrection and the canon) are related to the issue of the motives of credibility, I must issue an additional clarification on the motives of credibility. Unfortunately, Paul does not have a clear notion on what we mean by the “motives of credibility” in relation to the assent of Divine Faith. Here, I will follow Garrigou-Lagrange’s excellent exposition in De Revelatione.
The motives of credibility (miracles, prophecies, the marks of the Church, the sublimity of the doctrine, etc.) are the signs by which it becomes evident that a given revelation is credibly from God. Garrigou-Lagrange defines credibility, in substance, as the aptitude of the mysteries to be believed, insofar as from most certain signs they appear to our reason to be revealed by God (De revelatione I, c. XV a. 1 § III). This definition makes it clear that we are not saying that the motives of credibility make the mysteries evident. If such were the case, faith would no longer be an “obscure” assent (contrary to the words of the Apostle). Further, this also does not make the fact of revelation itself evident, as theologians commonly teach (cf. Scheeben, Handbook I.2, § 42 n. 730). Rather, the particular aspect in which the motives of credibility terminate is revealed by the name. These motives of credibility show that the mysteries are evidently credible. For something to be “credible” is quite distinct from something as “true.” It makes the truths “believable.”
From this, Garrigou-Lagrange draws out the four properties of credibility from the teaching of St. Thomas and other theologians (De revelatione I, c. XV a. 1 § III). First, “credibility is something common to all revealed things.” This is taught by St. Thomas in ST II-II q. 1 a. 4 ad 2. Second, “the truth of credibility is extrinsic to the things revealed. For the evidence of the credibility of the mysteries is not their intrinsic evidence; the mysteries remain obscure in themselves, but are said extrinsically to be evidently credible, insofar as from certain signs they appear to be revealed by God.” Third, credibility is “a speculative-practical truth,” which bears on the act of faith to be placed. Fourth, it is a conditio sine qua non of the act of faith insofar as rationality is a condition of the act of faith. It would be the vice of credulity to, in ordinary circumstances, assent to matters of faith without such a revelation being rationally credible. To lightly believe something is the work of the fool as Sacred Scripture itself testifies: Qui credit cito, levis corde est, et minorabitur. (Sir. 19:4)
There are two important points to highlight here. First, the motives of credibility terminate in the judgement of credibility. The judgement of credibility judges that the revelation of the mysteries is CREDIBLE, not that the revelation of the mysteries is TRUE. The latter assent is the assent of faith which has no created formal motive, but is the very uncreated truth. Otherwise, the supernaturality of the mysteries would be completely destroyed. Second, the judgement of credibility relates to the assent of faith as its CONDITION, not as its CAUSE. The assent of faith merely supposes that we have some rational certitude about revelation’s credibility, not that we are able to naturally demonstrate that such is true. The Salmanticenses summarize this quite well:
To have the evidence of credibility, it suffices that one evidently judge that there are here and now sufficient motives for believing something as said by God, although he sees neither the object nor God’s speaking. For credibility does not consist either in the object proposed or in the testimony of God, but in that relation and disposition of things by which the object appears evidently worthy of faith. (De fide disp. III dub. I n. 3)
From the consideration of the signs which constitute the motives of credibility, the intellect forms a certain judgement, i.e., that “this is credible.” From this judgement of credibility, there follows the judgement of credendity that “this ought to be believed” (the speculative-practical judgement) and that “this ought to be believed by me, here and now” (the practico-practical judgement). None of these judgements is the act of faith, but simply what precedes the act of faith. This is to make the act of faith reasonable, not to make the act of faith itself. These are natural judgements with natural certitude and with completely different objects than the object of the act of faith:
From this it is plain what the office of the judgement of credibility is: it is a condition sine qua non of the act of faith, insofar as the obscure assent must be resolved at least materially and extrinsically into some evidence ... The act of faith is not, therefore, the conclusion of the apologetic syllogism; rather this syllogism terminates in the judgement of credibility, namely: Whatever God reveals is reasonably credible; but God has revealed the Christian doctrine, as is plain from the signs by which it is confirmed; therefore this doctrine is reasonably credible. (De revelatione I, c. XV a. 3 § II)
Scheeben treats this matter excellently, opposing the tendency of many to turn faith into some sort of syllogism. In a different article, I laid out Scheeben’s opposition to the common misunderstanding. He explains quite well what the fact of God’s external revelation (and, a fortiori, the motives of credibility) is for:
The fact of God’s external revelation, or the real divine origin of a given word, is not the motive of faith itself ... It is merely a condition for God’s trustworthiness to support the content of the word in question and to make it internally trustworthy. Through itself and by itself it moves us only to accept the fact that that content is actually covered by God’s trustworthiness, and therefore makes it not so much deserving of belief (credendum) as believable (credibile)... [the signs] are designated merely as motiva credibilitatis, not as motiva credenditatis [motives for judging that it ought to be believed], much less fidei [motives of faith], because here too they are not the adequate and decisive reason for the necessity of believing, but merely the condition and means for the effectiveness of the chief reason that determines that necessity. (Handbook I.2, § 42 nn. 721–722)
The “motive of credibility” names exactly what it says. It is a motive for the judgement that something is credible, not the motive of faith.
So little are [the signs] in themselves the intrinsically determining motive and the intrinsically sustaining reason of the certainty of faith about the content of revelation, that strictly speaking they are not even a motive and reason of certainty about the fact of revelation ... They are a motive of certainty merely for the judgment of credibility, and even here not the adequate motive. They are a motive of the act of faith itself merely quoad exercitium, not quoad essentiam. (ibid., n. 756)
There are two corollaries to draw from this doctrine which has been defined by the Church. First, the certitude of faith is a greater certitude than the certitude of the motives of credibility (which would be impossible if the motives of credibility named the motives for the assent of faith). Therefore, Bl. Innocent XI condemned the thesis that “the will cannot effect that the assent to faith be in itself stronger than the weight of the reasons impelling toward assent.” (DS 2119, cf. DS 2121) Scheeben explains this condemnation:
Those reasons are understood to include the motives of credibility, whose rational certainty determines neither the measure of confidence with which the will adheres both to the content of the revelation and also to the fact of the revelation, nor the degree of decisiveness with which the intellect holds it fast at the inducement of the will. (ibid., n. 757)
The second consequence is that the judgement of credibility does not necessarily posit the assent of faith (which Paul himself seems to admit when treating the Jews who hold to the resurrection of Christ). It is not impossible that someone make the judgement of credibility and not follow this judgement with those further acts disposing towards faith. As Garrigou-Lagrange clearly explains from Scripture:
[The judgement of credibility] and even the speculative-practical judgement of credentity are found not only in those who come to faith, but also in those who with full advertence commit the sin of infidelity ... For some, like the Pharisees, when the Gospel preaching confirmed by miracles is proposed to them, resist interior grace ... Therefore they can, having seen the miracles, judge evidently of the credibility of the preaching proposed; indeed they can know the obligation of believing, and still they will not believe, out of their perversity. (De revelatione I, c. XV a. 3 § II)
To summarize, Paul uses “motive of credibility” as if it meant “motive of belief,” and once that mistake is made, every rational step that precedes faith becomes a “motive” of faith, and the whole of his critique follows. Yet, if we remove this crucial error, the entire critique he makes goes with it and the Catholic position can be easily defended against his examples.
The Arguments
Paul’s central complaint against my video is that I defined the terms held by my “paradigm,” but never demonstrated the premises upon which I based my critique. Therefore, he admitted that my argument would destroy Protestantism if these premises are demonstrated, holding that my argument was “valid but not sound” and a mere report of the “Thomistic account” rather than a proper demonstration.
The burden of this article, then (besides correcting the erroneous terminology and irrelevant examples given by Paul) is for me to demonstrate these principles. Since he has held that my argument is valid and stated explicitly the hypothetical that if I were to demonstrate this, then Protestantism is false, I must remind the reader that, if I am able to demonstrate these things to be true, then they ought to leave Protestantism. There is no other argument necessary.
Therefore, in order to achieve this weighty task, I will give the arguments commonly given in the schools (by both Thomists and non-Thomists). None of these arguments are mine, but have been repeated by Scholastics for centuries against Vega and Vázquez.
Two notes before I begin. First, I will give as the stock example the one that the tradition uses: “Every man is risible; Christ is a man; therefore, Christ is risible.” The major is a premise of natural reason, the minor is a premise of divine faith, and the conclusion is a proper theological conclusion. Because the natural premise happens to be the major here, whereas in Paul’s own examples it is often the minor, I will generally speak of “the natural premise” and “the revealed premise” rather than of major and minor. Wherever I say “the conclusion,” I mean the conclusion as a conclusion, i.e., reduplicatively, insofar as it is inferred. If the very same proposition happens also to be formally revealed elsewhere, or to be defined by the Church, it can of course be believed by faith on that other title.
Second, my arguments will take two forms. First, I will argue from commonly held logical axioms about the nature of argumentation, the specification of habits, the nature of faith, etc., that are commonly held by Protestant and Catholic authors. Where necessary, I will explain the grounds for these axioms to better illuminate the reader on the absurdity of the Protestant position. Second, I will argue by a reduction to absurdity. If we can show that the positing of the Protestant leads to some sort of absurd conclusion then it follows that the Protestant position is absurd.
First Argument. This argument proceeds from a consideration of the formal object of faith. This is the fundamental argument that is given by nearly every single author against Vega and Vázquez.
Major. Nothing can be of divine faith except what is believed because God has revealed and attested it, i.e., what God has said.
Minor. But the object of a proper theological conclusion is not said by God; something else is said, from which, with the help of a natural principle, this other thing is inferred.
Conclusion. Therefore the object of a proper theological conclusion is not of divine faith.
Proof of the major. This is the definition of theological or divine faith that is commonly held by both Protestants and Catholics. Divine faith is the assent to what God has revealed on the authority of God revealing. It is important to note this last qualification. It is not merely the assent to what God has revealed (in such a case, one simply assenting to Sacred History would have Divine faith), but an assent to matters of faith on a particular motive, viz. the authority of God revealing.
Proof of the minor. God revealed that “the Word was made flesh,” but not that “Christ is risible.” I do not assent to “Christ is risible” because God has revealed such to be the case, but because the authority of certain teachers has made this clear to me and reason has made this evident. When I assent to “Christ is risible,” a motive for my assent is the natural connection that I view between human nature and risibility. Therefore, I must include it in the motive of the conclusion and not as a mere instrument or condition. (That God has not said the conclusion, which the Vázquez party denies, is proven formally below in the Sixth Argument, from the freedom of revelation; here I state the minor as it appears to anyone who reflects on his own act.) Lugo states the reason for this succinctly:
Nothing can be of faith which is not believed because it has been revealed and attested by God. But the object of such a conclusion is not said by God; something else is said, from which, partially, this other thing is inferred. Therefore this cannot be believed by faith, since it does not share the formal reason and the proper motive of faith. For however much the revelation and the revealed object be explicated, the object of the conclusion will never be found said by God, nor indeed anything which could by itself move one to believe it. The intellect therefore is not moved by the testimony of God alone, but at the same time by that natural principle, which unless it were believed true, the object of the conclusion would not be believed. (De virtute fidei divinae, disp. I sect. XIII n. 261)
Pesch treats the proof of the minor as well:
To establish a theological conclusion two things concur, what God has said and what human reason dictates. Therefore the motive of assenting is not the authority of God alone, but also the authority of human reason. But the authority of human reason is not the motive of faith. (Praelectiones dogmaticae VIII, prop. XV n. 261)
From among the Thomists, Schultes gives the same syllogism:
Those things which are to be believed by divine faith are to be believed on account of the authority of God revealing, and not at the same time on account of another formal reason. But things only virtually revealed cannot be held on account of the sole authority of God revealing, but are held at the same time by reason of the discourse by which they are deduced. Therefore things virtually revealed cannot be believed by divine faith. (De Ecclesia catholica praelectiones apologeticae, a. LXVIII prop. II prob. 2)
As the Salmanticenses lucidly explain, when we consider the proposition “Christ is risible,” this is not immediately founded upon the fact that God has revealed that Christ is risible, but on the fact that He is a man. It is one thing to say that “I adhere to Christ’s risibility because God revealed it” and another to say that “I adhere to Christ’s risibility because Christ is a man.” The former is proper of faith, the latter is common to both natural reason and theological reason. The proposition revealed by God that “Christ is a man” does not immediately or formally establish by itself that “Christ is risible,” but requires the essential, per se concurrence of the proposition that “risibility is a property of man.” Due to this essential, per se concurrence of the premise, the certitude, the motive of the premise (which is natural) is included in the conclusion. This is what it means for proper demonstration to occur. When we engage in such discourse, the conclusion is illuminated by the natural light of reason and by the motive of the premises concurring in the drawing of the conclusion.
It is this that I meant by a “mixed motive.” The motive for the conclusion is drawn from the motives of the premises that per se concur in the drawing of the conclusion. Therefore, if we have a premise of human faith and a premise of natural reason, human faith and natural reason concur in the motive of the conclusion; if we have a premise of human faith and a premise of probable reason, human faith and probable reason concur in the motive of the conclusion. What else would it even mean for us to properly draw a conclusion from premises if one of the premises does not provide a motive for the assent to the conclusion? To deny that such is the case is to hold that reasoning is simply apparent rather than real, that the premises do not concur in the conclusion. It is to deny that the third act of the intellect actually exists as a distinct act.
This will be further explained in the second argument.
The objection that was stated against this (i.e., that such is still revealed in an objective manner; therefore, we can hold to it by faith) leads to manifest absurdities. First, against all philosophy, it would hold that each premise in scientific reasoning does not per se concur in the certitude and enter into the motive of assenting to the conclusion. Second, it is arbitrary insofar as it makes the premise of faith the entire source of the certitude of the conclusion, ignoring the premise of reason. Why, upon this philosophy, could we not just as well gather the entire certitude of the conclusion from the premise of reason? It is purely arbitrary that the premise of faith, rather than the premise of reason, is chosen as the source of the conclusion’s certitude. Third, this would destroy the notion of faith in general. If we were to consider an instance of human faith, it would be absurd to say that we can hold, upon the authority of the speaker, whatever can be deduced from their words. For example, if a King says “John exists,” who would be so absurd as to argue that, on the authority of the King, we would be able to hold that “the King testifies that John is risible”? To make such an argument would so expand human authority as to draw with any testimony each and every conclusion that could be drawn from it, even contrary testimonies. Therefore, the notion of faith in general would be destroyed, holding things not precisely on testimony, but from a multiplicity of motives. Fourth, upon this line of reasoning, there is nothing stopping us from calling “of faith” whatever is drawn from a revealed premise together with a natural premise of any degree of certitude. For example, if I have the revealed premise “Christ is man,” I could equally argue that a conclusion drawn from it together with a premise held by human faith (including historical testimony), or by probable argumentation, or by any other degree of certitude, could be “of Divine Faith,” since Paul must admit that these natural premises do not per se concur in the certitude and motive of the conclusion.
Second Argument. This argument answers the strange question of Paul of “why should we grant that the minor premise, as the demonstrative means, is the motive of belief?” He seems to be driven to a philosophical absurdity by his insistence on his Protestant doctrines. The natural premise is not, by itself, the demonstrative medium; neither premise is. The medium is the antecedent as one, compounded from both premises; and who can deny that each premise of a proper argument enters per se into that one medium? This is a more precise formulation of what was said in the first argument about the concurrence of the premises in the conclusion.
Major. The formal motive of the assent to a conclusion, as a conclusion, is the antecedent from which it is inferred, i.e., the medium through which it is known.
Minor. But in a mixed syllogism the antecedent contains a premise assented to on a natural motive, and this premise concurs in the inference per se, as a principle, not as a mere condition.
Conclusion. Therefore the formal motive of the assent to the conclusion contains a natural motive; therefore it is not the sole authority of God revealing; therefore the assent is not divine faith.
Proof of the major. Upon what foundation do we assent to the conclusion? It is either in itself or in another. It is not in itself, else it would not formally be a conclusion but something known in some other mode (as, e.g., a first principle). Therefore it is in another. This “other” (as should be evident from the very terms) is the antecedent, i.e., the premises that are stated together under the light of reason. In proper discourse, we proceed from the known to the unknown. The known is the cause of the knowing of the unknown. Now, the known are the premises that are placed under the light of reason. These cause the knowledge of the conclusion if reasoning is anything. This should be evident from the fact that the formal motive of some thing is what impels the assent to it. Now, in any proper reasoning, what impels the intellect to assent to the conclusion is the antecedent under the light of reason, not one or another of the premises taken distinctly. When we adhere to the conclusion, we do not adhere to it due to the immediate connection that the subject and predicate have with one another, but due to the connection that they have stated in the antecedent. This is what it means for there to be a formal motive. Faith has as the reason for the connection between the subject and predicate in the intellect the authority of God revealing; the theological conclusion has as the reason for the connection between the subject and the predicate in the intellect the antecedent under the light of reason with its distinct motives seen in the conclusion.
Proof of the minor. While Paul calls the natural premise in the antecedent the “instrument” or “sub-motive” (whatever that is supposed to mean), if it acts as a premise in proper reasoning, then it concurs in the certitude of the conclusion. John of St. Thomas, disputing against Vázquez, grants the objector’s premise that the natural premise “truly and properly influences the conclusion as a principle, and influences by reason of the natural light, which is all it has; therefore it furnishes a light distinct from the premises of faith,” and then draws out what follows:
Nor can it be said that it stands not as a principle but only as a condition for inferring the conclusion. For in a syllogistic discourse both premises concur per se in the manner of a principle ... and there is no greater reason why this premise should be a condition rather than the other ... we grant that two premises concur, but say that from both there must be made one medium, as in all other syllogisms, since the conclusion inferred from two premises is reached by one judgement and assent, and consequently by one light or medium compounded from both premises ... and so one formal reason is constituted, which bespeaks virtual and mediate revelation, under which the premise of faith and the natural premise influence in the same way. (Cursus theologicus, In I q. 1 disp. II a. VII nn. XVIII–XXII)
This is exactly what I have been repeating time and time again. What does it mean for something to be a premise in scientific reasoning? To concur per se in the eliciting of the conclusion, entering into its motive. To deny this is an incoherent confusion and must deny that scientific reasoning even exists. Further, as I stated above, “there is no greater reason why this premise should be a condition rather than the other.” On what basis is the one premise the motive and not the other? Why, on Paul’s standard, could we not just assert (as he does) that the entire conclusion solely rests on the natural premise? What is the difference? If the conclusion does not rest on both premises in scientific judgements, but only one, then it matters not which I assert. I could just as easily assert the one rather than the other.
Garrigou-Lagrange’s example of the professor illustrates this line of reasoning quite well. The professor proposing the doctrine of St. Thomas on St. Thomas’ authority is merely a condition, not a cause. Now change the case. Suppose I hold a certain doctrine on the authority of the professor, because the professor has told me that it follows as a conclusion from St. Thomas’ doctrine, without my seeing the inference myself. Upon what basis do I now hold the conclusion? Upon the professor’s authority, with St. Thomas’ authority concurring originatively and fundamentally, but not formally. Take a third instance. Suppose the professor shows me the evident line of reasoning leading to this conclusion. Now the professor’s proposal is once again a mere condition; the reasoning itself is the cause of my assent, with the doctrine of St. Thomas as its originative and fundamental source. Why these per se causes concur in distinct modes will be explained below when I explain the axiom of the “weaker part.”
Paul’s entire error is that he does not distinguish between the speaker as condition (which does not positively concur in the conclusion) and the speaker as cause (which does positively concur in the conclusion). The cases are evident by simply considering the cases.
Yet, the same can be put as a dilemma. In the antecedent, I have the premise “risibility is a property of man,” which I hold on a natural motive (whether of natural reason or of human faith). Where does the motive go in the consequent? Either it does not enter into the consequent, or it does enter into the consequent. If it does not enter into the consequent, then neither does the premise upon which it is based (since the motive is the form of the premise in the order of assenting); therefore, the conclusion was not drawn from the premise at all, and such is not a conclusion. If it does enter into the consequent, then there is a natural motive that partially compounds with the supernatural motive of the premise of faith; therefore, it is not held on the authority of God speaking alone, but on some natural motive.
This argument (and others that I have previously given) is never directly answered by Paul. Rather, he simply lists a handful of tu quoques that are beside the point.
There is quite literally no other process of proper illation that works the way Paul needs this one to work. In any other case, the motives of the premises in the antecedent continue into the consequent. If you hold one premise by natural reason and then you hold the other premise by the authority of the wise, how is it possible that the motive of the authority of the wise does not enter into the conclusion when you are inferring the conclusion from each premise? What new philosophy allows us to reason in this way?
This should be clear from the opposite case. If someone denies what is revealed by God, then he is a heretic. For, by its very definition, heresy is the denial of God’s word. If someone were, for example, to deny that Isaac is the father of Jacob, he is a heretic. Yet, in the case of a theological conclusion, we do not call the denier a heretic, but give him some other censure. Why? Because his denial can be a denial of the premise of reason or authority, rather than the premise of Divine Revelation. Yet, in other instances, where the subsumed premise acts as a mere condition, we do call those heretics who deny the conclusion. For example, we call those heretics who deny that they are under original sin, since the unconditional universal that “all men are under original sin” is a premise of faith.
Third Argument. This is the oldest Thomist form of the argument, given in substance by the commentators prior to the debate that took shape in the late-16th and 17th centuries. In order to understand this argument, we must understand the terms at play. There is the habit of first principles and then there is the habit of conclusions. In natural reason, by understanding, we apprehend certain first principles that immediately follow upon being. Then, by the process of reasoning, we apprehend certain conclusions that follow upon the first principles and form science. In the same way, matters of faith are, as it were, first principles that we apprehend from the authority of God revealing. Then theology comes into play and deduces certain scientific conclusions from the first principles of faith. Therefore, understanding is to science what faith is to theology. Both understanding and faith are habits of principles, whereas science and theology are habits of conclusions.
Major. No habit of principles elicits the assent to the conclusions deduced from its principles; that assent belongs to another habit, the science that proceeds from those principles.
Minor. But faith is the habit of the first supernatural principles from which theology proceeds.
Conclusion. Therefore faith does not elicit the assent to theological conclusions; the assent belongs to theology.
Proof of the major. This is a principle of common sense, which Aristotle clearly explains in the Posterior Analytics (I, 2–3; II, 19). The habit by which I hold that the whole is greater than the part is not the habit by which I hold the Pythagorean theorem, even though the theorem is drawn from such principles. The first is the habit of principles, the second is the habit of science. Who would be so absurd as to collapse the motive of the habit of principles (which follows from something that is self-evident) into the habit of conclusions (which proceeds from discourse from the first principles into scientific conclusions)?
This is explained well by Zumel:
The habit of first principles too inclines to conclusions by means of discourse; yet immediately it inclines only to the principles, whose assent it elicits. So faith does not elicit the assent to theological conclusions. It is necessary to posit another habit, which is a science, which immediately inclines to the conclusions of theology; in no other way, beyond the habit of principles, is a scientific habit constituted which immediately inclines to and regards the conclusions. (In Primam Partem commentaria t. I, q. 1 a. 2 quaestiunc. 2)
Proof of the minor. This is included in the definition of theology, which is the science of faith. We know the first principles by the light of faith, then, by theology, we draw conclusions.
Here we can see that Protestant authors are driven to absurdities by their doctrine. The Protestant authors affirm, when treating this question, that faith believes the consequent. But the habit that reaches the consequent as a consequent is, by the very notion of a conclusion, a habit of conclusions, not of principles; and faith is the habit of principles. From this, it would follow that faith is a science, which is to abolish the distinction between faith and theology.
Fourth Argument. This argument is taken from the common axiom that faith is “non-discursive,” i.e., that it is simple (not to be confused with the first act of the intellect, which is simple apprehension). What we mean by this is that faith reaches both what is believed and the reason for believing by one and the same act.
Major. The act of faith is not discursive: by one and the same act it reaches the thing revealed (as what is believed) and the revelation itself (as that by which it is believed).
Minor. But the assent to a proper theological conclusion, as such, is discursive: it reaches its object only through the illation from the premises.
Conclusion. Therefore the assent to a proper theological conclusion is not the act of faith.
Proof of the major. The theologians give three arguments for the major premise. First, from the unity of the act. Second, from infinite regress. Third, from the Church’s mode of defining. The third does not have any strength with the Protestants. Therefore, I will only give the first two arguments.
Gonet gives the first argument from the unity of the act as follows:
In a discourse the assent which turns on the premise or on the principle must be really distinguished from that which is about the conclusion; but the assent of faith about the divine revelation is not really distinguished from the assent which is about the revealed thing itself; therefore it is not properly discursive ... by the same act by which one assents to the revealed thing one assents also to the revelation itself, and this because the formal object of the assent of faith is the revealed thing, not taken materially, but formally and reduplicatively as revealed... [just as] the act of vision by which the eye reaches color and light is one and simple, because color is only the material object of sight, light its formal object; but likewise the thing revealed by God is only the material object of the act of faith, the divine revelation its formal object; therefore by one simple act faith believes the revealed thing and the divine revelation; and consequently it is not discursive. (Clypeus t. IV, De fide, disp. VIII a. I nn. 23–24, Dico ultimo)
The argument from regress is given by Gotti:
Some assent of faith is had without discourse; therefore every one: for no habit can be discursive as to some acts and not as to others, since in all it must keep the same mode of proceeding. The antecedent is proved. Let us posit the discourse from which the adversaries want the act of faith to proceed: Whatever God has revealed truly exists; but God has revealed the Trinity; therefore the Trinity truly exists. In this discourse the minor, God has revealed the Trinity, is truly believed by faith; and yet it is not believed by discourse. Which I prove thus: if it is believed by discourse, then it is believed by a discourse proceeding from another proposition believed by faith; of which I shall ask whether it is had by discourse or not. If not, then I already have an act of faith without discourse. If so, we shall go on to infinity. (Theologia scholastico-dogmatica, In II-II, De fide q. 1 dub. IV § VII)
I explain the significance of this in my aforementioned article on Scheeben’s opposition to those “syllogizing” faith. It is evident from the character of faith as a personal adherence to the veracity of God revealing.
This is the answer to Paul’s claim that “even an alleged simple act of divine faith can be broken down syllogistically.” This is completely rejected if by “syllogistically” you mean “proceeding from the third act of the intellect.” Either there must be, fundamentally, an adherence that is not of the third act of the intellect, or there is no faith at all. For, each demonstration relies on first principles that are immediately apprehended. If each is mediately apprehended, then there would be an infinite regress. There must be a first immediate apprehension or the entire thing collapses and has no foundation.
It is with this that we are able to see, at its greatest depth, the incoherency of Paul’s understanding of the assent of faith and the consequences which follow upon it. Paul’s understanding of the act of faith is a syllogism: “whatever God reveals is true; God revealed this; therefore this is true.” In his description of the act of faith, revelation is a premise which is known by one act and the divine mystery is a conclusion that is drawn by another act. With this description, it makes sense to see the theological conclusion as another instance of the same kind. Yet, this description is false at its very root.
Revelation is not a premise in an argument. Revelation is the light in which the mystery is seen. The first principles of any knowledge are not conclusions of proper discourse; this is evident from philosophy, and it is held by the Fathers as well as the scholastics (as I showed in my recent article on “Thomistic epistemology” explaining defensive metaphysics). Revelation is both id quo et quod creditur. St. Augustine illustrates the point with the example of a lamp: “Light shows other things and shows itself. You light a lamp, for instance, to look for a tunic, and the burning lamp enables you to find the tunic; do you light a lamp in order to see the burning lamp?” (In Ioannis Evangelium tract. XXXV n. 4) Garrigou-Lagrange draws the consequence: “So the First Truth revealing, or the divine light, manifests itself, without vicious circle and without a process to infinity, for another revelation is not necessary in order that revelation be manifested.” (De revelatione I, c. XIV a. 3 § II)
There is only a single act which reaches both the revealed thing as its object and the revelation as its light. There are not two acts, one adhering to the premise and the other to the conclusion. We adhere to God and to God alone. It is God who gives both the premise and its certitude in the act of revelation. Otherwise, the complete sublimity of faith is destroyed. This is what Scheeben calls the “logical-mechanical view of faith as a syllogism through which we demonstrate to ourselves the truth of the content of faith,” which “impoverishes the transcendent character of faith.” (Handbook I.2, § 40 n. 681) He explains this impoverishment by an appeal to the personal and living character of faith which adheres to God and God alone as first truth:
The knowledge of faith by its nature comes about not in the form of a logical conclusion, but rather in the form of a lively attachment to God and to His divine perfection. Accordingly the objective motive of the certainty of faith does not have to be apprehended with the same divine and supreme certainty as the material content of the revelation, as though its certainty in the strict sense were necessarily the cause of the certainty of the material content of the revelation, and the latter certainty is derived from the former through a formal or virtual logical conclusion. The objective motive is only the reason (ratio formalis) for the certainty of the material object, in much the same way as, in a comparison that became commonplace among theologians, the illumination of an object is the ratio formalis that makes it visible to the eye. Hence, just as in the latter case the illumination and the illuminated body are seen in one indivisible act, so too in the former case the ratio of the certainty of faith is apprehended as the formal object and its content as the material object with one and the same indivisible act of assent. (ibid., n. 691)
Proof of the minor. This is the very definition of a proper theological conclusion which is admitted by our adversaries. As the Salmanticenses write:
A proposition which is contained as in a cause in another or others formally revealed cannot terminate in itself the assent of our intellect except by means of a rigorous discourse by which we deduce it from that cause; but faith is not rigorously discursive, nor does it rest on discourse; therefore it cannot reach that proposition in itself, and hence cannot assent to it. (De fide disp. I dub. IV n. 124)
When we properly discourse, reasoning enters in as some sort of intrinsic medium. Therefore, Divine Revelation does not enter in adequately as that by which I adhere to the judgement. It is for this same reason that those theologians who say that a conclusion drawn from two revealed premises can be of faith before the definition of the Church are wrong.
Fifth Argument. This argument is drawn from the axiom of the philosophers that the “conclusion follows the weaker part.” In theological discourse when there is a premise of natural reason, such premise is the weaker part, which determines the certitude of the conclusion. This is established on the immortal principle that something cannot give more than it has. The effect does not escape the virtuality of the cause. The premise of natural reason is a limiting factor in the antecedent. The same is easily seen from a number of different examples of stronger/weaker premises in the antecedent, e.g., a certain premise and a probable premise can only give a probable conclusion as conclusion.
Major. The assent of faith is supernaturally and infallibly certain, resting on nothing but the First Truth; and all assents of faith are equally certain, because the First Truth is equal in all.
Minor. But the assent to a proper theological conclusion, as such, does not have this certitude: (a) it cannot exceed the certitude of its adequate cause, the antecedent taken as one medium, and that antecedent includes a natural principle; (b) its certitude is participated from the premises through a nexus of which we are certain only by natural light; (c) its medium does not have the infallibility of the First Truth, but only that of natural reason, which is fallible on the part of the one reasoning.
Conclusion. Therefore the assent to a proper theological conclusion is not the assent of faith.
Proof of the major. This is a property of Divine Faith. It relies on the authority and infallibility of God revealing as the first truth.
Proof of the minor. The minor premise is demonstrated from the nature of causality. The effect is limited by the strength of the cause and its natural properties. Now, the motives of the premises, in the intellectual order, are the causes of the motive of the conclusion. The motive of the conclusion is limited by the strength of the weakest motive in the antecedent. Therefore, formally speaking, the motive of the conclusion is the same as the motive of the weaker premise in the antecedent, although, in another manner, we can connect the conclusion’s dignity with the motive of the other premise, e.g., “fundamentally” or “originatively.” This is Lugo’s point: the conclusion follows the weaker part of the motive, since the conclusion cannot be believed more firmly than its motive warrants, and in our case the motive, at least as to one part, is not believed by faith (De virtute fidei divinae, disp. I sect. XIII n. 261; cf. n. 352, where he adds that the axiom holds as to the clarity and firmness of the assent, while the assent may be “nobler” from another side).
Here it is important to not interpret this axiom in a crude form that would place the theological conclusion on the same grounds as a conclusion of natural reason. For, it ought to be obvious that a conclusion drawn from two premises of natural reason has a lesser degree of certitude than a conclusion drawn from a premise of natural reason and a premise of divine faith. For, while, in each case, the premise of natural reason limits the motive of the conclusion, in comparison with the other premise, we see that the premise of divine faith is greater than the premise of natural reason. Therefore, while the weaker premise limits, it also “compounds,” able to dignify the conclusion, not formally, but originatively and fundamentally. To give an analogy, let’s say we have two houses. Each of these houses is able to be destroyed by a storm. One of these houses is built on a strong foundation and the other house is built on a weak foundation. In either case, the house, due to its very nature, can be destroyed. Yet, within this order of “destructibility,” the one house is less destructible, the other is more destructible, yet both are, essentially speaking, destructible. The house may exceed the destructibility of a mere house by the strength of its foundation, but it can never become indestructible while remaining a house. Certain theologians give the example of a mule. The mule is able to exceed the perfection of one of its inadequate causes (i.e., the donkey) by the participation of the other inadequate cause (i.e., the horse), but not the cause adequately taken (i.e., horse and donkey together). John of St. Thomas describes it as follows: “it is not necessary that the certitude of the conclusion be less than any premise taken by itself, but [less than] both, as they constitute one medium which results from both premises.” (Cursus theol. In I q. 1 disp. II a. IX n. XII)
This is clear from a number of different examples. If there is a particular premise in the antecedent, the conclusion as conclusion must not be universal. If there is a probable premise in the antecedent, the conclusion as conclusion must not be certain. The principle that “the conclusion follows the weaker part” means that the conclusion cannot exceed its adequate cause, which is the whole antecedent; the whole antecedent contains a natural principle; therefore the conclusion does not have the certitude of the premise of faith, and does not rest on God’s authority alone.
This can also be seen from the participated certitude of the conclusion. The conclusion participates in the certitude of the antecedent. Now, what is participated is either equal to or less than that which it participates in as its adequate cause physically influencing, yet never greater. Yet, the adequate cause physically influencing the effect contains a natural premise and a premise of faith as its adequate cause. Therefore, it does not exceed it as being solely a conclusion of faith. This is clearly explained by John of St. Thomas:
What is had through evident consequence, as such, is not a believed truth but a deduced one, nor certified through immediate testification, but through connexion and consequence, which is always inferior to the immediate certitude of faith: both because it is participated from the principles of faith, and so less than it, as something participated; and because the discourse itself rests on syllogistic rules, of which we are certified by natural light alone, and so a certitude depending on such a discourse has something less than the immediate certitude of faith. The antecedent is evident, because faith rests on no human discourse but on the testimony of the Holy Ghost, and not only because so it seems to us, but because so it seemed to the Holy Ghost, as is said in Acts 15; therefore an assent which rests on discourse and consequence, because so it seems to us and is inferred, is not immediately of faith. (Cursus theol. In I q. 1 disp. II a. IV n. IV)
This should be obvious to anyone simply reflecting on their reasoning process. They hold the conclusion they draw from premises with a lesser certitude than they hold the premises. As St. Thomas writes, “we know conclusions and give our assent to them because of the principles. Therefore, we know the principles with more conviction and give them stronger assent than the conclusion.” (Expositio libri Posteriorum lib. I lect. 6) He gives the reason for this evident principle: “Apropos of this reason it should be noted that a cause is always more noble than its effect.” (ibid.)
This is also known from the medium of knowing. The medium of human reasoning, as a medium of knowing (note: as a MEDIUM OF KNOWING), does not carry the infallibility of the First Truth; however evident the premise, the discourse rests on syllogistic rules “of which we are certified by natural light alone,” as John of St. Thomas says, and the one reasoning can err in applying them. Now, that which is of faith cannot be in error as to the medium of knowing, since the medium of knowing in faith is the very authority of God revealing. Therefore, the same conclusion follows.
Sixth Argument. This argument is taken from the freedom of Divine Revelation. This is formulated to answer an objection by Vega that is taken up by Paul (”there is a divine intent with that which is implicitly drawn out”). The objection, taken in its technical form, is that God’s veracity covers everything objectively connected with it because God’s knowledge is simple and non-precisive, i.e., he knows all things with all their connections one to another, the conclusions in their principles with a simple act.
Major. That alone is formally revealed which the words of the revelation signify, either always according to human usage or at least in the determinate circumstances in which they were spoken; because revelation is a free locution, and God reveals what He wills to say, not everything He knows.
Minor. But the object of a proper theological conclusion is reached only by recourse to a principle plainly different from the words and the circumstances of the revelation, namely the natural premise.
Conclusion. Therefore it is not formally revealed, and consequently is not an object of divine faith.
Proof of the major. This is proven by the absurdity of the contrary. If such were not the case, then God’s revelation would not be free. For, in the very revelation of any mystery, each of the other mysteries would necessarily be revealed. Pesch argues in this way:
The knowledge of God is necessary, but revelation is a free act. Therefore God by no means reveals at the same time everything that He knows at the same time. So God could reveal the unity of the divine nature and not reveal the trinity of persons. What God wills to express by words must be drawn partly from the words themselves, partly from the circumstances in which the revelation was made. That therefore is formally revealed which either the words of themselves always signify according to human usage, or which they signify at least in those determinate circumstances. But when recourse must be had to a principle plainly different from the words themselves and from the circumstances of the revelation, what is found by that way is not formally said by God, and consequently is not an object of divine faith. (Praelectiones dogmaticae VIII n. 266)
If what is virtually contained in a revealed judgment were per se revealed by God, then this would either be necessary from the fact, or purpose, or nature of the thing. This is not from the fact, for God has newly revealed certain properties of some essence when he has already revealed the essence of the thing. It is not from the purpose since God can have a special purpose of revealing the essence, but not those things superadded to the essence. It is not from the nature of the thing since speech directly and immediately expresses the concept of the speaker and only indirectly expresses the nature of the thing through the medium of the concept (this is demonstrated in logic). The concept of the thing represented is distinguished really and formally from the thing represented; therefore, he who explicitly says x does not explicitly say the properties necessarily connected to x and virtually distinguished from it. There is no necessity upon declaring the nature of something to also declare the properties of that thing. (cf. Mazzella, De virtutibus infusis, Rome 1879, disp. II a. IX prop. XX n. 487)
Proof of the minor. This is the very definition of a proper conclusion that we explained above in the state of the question. The predicate of the conclusion is not in the comprehension of the revealed subject, but must be drawn out by bringing in some exterior principle.
Seventh Argument. This is drawn from the natural entity of the theological habit. While there are a handful of Thomists who hold that the habit of theology is entitatively supernatural, the much more common opinion is that the habit of theology is formally natural. The commentators (Cajetan, John of St. Thomas, the Salmanticenses) demonstrate this from the fact that theology can grow essentially by study and other natural means, which is incompossible with a supernatural habit whose entire increase comes essentially from God. An acquired habit can only be formally natural. It is also something that rests on our natural powers, which is evident from the fact that one with a sharper intellect becomes a better theologian.
Major. It is contradictory that a natural essence have a supernatural property.
Minor. But theology is an entitatively natural (acquired) habit, whose property is its certitude; and the assent it elicits is an entitatively natural act.
Conclusion. Therefore the certitude of the theological conclusion is not the supernatural certitude of faith, and the assent is not the supernatural act of faith.
Proof of the major. This is self-evident. Properties flow from the essence and cannot exceed its order.
Proof of the minor. This was already stated in the introduction to the argument. There are a number of arguments for and confirmations of this thesis, which I will pass over since this is merely a confirming argument.
A final note on the arguments. The reader will notice that several of these arguments (especially the fourth, fifth, and seventh) are also used by the theologians who hold that a theological conclusion can never become of divine faith, even after the Church defines it. I take from them only what my thesis needs: that the conclusion, as a conclusion and before any definition, is not held by divine faith. Whether the Church’s definition can supply a new title on which the same proposition is believed is the further question about “ecclesiastical faith” from which, as I said in the state of the question, I abstract.
Objections and Replies
Paul did not give many arguments. He gave one argument (that I conflate the motive with the means) about eleven times, one syllogism about the canon, a handful of examples (the Trinity, the atheist, the resurrection, and the Sadducees), a quotation from Turretin, and the claim that it is all “just Thomism.” I have gathered his own statements under nine heads and answered each. Where he repeated himself, I have quoted the clearest version and noted the others.
First Objection. The theological conclusion ultimately resolves itself in a premise of faith; therefore, it is of faith.
Reply. Paul follows certain theologians who argue that the theological conclusion can be of faith simply because it ultimately resolves into the certitude of one of its premises, i.e., the premise of faith. Besides being arbitrary (it is quite convenient that it receives its certitude from the premise that you need to defend your doctrine, isn’t that interesting!), we can directly answer this objection as well by distinguishing the relationship between principles and conclusions in a non-subalternated science and a subalternated science.
A science that is subalternated to a higher science (as theology is subalternated to the knowledge of God and the blessed) receives its principles from that higher knowledge; but its conclusions belong to it, not to the higher knowledge, and they are resolved into the light of the higher knowledge only per accidens and not per se. The conclusions of metaphysics are ultimately resolved into the principles of metaphysics per se. The conclusions of physics are ultimately resolved into the principles of physics per se. Yet, it is otherwise when the principles of a science are received from another science. The conclusions of optics are resolved into the principles of geometry, as principles of geometry, per accidens and not per se. The same is the case with theology. Its conclusions are resolved per se into the articles of faith as into their principles; but they are resolved into divine revelation as the formal motive of faith only per accidens, for it is not under that motive that theology draws them. As the Salmanticenses explain:
This proposition Christ is risible, and all other theological ones, are resolved into divine revelation only per accidens, in the way a musical conclusion is resolved into faith about the principles of arithmetic in one who lacks that science ... And also, and chiefly, because although the conclusions of a subalternate science are resolved ultimately into the principles of the subalternating science, they do not for that reason belong to it, but to the subalternate. (De fide disp. I dub. IV n. 126)
Who would be so absurd as to say that the conclusions of a subalternate science are resolved per se into the light of the subalternating science so as to constitute conclusions in its order? A conclusion of music does not become a conclusion of mathematics because it is ultimately resolved into its principles, because this is per accidens, not per se. A conclusion of optics does not become a conclusion of geometry because it is ultimately resolved into its principles, because this is per accidens, not per se. For the same reason, the conclusions of theology are not conclusions of faith merely because they are ultimately resolved into the articles of faith, because their resolution into the motive of faith is per accidens, not per se.
The reason for this should be quite evident. Theology relies on the revealed principles presuppositively and not as its formal motive in drawing its conclusions. The same is true for all subalternated sciences. As Ferre puts it,
I do not assent to ‘Christ is risible’ because God revealed that Christ is a man; but, the faith that He is a man being supposed, from the fact that He is a man I infer that He is risible. Hence the revelation that Christ is a man is presupposed to the assent to the conclusion, but is not the formal reason moving to the assent to the conclusion; the formal reason is the intrinsic deducibility which the conclusion has from the revealed premise. (Tractatus theologici in Primam Partem, Tract. I q. 1, ad 2)
From here, we are able to draw a very important corollary. While it is true that the proposition “Christ is risible” is mediately revealed, it is not the case that we adhere to the judgement because it is mediately revealed. Rather, we adhere to the judgement because Christ’s humanity is immediately revealed and we have evidently deduced this from the immediate revelation.
Second Objection. “I submit the key problem is that, with his attack on the use of good and necessary consequence to establish articles of faith, Wagner is conflating the motive of belief with the means by which we come to that belief. Which is ironic, because later in the video he actually makes that very distinction when receiving potential counterarguments from Protestants on this issue. He makes the distinction, but I submit that he equivocates on these things in this issue.”
And again: “What this shows is that there is a distinction between that proper, ultimate motive for believing something, versus, if you want to speak improperly, the rational sub-motives for the same. It is the authority validating the belief versus the means by which we receive that knowledge. I submit, even though Wagner does recognize the distinction and uses it for his own defense a bit later in the video, he actually equivocates between those things here in order to make the critique of our paradigm. He is trying to say that for us, when we reason by good and necessary consequence, the divine motive and the rational means are actually on the same epistemic layer; therefore the motive of belief is no longer pure and divine. I submit, rather, that obviously these are two different epistemic layers. The grounding is still purely divine.”
And again: “Wagner subtly equivocates between the motive and the instrument by which we come to believe a thing. That is the only way in which he can say that we allow a human element to enter into the motive of belief.”
And at the end: “We agree the motive for believing, even in a doctrine derived by good and necessary consequence, is still because God revealed it.”
Reply. As I have noted in a number of places, it is completely appropriate to distinguish between the motives for belief and the instruments whereby we come to believe such and such a thing. The instruments by which we come to believe something do not necessarily add an additional motive for our belief, but are as conditions that do not positively influence our assent to the conclusion, e.g., our ability to read, the explication of a definition, the identification of a particular under an unconditioned universal, etc. Hence, when I identify that “I am a man” in order to conclude that “I am under original sin by my origin from Adam,” my identification of “I am a man” does not add any particular additional motive to my conclusion, but simply acts as an instrument in my reasoning. Nor does the axiom of the “weaker part” touch this case, for here there is no illation: the assent bears on the revealed universal, “all men are under original sin,” and the identification of myself as a man is only the condition of its application to me. It is precisely where such an identification cannot be certain by natural means that we have the conditioned universal, which, as I said in the state of the question, no one holds to be of faith before the definition of the Church.
Now it seems as if Paul concedes (at least for the sake of argument) that an addition of some motive beyond divine revelation would allow the conclusion to follow that I have drawn against the Protestants. This is sensible, because a human motive would exclude the act of divine faith, which, as Protestants and Catholics both concede (beyond differences of terminology), consists in an act that affirms that such and such is the case on the basis of God revealing.
Therefore, the only question at hand is whether a theological conclusion (meant in the sense of the derivation of some virtually distinct property by a premise of reason) adds an additional motive of assent beyond the authority of God revealing, which is established from the seven arguments above.
Paul’s objection is that I distinguish motive from instrument in my own case, but that I collapse them when I consider the case of the Protestant drawing proper theological conclusions. Yet, this is not true. As I have established above, when there is a case of a premise of natural reason in proper discourse, it concurs per se in the eliciting of the conclusion, and, therefore, its certitude enters into the conclusion rather than simply being a condition of it. The tu quoques related to this are weak (as I will show below) and he never provides a formal argument for why the formal motive of assent must change in the other examples given by me. I apply the distinction consistently and carefully, considering these problems from the principles of theology.
In the cases I have given where I do not add a motive of human faith in the conclusion, the reason why should be simple and the test is easy. The Salmanticenses give this criterion:
[Improper discourse] does not include this motion [from the known to the unknown], but, as it were remaining at the same point, only explicates in the consequent what in the premises was not so perspicuously signified ... because it is not fitted to generate a knowledge specifically diverse from the knowledge of the premises, which seems to be proper to discourse; but only perfects and illustrates it. Whence this kind of discourse cannot stand in the way of an act of faith, or of the habit of natural first principles, which are not discursive. (De fide disp. I dub. IV n. 122)
There is no transition from unknown to known elicited by my eyes reading the canon list (for the senses lie outside the causality of the intellectual judgement and concur only by providing the necessary matter for the intellect to work upon); therefore, we call this conveyance. There is no transition from unknown to known by my clarification of the notion of “man” as “rational animal” since both are contained under the same formal concept; therefore, we call it explication. There is no transition from unknown to known by my identification of a certain singular under an unconditional universal; therefore, we call it application. Yet, in the case of scientific reasoning, there is a transition from the unknown to the known. We join the premise “risibility is a property of man” to “Christ is a man” in order to produce “Christ is risible,” which is a) formally a new judgement (unlike mere explication), and b) positively caused by the premises (unlike the cases where the senses enter in as a condition). In the case “Christ is risible,” we have a new judgement with a new predicate including new terms that are not identical to the concepts originally had.
As for “equivocation”: equivocation occurs when the same term is used in two different significations under the same verbal or written sign. As an example, I would be equivocating if I were to make the following argument: “A dolphin is a popular sport fish; now, a dolphin is a mammal; therefore, a mammal is a popular sport fish.” In the former case, I am using the term “dolphin” to indicate the mahi-mahi, while in the latter case I am using it to indicate the aquatic mammal. Where, in any of my treatments of the topic, have I done that? When someone is equivocating, they do not use qualifiers in order to communicate precisely how they are using the term. In my case, I frequently use terms like “formal motive” or “formal motive of assent” in order to indicate what formally moves the intellect to judge the truth of a certain proposition, and I use them in that sense every single time.
Beyond this, it is purely arbitrary and ad hoc to identify the motive of divine authority as the “true motive” whereas the motive of natural reason is the “sub-motive” (whatever that is supposed to mean) that has no positive influence (somehow) on the assent to the conclusion. Supposing that you are right here, why can’t I claim the contrary? There is no reason why the assent to the naturally knowable premise is “instrumental” rather than the assent to the premise of divine faith.
And the last version of the objection, “we agree the motive for believing is still because God revealed it,” is not an objection at all. The question at hand isn’t what you say is the motive of your assent to a certain doctrine. The question at hand is what actually is the motive of your assent. You have still failed to explain how the formal motive of one of your premises in proper illation does not enter into the conclusion. I have explained at length how it does. You haven’t explained how it is reasonable for you to include a premise of natural reason in the antecedent and then have the motive for that assent disappear in the consequent, conveniently saving your doctrine while you’re at it.
Third Objection. “What is actually preventing me from saying, ‘I believe this because God revealed it,’ even with the additional rational steps granted to get there? What is actually stopping me? What renders me a liar if I say, ‘I believe this because God revealed it’? That’s only the case if you presuppose that what God reveals is only those things which are express, and that there isn’t a divine intent with that which is implicitly drawn out with a firm theological conclusion. So if you don’t presuppose that ‘revealed’ equals ‘verbatim stated,’ but ‘revealed’ also means ‘clearly concluded from A to B to conclusion,’ if you don’t presuppose that, then I am perfectly able to say, ‘I believe in this derived article of faith because God revealed it.’ Because God’s revealing is still the motive of belief.”
And the example: “Let’s just say the fullest explanation of the Holy Trinity. There are explicit statements in Scripture: Christ is God; the Holy Spirit is God; the Father is God; they’re all divine. But the full Trinitarian formula, that God is one, there is one divine essence instantiated in three persons, that is not in express words in Scripture. We have to conclude that from Scripture. That, I would submit, is a theological conclusion in that sense.”
Reply. As I noted above, I am NOT denying that theological conclusions are revealed. The revealed judgement contains potentially every singular and virtually every proper conclusion. It is really and truly there, and I reject as completely senseless anyone who would say the contrary. So I do not “presuppose that ‘revealed’ equals ‘verbatim stated.’” Nobody in the tradition does. The formally-implicit (the definition in the defined, the part in the whole, the particular in the unconditioned universal, the equivalent formula) is revealed and is of faith without any definition, and I said so in the video.
He asks “what is stopping me?” and the answer, in summary of the arguments given above, is that the natural premise and its formal motive are stopping it. You needed it as a true motive distinct from the motive of Divine Revelation. If God had said the conclusion, you would not have needed it as a motive. Since you needed it, God did not say the conclusion; and what God did not say, you do not believe God for.
I do not argue on the basis of the exigency of the revealed judgement (what it contains), but on the process of reasoning when there is an additional motive beyond what is revealed (how we get to what it contains). A man must use additional premises, with motives that are outside the motive of the revealed premise, in order to reason to the conclusion. These motives do not somehow disappear, as I noted above, when you reason. They truly enter into the conclusion and join with the motive for the revealed premise. It is on this basis that we are arguing and on no other basis (although, as I have frequently noted, I could argue on the very foundation of proper illation, as many Thomists do).
As to the Trinity. The dogma of the Trinity is not something that is merely virtually revealed in Scripture, but is formally revealed in Scripture in the identification of the unity of the Godhead, the divinity of the persons, the real distinction of the persons, the processions, and the relative names. Here, Paul is confusing the coordination of our thoughts with the proper theological conclusion. For me to coordinate the propositions “God is one” and “the Father is God” and “the Son is God” is not an instance of my proceeding under the light of virtual revelation, but of proceeding under the light of formal revelation, insofar as each judgement is formally revealed (any “formalization” concerns the process of definition, which, as I have noted above, is not included in my argument).
Three additional notes. First, he used the phrase “the fullest explanation of the Holy Trinity” and the phrase “the full Trinitarian formula.” In the latter case, he seems to be speaking merely of the creedal formula of the Trinity. In this sense, I would argue that the coordination of judgements in the creed simply concerns what is formally revealed in Scripture in equivalent terms, which is commonly stated by our theologians. In the former case, the full explanation of the Holy Trinity could mean its full scholastic development as one would find in the various scholastic works of the last millennium. In this case, I would obviously concede that, in some judgements, we follow the light of virtual revelation and have true theological conclusions. Yet I would simply deny what is assumed, i.e., that such are of faith. Otherwise, nearly every Catholic theologian would be a heretic (for, even among the Thomists, there are disagreements on theological conclusions).
Second, he did not seem to attend to the distinction between before and after the definition in Roman Catholic theology, something that I have treated in a number of places. The majority of Catholic theologians (as noted by Fr. Marín-Sola) hold that what is virtually revealed can become of divine faith by the definition of the Church. Therefore, even if I were to affirm that the creedal formulation of the Trinity concerns judgements that are virtually revealed, it would still not follow as an argument against the argument I have given. For I would simply hold that such judgements were not of divine faith until after the definition of the Church.
Third (and I only note this because he made so much of my not proving my premises), Paul abandoned his own example within a minute of giving it. “In fact, because of how dicey the Trinity may be, let’s ignore that example and just go back to doctrine X in the abstract.” The one concrete instance offered of a doctrine that is derived by good and necessary consequence to which we give divine faith was abandoned as soon as it was given. I do not know what “doctrine X in the abstract” is, but it is probably resolved quite easily if the examples given can be any indication.
Fourth Objection. “Someone who affirms a mere direct teaching of holy Scripture, something that’s very explicit, so, ‘he who teaches that Christ has not come in the flesh is antichrist’ ... Christ came in the flesh; Christ became a man. That’s clear, directly explicit in holy Scripture. Now, even in that case, it is still also true to say that I believe this because I derived it from the word of God. And it is precisely because, even in that case of direct, simple apprehension of the data from Scripture, the rational process is still in play.”
And: “I submit that even in allegedly simple apprehensions of divine propositions ... even in the case of an allegedly simple apprehension of divine dogma, where you’re not reasoning from good and necessary consequence, you’re just saying ‘Scripture says this,’ or ‘the Church, as the rule of faith, says this; I just immediately receive it,’ I submit that in the sense in which Wagner himself says a human element comes into the motive of belief, if you grant his equivocal sense, it’s actually the same even for an allegedly simple apprehension of divine dogma.”
And, on Kevin’s clip: “The problem with some people like us is that we can think that syllogisms are like a law of the universe, like the code of the universe. Frankly, the issue is that syllogism and syllogistic reasoning is fundamentally descriptive of the rational process, not, as such, prescriptive. That’s very important, because that means you can actually break down many different things in the same syllogistic way from different angles. I submit that even in an alleged simple act of divine faith, you can actually break that down syllogistically, because of the theological priors.”
Reply. There is not much to say here except that in these cases reason is acting as an instrument. There is no distinct motive except that of divine revelation. I am not arguing from the simple use of the intellect; therefore the critique does not follow. I have made this clear. But since Paul made this the backbone of his response to Kevin, let me explain it to you in a bit more detail, so that you are able to overcome these arguments with ease.
Dogma is revealed to us in words. This should be obvious. These words make up judgements. Judgements are an act of the second operation of the intellect. The judgement is formed from the joining or severing of two terms, which are acquired by simple apprehension. Simple apprehension produces the formal concept and terminates in the objective concept, i.e., the nature as known. The transmission of divine revelation, the articles of the faith, etc., actually supposes the pre-existence of abstracted concepts that are already present in your intellect. What divine revelation does is order these concepts into judgements, whether affirming or denying. Divine revelation, as it is transmitted to us who receive it by hearing, does not “infuse” new concepts into your intellect (I leave aside the case of the prophet himself, who may receive infused species; ST II-II q. 173 a. 2). So, when Scripture says that “Christ is a man,” it is joining together into a judgement two concepts: “Christ” and “man.” Now, if I were to reflect on this concept “man,” I see that the concept “man” is the same exact concept as “rational animal.” I am simply sharpening the concept that is possessed already in my intellect, which Scripture is ordering into judgements. Therefore, if I were to make the additional judgement that “Christ is a rational animal,” THE SAME CONCEPTS ARE USED; my intellect is just apprehending the concept in a weaker way in one instance and in a stronger way in another instance. While this may be expressed in terms of a syllogism, it is not a product of the third operation of the intellect. There is no additional motive of my assent to “Christ is a rational animal.” The motive of my assent is exactly the same in either case. The concepts are the exact same. The objective concept (which is the nature of the thing itself, differing from it only in its mode of being, i.e., intentional rather than real) is the same in either case; therefore it is the same in the conclusion, adding no additional motive of assent. Here reason acts merely as an instrument, and the tradition calls this “improper” or “explicative” discourse. Hugon lists these “immediate illations” (by equipollence, conversion, subalternation, “from one predicate to another, or from one subject to another, on account of the evident identity of each”) and rules: “Immediate consequence is not properly consequence or illation. For it belongs to the reason of illation that it proceed from the known to the unknown.” (Logica minor tr. III q. I a. II n. V)
Now, the same can appear when we identify a particular under an unconditioned universal. Let’s say we have the judgement “all men are under original sin.” There are two concepts present in this judgement, the simple concept of “man” and the complex concept of “under-original-sin.” When I look around me and perceive the exterior accidents of a man by my senses, this phantasm is formed in my mind and my intellect ultimately abstracts the concept, which is an immaterial thing. My intellect recognizes that what I am perceiving before me is identical with the concept of “man” in the judgements that I have about men, including the judgements of dogma that divine revelation orders. There is no additional motive of reason that is required for me to assent to “this man is under original sin” except the motive of divine revelation that ordered the judgement. Gotti says the same of “Christ died for me”: that discourse “is not truly illative but only explicative; just as this discourse, Every man is rational; I am a man; therefore I am rational, is not a truly illative discourse but only explicative, because the meaning of this proposition, I am rational, is contained in this, every man is rational.” (Theologia scholastico-dogmatica t. I q. 1 § XXXII)
Contrast the proper conclusion. “Christ is a man” and “every man is risible” do not use the same concepts. “Risible” is nowhere in the comprehension of “man”; it is a property flowing from the essence and distinct from it (a proper accident, and so really distinct from the substance in Thomist metaphysics; but all the argument requires is that it be at least virtually distinct, Marín-Sola’s second degree); and I get it from a new judgement, held on a new motive. That is why the tradition calls the one discourse explicative and the other illative, and why the first can be of faith and the second cannot.
So: “Christ came in the flesh” is explicit; “Christ is a man” is the same judgement in other words; “Christ is a rational animal” is the same judgement explicated. None of these is a theological conclusion. Paul’s “Christ came in the flesh” example is not pertinent to the case, as I have explained in a number of different videos and articles (even giving this exact example). Not once in the stream did Paul ever produce a single example of a proper theological conclusion drawn with a premise of natural reason that ought to be assented to by faith without the Church’s judgement. Further, he never demonstrated to us rigorously that the motive remains unmixed in the conclusion. He merely produced examples of explicative discourse and examples of the preambles of faith, and then called them all “syllogisms” without any of the precision that I include in my work, while (ironically) critiquing my lack of argumentation.
Which brings me to “syllogisms are descriptive, not prescriptive.” I find it a bit strange that he described Kevin’s qualification, “in scientific demonstration,” accurately, and then ignored it in his refutation. There is nothing magical about being able to construct a syllogism. As I have mentioned time and time again, the subsumed premise does not act as a motive in an explicative discourse or where there is an unconditioned universal and a particular. In either of these cases, the subsumed premise is not the formal motive of the conclusion. What is presented in these cases is not a scientific demonstration. A scientific demonstration is not the same as just writing something up in syllogistic form. There are many things that can be written up in syllogistic form (explicative discourse, the identification of a particular under a universal judgement, probable arguments, etc.) that are not instances of scientific demonstration. A scientific demonstration involves the exact process that I mentioned above, i.e., drawing forth a conclusion that is virtually contained in a certain premise by means of another premise. So when Paul says “you can break down many different things in the same syllogistic way from different angles,” he is right, and he has just conceded my point: the syllogistic form proves nothing about the motive. That is why I keep telling him to look at the act and not at the form.
The claim itself, that “even in an alleged simple act of divine faith, you can actually break that down syllogistically, because of the theological priors,” has been answered under the fourth argument, but let me repeat it briefly. You can write down the following syllogism as much as you want: “whatever God reveals is true; God revealed this; therefore this,” but that has nothing to do with whether this actually proceeds discursively. I demonstrated above in detail that faith is non-discursive. It is a basic mistake of both logic and theology to confuse these matters. Revelation is the light in which a man sees the thing believed, at once that by which and that which is believed. A denial of this makes absolutely no sense upon careful examination. It would result in an infinite regress wherein the entire chain of premises falls under syllogistic demonstration, leading to no first principle upon which the entire thing is based.
Fifth Objection. “Now, let’s say an atheist comes along, and he reads the Scriptures, and he comes to the same doctrinal conclusion. ‘Oh yeah, this passage says this, this passage says that; that leads to this doctrinal conclusion.’ Great. Now, will the atheist therefore come to believe that doctrine? No. He doesn’t ... Why? Because he doesn’t believe in the authority of God revealing ... That rational process, in other words, is not the motive of belief, or even a motive of belief, for him ... Conversely, the believer, me, I do have the motive of the authority of God revealing, and therefore I do come to affirm it.”
He repeats this three times, and calls it the thing that “shows” the distinction between motive and sub-motive.
Reply. There is both a formal defect in this line of reasoning and a material defect.
Formally, the argument only works with a hidden premise. Paul’s inference is: the atheist has the rational process and does not believe; therefore the rational process is not a motive of belief. That follows only if a motive must be, by itself, sufficient for the assent, so that its presence guarantees belief and its failure to guarantee belief shows that it is no motive at all. But nobody claims that the natural premise is a sufficient motive; the claim is that it is a partial motive, concurring with the revealed premise in one compounded medium. Remove the hidden premise and the argument collapses: from “the atheist, who lacks faith in the antecedent, does not believe the consequent,” nothing whatever follows about what the believer’s assent to the consequent rests on.
Materially, then, Paul has confused a necessary condition with a sufficient condition. To assent to something on the basis of the inclusion of something in revelation is a necessary condition for divine faith; yet it is not a sufficient condition for divine faith in every instance. Therefore, while the absence of it excludes the atheist from having divine faith, this does not make its presence sufficient of itself in all cases for divine faith. This supposes what it ought to prove. The presence of the divine motive in one premise is not in dispute. What is in dispute is whether it is the only motive in the conclusion, and the atheist example says nothing whatever about that.
Further, we see that the test proves too much when applied to the theological opinion that proceeds by way of probable reasoning. Take the case of an atheist who reads St. Thomas’ probable argument for some conclusion and then grants that it is a decent probable argument (denying the conclusion because he denies the premise of faith), while a Catholic follows the same argument and holds it as a theological opinion. By Paul’s example, the difference between them is “the authority of God revealing,” and therefore the Catholic holds the opinion by divine faith. It would necessarily follow from this that every probable theological opinion is of divine faith. Therefore, every theologian who has ever changed his mind on a disputed question has denied the faith and rejected Divine Revelation by that act, becoming a heretic. The test cannot distinguish faith from theology, or theology from opinion, because it only tests for the presence of one motive and ignores the other motive because it must gratuitously ignore the other motive in order to save the Protestant doctrine.
I would also like to note something about the proposed example. He states that “this Scripture says this, this Scripture says that, therefore this doctrine follows from that.” This is an instance of drawing a theological conclusion from two revealed premises, which, as I said in the state of the question, is not the case that presses him.
As an additional point, he bastardizes his own example. In the case of the atheist “concluding” a doctrine from Scripture, the atheist is not affirming directly that “x conclusion is the case”; he is affirming that “x conclusion follows from Scripture.” He is assenting to something, and has a motive for his assent; it is simply indirect rather than direct, i.e., he is affirming that Scripture says something, not affirming something that Scripture says. This is what infidel scholars do in their biblical commentaries. Now notice what that means for Paul. The atheist and Paul assent to exactly the same thing by exactly the same motive: that the consequent follows from the antecedent, by the evidence of the consequence. That assent is natural in both of them. Paul then adds a second assent, to the consequent itself. What is the motive of that assent? It cannot be God’s authority alone, for God’s authority reaches only the antecedent; what carries Paul from the antecedent to the consequent is the very consequence that he shares with the atheist, and that consequence is seen by natural light. So the assent to the consequent has two things in it, the believed antecedent and the seen consequence, and one of them is natural. Paul’s own example, properly analyzed, shows exactly the mixed motive he denies.
Sixth Objection. “Our Roman apologist friends believe they have divine faith in the canon of Scripture because of the authentic decision of the magisterium ... So in one sense, they can say that they affirm the Gospel of Mark’s canonicity on the authority of God revealing. That is the sense in which I would say it. However, it’s also true that they believe that because they derived it from human testimony, their priest, historical documents of the Church, etc. ... But the instrumental motive, if you will, for their assent is the derivation of this fact from these historical, living testimonies, such as can be expressed in a syllogistic form.”
And the syllogism: “Premise one: ‘I ought to believe everything that is revealed by God.’ Premise two: ‘That which is revealed by God for the Church, including me individually, is sufficiently attested to by certain marks and testimonies, that is, for example, the authentic testimony of the Church.’ Premise three: ‘It has been demonstrated to me, through history and reliable living witnesses, that the canonicity of the Gospel of Mark is attested to by sufficient, certain marks and testimonies.’ Conclusion: ‘I ought to believe in the canonicity of the Gospel of Mark,’ and from that, the person goes to ‘I assent to it by divine faith.’ Notice the multiple steps of non-revealed minor premises here.”
Reply. First, the phrase “the instrumental motive,” as distinguished from the formal motive, is confused. An instrument, properly speaking, is not a condition: an instrumental cause positively concurs in the effect, under the motion of the principal cause. So if the natural premise is an “instrument” in the proper sense, it positively concurs in the assent, which is exactly what I say and what Paul denies. If, on the other hand, it does not positively concur, then it is a mere condition, and should not be called an instrument at all. Paul cannot have it both ways: either the natural premise contributes to the assent, and then it is part of its motive, or it does not, and then the conclusion was not drawn from it. This is distinct from the loose sense of “instrument” (my eyes, my ears) that has been explained above, where the word names a condition.
Second, this is not the sense in which I mean it, because you are specifically treating an objection to your doctrine on the basis of proper illation from a naturally knowable proposition, in which the motive of natural reason enters into the very process of reasoning itself. I do not claim (nor have I ever claimed) that I believe the canonicity of certain books of Scripture on the basis of any judgement that is naturally knowable. In fact, I am actually known for saying the exact opposite and using this as an argument against Protestantism.
To give an analogy: if I have a canon list in front of me, it is necessary that I use my eyes in order to read the page in front of me. Are my eyes the motive upon which I affirm the canon list? No. The motive is the divine authority that I believe the proposer has in such a case. My vision does not add any motive upon which reason rests, but is only a condition (which, as I have repeated, does not positively influence the effect, which is the proper office of a cause). How this is the case and not arbitrary, I have already explained above.
Third, look at the conclusion of his syllogism and think whether you have seen this before: “I ought to believe in the canonicity of the Gospel of Mark.” What is the judgement called where you ought to believe something? It isn’t the act of faith, which is the judgement terminating in the truth of the conclusion. It is the judgement of credentity (iudicium credentitatis), which is the practical judgement that this thing is to be believed, which follows on the judgement of credibility and precedes the act of faith. Then, take a look at his premises, which should be equally obvious from the above explanation: “What is revealed by God is sufficiently attested by certain marks and testimonies.” These are motives of credibility. “It has been demonstrated to me through history and reliable witnesses that the canonicity of Mark is so attested.” This is the judgement of credibility, which is formed by natural reason from these motives. In a spectacular turn of events, Paul has demonstrated to us that our understanding of the assent of faith and the antecedent judgements of the intellect are so intuitive that, when attempting to draw out the process of faith, he has listed them all. Then, he states “and from that, the person goes to ‘I assent to it by divine faith.’”
This is exactly correct. These are acts that precede the act of faith which are different than the assent as faith, as evidenced from the different object (”x is credible,” “x ought to be believed”) and a different motive (i.e., a natural motive). This is precisely Garrigou-Lagrange’s point, quoted above, that the act of faith is not the conclusion of the apologetic syllogism, which terminates rather in the judgement of credibility.
Yet, somehow, he goes on to treat the motives of these preparatory judgements as though they were the motive of the assent of faith itself. Well, he says this before immediately contradicting himself by arguing that the formal motive is the authority of God revealing. Oh well! We “Romanists” can simply hold that it is one thing to say that “this ought to be believed” or that “this is credible” and another to affirm something by the act of faith. This should be evident from the terms of the matter, wherein faith’s entire motive is the authority of God revealing. Paul has gone so far as to both make the assent of faith a syllogism AND to make the formal motive of the assent of faith a matter of natural inquiry. How are we to retain the supernaturality of faith? How am I to avoid the semi-rationalism of Hermes and Günther, condemned at Vatican I, with this novel doctrine? How do I avoid collapsing the natural and supernatural orders? I do not know. Yet, the one thing I do know is that the conclusion does not follow.
As to his comments on the canon of Scripture, the act whereby I affirm the canon is not a theological conclusion and it is not a mere dogmatic fact either (contrary to some moderns). It is formally revealed in sacred Tradition, as I have repeated on a number of occasions. Vatican I says that the Church holds the books as sacred and canonical “not because, having been composed by human industry alone, they were afterwards approved by her authority; nor merely because they contain revelation without error; but because, having been written under the inspiration of the Holy Ghost, they have God for their author, and as such have been delivered to the Church herself.” (DS 3006)
The Catholic’s assent to “Mark is inspired” is an assent to something God revealed, on the authority of God revealing, proposed by the Church. The Church’s proposition is not a premise from which I infer the canon; it is the condition under which the revelation reaches me, the application of the rule of faith. This is an instance (as I explained above) of applicative discourse, not of scientific discourse. The universal in an applicative discourse is nothing other than the particulars themselves. The subsumed proposition is nothing but a pure explication of the universal proposition, applying it to a determinate subject. It acts as condition, not as motive. This should be clear from what I have already said.
Seventh Objection. “One of my favorite examples of this as well is the case of someone who comes to believe in the resurrection of Christ and comes to faith that way ... They go through all the arguments: the historicity of the Gospels, their authorship, their dating, questions on the reliability of witnesses ... And then, at the end of that whole process, they come to conclude: ‘Okay, Jesus rose from the dead. Now I’m going to assent in faith to that.’ ... But that whole thing came about because of a long string of rational processes. That is key there.”
Then: “The Romanist may still say, ‘Well, actually, in that case you don’t really give divine faith to the resurrection, because it was demonstrated more rationally, not on the authority of God revealing.’ But when you actually think about it, that just makes no sense. Because in the end, the assent of faith is not merely a virtue; it is actually a psychological thing ... that person then chooses to go from that rational demonstration to giving faith in Christ. And so, with that act of faith, it is actually on the authority of God, because these rational motives showed him that Jesus is the Christ ... You can distinguish the rational acceptance of the resurrection of Christ and the act of faith subsequent to that. But the important thing is that that act of faith ... still has the formal motive of the authority of God ... But the rational process is what got him there, fundamentally.”
Then, on my video’s treatment of the motives of credibility: “There is a sense in which, yes, that rational investigation of the motives of credibility caused the assent of faith. Again, emphasis on caused. It was an instrumental cause which God used to enlighten the reason of the person ... Just apply the same now to good and necessary consequence reasoning from the articles of faith ... It’s the same thing. It’s the same thing.”
And in the Q&A: “I simply submit that the distinction between this process being prior to articles of faith, versus good and necessary consequence being posterior to articles of faith, that distinction is like, okay, so what? How does that still make one faith and the other not faith? So what if one’s posterior?”
Reply. This objection, if taken in a strict sense (although he does not mean it in this sense), is rationalistic and destroys the notion of faith. Faith, as we agree, is, in the sense we use it here, an affirmation of something on the basis of God revealing. You do not assent to the resurrection of Christ, as an article of faith, on the basis of historiography. Even unbelievers can assent to the resurrection of Christ on the basis of historiography, and the guards at the tomb and the chief priests knew of it without believing (Mt 28:11–15). That reveals exactly what I am saying. The motive for my assent to matters of faith is not those antecedent or concomitant exercises of the senses or intellect that are required conditions for me to be able to make the assent of faith (e.g., the apprehension of the notions that are necessary for the assent as its terms, the senses that are required for the communication of judgements to us, the investigation of the signs that makes the assent reasonable, etc.). The motive of my assent is the testimony of God revealing.
But Paul, in the second passage, concedes all of this and then contradicts himself in the same breath. He rightly points out that we would respond that the historical demonstration does not itself constitute faith. Then he actually concedes exactly our point in substance: “that person then chooses to go from that rational demonstration to giving faith in Christ,” and “you can distinguish the rational acceptance of the resurrection of Christ and the act of faith subsequent to that.” How does he not see that he has just conceded the distinction he came to deny? He very clearly explains here that the resurrection of Christ, historically established, is a motive of credibility that induces the mind to make an act of faith by the judgement of credibility, and that the act of faith is a distinct act with its own formal motive. Yet, if this is the case, then the “long string of rational processes” is not the motive of the assent of faith; it is what precedes it.
He continues: “But the rational process is what got him there, fundamentally.” Does he not see the irony? What is fundamental is not formal. What is preparatory for a thing is not that thing. The rational process of inquiry is not formally the assent of faith, but fundamental to it as a preparation for it. That is the entire point that I labored so hard above to actually prove. And now apply it to the theological conclusion, and see the difference. In the case of the resurrection investigation, the reasoning terminates in a judgement (this revelation is credible; it ought to be believed) whose object is not the object of faith and which is not the medium through which the article is known; and then a new act, faith, reaches the article on God’s word. In the case of the theological conclusion, the reasoning terminates in the very proposition assented to; the natural premise is not “fundamental” to the conclusion as a preparation for it, but is part of the cause of the assent, and its motive enters the conclusion as virtually contained in it. In the first case there are two acts, and the second does not rest on the first as on its medium. In the second case there is one act, the assent to the conclusion, and it rests on the premises as on its medium, because that is what an assent to a conclusion is. This is completely different from the other rational processes that Paul has described.
That is also the answer to “so what if one’s posterior?” The difference between the preambles and the theological conclusion is not that the one comes before faith and the other after. It is that the preambles are not the medium of the article (they are the medium of a different judgement, about credibility), and the natural premise of a theological conclusion is the medium of the conclusion.
Recall the proposition condemned by Bl. Innocent XI, quoted above (DS 2119). If the “long string of rational processes” were the motive of the assent of faith, then the assent could not exceed the strength of that string. Yet, in Catholic theology, the assent of faith is stronger than the weight of reasons impelling towards the assent. Therefore, we must deploy the reasonable distinction of Scheeben between the motive quoad exercitium and the motive quoad essentiam, which occurs with frequency in our natural acts.
As to “the assent of faith is not merely a virtue; it is actually a psychological thing,” nobody said the act was not “psychological.” What we said is that the act has a formal motive, which specifies it, and that the motive is not any of the things that happen in the psyche before it. Paul seems to think that if he can show that something happened in the mind before the act, he has shown that the something is the act’s motive. That is the empiricism I mentioned above.
Eighth Objection. Paul drew an objection from Turretin’s treatment of consequences (which I quoted in my video together with the similar statements of Cameron and Gillespie): “To apprehend the reason of a consequence is different from apprehending the consequent itself. Faith apprehends the consequent; reason, the consequence ... And it does not follow from this that faith, by which the consequent is believed, is founded upon reason, because reason is not an argument here on account of which I believe, but the instrument through which I believe. Now, the instrument does not introduce into the text what was not there before, but adduces by legitimate consequences what was concealed in it. Hence the theological conclusion results from the inferred mean; but the logical, from reason, or the instrument eliciting consequences. The consequence, as to its materiality, is founded upon the word; as to its formality, upon reason.” And again: “It belongs not to faith alone, but also to reason, to discern the reason of the consequence. Yet we say that it belongs properly to faith to believe the consequent. Nor does it follow from this that faith, because the consequent is believed, rests upon reason, since reason here is not an argument but an instrument.”
Reply. I quoted these authors in my video to show that Protestant divines admit that some articles are known from Scripture only by consequence.
First, the distinction between “argument on account of which” and “instrument through which” is precisely the thing in dispute. Turretin asserts that reason, in a mixed syllogism, is an instrument and not an argument. Neither Paul, nor Turretin, nor Cameron actually proves that this is the case. I have already refuted this above. The natural premise is not an “instrument” of the inference; it is one of the two things the inference is from and from which it has its truth and motive. Mere instruments (in the sense we are using them here) would include those acts and faculties which do not positively and per se concur in the production of the conclusion, e.g., my eyes, ears, etc. To apply this to one of the premises in a demonstration is, as I demonstrated at length above, nonsense and would completely eviscerate the reality of proper reasoning.
Second, Turretin’s own distinction between the consequence and the consequent cuts against him. He says reason apprehends the consequence and faith the consequent. But why do I assent to the consequent? Because I have seen the consequence. The assent to the consequent, as a consequent, is caused by the seeing of the consequence together with the believing of the antecedent. That is what “consequent” means. Turretin cannot have faith “apprehend the consequent” unless faith has the consequence, and faith does not have the consequence; reason does, by his own admission. So the assent to the consequent has two things in it, and one of them is reason’s.
Third, oddly enough, Turretin basically just admits that we are correct if we only draw out the implications: “The consequence, as to its materiality, is founded upon the word; as to its formality, upon reason.” The conclusion has its motive from that which formally illuminates it, not the material element. The material element does not actually tell us why reason adheres to the judgement, only the formal element does that, i.e., the motive. Therefore, if the consequence rests formally upon reason, then our critique follows. The specification of the habit lies in the formal reason of the object. If not, then all those things which are materially of faith and held by reason would be held by faith (e.g., the Jew holding the truth of the resurrection).
Fourth, Cameron’s and Gillespie’s language (”a certain divine truth that ought to be believed”) is not necessarily of faith. Of course a necessary consequence from revealed premises is a certain truth and, therefore, “ought to be believed” in the sense that a rational man ought not to deny what evidently follows from what he believes. That is why Catholic authors state that the denier of an evident theological conclusion is presumed a heretic. But “ought to be believed” is not “is believed by divine faith,” any more than “I ought to believe the canonicity of Mark” in Paul’s syllogism was the act of faith in the canon.
Fifth, these passages presuppose a picture of faith that is discursive (which, as I have explained above, is absurd). “Faith apprehends the consequent; reason, the consequence” is only intelligible if faith is the kind of act that could apprehend a consequent as a consequent, i.e., if faith is itself a discursive, inferring act that merely happens to have God’s word among its premises.
Ninth Objection. “Notice our Lord doesn’t point the Sadducees to an explicit passage on the resurrection and say, ‘You’re wrong.’ ... He points to Moses, the books of Moses: ‘I am the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob.’ Jesus then gives a rational conclusion from that: he is not the God of the dead, but the God of the living. Therefore there is the resurrection ... Does our Lord teach the resurrection of the dead as an article of faith here, or not? ... If you say no, then you’re creating an absurdity: that our Lord is somehow implicitly, without any clarification, assuming a very precise Thomistic account of epistemology on what constitutes the assent of faith, without the crowd realizing ... So I submit that this undercuts the attempted Thomistic account that articles of faith can only ever be through the express, explicit testimony of God ... So I think that could work as a one-shot argument, frankly.”
Reply. Oh boy.
The teaching of the “Thomists” (which is not just the teaching of the Thomists, as the reader now knows) isn’t that implicit testimonies to articles of faith cannot be used to dispute with someone who denies an article of faith in order to induce him to its acceptance. That would be insane and would basically contradict the entire theological tradition. Suárez and Gotti both note that the councils themselves argue from consequences in their chapters before defining in their canons. Arguing to someone from what he already grants is what every apologist does, and what Our Lord does here.
First, the resurrection of the dead was explicitly present in the Old Testament (Daniel 12:2; Isaiah 26:19; Job 19:25–27; 2 Maccabees 7 and 12; Ezekiel 37), and the Jewish teachers who sat on the seat of Moses preached this mystery explicitly, as St. Luke records: “the Sadducees say that there is no resurrection, neither angel, nor spirit: but the Pharisees confess both.” (Acts 23:8) It was an article of faith. Therefore it is completely appropriate for Our Lord to appeal to implicit testimonies from Scriptures they accept in order to induce them to faith in this mystery. That is an argument ex concessis, and exactly the type of argument apologists use constantly against opponents. Paul says that if the Sadducees had a smaller canon “it makes the passage even more powerful.” Why? He is arguing against an adversary who denies the rule of faith and induces them both to the acceptance of this doctrine and the rule of faith by which they would be able to accept this doctrine by faith.
Strangely enough, Paul’s entire mode of argumentation seems to suppose that the Sadducees had faith and that Our Lord was attempting to elicit an act of faith from their previously held principles. What? They were faithless. They rejected the rule of faith and fell into innumerable heresies. They were opponents of the prophets and rejected the chair of Moses. What’s next, are we to argue that Korah had charity?
Second, I find Paul’s rhetorical question a bit disingenuous. “Our Lord is somehow implicitly, without any clarification, assuming a very precise Thomistic account of epistemology on what constitutes the assent of faith, without the crowd realizing.” It is rhetorically misleading to speak in this way. This reminds me of discussions with various Christological and Trinitarian heretics on the mysteries of the faith. “Oh, do you REALLY think Our Lord had partitive exegesis in mind when he spoke of his humanity?” This type of rhetoric may be exceedingly convincing to the masses, but it doesn’t actually mean anything. What Our Lord meant is what He said (e.g., “I thirst”). If someone comes around later and attempts to draw a conclusion from what Our Lord said, and we explain how this conclusion doesn’t follow from the statement, by synthesizing the entire testimony of Scripture, the use of theological reason, etc., you can’t turn around and say something like: “Oh, do you REALLY think Our Lord had ALL THAT in mind?” (a) Yes, I actually do, because I believe in orthodox Christology. (b) That is irrelevant to the matter at hand, because we are speaking about what the proper force of the language used is and what this signifies in reality. You are drawing a false conclusion from this. I am refuting this through other means. This isn’t that hard to understand. It amazes me that such a basic concept cannot be understood by opponents when they try this rhetorical fluff against us.
We can make this a bit absurd, if we wished, by Paul’s exegesis. Our Lord and the Apostles frequently appeal to natural reason or external signs in order to argue in favor of various matters of faith (e.g., the appeal to the five hundred witnesses). Now, are we to conclude from this that the formal motive of assent to matters of faith can be natural reason or external signs? That would obviously be absurd. They were clearly using such arguments to induce them to accept the testimony of God, as apologists always do.
That he calls this a “one-shot” argument is beyond me. Who is actually convinced by this?
Well written Wagner
The breadth and attention here is really something, Paul should be flattered someone took the time to assess his "arguments" (or confused counter-examples) so seriously. I learned quite a bit myself. Very humbling gold mine you wrote. Thanks Wagner.