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Introduction
The phrase “Perverted Faculty Argument” entered the English-speaking world through a brief debate that took place in the American Ecclesiastical Review in 1928–1929 between four Catholic priest-theologians: E. J. Mahoney, John A. Ryan, John M. Cooper, and Henry Davis.
In the early twentieth century, among certain novel strains of Catholic moral theology, the argument was quite unpopular. While these authors held to the moral conclusions drawn from the argument, they denied the validity of the argument itself. The debate of the late 1920s provides us with a particular iteration of this dispute, with the fullest treatment coming from one of the greatest moralists of the era, Henry Davis.
While the phrase itself was first introduced to the English-speaking world in this debate, the argument goes back much further. Its classical formulation is found in St. Thomas’s treatment of fornication in the Summa contra Gentiles (III, c. 122). Among the later scholastic authors, as in many areas, the formulation became more definite: they clarified the sense of the terms, drew forth certain conclusions, applied the argument to more problems, set out the sequence of the argument in greater detail, and answered objections.
Unfortunately, much of the modern discourse surrounding the Perverted Faculty Argument has lost the “bite” that previous generations of scholastics had when treating the argument. Among many moderns, key distinctions are lost, the foundation of the argument is obscured, and the principles are applied wrongly. This concerns not merely those who would count themselves opponents of the argument, but even its defenders.
In this article, I want to gather in one place the many distinctions that are often invoked by traditional authors when explaining the argument and its relevance. It is important to note that these distinctions are not ad hoc. Each of them flows naturally and necessarily from the principles employed to make the argument, when the argument and its sequence are properly considered in light of the entire moral system in which it is employed. Therefore, what might seem arbitrary to the beginner is not arbitrary whatsoever, but carefully worked out from higher principles, even if the application of these principles to the distinction remains latent.
NOTE. This is an article about moral theology. More than that, it is an article about moral theology related to an argument that is most often applied to sexual morality. If you struggle with scrupulosity, or will be scandalized in some other way by reading this article, then don’t read it. Curiositas is a vice.
Misconception 1. The Term “Faculty”
The first misconception concerns the term “faculty.” If you look at the argument given by St. Thomas in SCG III, cap. cxxii, there is a conspicuous absence of the term “faculty.” In fact, when you look through the chapter, the phrase that is used is emissio seminis, i.e., the emission of seed (the genus for the act, whether it be solitary, fornicatory, or conjugal). The argument is not actually about the “faculty” of a person, but about the act that follows from this faculty. What is the ordination inherent in the operation of a faculty?
This is a clarification that was given by Fr. Davis during the dispute in the American Ecclesiastical Review:
It appears to the writer to be of the utmost importance to distinguish between the faculty and the use of it, or the act. In contraception, it is the act that is frustrated, but the faculty is used. The misuse of the faculty consists in the abuse or frustration of the act.
In this way, we see how silly many of the objections to the argument are that are concerned with non-acts, or with something outside the ordination of the act considered in itself. Celibacy does not fall under the Perverted Faculty Argument because it is a non-act: the faculty is simply not used. Periodic continence (NFP) does not fall under it either for a similar reason. On the days the couple abstain, the faculty is not used; on the days they do not abstain, they perform the natural act in its integrity, and its infertility on that day is accidental to the act (as I will explain below). Therefore, the act must be judged from the intention of the couple and its circumstances. The argument couldn’t be used against either of these and has nothing to say about them. Since the argument concerns the operation of the faculty, the only cases in which it could be applied concern the proper or improper operation of the faculty based on its orientation, not the non-operation of the faculty.
Misconception 2. The Finis Operis
It is important here to distinguish between the finis operis and the finis operantis. The first concerns the “end of the work” and the latter the “end of the worker.” When we say the “end” or “purpose” or “orientation” of the act, we are not concerned with the good that is being sought psychologically or experientially by the individual when he operates. Rather, by the “end” or “purpose” or “orientation” of the act, we are speaking about the intrinsic order that is present in the work. This principle is immediately justified from the order of finality present within things, which is available to natural reason.
In this way, we see that objections from the individual intention of the operator fail. For example, someone may object to the argument on behalf of a couple who perform the marital act without any intention of generating a child. This is not a case in which the Perverted Faculty Argument applies and confuses the finis operis and finis operantis. The act may be sinful due to a failure as to its circumstances or an improper finis operantis like any other act, but the finis operis is not improperly ordered. Therefore, each case must be judged individually.
Misconception 3. Not the “Only Rule”
It is common for many (even many priests) to believe that the Perverted Faculty Argument is the only thing relevant to sexual morality. Therefore, they conclude that if there is not the complete use of the sexual organs outside of the proper vas, then it must always be considered at least a morally unobjectionable practice when done with one’s spouse. Yet this misunderstands the purpose of the argument.
The Perverted Faculty Argument is able to judge the species of the act. It is not able to judge whether such an act was done with the proper circumstances and end, which may render the act morally vicious. For example, there is the well-known condemnation by Bl. Innocent XI of the proposition that sexual union for pleasure alone is free of all fault and venial defect. This has nothing to do with the “perverted faculty”; it has to do with the finis operantis when performing the act.
The argument is not an exhaustive, one-size-fits-all argument that can determine whether any act is virtuous or vicious. It merely concerns one aspect of this question. We can take an example to clarify this: marital relations with a pregnant wife. Some may object that the Perverted Faculty Argument must be against the teaching of the Fathers and the older theologians insofar as they condemned relations with a pregnant wife as either a mortal or a venial sin (whether universally, or in most cases).
Yet this leaves out a third option, which is in fact the case. These Fathers and theologians didn’t justify their sentence on this issue by an appeal to the finis operis, but by something else, e.g., the finis operantis, the danger to the child, etc. The Perverted Faculty Argument is giving you one fact about the act, i.e., whether it is or is not against the finis operis, not whether an act should be approved as moral in individual cases (which requires that the act be integral in all of its causes).
The fact of the matter is that the counsels and precepts given by the Fathers and many moralists on a variety of moral issues touching the marriage bed are dependent on factors besides the finis operis. This is an excellent point brought out in all its details by Fr. William A. Wallace, O.P., in his work The Role of Demonstration in Moral Theology. The greatest moralists are able to distinguish clearly between (a) the judgment of moral science concerning what is to be done per se by the virtuous man in such and such circumstances, which reaches the individual case only as an individuum vagum; (b) the judgment of prudence concerning this singular act here and now; and (c) those rules that are true only ut in pluribus (for the most part) developed through generations of pastoral work by moralists and directors of souls.
When we read an author and hear his judgment on a question, it is important to distinguish which judgment he is making, in order not to misapply what is being said as to the certitude and universality of his judgment.
Misconception 4. Per se vs. per accidens
As I mentioned above, when we are using the Perverted Faculty Argument, we are considering the question from the perspective of the finis operis. There are certain factors that can be added to this ordination that are per se and others that are per accidens. For example, if we consider the copulation of two men, their copulation removes the finis operis per se and in principle. The copulation is such that its order to procreation is removed. Yet, if we consider the copulation of a man with his sterile wife, their copulation does not attain its end due to some defect that is per accidens to the act. The act that they perform is still, intrinsically, essentially, and in principle, ordered towards procreation. It is the type of act that results in procreation. Yet, due to some defect in one of the agents (i.e., sterility), the act does not attain its effect.
To put it another way, when we give the Perverted Faculty Argument, we are not merely arguing in a consequentialist manner (whether or not such an act has its effect). Rather, we are arguing from the essential and intrinsic character of the act and its per se ordering to its end. If the act retains its essential and intrinsic character and its per se ordering to the end, failing due to something that is per accidens (sterility, pregnancy, etc.), then the argument does not apply to the question at hand. We are considering the finis operis, i.e., the end of the very operation or work which is done. Questions of circumstance, the intention of those entering upon copulation, etc., are not relevant here.
In this way, you can see how most of the rejoinders related to copulation between the married concern something that is per accidens. When we combine this with the clarification that the argument does not provide an exhaustive norm of Catholic sexual morality, and is concerned with the finis operis rather than the finis operantis, most of the objections are easily dissolved.
This also occurs in the contrary case. One of the arguments given against fornication is that it is per se contrary to the end of procreation insofar as the good of procreation also includes the raising of children, not merely their generation. Now, the governance of children requires a certain determinate and stable bond between the couple in order to raise them properly. Therefore, where this is absent, the act is per se contrary to the end of procreation.
To this argument, many object that such a case is not universal insofar as a woman may, perhaps, be very wealthy and hire tutors and caregivers who are able to govern the children she has through fornication.
In response to this, St. Thomas emphasizes that this argument isn’t taken from the case of individual goods distributively taken, but from the good of the species (ST II‑II, q. 154, a. 2). Now, when it concerns the good of the species, exceptions are merely accidental to our consideration of the morality or immorality of the act. Therefore, even in the case where the bad effect may be mitigated in some way per accidens, the immorality is still clear from what follows per se from the act.
This is what was said in the contrary case about the sterile or pregnant wife. It is not necessarily immoral to engage in acts whose finis operis is intrinsically ordered towards its end simply because something per accidens removes the acquisition of this good. In the same way, it is not moral to engage in acts whose finis operis is intrinsically ordered towards a contrary end simply because something per accidens removes the evil effect.
Misconception 5. “Beside” the End
Unfortunately, many commentators will describe the argument as follows: “using a faculty for anything other than its natural end is sinful.” This is not the principle from which the argument proceeds. It would obviously be more than absurd to argue that using a faculty for anything other than its natural end is sinful. Unfortunately, this formulation (as false as it is common) has led to two disastrous effects: (a) many Catholics imbibe certain oddities about the moral life, especially concerning the marital use, and (b) many opponents of the Church are given an opportunity to mock Catholic teaching.
The more accurate formulation of the principle from which the argument proceeds would be as follows: “any operation that frustrates the proper good to which the operations of the faculty are ordered is sinful.” In this formulation, the malice is not found in acting in any way that is beside the ordinary use of the faculty, but in eliciting an operation of the faculty that contradicts or excludes the good to which the operations of the faculty are ordered.
Sylvester of Ferrara clarifies this quite well:
“From this reply it is to be noted that the total reason why fornication (or any emission of seed from which the generation of offspring, or its fitting upbringing, cannot follow) is a sin, is not to be taken to be that whenever the use of some part of the body is not according to the order of nature, it is then a sin; for it is plain that this is not universally true in the use of the hands and feet. Rather, one must add that such a disordered use be of such a kind that an evil of nature follows from it: namely, that the good of nature is either wholly taken away by it, or impeded.” (In C. Gent. III, c. 122)
When we have an act whose end is that good ordered by nature, we have an act that is good according to its species; when we have an act whose end is contrary to the good ordered by nature, we have an act that is evil according to its species. Between these lie the acts that are “beside” the end, and this can be distinguished into those acts that are praeter naturam and those acts that are merely instrumental. Unfortunately, many modern exponents of this argument have not kept these apart.
First, there is the case where the natural operation of the faculty is elicited, but in a mode that departs from the natural mode without defeating the end. This is what the scholastics call praeter naturam, beside nature, and it is not simply indifferent. Most say that such acts are somehow against the good of man, yet lightly. Therefore, many theologians give what may seem to be “odd” judgments concerning the position in which one engages in copulation. They say that it is unnatural as to mode insofar as it is beside nature and somehow departs from the natural order; therefore there is something of the character of evil to it, yet it is lightly evil. Yet, since it is not contrary to the grave good that is sought by nature in such acts, it follows that (a) it is not gravely evil (i.e., not a mortal sin), and (b) it can be justified by a sufficient reason. The example commonly given is the change of position in copulation with a woman who is pregnant. In such a case, there is sufficient justification to change the position for the health of the child and to engage in the act more easily. Therefore, they do not mark such changes with the censure of sin, but say that there is some adequate justification for the deficiency of mode.
Second, it is possible that a part be used purely as an instrument for something else, its natural operation being set aside altogether (as when we use our hands to walk on, or our tongue to lick a stamp). Here the act is indifferent according to its species, rendered good or evil by the agent’s end and the circumstances. This is Ferrariensis’s own solution to the objection from walking on the hands: reason may use any part of the body as an instrument even for a use other than that for which nature instituted it; what it may not do is elicit the natural operation of the part in a way contrary to the end of that operation. Some of the cases frequently brought forward as “contrary to the end” are actually instances of something being used instrumentally. For example, in the case of eating foods that have zero calories, the mouth is being used instrumentally for the sake of taste. Therefore, the act should be judged from circumstance and end.
A related case, but not the same one, is the principle of totality: the hands are for the sake of the good of the whole man, and so a hand may be cut off in order to save the life of the body. Why the same reasoning cannot be applied to emission for the sake of the health of the body, or to save someone’s life, we will gather later when we treat the good to which generation is ordered.
One caution should be added here. Some say that when the organs are excited so as to prepare for the marital act, they are being used “instrumentally.” This is not accurate. The preparation for the marital act is not a use of the organs beside their natural operation; it is the beginning of the natural operation itself, and it is licit precisely because it is ordered to that act. Objections drawn from such preparation therefore cannot be invoked against the argument.
This distinction between those acts that are contrary to the good towards which the operations are ordered vs. those that are beside, instrumental, or according to that good is quite important for setting out fair parallel cases to which the same argument applies. Often, parallels will be sought with nutrition. The act of eating is for the sake of the preservation of the body of the person. For an act of eating to be gravely contrary to the good towards which the operation is ordered, the act of eating would have to, by its very nature, induce the removal of this end. Fr. Davis gives the example of the person who eats a large quantity of sand so as to remove his natural life. Cases like chewing gum (not an act of nutrition), eating food for the sake of pleasure alone (concerned with the finis operantis), and the other common examples that are stated are in no wise akin to the case of the misuse of the sexual faculties. In order to be parallel, it would have to be the case that the act is per se contrary to, and excludes, a grave good to which the acts of the faculty are ordered.
Here we are able to better understand what exactly would need to be verified in a proper counterexample, i.e., the act is a use of a faculty which excludes the grave good of human nature to which it is ordered per se. If you use your teeth to rip open a package, you are not excluding a grave good of human nature to which the teeth are ordered per se, but using the faculty instrumentally and the use participates in the morality of the principal act. If a man copulates with his pregnant wife, the act is not per se excluding the good of offspring, but is excluded by something outside the act and attached to it per accidens.
Misconception 6. The Good Intended
When we are considering the Perverted Faculty Argument in the case of generation, the good that is intended by the act is generation, i.e., the conservation of the species by the creation of new life. This good is a grave good, surpassed among the goods of nature only by the good of life itself (which is violated contrarily by murder).
This is one issue where the modern defenses of the principle are weakest. Many speak of acts of generation as if they were ordered towards the good of the individual (as, e.g., nutrition is) rather than rightly regarding the act of generation as ordered towards the good of the species. Therefore, it often happens that its defenders are deprived of some of the strongest arguments for refuting objections, and of the grounds for explaining the gravity of sexual sins.
If we were merely to explain the evil of sexual sins on the grounds of the individual good, then we would have no other grounds for opposing them than we have for any other sin against temperance, which cannot adequately explain the universal prohibition that the natural law gives against such acts.
This leads us to two corollaries of note.
First, anything contrary to the end in sexual matters is gravely sinful. For a grave sin is a violation of a grave good. In the cases where a grave good is violated, e.g., blasphemy, the entire genus of the sin that is contrary to the acquisition of this good is grave and does not suffer lightness of matter. Therefore, the only cases wherein sins against such a precept are considered light are (a) when there is some mitigating factor in the will or intellect, or (b) when the fault concerns something accidental to the act (e.g., the mode, certain light circumstances, the finis operantis, etc.).
NOTE. The gravity of the act is not being taken from the exclusion of good in general, but from the exclusion of a grave good in particular. Therefore, in cases where the good that is excluded is light (e.g., a small lie), the act will likewise be lightly sinful.
Second, there is no exception that can justify the violation of this precept. As I mentioned above, there are certain cases where the goods of the part may be sacrificed for the goods of the whole, e.g., a limb is amputated in order to save the entire body to which it is ordered. In the case of generation, the act is not ordered to the good of the individual, but to the good of the species. Let’s take two examples to illustrate this point. First, a man is told that he will die unless he procures an emission of seed. Second, a man is told that he will die unless his hand is cut off. In either case, the act that is being done is contrary to a certain good, yet the Christian conscience recoils from the first case, while in the second case it ordinarily approves of the act as reasonable. Why? In the first case, the good that is being violated is the good of the species, which is not at the disposal of any individual, whereas in the second case, the good that is being violated is the good of the individual, which may be sacrificed for a higher good of the same individual.