<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" version="2.0" xmlns:itunes="http://www.itunes.com/dtds/podcast-1.0.dtd" xmlns:googleplay="http://www.google.com/schemas/play-podcasts/1.0"><channel><title><![CDATA[THOMISM.COM]]></title><description><![CDATA[A theological publication dedicated to the study and defense of the Catholic Faith through the Scholastic method. Join over 8,000 readers. Subscribe for free.]]></description><link>https://thomism.com</link><generator>Substack</generator><lastBuildDate>Sun, 22 Nov 2026 12:28:37 GMT</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://thomism.com/feed" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><copyright><![CDATA[Christian B. Wagner]]></copyright><language><![CDATA[en]]></language><webMaster><![CDATA[scholasticanswers@substack.com]]></webMaster><itunes:owner><itunes:email><![CDATA[scholasticanswers@substack.com]]></itunes:email><itunes:name><![CDATA[Christian B. Wagner]]></itunes:name></itunes:owner><itunes:author><![CDATA[Christian B. Wagner]]></itunes:author><googleplay:owner><![CDATA[scholasticanswers@substack.com]]></googleplay:owner><googleplay:email><![CDATA[scholasticanswers@substack.com]]></googleplay:email><googleplay:author><![CDATA[Christian B. Wagner]]></googleplay:author><itunes:block><![CDATA[Yes]]></itunes:block><item><title><![CDATA[A Thomistic Overview of Protestantism: On the Oxford Movement]]></title><description><![CDATA[Part 6. The Oxford Movement and Its Outcome]]></description><link>https://thomism.com/p/protestantism-oxford-movement-and-its-outcome</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://thomism.com/p/protestantism-oxford-movement-and-its-outcome</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Christian B. Wagner]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 20 Nov 2026 12:01:53 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/d15cbf71-18e1-4317-9958-533057d175c9_1200x800.jpeg" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<h1>A General Introduction</h1><p>In my opinion, the greatest theologian of the twentieth century was Fr. Francisco Mar&#237;n-Sola, O.P. His greatness lay in his power of synthesis: he understood a whole system in its relation to all of its parts, in harmonious unity. From that vantage he could lay out a problem in its full depth and then give a solution that does justice to whatever is legitimate in the contrary objections. He was meticulous by temperament, spending his entire scholarly energy on two problems: the development of doctrine and the grace controversies.</p><p>Born in 1873 in C&#225;rcar, Navarre, he entered the Dominican Order and was sent as a young priest to the Philippines, where he taught at the University of Santo Tom&#225;s in Manila, was taken prisoner during the revolution, and afterwards began a short career in the Catholic press. From 1911 he taught in the Dominican house of studies at Rosaryville, Louisiana; from 1918 he held the chair of dogmatic theology at Fribourg, where he wrote <em>The Homogeneous Evolution of Catholic Dogma</em> and fought his famous battle over efficacious grace in the pages of <em>La Ciencia Tomista</em>. He returned to Manila and died there in 1932 while working on a lengthy treatment of the grace controversies titled <em>Concordia Tomista</em>. </p><p>Around four years ago, while reading <em>The Homogeneous Evolution of Catholic Dogma</em>, I learned that Fr. Mar&#237;n-Sola, during his years in the Catholic press, wrote a series of articles on another subject I care about: Protestantism. These were written in the form of a popular presentation in a Manila daily newspaper called <em>Libertas</em>. Their erudition and fairness were praised by the Protestants themselves; as Fr. Manuel Pi&#241;on, O.P., notes, an Anglican bishop (Irving Spencer) commended their &#8220;gentle and fair tenor.&#8221;</p><p>My excitement was soon crushed. Fr. Mar&#237;n-Sola was on the staff of <em>Libertas</em> for four years and its editor for two, so his output was enormous. Two further facts made things worse. First, he never wrote under his own name, but under a pseudonym or anonymously. Second, <em>Libertas</em> was a daily, which means thousands of issues were printed during his time there. To my knowledge, apart from general indications of the years of publication and some topics, no bibliography of these articles has ever been produced. Michael Torre records that Mar&#237;n-Sola himself gathered them into twenty-two notebooks, which appear to be lost:</p><blockquote><p>According to Velasco (&#8220;Ensayo de Bibliograf&#237;a,&#8221; 111), Mar&#237;n-Sola collected his brief articles published in <em>Libertas</em> (published anonymously or under the pen names &#8220;Euripio&#8221; and &#8220;Quicoy&#8221;) in 22 notebooks, which he had to leave in the parish of St. Anthony of Padua, in New Orleans, when he left for Europe in 1918. These notebooks, if they still exist, may now be in the Dominican archives of the University of Santo Tomas.</p></blockquote><p>At the time, collecting them seemed impossible. But things have changed. I discovered that the entire run of <em>Libertas</em> has been digitized and is, in principle, searchable. With the pen names &#8220;Euripio&#8221; and &#8220;Quicoy&#8221; as leads, it seemed possible at least to gather the signed articles. This hope, too, was quickly disappointed: many of the scans are poor, and the OCR, defeated by the multi-column layout, is poorer still. I had to shelve the project.</p><p>Then I tried something else. It was now technically possible for an AI to read through the whole corpus page by page and look for the pen names as a matter of image recognition rather than text search, which sidesteps the broken OCR entirely. So I did a complete pass over more than ten thousand newspaper pages across over a thousand web pages to search for articles written by &#8220;Euripio&#8221; and &#8220;Quicoy.&#8221; </p><p>After many, many hours of running, it returned 127 certain identifications and 3 likely ones. (A targeted search for his anonymous articles would be a far harder problem, but with these tools it is no longer an unthinkable one.)</p><p>I now have every one of those pages collected and OCR&#8217;d, the text extracted, and provisional translations made. This series will present those translations, publishing every article of doctrinal interest, grouped by subject, beginning with his classic 1902&#8211;1903 series on Protestantism and then moving on to the rest. It will run to fifteen posts, each containing a handful of related articles released every friday:</p><ol><li><p><a href="https://thomism.com/p/a-thomistic-overview-of-protestantism">On Lutheranism &#8212; 4 articles</a></p></li><li><p><a href="https://thomism.com/p/protestantism-catholic-unity-and-protestant-fragmentation">On Catholic Unity and Protestant Fragmentation &#8212; 4 articles</a></p></li><li><p><a href="https://thomism.com/p/protestantism-reformed-church-and-calvinist-objections">On the Reformed Church and Calvinist Objections &#8212; 2 articles</a></p></li><li><p><a href="https://thomism.com/p/protestantism-origins-and-constitution-of-anglicanism">On the Origins and Constitution of Anglicanism &#8212; 3 articles</a></p></li><li><p><a href="https://thomism.com/p/protestantism-puseyism-and-ritualism">On Puseyism and Ritualism &#8212; 3 articles</a></p></li><li><p><strong>On the Oxford Movement and Its Outcome &#8212; 3 articles [you are here]</strong></p></li><li><p>On the Three Parties of Anglicanism &#8212; 5 articles</p></li><li><p>On Anglicanism and the Church of Rome &#8212; 2 articles</p></li><li><p>Appendix A: Prayer, Miracles, and the Natural Order &#8212; 3 articles</p></li><li><p>Appendix B: Papal Authority, Obedience, and Catholicity &#8212; 4 articles</p></li><li><p>Appendix C: Holy Orders and the Minister of Ordination &#8212; 6 articles</p></li><li><p>Appendix D: Marriage and the Religious State &#8212; 3 articles</p></li><li><p>Appendix E: Catholic Unity, Christian Liberty, and Religious Truth &#8212; 4 articles</p></li><li><p>Appendix F: Indulgences and Forbidden Books &#8212; 2 articles</p></li><li><p>Appendix G: Religion, Patriotism, and Public Life &#8212; 3 articles</p></li></ol><p>Once a human review of each batch is complete, I will publish the collections for the general public. Until then, I am releasing them one post at a time for my Substack members and Patrons. If you want to read Fr. Mar&#237;n-Sola on Luther, Calvin, and the Church of England before anyone else does, this is the place to do it.</p><p>While I will eventually publish each of these together for the general public, for now, while the human overview process is under way, I am going to post these for my Substack members and Patrons. </p><p>If you are not yet a member, here is a 30-day free trial to read these articles for the next month:</p><p class="button-wrapper" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://thomism.com/subscribe?coupon=38ae34f1&amp;utm_content=220280722&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Get 30 day free trial&quot;,&quot;action&quot;:null,&quot;class&quot;:null}" data-component-name="ButtonCreateButton"><a class="button primary" href="https://thomism.com/subscribe?coupon=38ae34f1&amp;utm_content=220280722"><span>Get 30 day free trial</span></a></p>
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   ]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[A Scholastic Guide to Confession: Ensuring Validity]]></title><description><![CDATA[Preliminary Notions]]></description><link>https://thomism.com/p/was-my-confession-invalid</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://thomism.com/p/was-my-confession-invalid</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Christian B. Wagner]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Tue, 17 Nov 2026 00:03:57 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/bcc27633-cc2e-4630-bc95-7405bf46d5b1_1886x1274.png" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<h2>Introduction</h2><p>For many Catholics, there are a number of different questions about confession that they want answered. Unfortunately, answers are difficult to come by. Even when they ask a priest (whether inside or outside the confessional), it often happens that the priest himself is not sure, his answer is not clear, or you suspect that he was shooting from the hip by formulating his own opinion on the spot. This is why the Church has developed over the past few centuries various styles of theology that are meant to answer such questions precisely. This precision can take some time to digest, but you can be assured that the answers that are given are answers that are accepted by a great number of theologians, priests, saints, and members of the hierarchy over multiple centuries. While there are quite niche questions where there are debates between theologians, these are usually the sort of questions that people don&#8217;t really ask about or need to know about. Unlike some other topics in theology, there is broad (practical) agreement among theologians on some of the most important questions about the confessional.</p><p>In order to treat this topic properly, I will treat it across nine articles, of which this is the first. While each article can be read by itself to give answers to questions about confession, they also build upon each other, with later articles elucidating in more detail what is treated in earlier articles in order to give a systematic presentation of what is useful for laymen to know about confession. Each section will begin with a listing of various classical sources where these questions are treated for those who wish to look into these topics in greater detail. There will also be extensive endnotes quoting sections from these theologians, especially where there is disagreement or a more speculative question.</p><p>I (usually) have my own opinion where there is debate between theologians, but I will be sure to note this disagreement in the body of the article where there is no consensus and further reading can be done by checking out the recommended sources (especially Doronzo) and the footnotes.</p><p>This series is specifically concerned with what is being confessed and how, but it would be a mistake to conclude that following what is said here is sufficient on its own for a valid and fruitful confession. To merely state your sins with the most exact and extensive examination of conscience is not sufficient to be validly absolved. There are various dispositions required on the part of the penitent. In this series, I will not be treating those aspects of confession (I gave a brief treatment of this <a href="https://thomism.com/p/is-my-confession-invalid">here</a>), but will be focusing on what sins need to be confessed and how.</p><p>Throughout this series, I will give an exhaustive treatment of whatever needs to be known about what you must confess, what details must be given in confession, how to give them, when confessions must be repeated, what happens if you &#8220;mess up&#8221; your confession or cannot remember your sins, and many questions in between.</p><p>There are nine articles planned for this series:</p><ol><li><p>Was My Confession Valid?</p></li><li><p>How to Confess the Number of Sins</p></li><li><p>How Much Detail Do I Have to Give?</p></li><li><p>Do I Have to Confess a Sin I&#8217;m Not Sure I Committed?</p></li><li><p>Why You Should Confess More than Mortal Sins</p></li><li><p>What Happens if I Forget a Sin in Confession?</p></li><li><p>When Do I Have to Confess a Sin Again?</p></li><li><p>When Do I Have to Go to Confession?</p></li><li><p>How to Make a Good Confession</p></li></ol><p>In this series I want to home in on one particular aspect of confession that is often vaguely presented by catechists, pastors, etc., and to treat it from authoritative sources of theology.</p><p>The first article is meant to lay the foundation for the rest. Here, the theological principles will be laid down, along with the general answers of the validity and integrity of confession that will be applied throughout this series. This is crucial to understanding the rest.</p><p>NOTE. These articles will be released one per week going forward. If you want to follow along with the series, please consider becoming a FREE subscriber by clicking the join button below. If you become a paid subscriber, then you will also have access to additional notes at the end of each article in this series!</p><p class="button-wrapper" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://thomism.com/subscribe?&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Subscribe now&quot;,&quot;action&quot;:null,&quot;class&quot;:null}" data-component-name="ButtonCreateButton"><a class="button primary" href="https://thomism.com/subscribe?"><span>Subscribe now</span></a></p><h2>A Note to the Scrupulous</h2><p>Please stop reading if you are (truly) scrupulous. If you have genuine scrupulosity that makes confession extraordinarily difficult, I am warning you that it is poison to study these matters in detail during an episode (although it will help you outside of these times). With the help of a regular confessor to whom you submit completely and without question, you can overcome scrupulosity.</p><p>On the other hand, for many of you, while you may think you have scrupulosity, you do not. It is extraordinarily common to falsely identify oneself as a scrupulant. You may have a delicate conscience or have scruples without being a scrupulant. For you, this article will be of great help in fruitfully putting your delicate conscience to good use. In fact, I truly believe that a thorough and technical knowledge of such matters is a guard against falling into scrupulosity.</p><p>If you want to read more about genuine scrupulosity, check out St. Alphonsus&#8217; treatment of this matter (<em>Theologia Moralis</em>, lib. I, nn. 11-19). It is important for me to emphasize again that many of you who believe that you have scrupulosity are not scrupulants. For those with tendencies for scruples or a delicate conscience, this study will help you guard against scrupulosity. I do not ask these to stop reading, but encourage them to study with zeal. This also applies to those who have scrupulosity, but have made progress and are not in an episode. Even so, be circumspect: always receive permission from your confessor and keep him updated.</p><p>Throughout this article, I will give notes on scrupulosity and how each of these matters relates to the scrupulous. I do not do this as if I believe an active scrupulant could read such an article and be ordinarily helped by this study. I do this because I am aware that there are seminarians and priests who read my articles, along with seminary professors and those who could become seminary professors one day. These individuals need a thorough study of such matters. It is also useful for the man who is not a scrupulant, either as a foil or as knowledge that will be helpful if he begins to slide into scrupulosity.</p><p>As a final note, do not let your false self-diagnosis become an excuse for laxity. Laxity and tepidity will destroy your soul faster than scrupulosity ever could. Many of the notes for scrupulants concern recommendations that are less rigid than what is recommended for others due to the extraordinary situation that they find themselves in. If that is not you, it is discouraged (or, in some cases, even immoral) to follow such recommendations.</p><h2>What &#8220;Must&#8221; Means</h2><p>SOURCES: St. Thomas, <em>Suppl.</em>, q. 6, aa. 1&#8211;6; <em>Quodl.</em> I, aa. 10&#8211;12. Doronzo, <em>De Poenitentia</em> II, a. 37 (pp. 464&#8211;541). St. Alphonsus, <em>Theologia Moralis</em> VI, nn. 662 ff. Su&#225;rez, <em>De poenitentia</em>, disp. 21; Lugo, <em>De poenitentia</em>, disp. 15.</p><p>In ordinary language, terms like &#8220;can,&#8221; &#8220;should,&#8221; &#8220;must,&#8221; etc., are used without much regard for their formal meaning. There is nothing inherently strange or problematic with this. Yet, when we are discussing issues in sacramentology, it is certainly problematic to use these descriptors without some attention to what we are actually attempting to communicate.</p><p>For example, let&#8217;s say that I said &#8220;you need to have 6 months of preparation for marriage in this diocese.&#8221; What do I mean by &#8220;need&#8221;? I mean that it is something that is commanded by the relevant authorities in the diocese. On the other hand, let&#8217;s say &#8220;you need to have witnesses in order to be married.&#8221; With this, I don&#8217;t simply mean to indicate something that is commanded by certain authorities, I also mean something that is necessary for the existence or validity of the marriage.</p><p>From this brief example, we recognize that it is incumbent on us to clarify what we mean when describing confession. Is this necessary for validity? Is this necessary by law? Is this necessary for a good confession? Each of these can be confused if we are not careful enough with how we describe things. Therefore, while certain terms or phrases may sound repetitive, there is a reason for it.</p><p>In general, there are five senses that &#8220;must&#8221; can have in moral theology, which must be kept distinct. If these are confused with one another, a completely wrong conclusion can be drawn and, in some cases, it can lead to practical ruin. These senses are the following: (1) What is required for the validity of the sacrament, so that without it there is no absolution at all (i.e., matter, form, minister, intention); (2) What is commanded by divine precept, from which no one, not even the Pope, can dispense (St. Thomas, <em>Suppl.</em>, q. 6, a. 6); (3) What is commanded by the law of the Church, which can be dispensed by the proper authorities (e.g., yearly confession); (4) What is practically necessary due to the ordinary state of penitents, but not strictly necessary; and, (5) What is merely counselled as the better thing, and not even practically necessary, which can, in certain cases, even be harmful <em>per accidens</em>.</p><p>Each of these things can be described as things we &#8220;must&#8221; do, which can be illustrated with a few examples. First, you must be contrite for a valid absolution, since contrition belongs to the matter of the sacrament. Second, you must tell every unconfessed mortal sin in number, species, and necessary circumstances by divine law, yet one who is inculpably ignorant of a mortal sin that he did not confess can be validly absolved. Third, you must confess at least once a year by the law of the Church. Fourth, you must confess all notably aggravating circumstances, even those that do not change the species (while it is probable that these circumstances need not be confessed, confessing them is practically necessary due to the difficulty that most penitents have in telling which circumstances change the species). Fifth, you must confess your venial sins or make a general confession (which is an excellent counsel that can be harmful <em>per accidens</em>, e.g., in the case of scrupulants).</p><p>In each of these five cases, the word &#8220;must&#8221; is used, yet they are functioning in five different ways. If any of these are confused, this can wrongly lead the faithful to conclude that their confessions are invalid or that they gravely sinned, when they simply left out a counsel, or vice-versa.</p><p>It will be important to disambiguate cases of the first from the other cases. Simply because what ought to be done is not done does not mean that the sacrament is not valid (except in cases where the violation is gravely culpable, i.e., a mortal sin committed in the confession itself, which necessarily invalidates the sacrament). It is also important to distinguish the fourth case from the second, third, and fifth. There are a handful of different cases where doing and not doing are each probable in themselves, yet for the ordinary layman, it is morally necessary that he do that act.</p><p>This is something that is especially important when it comes to confession since this could be the difference between having to repeat a confession and simply making a note for the future.</p><h2>The Matter of the Sacrament</h2><p>SOURCES: Council of Trent, sess. 14, cc. 3 and 5, cann. 4 and 7. 1917 Code, cann. 901&#8211;902; 1983 Code, can. 988. St. Thomas, III, q. 84, aa. 2&#8211;3; q. 90, a. 1; <em>Suppl.</em>, q. 8, a. 5, ad 4; q. 18, a. 2, ad 4; <em>In IV Sent.</em>, d. 16, q. 1, a. 2; d. 17, q. 3, a. 3, qc. 5, ad 4. Doronzo, <em>De Poenitentia</em> I, aa. 3&#8211;7 (pp. 156&#8211;229), especially a. 6 (pp. 209&#8211;211) and a. 7 (pp. 211&#8211;229); IV, a. 95, nota 8 (pp. 533&#8211;534). St. Alphonsus, <em>Theologia Moralis</em> VI, nn. 425&#8211;432; <em>Homo Apostolicus</em>, tr. XVI. Su&#225;rez, disp. 18, sect. 1; Lugo, disp. 13, sect. 3; Salmanticenses, <em>Cursus theologicus</em>, tr. 24, disp. 2, dub. 1; Billot, <em>De poenitentia</em>, thes. 5; Galtier, <em>De paenitentia</em>, nn. 457&#8211;460.</p><p>Every sacrament is constituted by matter and form. The form is applied to the matter in order to make a sacrament. Baptism has the Trinitarian formula and water; the Eucharist has the words of institution and bread and wine. In Penance, it is a bit more complicated. The form of Penance is the absolution of the priest, but the matter is different from the examples we have brought forward; in Penance, the matter that the form is applied to is certain acts of the penitent himself (contrition, confession, satisfaction). It is for this reason that Penance uniquely requires proper dispositions in the penitent in order to be valid. If a penitent is not truly contrite, then he is not validly absolved due to improper matter. A common example of this concerns the firm purpose of amendment; in many cases, the penitent does not intend to amend his life, avoiding all mortal sin and the proximate occasions of it.</p><p>While contrition was discussed in a previous article, in this series I want to deal with the second aspect of the matter, i.e., confession. When we consider sacraments, the matter can be twofold: the remote matter and the proximate matter (e.g., in baptism, the remote matter is water and the proximate matter is the pouring of the water). In Penance, the remote matter is the sins of the penitent, whereas the proximate matter is how these sins are acted upon by the penitent: contrition (the hatred of sin), confession (the declaration of sins), and satisfaction (the actions that remove the effects of sin). When these are presented to the priest externally, he applies the form (absolution) to the penitent, absolving him of his sins.</p><p>When it comes to the sacrament of penance, if there is an essential defect of the minister, intention, form, or matter, then it is invalid. Defect of minister would occur if the priest did not have jurisdiction to hear confessions and perform absolution (or, if the minister was not a priest). Defect of intention would occur if the priest did not intend to do what the Church does in absolving. Defect of form would occur if the absolution was not said properly with some essential defect (e.g., if the priest said only &#8216;May God forgive you&#8217; and left out &#8216;I absolve you&#8217;). Defect of matter occurs when there is an essential defect in contrition, confession, or satisfaction. This would occur if the penitent is not truly contrite for his sins (e.g., he does not intend to amend his life), or if he does not confess as he is able to (e.g., if he deliberately avoids telling certain mortal sins without just cause), or does not intend to perform satisfaction (n.b., if the satisfaction is not in fact performed, then the confession is valid as long as he intended to perform it).</p><p>In this article, I wish to consider the remote matter insofar as it is the object of confession. When we consider the &#8216;remote matter&#8217; (i.e., that upon which the sacrament acts, called <em>materia circa quam</em> by theologians), this is distinguished into necessary matter, free matter, and sufficient matter.</p><ul><li><p>Sufficient matter: This includes anything that can be presented so that the absolution could be valid (e.g., a man who confesses venial sins can be absolved if he has no mortal sins to confess)</p></li><li><p>Necessary matter: This includes all those sins that must be submitted to the keys in confession, i.e., every mortal sin committed after Baptism and not yet directly remitted by confession (n.b., this includes sins that have been forgiven indirectly but have not yet been integrally confessed, which will be explained below).</p></li><li><p>Free matter: This includes all those sins that can be submitted to the keys without an obligation to submit them to the keys (i.e., venial sins and mortal sins already confessed)</p></li></ul><p>Either necessary matter or free matter is sufficient matter insofar as it is sufficient for absolution in itself; although, it may not be sufficient here and now if a man has necessary matter to confess and attempts to merely present free matter. To put it in other words, some sin is required and any sin suffices (sufficient matter), while certain sins must be confessed (necessary matter). All and only mortal sins not yet confessed are necessary matter, while every mortal sin already confessed and every venial sin whatsoever is free matter. Sometimes, we also distinguish between principal matter (mortal sin) and secondary matter (venial sins), which will be explained in the fifth article of this series.</p><p>One practical consequence of this division is that one should always present what is certainly sufficient matter. If someone goes to confession and only presents doubtful sins or only presents imperfections, then the absolution is null or doubtful for want of certain matter (and to seek it knowingly would be sacrilegious). Therefore, it is always a good idea when one doubts whether sufficient matter is present to confess some certain sin that has already been confessed and absolved, or some certain venial sin. [1]</p><p>NOTE: When we call sins the &#8220;matter&#8221; of the sacrament, we mean it in the sense of remote matter, just as we call water the matter of baptism as the remote matter. Do not conclude from this that it is possible for sins alone, without acts of the penitent, to be absolved by the application of the form to them. In order for sins to be apt for absolution, they have to be acted upon in order to make it proximate matter, just as baptismal water must be applied to the one being baptized, without which baptism would be impossible. Sins are only the matter of the sacrament as the object of the penitent&#8217;s contrition and confession, and where these are absent there cannot be a sacrament. Therefore, the dying man cannot be absolved absolutely unless he gives some external sign of sorrow (where it is doubtful whether he has given one, he is absolved conditionally).</p><h2>The Integrity of Confession</h2><p>SOURCES: Council of Trent, sess. 14, c. 5 and can. 7 (DH 1679&#8211;1683, 1707). St. Thomas, <em>Suppl.</em>, q. 9, a. 2; q. 10, a. 5; <em>In IV Sent.</em>, d. 16, q. 3, a. 2, qc. 5. Doronzo, <em>De Poenitentia</em> II, a. 39 (pp. 544&#8211;687): the state of the question (pp. 544&#8211;546) and Conclusions 1&#8211;3 (pp. 552&#8211;564). St. Alphonsus, <em>Theologia Moralis</em> VI, nn. 465 and 479; <em>Homo Apostolicus</em>, tr. XVI. Su&#225;rez, disp. 22, sect. 1&#8211;2; Lugo, disp. 16, sect. 1&#8211;2; Salmanticenses, tr. 24, disp. 8, dub. 1&#8211;2; Gonet, <em>Clypeus</em>, <em>De poenitentia</em>, disp. 10; Billuart, <em>De poenitentia</em>, diss. 7, a. 2. Pr&#252;mmer, III, nn. 362 ff.; Merkelbach, III, nn. 517 ff.; Cappello, <em>De poenitentia</em>, nn. 134&#8211;211; Aertnys-Damen, II, nn. 291&#8211;305; Regatillo-Zalba, III, nn. 535&#8211;555; Concina, <em>Theologia christiana dogmatico-moralis</em> IX, lib. I, diss. 4, cap. 4; Patuzzi, <em>Ethica christiana</em> VI, cap. 3; Mezger, <em>Theologia scholastica</em> III, tract. 18, disp. 47, a. 3; Reding, <em>Theologia scholastica</em> VII, q. 9, a. 2; Tanquerey, <em>Synopsis theologiae moralis</em>, <em>De poenitentia</em>, nn. 254 and 295&#8211;301; Konings, <em>Theologia moralis</em>, n. 1367.</p><p>The integrity of confession is its completeness relative to its necessary matter. This is distinct from both the validity (i.e., did the sacrament truly happen) and liceity (i.e., did the sacrament happen legally) of confession. Unfortunately, many simply consider the question of validity or liceity vis-&#224;-vis confession, but integrity is also a significant question that may ground an obligation to confess sins that were previously absolved (indirectly). Therefore, Pope Alexander VII condemned the following proposition: &#8220;We are not bound to express in a following confession sins omitted or forgotten in confession because of pressing danger to life or for another cause&#8221; (DH 2031).</p><p>Material integrity is a completeness that consists of confessing every sin that <em>per se</em> must be submitted to the sacrament (i.e., every mortal sin committed after Baptism that has not yet been confessed). This kind of integrity is rarely reached outside of a few cases (e.g., someone who is baptized later in life and confesses frequently). One of the reasons for this lack of material integrity (besides simply forgetting mortal sins) is the fact that those sins that are invalidly confessed, or confessed with some sort of defect (e.g., not consisting of the correct number or a sufficiently specific species, relevant circumstance, etc.) must also be confessed for material integrity.</p><p>Formal integrity is a completeness that consists of confessing every sin that a penitent can and must accuse himself of here and now, i.e., every sin from whose accusation he is not legitimately excused for the moment. Since men have imperfections of mind and body that make the confession of every mortal sin committed after Baptism that has not yet been confessed impossible, formal integrity does not always coincide with material integrity.</p><p>It is to be noted that there is a range of terminology employed by moralists in order to describe this distinction. Some moralists call material integrity &#8220;objective&#8221; and formal integrity &#8220;subjective,&#8221; since material integrity indicates what must, abstractly speaking, be done, while formal integrity indicates what the penitent, concretely, can and must do here and now (e.g., Cappello, <em>De poenitentia</em>, n. 141; Tanquerey, n. 254).</p><p>What is required for the validity of confession is formal integrity, which is always present when nothing is left out of one&#8217;s confession through one&#8217;s own grave fault (i.e., when &#8220;nothing is kept back in bad faith&#8221;; Aertnys-Damen, II, n. 291). It is for this reason that the Church makes qualifications when describing the integrity of confession. The 1983 Code of Canon Law speaks of the grave sins &#8220;of which the person has knowledge after diligent examination of conscience&#8221; (Can. 988 &#167;1) and Trent variously speaks of &#8220;all the mortal sins, of which, after a diligent examination of themselves, they are conscious&#8221; (Sess. 14, cap. v), &#8220;all the sins which occur to their memory&#8221; (ibid.), &#8220;mortal sins which after due and diligent previous meditation are remembered&#8221; (ibid., can. vii), and it uses this to answer the Protestant objection to the requirement of integrity in confession:</p><blockquote><p>&#8220;Nothing else is required of penitents, but that, after each has examined himself diligently, and searched all the folds and recesses of his conscience, he confess those sins by which he shall remember that he has mortally offended his Lord and God: whilst the other sins, which do not occur to him after diligent thought, are understood to be included as a whole in that same confession.&#8221; (Ibid., cap. v)</p></blockquote><p>On this point, there is complete agreement among Catholic theologians. If one performs a diligent examination and cannot remember a mortal sin, then this is forgiven by the sacrament indirectly. There is no obligation whatsoever to go to heroic lengths in trying to conjure up sins, but a proportionate and serious examination suffices to be free from any accusation of negligence.</p><p>Fr. Su&#225;rez writes that the validity of confession is preserved when there is &#8220;a confession of all the sins for which no excuse intervenes.&#8221; (<em>De poenitentia</em>, disp. 22, prooem.) Cardinal Lugo writes that, for validity, &#8220;what is required is the formal integrity of confession, not the material: that is, that all things be told, so far as can be done.&#8221; (<em>De Eucharistia</em>, disp. 14, sect. 5) St. Alphonsus writes that, for validity, a confession does not need to be materially integral &#8220;provided that it be so formally or morally, that is, as far as it morally can be here and now.&#8221; (<em>Theologia Moralis</em> VI, n. 479) Fr. Patuzzi gives the reason, writing that &#8220;if material integrity cannot be had, formal integrity suffices&#8230; for God does not command impossible things.&#8221; (<em>Ethica christiana</em> VI, cap. 3, n. 6) This is commonly taught and there are no dissenters. [2]</p><p>The physical or moral impotence that causes this difference between what is necessary for material integrity and what is necessary for formal integrity may be something that is permanent (e.g., inability to speak) or it may be something that is temporary (e.g., temporary loss of memory). If it is temporary, then it only applies as long as the impotence lasts, with the concrete obligation to confess properly once the impotence has been removed (e.g., someone in danger of death who confesses quickly and recovers must again confess in species and number as far as he is able to when recovered); if it is permanent, then the abstract obligation to confess these sins properly remains, but it is never concrete. Further, the physical or moral impotence that causes this may be either entire (e.g., intense scrupulosity) or it may be partial (e.g., inculpable ignorance of a previously committed mortal sin). Where the physical or moral impotence is partial, the exception goes only as far as the impotence does (e.g., the man who is invincibly ignorant of one sin is still required to confess another for formal integrity): he is required to confess, in species and number, all the sins which the moral or physical impotence does not touch. [3]</p><p>While these distinctions may seem unimportant, they help explain a perpetual problem that many Catholics have vis-&#224;-vis confession. When we give due diligence to the task of finding out these sins, it happens more often than not that we make some mistakes in this process, often misremembering the number or leaving out a sin. In fact, nearly every confession lacks material integrity since this includes ALL unconfessed mortal sins after baptism, even those from decades earlier. This being the case, we judge the errors that arise in this process like we do any other precept. Is the gravity of the fault light or grave? Was the fault culpable or inculpable? For most of us who spend some time examining our consciences, any faults in recounting our mortal sins are either inculpable or they are due to light faults. In this case, there is complete &#8216;formal integrity&#8217; even while there is an incomplete &#8216;material integrity.&#8217;</p><p>On this point, it should be remembered that some things required in confession do not invalidate it when omitted through inculpable ignorance, while others do so whether we are inculpably ignorant or not. For example, let&#8217;s assume that some person was somehow ignorant of the fact that he needed to give the number of mortal sins and every priest simply assumed he was confessing only venial sins for years. Were his confessions invalid all those years? It depends. If he was culpably ignorant in so grave a matter, his confessions would be invalid, but if he was inculpably ignorant, then his confessions would be valid if there is formal integrity and everything else requisite for the validity of the sacrament is present (i.e., the form, minister, true contrition, etc.). While the other elements are invalidating even if excluded by inculpable ignorance (i.e., form, minister, formal integrity of confession, true contrition, etc.), the material integrity of confession is not one of them.</p><p>Therefore, when asking the question of the obligation to repeat confessions, there are two questions that need to be asked. First, where was there a lack of material integrity? On each of those essential points, even if it was excluded from confession by legitimate excuse, there remains an obligation to confess. Second, where was there invalidity? In such a case, the entire confession needs to be repeated since none of the sins were absolved. [4]</p><p>This is important to note for those who struggle with the fact that they often forget sins during their examination of conscience. If you carry out your examination without any gravely culpable defect (i.e., with the amount of time and diligence necessary for a serious task) and confess every mortal sin you recall, then you have formal integrity. If the formal integrity of confession is preserved even if the impotence of a man is so great that he can only make gestures of his contrition without a single word, why can&#8217;t it be preserved in your case when you make a diligent and serious examination?</p><p>Yet, remember that, alongside this, there is a moral obligation to confess all mortal sins with material integrity (number, species, necessary circumstances); therefore, where there is inculpable omission, the sin is absolved, but you still have the obligation to confess the sin once you recall it. To give an example, let&#8217;s say that you examined your conscience and found that you had mortally sinned by theft; but, when you go to confession, you are so nervous that you forget this sin and receive absolution. If this is inculpable or only lightly culpable, then the sin is absolved, but you still have to state it the next time you go to confession.</p><p>NOTE 1. This is why the Church strongly recommends the practice of general confessions. It may happen that there are a number of different sins that were passed over in confession without you remembering or invalid confessions that you believe in good faith were actually valid. Your obligation towards these cannot extend further than your memory. In a general confession, you sit down and think through your entire life since your baptism and confess the mortal sins that you can remember from the top down. If you sit down and diligently record everything you can remember, obviously anything that was done improperly is covered and whatever is not remembered is invincibly forgotten.</p><p>It is to be noted that general confessions are NOT to be permitted to scrupulants, or anyone else who unreasonably fears the invalidity of their past confessions. There is plenty of room for reasonably fearing the invalidity or incompleteness of your confessions (e.g., you did not state number for years, did not do any examination of conscience for years, etc.), but unreasonable fears will destroy true peace of conscience.</p><p>General confessions will be treated at length in a later article.</p><p>NOTE 2. Certain catechetical materials will frequently only mention the deliberate concealing of sins as invalidating confessions. While this is one act that can destroy formal integrity and require re-confession, this is not the only one. For example, if you omit your examination of conscience through grave fault when it is gravely necessary, you do not have a formally integral confession; if you through grave fault omit or change the number or circumstances in necessary matter, the same applies. Any act that is gravely culpable destroys the formal integrity of confession and requires re-confession. The same does not apply for acts that are lightly culpable (e.g., doing one&#8217;s examination quicker than he should, but not to such a degree as to gravely endanger his ability to examine). The same also does not apply to acts that are <em>per se</em> grave, but are done inculpably (e.g., you are invincibly ignorant of the obligation to examine your conscience before confession).</p><h2>An &#8220;Acceptable&#8221; Violation of Confession&#8217;s Integrity</h2><p>SOURCES: Roman Catechism, II, c. 5. St. Thomas, <em>Suppl.</em>, q. 6, a. 4 (especially ad 3); q. 9, a. 4; II-II, q. 69, aa. 1&#8211;2. Doronzo, <em>De Poenitentia</em> II, a. 38 (pp. 541&#8211;544) and a. 39, nota 9 (pp. 605&#8211;607). St. Alphonsus, <em>Theologia Moralis</em> VI, nn. 495&#8211;497; <em>Homo Apostolicus</em>, tr. XVI, n. 28. Su&#225;rez, <em>De poenitentia</em>, disp. 22, sect. 10; Lugo, <em>De poenitentia</em>, disp. 16, sect. 2, &#167;6 (nn. 98 ff.); Salmanticenses, tr. 24, disp. 8, dub. 8 (nn. 256 ff.). Sylvester Prierias, <em>Summa</em>, v. <em>Confessio</em> I, n. 9. Concina, <em>Theologia christiana dogmatico-moralis</em> IX, lib. I, diss. 4, cap. 3, q. 1; Patuzzi, <em>Ethica christiana</em> VI, cap. 3, nn. 1&#8211;2. Aertnys-Damen, II, n. 309; Marc, <em>Institutiones morales Alphonsianae</em> II, n. 1689; Cappello, <em>De poenitentia</em>, n. 134; Merkelbach, III, nn. 525 ff.; Noldin, <em>De sacramentis</em>, n. 269; Wouters, n. 324; Tanquerey, <em>Synopsis theologiae moralis</em>, De poenitentia, nn. 290&#8211;291; Gury-Ballerini, II, n. 474.</p><p>Here, it is important to speak against an abominable practice that some engage in to vainly comfort themselves by petty lies in so solemn a matter. This violation is seen as not only acceptable, but even pious. While many speak of concealing sins as a violation of the integrity of confession, it is also true that penitents who invent sins in order to be &#8220;on the safe side&#8221; violate the integrity of confession, stating as certain that which is doubtful, increasing the number to account for a possible lapse in memory, etc. This should be avoided at all costs as a sacrilegious act since, as St. Alphonsus notes, it is far worse than a simple lie, violating truthfulness by falsehood and religion by sacrilege (<em>Theologia Moralis</em> VI, n. 497).</p><p>Taken in itself, the act is grave as an act of sacrilege. This is something that is commonly taught by Catholic theologians. Yet, it may happen in certain cases (i.e., when it is done from simplicity, scruple, disturbance of mind, etc.) that this is excused from mortal sin. Some authors even say that this is what happens in the majority of instances (Marc, <em>Institutiones morales Alphonsianae</em> II, n. 1689; Cappello, <em>De poenitentia</em>, n. 134). Yet, when this is done knowingly and deliberately, then it is a grave lie and sacrilege. In practice, penitents rarely do this knowingly and deliberately and incur only slight fault or none, yet those who are reading this right now have been informed of the evils of this practice. Therefore, do not scruple about your past confessions where you did this, but avoid it in the future.</p><p>While it is often excused from grave sin when culpability is lessened, this perversion of false humility and security should be avoided at all costs. It feeds into scruples and destroys the foundations of true repentance. Truly and honestly state the number of sins as best you can approximate it. When you are doubtful of a sin, state it as doubtful; as St. Thomas says, the penitent &#8220;ought not to assert that it is mortal, but to speak doubtingly, and to await the judgment of the priest&#8221; (<em>Suppl.</em>, q. 6, a. 4, ad 3). Do not try to &#8220;err on the safe side&#8221; since intentional error is lying, which is always against the moral law.</p><p>Fr. Su&#225;rez gives us clearer details of this matter (<em>De poenitentia</em>, disp. 22, sect. 10). He states that a man can lie in confession in two ways: by denying what he did, or by affirming what he did not do; further, the lie may be about three things: circumstances that have nothing to do with the confession, free matter, and necessary matter (ibid., n. 2). In this case, we are treating lying about the third object in the second way.</p><p>As to the first kind of thing, &#8220;it is not a mortal sin, nor against the validity of confession, to mix in some lie, whether by affirming or by denying; but it is a venial sin, and a graver one than a like lie would be outside that act.&#8221; (ibid., n. 3)</p><p>To lie about the second kind of thing is commonly held to be a venial sin (and, according to many, a graver one than the same lie outside the sacrament), unless a falsely accused venial sin is presented as the only matter, in which case the sin is grave and the sacrament is null (cf. St. Alphonsus, <em>Theologia Moralis</em> VI, nn. 495&#8211;496; Doronzo, <em>De Poenitentia</em> II, a. 39, nota 9). A few authors hold that it is mortal even apart from that case, on account of the irreverence shown to the sacrament (Cajetan), or at least doubt whether it is simply a venial fault (Concina). [5] Yet, it should be noted that this hardly ever happens and would almost necessarily either involve contempt or some mitigating factor. [6]</p><p>To lie about the third kind of thing in a negative manner, denying that one has committed a mortal sin, or that it had some necessary circumstance, etc., &#8220;is always mortal and against the substance of the sacrament.&#8221; (ibid., n. 10) This is agreed upon by all. The difficulty concerns the affirmative lie, although Su&#225;rez finds only Sylvester suggesting the contrary of the common teaching, which holds that this is grave as well. Here are the reasons that Su&#225;rez gives:</p><blockquote><p>In itself, and setting aside invincible ignorance, this is a mortal sin, and consequently against the substance of the sacrament&#8230; The ground is that this is matter of grave sacrilege. Its gravity is shown, first, from the fact that it is a deception in the necessary matter of the sacrament. Second, because in every judgment a lie in what belongs to the substance of the cause, deceiving the judge in it, is a mortal sin. Third, because in this way the whole knowledge which the confessor receives of the penitent&#8217;s conscience, as to the number or the species of his mortal sins, would be made very uncertain; nor would penitents be bound to examine their conscience so as to give a definite number, since they could increase it at will without mortal sin&#8230; This resolution is to be understood of the matter in itself. For where ignorance and good faith come in, it is clear that the penitent can be without sin in this, and consequently can make a valid confession; and in this way many simple people can be excused, who think that they do no wrong in saying more than they did. (ibid., n. 11)</p></blockquote><p>For those who are aware of the rule and lie anyway, the excuse of simplicity is not available. Therefore, moralists state simply that it is mortal for those who do this knowingly:</p><blockquote><p>He sins gravely who knowingly confesses a mortal sin which he did not commit; or who knowingly increases the number of his mortal sins, unless he should do this from simplicity; likewise he who knowingly confesses a doubtful sin as certain, or the reverse; or who denies that he is a habitual sinner, a relapsing sinner, or in an occasion of sin, when in truth he is; because he notably vitiates the judgment of the confessor in a grave matter. (Aertnys-Damen, <em>Theologia Moralis</em> II, n. 309; cf. Noldin, <em>De sacramentis</em>, n. 269)</p></blockquote><h2>Conclusion</h2><p>This article lays the groundwork for the entire series, which is going to elucidate the meaning of the principle that &#8220;it is of divine law that every mortal sin committed since baptism be confessed in species, number, and necessary circumstances,&#8221; whether explaining what the terms mean, how far they apply, or how to practically present them in confession.</p><p><strong>Below are some notes that I added which explain many of these points in greater detail. If you are a paid subscriber, you can get access to these!</strong></p><p>Although, before that, I want to insert an appendix on a point that didn&#8217;t really fit anywhere in the article without serious digression.</p><h2>Appendix. A Theological Explanation of the Necessity of Material and Formal Integrity</h2><p>To understand better the distinction between material and formal integrity, note that material integrity of confession is not one of those things that are (in the words of the theologians) necessary by a necessity of means <em>per se</em> (as is the case for contrition, charity, sanctifying grace, faith, etc.) or necessary by a necessity of means <em>per accidens</em> (as is the case for explicit faith in the Trinity/Incarnation, sacramental baptism, membership in the Catholic Church, etc.), but only necessary by a necessity of precept. Contrition is necessary by a necessity of means <em>per se</em> (hence, indispensable for all adults), formal integrity is necessary by a necessity of means <em>per accidens</em> (therefore, an explicit or implicit desire must be included in contrition, as is the case with implicit faith vis-&#224;-vis faith in the Trinity and Incarnation, baptism of desire vis-&#224;-vis sacramental baptism, and implicit desire of union with the Church vis-&#224;-vis membership in the Catholic Church), and material integrity is necessary by a necessity of precept.</p><p>Therefore, in cases of moral or physical impotence, material integrity is NOT necessary. If you are inculpably ignorant of unconfessed mortal sins after baptism or there is simply not time to recount them (e.g., danger of death), formal integrity suffices. Therefore, even in extreme cases where the externalization of contrition over sin is certain without number and species (e.g., of a man merely telling the priest that he has mortally sinned and expressing some contrition) and there is moral or physical impotence to add any further degree of material integrity, absolute absolution can be given. Where this is doubtful, conditional absolution can be given. [7]</p><p>Corollary. Since the material integrity of confession is something that is only necessary by a necessity of precept, the manner in which opinions are formed and followed related to it are quite different than the manner in which opinions are formed and followed related to the validity of a sacrament. In questions concerning the material integrity of the sacrament, probable opinions can be followed, e.g., I can follow as a probable opinion that notably aggravating circumstances do not need to be confessed. On the other hand, when it concerns the validity of sacraments, I cannot follow a probable opinion, e.g., a priest cannot categorically absolve a penitent who probably lacks true contrition. (cf. Tanquerey, <em>Synopsis theologiae moralis et pastoralis</em>, vol. I, n. 258)</p><h2>Notes</h2>
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   ]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[A Thomistic Overview of Protestantism: On Anglo-Catholicism]]></title><description><![CDATA[Part 5. Puseyism and Ritualism]]></description><link>https://thomism.com/p/protestantism-puseyism-and-ritualism</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://thomism.com/p/protestantism-puseyism-and-ritualism</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Christian B. Wagner]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 13 Nov 2026 12:01:48 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/eefedd08-f5f0-47a0-b490-c13190ad5459_1200x800.jpeg" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<h1>A General Introduction</h1><p>In my opinion, the greatest theologian of the twentieth century was Fr. Francisco Mar&#237;n-Sola, O.P. His greatness lay in his power of synthesis: he understood a whole system in its relation to all of its parts, in harmonious unity. From that vantage he could lay out a problem in its full depth and then give a solution that does justice to whatever is legitimate in the contrary objections. He was meticulous by temperament, spending his entire scholarly energy on two problems: the development of doctrine and the grace controversies.</p><p>Born in 1873 in C&#225;rcar, Navarre, he entered the Dominican Order and was sent as a young priest to the Philippines, where he taught at the University of Santo Tom&#225;s in Manila, was taken prisoner during the revolution, and afterwards began a short career in the Catholic press. From 1911 he taught in the Dominican house of studies at Rosaryville, Louisiana; from 1918 he held the chair of dogmatic theology at Fribourg, where he wrote <em>The Homogeneous Evolution of Catholic Dogma</em> and fought his famous battle over efficacious grace in the pages of <em>La Ciencia Tomista</em>. He returned to Manila and died there in 1932 while working on a lengthy treatment of the grace controversies titled <em>Concordia Tomista</em>. </p><p>Around four years ago, while reading <em>The Homogeneous Evolution of Catholic Dogma</em>, I learned that Fr. Mar&#237;n-Sola, during his years in the Catholic press, wrote a series of articles on another subject I care about: Protestantism. These were written in the form of a popular presentation in a Manila daily newspaper called <em>Libertas</em>. Their erudition and fairness were praised by the Protestants themselves; as Fr. Manuel Pi&#241;on, O.P., notes, an Anglican bishop (Irving Spencer) commended their &#8220;gentle and fair tenor.&#8221;</p><p>My excitement was soon crushed. Fr. Mar&#237;n-Sola was on the staff of <em>Libertas</em> for four years and its editor for two, so his output was enormous. Two further facts made things worse. First, he never wrote under his own name, but under a pseudonym or anonymously. Second, <em>Libertas</em> was a daily, which means thousands of issues were printed during his time there. To my knowledge, apart from general indications of the years of publication and some topics, no bibliography of these articles has ever been produced. Michael Torre records that Mar&#237;n-Sola himself gathered them into twenty-two notebooks, which appear to be lost:</p><blockquote><p>According to Velasco (&#8220;Ensayo de Bibliograf&#237;a,&#8221; 111), Mar&#237;n-Sola collected his brief articles published in <em>Libertas</em> (published anonymously or under the pen names &#8220;Euripio&#8221; and &#8220;Quicoy&#8221;) in 22 notebooks, which he had to leave in the parish of St. Anthony of Padua, in New Orleans, when he left for Europe in 1918. These notebooks, if they still exist, may now be in the Dominican archives of the University of Santo Tomas.</p></blockquote><p>At the time, collecting them seemed impossible. But things have changed. I discovered that the entire run of <em>Libertas</em> has been digitized and is, in principle, searchable. With the pen names &#8220;Euripio&#8221; and &#8220;Quicoy&#8221; as leads, it seemed possible at least to gather the signed articles. This hope, too, was quickly disappointed: many of the scans are poor, and the OCR, defeated by the multi-column layout, is poorer still. I had to shelve the project.</p><p>Then I tried something else. It was now technically possible for an AI to read through the whole corpus page by page and look for the pen names as a matter of image recognition rather than text search, which sidesteps the broken OCR entirely. So I did a complete pass over more than ten thousand newspaper pages across over a thousand web pages to search for articles written by &#8220;Euripio&#8221; and &#8220;Quicoy.&#8221; </p><p>After many, many hours of running, it returned 127 certain identifications and 3 likely ones. (A targeted search for his anonymous articles would be a far harder problem, but with these tools it is no longer an unthinkable one.)</p><p>I now have every one of those pages collected and OCR&#8217;d, the text extracted, and provisional translations made. This series will present those translations, publishing every article of doctrinal interest, grouped by subject, beginning with his classic 1902&#8211;1903 series on Protestantism and then moving on to the rest. It will run to fifteen posts, each containing a handful of related articles released every friday:</p><ol><li><p><a href="https://thomism.com/p/a-thomistic-overview-of-protestantism">On Lutheranism &#8212; 4 articles</a></p></li><li><p><a href="https://thomism.com/p/protestantism-catholic-unity-and-protestant-fragmentation">On Catholic Unity and Protestant Fragmentation &#8212; 4 articles</a></p></li><li><p><a href="https://thomism.com/p/protestantism-reformed-church-and-calvinist-objections">On the Reformed Church and Calvinist Objections &#8212; 2 articles</a></p></li><li><p><a href="https://thomism.com/p/protestantism-origins-and-constitution-of-anglicanism">On the Origins and Constitution of Anglicanism &#8212; 3 articles</a></p></li><li><p><strong>On Puseyism and Ritualism &#8212; 3 articles [you are here]</strong></p></li><li><p>On the Oxford Movement and Its Outcome &#8212; 3 articles</p></li><li><p>On the Three Parties of Anglicanism &#8212; 5 articles</p></li><li><p>On Anglicanism and the Church of Rome &#8212; 2 articles</p></li><li><p>Appendix A: Prayer, Miracles, and the Natural Order &#8212; 3 articles</p></li><li><p>Appendix B: Papal Authority, Obedience, and Catholicity &#8212; 4 articles</p></li><li><p>Appendix C: Holy Orders and the Minister of Ordination &#8212; 6 articles</p></li><li><p>Appendix D: Marriage and the Religious State &#8212; 3 articles</p></li><li><p>Appendix E: Catholic Unity, Christian Liberty, and Religious Truth &#8212; 4 articles</p></li><li><p>Appendix F: Indulgences and Forbidden Books &#8212; 2 articles</p></li><li><p>Appendix G: Religion, Patriotism, and Public Life &#8212; 3 articles</p></li></ol><p>Once a human review of each batch is complete, I will publish the collections for the general public. Until then, I am releasing them one post at a time for my Substack members and Patrons. If you want to read Fr. Mar&#237;n-Sola on Luther, Calvin, and the Church of England before anyone else does, this is the place to do it.</p><p>While I will eventually publish each of these together for the general public, for now, while the human overview process is under way, I am going to post these for my Substack members and Patrons. </p><p>If you are not yet a member, here is a 30-day free trial to read these articles for the next month:</p><p class="button-wrapper" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://thomism.com/subscribe?coupon=38ae34f1&amp;utm_content=220280584&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Get 30 day free trial&quot;,&quot;action&quot;:null,&quot;class&quot;:null}" data-component-name="ButtonCreateButton"><a class="button primary" href="https://thomism.com/subscribe?coupon=38ae34f1&amp;utm_content=220280584"><span>Get 30 day free trial</span></a></p>
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   ]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[A Thomistic Overview of Protestantism: On Anglicanism]]></title><description><![CDATA[Part 4. The Origins and Constitution of Anglicanism]]></description><link>https://thomism.com/p/protestantism-origins-and-constitution-of-anglicanism</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://thomism.com/p/protestantism-origins-and-constitution-of-anglicanism</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Christian B. Wagner]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 06 Nov 2026 12:03:32 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/25ec80ec-3ce2-43d5-bc4f-70d21c483f4d_1200x800.jpeg" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<h1>A General Introduction</h1><p>In my opinion, the greatest theologian of the twentieth century was Fr. Francisco Mar&#237;n-Sola, O.P. His greatness lay in his power of synthesis: he understood a whole system in its relation to all of its parts, in harmonious unity. From that vantage he could lay out a problem in its full depth and then give a solution that does justice to whatever is legitimate in the contrary objections. He was meticulous by temperament, spending his entire scholarly energy on two problems: the development of doctrine and the grace controversies.</p><p>Born in 1873 in C&#225;rcar, Navarre, he entered the Dominican Order and was sent as a young priest to the Philippines, where he taught at the University of Santo Tom&#225;s in Manila, was taken prisoner during the revolution, and afterwards began a short career in the Catholic press. From 1911 he taught in the Dominican house of studies at Rosaryville, Louisiana; from 1918 he held the chair of dogmatic theology at Fribourg, where he wrote <em>The Homogeneous Evolution of Catholic Dogma</em> and fought his famous battle over efficacious grace in the pages of <em>La Ciencia Tomista</em>. He returned to Manila and died there in 1932 while working on a lengthy treatment of the grace controversies titled <em>Concordia Tomista</em>. </p><p>Around four years ago, while reading <em>The Homogeneous Evolution of Catholic Dogma</em>, I learned that Fr. Mar&#237;n-Sola, during his years in the Catholic press, wrote a series of articles on another subject I care about: Protestantism. These were written in the form of a popular presentation in a Manila daily newspaper called <em>Libertas</em>. Their erudition and fairness were praised by the Protestants themselves; as Fr. Manuel Pi&#241;on, O.P., notes, an Anglican bishop (Irving Spencer) commended their &#8220;gentle and fair tenor.&#8221;</p><p>My excitement was soon crushed. Fr. Mar&#237;n-Sola was on the staff of <em>Libertas</em> for four years and its editor for two, so his output was enormous. Two further facts made things worse. First, he never wrote under his own name, but under a pseudonym or anonymously. Second, <em>Libertas</em> was a daily, which means thousands of issues were printed during his time there. To my knowledge, apart from general indications of the years of publication and some topics, no bibliography of these articles has ever been produced. Michael Torre records that Mar&#237;n-Sola himself gathered them into twenty-two notebooks, which appear to be lost:</p><blockquote><p>According to Velasco (&#8220;Ensayo de Bibliograf&#237;a,&#8221; 111), Mar&#237;n-Sola collected his brief articles published in <em>Libertas</em> (published anonymously or under the pen names &#8220;Euripio&#8221; and &#8220;Quicoy&#8221;) in 22 notebooks, which he had to leave in the parish of St. Anthony of Padua, in New Orleans, when he left for Europe in 1918. These notebooks, if they still exist, may now be in the Dominican archives of the University of Santo Tomas.</p></blockquote><p>At the time, collecting them seemed impossible. But things have changed. I discovered that the entire run of <em>Libertas</em> has been digitized and is, in principle, searchable. With the pen names &#8220;Euripio&#8221; and &#8220;Quicoy&#8221; as leads, it seemed possible at least to gather the signed articles. This hope, too, was quickly disappointed: many of the scans are poor, and the OCR, defeated by the multi-column layout, is poorer still. I had to shelve the project.</p><p>Then I tried something else. It was now technically possible for an AI to read through the whole corpus page by page and look for the pen names as a matter of image recognition rather than text search, which sidesteps the broken OCR entirely. So I did a complete pass over more than ten thousand newspaper pages across over a thousand web pages to search for articles written by &#8220;Euripio&#8221; and &#8220;Quicoy.&#8221; </p><p>After many, many hours of running, it returned 127 certain identifications and 3 likely ones. (A targeted search for his anonymous articles would be a far harder problem, but with these tools it is no longer an unthinkable one.)</p><p>I now have every one of those pages collected and OCR&#8217;d, the text extracted, and provisional translations made. This series will present those translations, publishing every article of doctrinal interest, grouped by subject, beginning with his classic 1902&#8211;1903 series on Protestantism and then moving on to the rest. It will run to fifteen posts, each containing a handful of related articles released every friday:</p><ol><li><p><a href="https://thomism.com/p/a-thomistic-overview-of-protestantism">On Lutheranism &#8212; 4 articles</a></p></li><li><p><a href="https://thomism.com/p/protestantism-catholic-unity-and-protestant-fragmentation">On Catholic Unity and Protestant Fragmentation &#8212; 4 articles</a></p></li><li><p><a href="https://thomism.com/p/protestantism-reformed-church-and-calvinist-objections">On the Reformed Church and Calvinist Objections &#8212; 2 articles</a></p></li><li><p><strong>On the Origins and Constitution of Anglicanism &#8212; 3 articles [you are here]</strong></p></li><li><p>On Puseyism and Ritualism &#8212; 3 articles</p></li><li><p>On the Oxford Movement and Its Outcome &#8212; 3 articles</p></li><li><p>On the Three Parties of Anglicanism &#8212; 5 articles</p></li><li><p>On Anglicanism and the Church of Rome &#8212; 2 articles</p></li><li><p>Appendix A: Prayer, Miracles, and the Natural Order &#8212; 3 articles</p></li><li><p>Appendix B: Papal Authority, Obedience, and Catholicity &#8212; 4 articles</p></li><li><p>Appendix C: Holy Orders and the Minister of Ordination &#8212; 6 articles</p></li><li><p>Appendix D: Marriage and the Religious State &#8212; 3 articles</p></li><li><p>Appendix E: Catholic Unity, Christian Liberty, and Religious Truth &#8212; 4 articles</p></li><li><p>Appendix F: Indulgences and Forbidden Books &#8212; 2 articles</p></li><li><p>Appendix G: Religion, Patriotism, and Public Life &#8212; 3 articles</p></li></ol><p>Once a human review of each batch is complete, I will publish the collections for the general public. Until then, I am releasing them one post at a time for my Substack members and Patrons. If you want to read Fr. Mar&#237;n-Sola on Luther, Calvin, and the Church of England before anyone else does, this is the place to do it.</p><p>While I will eventually publish each of these together for the general public, for now, while the human overview process is under way, I am going to post these for my Substack members and Patrons. </p><p>If you are not yet a member, here is a 30-day free trial to read these articles for the next month:</p><p class="button-wrapper" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://thomism.com/subscribe?coupon=38ae34f1&amp;utm_content=220280446&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Get 30 day free trial&quot;,&quot;action&quot;:null,&quot;class&quot;:null}" data-component-name="ButtonCreateButton"><a class="button primary" href="https://thomism.com/subscribe?coupon=38ae34f1&amp;utm_content=220280446"><span>Get 30 day free trial</span></a></p>
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   ]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[Does Every Soul in Purgatory Burn?]]></title><description><![CDATA[Medieval visionaries and scholastic theology]]></description><link>https://thomism.com/p/does-every-soul-in-purgatory-burn</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://thomism.com/p/does-every-soul-in-purgatory-burn</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Christian B. Wagner]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 04 Nov 2026 18:06:24 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/89d2752e-7d1d-434a-a82e-af8ce68139d0_1200x630.jpeg" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>Free subscribers get a new article in their inboxes every week. Paid subscribers get an additional article every week and help keep this work going. Please consider becoming a free or paid subscriber by clicking the button below:</em></p><p class="button-wrapper" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://thomism.com/subscribe?&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Subscribe now&quot;,&quot;action&quot;:null,&quot;class&quot;:null}" data-component-name="ButtonCreateButton"><a class="button primary" href="https://thomism.com/subscribe?"><span>Subscribe now</span></a></p><div><hr></div><blockquote><p>&#8220;In matters concerning Purgatory that have not been determined by the Church, we ought to adhere to those opinions which are most in conformity with the sayings and revelations of the saints.&#8221; (St. Robert Bellarmine, <em>De purgatorio</em> II.VII)</p></blockquote><h2>A Place Between Purgatory and Heaven</h2><p>St. Bede, in his <em>Historia ecclesiastica gentis Anglorum</em>, tells the story of Drycthelm, a man who died and was taken to see the various places that men go after death. The first place was described as follows: &#8220;One side was exceedingly terrible with raging flames; the other was no less unbearable with fierce hail and freezing snow blowing and sweeping through everything.&#8221; In this place, the souls were tormented by the alternation of cold and heat so that they jumped from one side to another, fleeing the burning heat into the bitter cold and then fleeing the bitter cold back into the burning heat without rest. The man, upon seeing these unbearable torments, was convinced that he was seeing hell. Yet, his guide told him that &#8220;this is not the hell you imagine.&#8221;</p><p>He then went on to the next place, a place of darkness where he heard maniacal laughter and screams of terror. In this place, the flames themselves were dark. The laughter was from demons, while the screams of terror came from the souls that were kept here for eternity. He saw demons dragging souls down into the abyss and, as he stood terrified, the demons threatened to seize him with fiery tongs, but they did not dare touch him, and they fled when his guide returned.</p><p>Then, he went to a third place. This third place is described as follows:</p><blockquote><p>There was an exceedingly broad and delightful field, filled with such fragrance of flowering blossoms that the wonderful sweetness of its scent immediately drove away all the stench of the dark furnace which had penetrated me. Such light filled the whole place that it seemed brighter than all the splendor of day or the rays of the midday sun. In this field were innumerable gatherings of people clothed in white, and many seats occupied by rejoicing companies.</p></blockquote><p>The obvious assumption that was made by the man was that he was seeing heaven due to the delight that was before him. Yet, as with the first place, he was mistaken, for his guide told him that &#8220;this is not the kingdom of heaven which you suppose.&#8221; Beyond the meadow, he also approached a far brighter and sweeter place, which the guide later identified with the neighborhood of the heavenly kingdom.</p><p>What does he mean by this? It seems that the first place is purgatory and the second place is hell. What would the third place be besides heaven? If it is not heaven, then what is it? Some may assume that this place is limbo, yet this is not the explanation that is given by the guide. Here are the descriptions given of the three places:</p><blockquote><p>That valley which you saw, dreadful with raging flames and rigid cold, is the place where the souls of those who postpone confessing and amending the sins they have committed, and finally take refuge in repentance at the very moment of death, and thus leave the body, must be tested and chastised. Yet because they had confession and repentance even at death, they will all reach the kingdom of heaven on the day of judgment. The prayers of the living, alms, fasts, and especially the celebration of Masses help many of them to be delivered even before the day of judgment.</p><p>The foul, fire-spewing pit which you saw is the very mouth of Gehenna. Whoever has once fallen into it will never be delivered from it for eternity.</p><p>But this flowery place, in which you see this most beautiful company of young people rejoicing and shining, is the place where the souls of those who leave the body in good works are received, yet who are not of such perfection as to deserve to be introduced immediately into the kingdom of heaven. All of them, however, will enter the vision of Christ and the joys of the heavenly kingdom on the day of judgment. For whoever is perfect in every word, deed, and thought reaches the heavenly kingdom immediately after leaving the body. To its neighborhood belongs that place where you heard the sound of sweet singing, with the fragrance of sweetness and splendor of light.</p></blockquote><p>This division of the afterlife is confusing to those with knowledge of traditional Catholic eschatology. In the familiar account, there is hell (which has the punishment of sense and the punishment of loss), the limbo of children (which has the punishment of loss and no punishment of sense, or at least a very light punishment of sense), purgatory (which has both punishments, but in a provisional way), and heaven (which has beatitude). There seems to be no place in this accounting for those souls who both lack the punishment of sense and will eventually enter heaven (since the souls in the limbo of children do not enter heaven).</p><p>While this may seem like a &#8220;one-off&#8221; description from a single author, this is not the case. The mid-twelfth-century <em>Visio Tnugdali</em> has a similar case with a division between two provisional places, the first for those who are &#8220;not very evil&#8221; and the second for those who are &#8220;not very good.&#8221; The first place is described as follows: &#8220;Below the wall... was a great multitude of men and women enduring rain and wind. They were very sad, suffering hunger and thirst; yet they had light and did not perceive a stench.&#8221; The second place is described as follows:</p><blockquote><p>Going a little farther, they came to a gate which opened to them of itself. When they had entered it, they saw a beautiful, fragrant field, planted with flowers, bright and very pleasant, in which was a multitude of souls that no one could count. There was a multitude of exultant men and women; there was no night there, nor did the sun set there, and there is a fountain of living water there. After the great and terrible bitterness it had suffered before, the soul was exceedingly delighted by the sweetness of the beautiful field... [The man asked:] &#8220;Whose souls, I ask, have this rest, and what is this fountain&#8217;s name?&#8221; The angel answered: &#8220;Here dwell those who are good, but not very good, who, having been rescued from the torments of the lower world, do not yet deserve to be joined to the company of the saints. This fountain which you see is called living: if anyone tastes this water, he will live forever and thirst no more.&#8221;</p></blockquote><p>Another popular description is found in the so-called &#8220;St. Patrick&#8217;s Purgatory,&#8221; the <em>Tractatus de purgatorio sancti Patricii Hibernorum apostoli</em> written by Henry of Saltrey in the late twelfth century. While the details of purgatory in this text are not always unobjectionable (e.g., in the account of the torture by demons in purgatory, commonly rejected by theologians), the same tradition is present. In this text, this place is identified with the earthly paradise of our first parents and said to be &#8220;peaceful, placid, and pleasing.&#8221; Yet, it is clearly distinguished from beatitude, which these souls long to enter into.</p><p>The strange part of this text comes from its explanation of the reason why such souls are kept there. The author seems to distinguish this place from purgatory insofar as purgatory is the place of penal afflictions, while this place is for souls who have paid their entire debt but did not merit a speedy entry into heaven in their life:</p><blockquote><p>Receiving faith in him, and freed through baptism both from actual sins and from original sin, we deserved to return to this country. Yet because we stained the robe received at baptism when through the flesh&#8217;s frailty we sinned, it was necessary for us to obtain forgiveness of actual sins through penance. The penance which we undertook before death, or when near our end, but did not complete in life, we have paid after separation from the flesh in the penal places which you saw, suffering torments for a longer or shorter time according to the measure and quantity of our faults.</p><p>For all of us who are here have passed through those places into this rest. And all those you saw in the various penal places, except those held below the mouth of the infernal pit, will be saved when they have been purified and come into this rest. Every day some who have been purified also arrive; we receive them as we received you and joyfully bring them in here. None of those who are in punishments knows how long he will be tormented there. But through Masses, psalms, prayers, and alms, whenever these are performed for them, their torments are either mitigated, or they are transferred to lesser and more bearable ones, until at length through such benefits they are entirely set free.</p><p>And when they have come to this place of rest, they are completely ignorant how long they will remain here; none of us can know this about himself. For just as in the penal places they are detained according to the quantity of their faults, so we who are here will remain in this rest for a longer or shorter time according to our good merits. See, as you observe, we are free from punishments and enjoy great rest; nevertheless, we are not yet worthy to ascend to the heavenly joy of the saints. None of us knows the day and term of our promotion to a better state; but after the term fixed for each we shall pass into greater rest. Every day our society in a certain way increases and decreases, since each day some ascend to us from punishments, and some from us into the heavenly paradise.</p></blockquote><p>Similar accounts are recorded in a number of different places: the late-twelfth-century vision of the monk of Eynsham (<em>Visio monachi de Eynsham</em>, cap. XLIXf), the late-thirteenth-century vision of St. Mechthild of Hackeborn (<em>Liber specialis gratiae</em>, pt. V), the vision of St. Gertrude the Great from the same era (<em>Legatus divinae pietatis</em>, IV.27, V.5), the fourteenth-century visions of St. Bridget of Sweden (<em>Revelationes</em>, IV.7, 127), the collection of Ven. Louis de Blois (<em>Monile spirituale</em>, cap. XIII), and others collected by Bautz (St. Frances of Rome, St. Maria Crescentia, Ven. Frances of the Blessed Sacrament, St. Catherine of Genoa, etc.).</p><h2>The Theological Affirmation</h2><p>A difficulty immediately arises. It is a dogma of the faith that the soul whose entire obligation of temporal punishment has been remitted in purgatory immediately enters into beatitude, as taught by Florence&#8217;s <em>Laetentur caeli</em> and Benedict XII&#8217;s <em>Benedictus Deus</em>. At first glance, it seems that some of these accounts hold that there is a twofold process. First, there is a punishment that remits the obligation to temporal punishment in purgatory. Second, there is a waiting period after punishment has been paid before entrance into heaven. This crude form must obviously be rejected. But is this the only form? Is there any way that this can be salvaged?</p><p><strong>Become a FREE subscriber to continue reading. It costs nothing!</strong></p>
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   ]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[A Thomistic Overview of Protestantism: On Calvinism]]></title><description><![CDATA[Part 3. The Reformed Church and Calvinist Objections]]></description><link>https://thomism.com/p/protestantism-reformed-church-and-calvinist-objections</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://thomism.com/p/protestantism-reformed-church-and-calvinist-objections</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Christian B. Wagner]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 30 Oct 2026 11:01:52 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/60f5f361-32ac-429b-89e5-4c5687c1dd60_1200x800.jpeg" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<h1>A General Introduction</h1><p>In my opinion, the greatest theologian of the twentieth century was Fr. Francisco Mar&#237;n-Sola, O.P. His greatness lay in his power of synthesis: he understood a whole system in its relation to all of its parts, in harmonious unity. From that vantage he could lay out a problem in its full depth and then give a solution that does justice to whatever is legitimate in the contrary objections. He was meticulous by temperament, spending his entire scholarly energy on two problems: the development of doctrine and the grace controversies.</p><p>Born in 1873 in C&#225;rcar, Navarre, he entered the Dominican Order and was sent as a young priest to the Philippines, where he taught at the University of Santo Tom&#225;s in Manila, was taken prisoner during the revolution, and afterwards began a short career in the Catholic press. From 1911 he taught in the Dominican house of studies at Rosaryville, Louisiana; from 1918 he held the chair of dogmatic theology at Fribourg, where he wrote <em>The Homogeneous Evolution of Catholic Dogma</em> and fought his famous battle over efficacious grace in the pages of <em>La Ciencia Tomista</em>. He returned to Manila and died there in 1932 while working on a lengthy treatment of the grace controversies titled <em>Concordia Tomista</em>. </p><p>Around four years ago, while reading <em>The Homogeneous Evolution of Catholic Dogma</em>, I learned that Fr. Mar&#237;n-Sola, during his years in the Catholic press, wrote a series of articles on another subject I care about: Protestantism. These were written in the form of a popular presentation in a Manila daily newspaper called <em>Libertas</em>. Their erudition and fairness were praised by the Protestants themselves; as Fr. Manuel Pi&#241;on, O.P., notes, an Anglican bishop (Irving Spencer) commended their &#8220;gentle and fair tenor.&#8221;</p><p>My excitement was soon crushed. Fr. Mar&#237;n-Sola was on the staff of <em>Libertas</em> for four years and its editor for two, so his output was enormous. Two further facts made things worse. First, he never wrote under his own name, but under a pseudonym or anonymously. Second, <em>Libertas</em> was a daily, which means thousands of issues were printed during his time there. To my knowledge, apart from general indications of the years of publication and some topics, no bibliography of these articles has ever been produced. Michael Torre records that Mar&#237;n-Sola himself gathered them into twenty-two notebooks, which appear to be lost:</p><blockquote><p>According to Velasco (&#8220;Ensayo de Bibliograf&#237;a,&#8221; 111), Mar&#237;n-Sola collected his brief articles published in <em>Libertas</em> (published anonymously or under the pen names &#8220;Euripio&#8221; and &#8220;Quicoy&#8221;) in 22 notebooks, which he had to leave in the parish of St. Anthony of Padua, in New Orleans, when he left for Europe in 1918. These notebooks, if they still exist, may now be in the Dominican archives of the University of Santo Tomas.</p></blockquote><p>At the time, collecting them seemed impossible. But things have changed. I discovered that the entire run of <em>Libertas</em> has been digitized and is, in principle, searchable. With the pen names &#8220;Euripio&#8221; and &#8220;Quicoy&#8221; as leads, it seemed possible at least to gather the signed articles. This hope, too, was quickly disappointed: many of the scans are poor, and the OCR, defeated by the multi-column layout, is poorer still. I had to shelve the project.</p><p>Then I tried something else. It was now technically possible for an AI to read through the whole corpus page by page and look for the pen names as a matter of image recognition rather than text search, which sidesteps the broken OCR entirely. So I did a complete pass over more than ten thousand newspaper pages across over a thousand web pages to search for articles written by &#8220;Euripio&#8221; and &#8220;Quicoy.&#8221; </p><p>After many, many hours of running, it returned 127 certain identifications and 3 likely ones. (A targeted search for his anonymous articles would be a far harder problem, but with these tools it is no longer an unthinkable one.)</p><p>I now have every one of those pages collected and OCR&#8217;d, the text extracted, and provisional translations made. This series will present those translations, publishing every article of doctrinal interest, grouped by subject, beginning with his classic 1902&#8211;1903 series on Protestantism and then moving on to the rest. It will run to fifteen posts, each containing a handful of related articles released every friday:</p><ol><li><p><a href="https://thomism.com/p/a-thomistic-overview-of-protestantism">On Lutheranism &#8212; 4 articles</a></p></li><li><p><a href="https://thomism.com/p/protestantism-catholic-unity-and-protestant-fragmentation">On Catholic Unity and Protestant Fragmentation &#8212; 4 articles</a></p></li><li><p><strong>On the Reformed Church and Calvinist Objections &#8212; 2 articles [you are here]</strong></p></li><li><p>On the Origins and Constitution of Anglicanism &#8212; 3 articles</p></li><li><p>On Puseyism and Ritualism &#8212; 3 articles</p></li><li><p>On the Oxford Movement and Its Outcome &#8212; 3 articles</p></li><li><p>On the Three Parties of Anglicanism &#8212; 5 articles</p></li><li><p>On Anglicanism and the Church of Rome &#8212; 2 articles</p></li><li><p>Appendix A: Prayer, Miracles, and the Natural Order &#8212; 3 articles</p></li><li><p>Appendix B: Papal Authority, Obedience, and Catholicity &#8212; 4 articles</p></li><li><p>Appendix C: Holy Orders and the Minister of Ordination &#8212; 6 articles</p></li><li><p>Appendix D: Marriage and the Religious State &#8212; 3 articles</p></li><li><p>Appendix E: Catholic Unity, Christian Liberty, and Religious Truth &#8212; 4 articles</p></li><li><p>Appendix F: Indulgences and Forbidden Books &#8212; 2 articles</p></li><li><p>Appendix G: Religion, Patriotism, and Public Life &#8212; 3 articles</p></li></ol><p>Once a human review of each batch is complete, I will publish the collections for the general public. Until then, I am releasing them one post at a time for my Substack members and Patrons. If you want to read Fr. Mar&#237;n-Sola on Luther, Calvin, and the Church of England before anyone else does, this is the place to do it.</p><p>While I will eventually publish each of these together for the general public, for now, while the human overview process is under way, I am going to post these for my Substack members and Patrons. </p><p>If you are not yet a member, here is a 30-day free trial to read these articles for the next month:</p><p class="button-wrapper" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://thomism.com/subscribe?coupon=38ae34f1&amp;utm_content=220280197&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Get 30 day free trial&quot;,&quot;action&quot;:null,&quot;class&quot;:null}" data-component-name="ButtonCreateButton"><a class="button primary" href="https://thomism.com/subscribe?coupon=38ae34f1&amp;utm_content=220280197"><span>Get 30 day free trial</span></a></p>
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   ]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[How Catholic Apologetics RUINED Purgatory]]></title><description><![CDATA[On Purgatorial Punishments]]></description><link>https://thomism.com/p/how-catholic-apologetics-ruined-purgatory</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://thomism.com/p/how-catholic-apologetics-ruined-purgatory</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Christian B. Wagner]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 28 Oct 2026 00:23:20 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/e12c783e-1066-4065-82e1-ef620f035767_1456x1048.jpeg" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em><strong>A note for the reader.</strong></em> While I have been writing my series on Penal Substitution (<a href="https://open.substack.com/pub/scholasticanswers/p/penal-substitution-a-catholic-dogma?r=dgylx&amp;utm_campaign=post-expanded-share&amp;utm_medium=post%20viewer">first article</a>, <a href="https://thomism.com/p/how-penal-substitution-refutes-protestantism">second article</a>), I realized that many of the qualifications I gave and would continue to apply to that topic fall on deaf ears due to common errors vis-a-vis purgatory. Therefore, I thought that it would be helpful to make a few points of correction on this exact point. If you would like to follow along on future articles, please consider subscribing for free below!</p><p class="button-wrapper" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://thomism.com/subscribe?&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Subscribe now&quot;,&quot;action&quot;:null,&quot;class&quot;:null}" data-component-name="ButtonCreateButton"><a class="button primary" href="https://thomism.com/subscribe?"><span>Subscribe now</span></a></p><div><hr></div><h2><strong>Introduction</strong></h2><p>For many Protestants, one of the most difficult Catholic dogmas to accept is purgatory. They object to the claim that someone whose sins have been forgiven may still owe temporal punishment, and that this punishment must be discharged before he enters heaven. A familiar apologetic argument attempts to get around that objection. The apologist asks whether everyone who dies in God&#8217;s friendship is already completely sanctified. The Protestant says no. He then asks whether anyone in heaven is imperfectly sanctified. The Protestant again says no. There must, therefore, be a change by which the person becomes perfectly fit for heaven. The apologist triumphantly announces that the Protestant has conceded purgatory and needs only to accept the name.</p><p>In reality, he has conceded no such thing, for a number of different reasons. First, what is essential and fundamental to purgatory is that a person who owes temporal punishment after death is punished in proportion to this debt. If someone were to concede &#8220;purgatory&#8221; and deny such a punishment, he would not concede the Catholic dogma. Second, the conclusion assumes an imperfect enumeration of the cases. No argument can be made that necessarily ties the sanctification of a person to post-mortem purgatorial punishments. In fact, when Catholic authors specifically treat questions related to purging the disorder with which we die and the acquisition of necessary virtues, very few of them even explain these by the mechanism of purgatory or purgatorial punishments. Indeed, in certain cases, it is actually impossible to distinguish traditional Protestant accounts of this mechanism from the accounts given by certain Catholic authors.</p><p>Many Catholic authors explain the extinction of all vicious inclinations by an act of contrition immediately following upon death. Clearly, a Protestant could affirm that such an act of contrition occurs at the particular judgment without admitting the need for purgatorial punishments of any kind (since he denies that the debt or reatus of temporal punishment continues after death). Other Catholic authors explain the complete bestowal of virtues as an effect of beatitude that occurs upon one&#8217;s entrance into heaven, which clearly does not require the admission of purgatory.</p><p>Further, this line of argumentation, if it were in any way legitimate, would provide serious difficulties for Catholics as well. Consider the cases of the baptized and of martyrs. As the Council of Florence dogmatically teaches, the entire debt of punishment is remitted for the baptized. Now, let us say we have a case in which a newly baptized adult dies immediately, before committing any other sin. This individual, who likely has certain habitual vices and a lack of growth in many virtues, will immediately go to heaven and not to purgatory. If we are to prove the necessity of purgatory from these habitual vices and this lack of growth in the virtues rather than from the debt or reatus of temporal punishment, then we would have to admit that the newly baptized would need to be purified in purgatory. The same can be drawn from the common doctrine concerning the case of martyrs, who are also said to have the entire temporal debt forgiven, yet can continue to have these indispositions and imperfect virtues. The same point is made by Su&#225;rez in relation to plenary indulgences, which do not require a complete lack of moral indispositions or a perfection of virtues, yet remove all impediments to an immediate entrance into heaven.</p><p>This point vis-&#224;-vis martyrs and the newly baptized is made by St. Robert Bellarmine (hardly a Protestant sympathizer):</p><blockquote><p>Nevertheless, we do not posit Purgatory on account of habits of this kind either. For otherwise it would follow that adults who are baptized after acquiring many bad habits and immediately die, or indeed are killed for Christ, could not be saved except through Purgatory, because neither Baptism nor martyrdom dissolves such habits. For we see that baptized people still have the same bad propensities they had before, and that they must gradually remove such habits by contrary acts. (De purgatorio II.9)</p></blockquote><p>Su&#225;rez gives an analogous example which shows the fallaciousness of this reasoning. Ignorance is the privation of knowledge. Now, just as in heaven there will be no imperfection of virtue, so also will there be no imperfection of knowledge. Yet we die with various ignorances. Nevertheless, we are not able to conclude from this fact that all souls who die ignorant must go through a temporary schooling before ascending to heaven. There can obviously be an immediate infusion of knowledge upon death without positing some &#8220;educational state&#8221; to remedy our ignorance. This should be obvious from a consideration of the matter:</p><blockquote><p>Objection: To obtain beatitude it is not enough to be free from every fault and liability to punishment; one must also be free from bad habits and inclinations.</p><p>Reply: I answer that there is no need to imagine any detention on this account. For whatever of this kind is in the sensitive appetite is laid aside in death itself, together with the body in which the appetite exists. Habits existing in the will, however, are either removed at the very instant of death, through contrary acts produced by divine power or through the withdrawal of the conserving divine influx; or else, at the first entry into glory, by reason of that state all virtues, even natural virtues, are infused in an accidental manner (per accidens), and these expel the incompatible habits, just as general kinds of knowledge also are infused, which expel all ignorance. (De poenitentia XLVII.I.5)</p></blockquote><p>Unfortunately, while this is clear from a study of Catholic theologians, apologists have ruined the notion of such things in the popular mind. Therefore, in this article, I want to treat the various positions taken by Catholic theologians on such questions, discovering the specific mechanisms that they set forward, in an effort to clarify better what is essential in the dogma of purgatory and what the state of the question is in our disputes with Protestants.</p><p>In order to treat this question properly, I will divide my treatment into two parts: first, concerning the guilt of venial sins; second, concerning the habits of the virtues.</p><h2><strong>On Guilt and Punishment</strong></h2><h3><strong>What remains after a sin</strong></h3><p>Sources: St. Thomas, Summa III.86&#8211;87 and De malo 7.11; Bellarmine, De purgatorio II.9; Durandus, IV.21.1; Peter of Palude, IV.21.1.2; Gabriel Biel, IV.16.5.I; Mastri, Disputationes theologicae V.IX.IV&#8211;V.</p><p>When a man sins, the act has a beginning and an end; the act does not continue forever. Yet, when we consider the act of sin, we realize that there are remnants of this sin that continue on. A man who sins may be punished, or he may be forgiven, or he may be corrected. Each of these notions supposes a continuing remnant of sin beyond the act. Yet the questions that arise as to the continuation of each of these aspects are different. While certain Catholic theologians have identified in reality one or more of these remnants (especially Scotists and Nominalists), the point remains that these are at least distinct as to concept. Yet this is something that must in some sense and to some degree be affirmed as existing in reality as well. For example, a man may sincerely repent of a fault while retaining a bad habit. If we use &#8220;stain&#8221; or &#8220;remnant&#8221; for each of these without distinguishing what we mean, we can make different doctrines appear identical.</p><p>In the Thomistic account (to which I adhere), mortal guilt involves the privation of sanctifying grace and the will&#8217;s aversion from its last end. Its remission restores the person to God&#8217;s friendship by the infusion of sanctifying grace (since a form removes its privation). On the other hand, venial sin does not destroy that friendship. Further, we are aware that there is also a punishment due to both mortal and venial sin. The punishment due to mortal sin is commuted to temporal punishment when sanctifying grace comes, while the punishment due to venial sin is of itself only temporal. On this earth, God has graciously appointed means for removing this obligation to punishment, especially satisfaction, which continues as long as we are able to merit. God graciously accepts these small afflictions, compared to what we owe, and allows us to merit by these voluntary afflictions done in charity. Yet after this life there will no longer be &#8220;satisfaction,&#8221; by which we can merit an increase of beatitude, but only &#8220;satispassion,&#8221; in which we will suffer the punishment due to our sins.</p><p>To clarify a few technical terms that are commonly used by Catholic theologians: by culpa I mean guilt or fault; by reatus poenae, the liability or obligation to punishment. By reliquiae peccati I mean the remnants of sin, a wider expression that may include an unpaid debt, an unforgiven venial fault, a bad habit in the will, or an inclination connected with the body. Macula, the stain, does not have one undisputed analysis in every school, which is further complicated by the conflicting accounts of whether there is even such a thing as macula in the case of venial sin. Therefore, it is better for us to speak in terms of culpa when referring to venial sins. This culpa is understood in one of two ways. First, some theologians consider venial culpa as a disorder that remains in the justified man, to be retracted by a contrary act of the will. Second, other theologians consider venial culpa as simply the obligation to pay the debt of temporal punishment. This is important to clarify, since it is possible to interpret certain authors who identify the payment of the punishment in purgatory with the remission of venial culpa as saying the exact opposite of what they are actually saying (i.e., that the payment of the debt is to be taken &#8220;morally,&#8221; when in reality they mean that culpa is to be taken &#8220;punitively&#8221;).</p><p>Biel gives the latter account in plain terms. He reports two opinions and calls this first one the more intelligible:</p><blockquote><p>The first is that the remission of venial guilt is nothing other than the payment of the temporal punishment due for it. Proof: what remains after the passing act of venial sin is nothing but liability to the punishment due. But that liability is only to temporal punishment. Consequently, by the very fact that temporal punishment is paid, here or in purgatory, venial guilt is forgiven. (IV.16.5.I)</p></blockquote><p>I would like to emphasize that this is not the same as the modern claim that &#8220;punishment&#8221; is simply a medicinal and morally corrective act and that the &#8220;debt of punishment&#8221; is a moral disorder (dissolved as soon as moral correction takes place). Such a notion was completely unknown to the medieval theologians who intricately disputed over this question of the constitutive of culpa. To read a notion akin to that of modern Western liberal jurists back into the scholastics is criminally negligent. In reality, the position taken by certain medieval theologians tended in the opposite direction.</p><p>If I may go on an aside, the entire absurdity of reading this notion back into the scholastics is verified by the asking of the question in the first place. If they had identified the &#8220;debt of punishment&#8221; with a simply moral disorder and &#8220;punishment&#8221; with a medicinal remedy, asking whether purgatory removes the culpa of venial sin would be an absurd question, since to remove the reatus of temporal punishment would be to remove the culpa. The same goes for the concept of indulgences, which supposes the remission of culpa with the continuation of the reatus poenae. We see that they were so far from such a ridiculous notion that the only ones who identified the concepts were the aforementioned theologians who completely denied that culpa was a disorder within us, simply identifying it with the obligation to undergo the entire temporal punishment. Those theologians who affirmed that culpa is a disorder within us rejected such a view and explained its removal in a distinct way (mostly as an instantaneous effect of an act of contrition). How much further could these modern theologians stand from any continuity with these generations of theologians? Their resolution of the matter is absent from these authors, and where anything like it appears, it appears in the opposite sense, denying any &#8220;medicinal&#8221; or &#8220;sanctifying&#8221; aspect to the removal of culpa.</p><h3><strong>Merit and Satisfaction After Death</strong></h3><p>Sources: St. Thomas, IV.21.1.3 and De malo 7.11; Capreolus, IV.21.1; Soto, IV.15.2.2; Su&#225;rez, De poenitentia XLVII.II; Tanner, Universa theologia scholastica IV.VI.IV.V; Mastri, V.IX.V.</p><p>Another point that was mentioned above concerns &#8220;merit&#8221; and &#8220;satisfaction.&#8221; It is a common axiom among theologians that death ends the wayfarer&#8217;s capacity to perform new meritorious (or demeritorious) acts; by extension, this same axiom is applied to satisfaction. Therefore, an obvious difficulty arose, which was the occasion for asking the question concerning venial culpa in the first place. If no merit or satisfaction can be performed, but only the suffering of punishment (whether temporal or eternal) or the gathering of reward, how can we consistently affirm that venial culpa is remitted after death?</p><p>As we will see below, this vexing problem is what led some theologians simply to reject that venial culpa is remitted after death. Certain authors held that a final grace at the moment of death removed venial culpa, so as to avoid placing the remission after death. Others held that a refusal to repent of venial culpa was a mortal fault! The aforementioned theologians who simply reduced culpa to the reatus poenae found their most significant point of defense in accusing the other accounts of inconsistency on this point, at times claiming that they refuse satisfaction after death yet practically reduce to the same.</p><p>To avoid this implication about merit after death, a number of solutions were given. First, some argued that this must be an effect of merit (since they defined merit as any benefit connected to a previous act); therefore, they held that it was an effect of merit from this life rather than something having any relation to acts after death. Second, others made a distinction as to merit itself; they rejected the notion that the axiom was meant to reject every connection between acts and benefits after death, holding only that there is no essential increase in reward after death. Therefore, they explained the removal of venial culpa as an effect of contrition, as an act naturally incompatible with venial culpa which removes a certain impediment to the remission of venial culpa. Some referred to this as &#8220;accidental merit.&#8221; Even St. Thomas states that &#8220;after this life there cannot be merit with respect to the essential reward; but with respect to some accidental reward there can be, as long as a person remains in some way in the wayfarer&#8217;s state.&#8221; (IV.21.1.3, ad 4) Yet this terminology was uncommon and is better rejected (although it can be explained in a good sense). St. Thomas makes the classical statement of the matter in his De malo:</p><blockquote><p>To the second it must be said that in the future life there is no essential change of the will, namely, as regards the end, or as regards charity or grace; nevertheless, there can be some accidental change through the removal of an impediment. For what removes a hindrance is a mover accidentally, as is said in Book 8 of the Physics. (De malo 7.11, ad 2)</p><p>It must be said that remission of venial guilt does not bring about spiritual progress of itself, namely, as regards an increase of spiritual good, but only accidentally, namely, as regards the removal of an impediment. (Ibid., ad 5)</p></blockquote><p>The same is expressed by St. Bonaventure, who writes that the soul &#8220;is in a state in which it can be disposed for entrance into glory through the removal of an impediment, although it cannot merit.&#8221; (IV.21.I.II.1)</p><p>Further, the term &#8220;satisfaction&#8221; was commonly rejected (although used in a broad sense), and in its place satispassio was used. &#8220;Satisfaction&#8221; refers to a voluntary work done in payment of a debt, which occurs in this life. Satispassio refers to the suffering or payment of the punishment owed. Whether this satispassio was at all involved in the remission of venial culpa was hotly disputed. For the authors who took culpa as the obligation to the full payment of the reatus poenae, the answer is quite obvious; in such a case, satispassio is simply the removal of culpa, since culpa is just the obligation to pay the full penalty. Most other authors found no connection whatsoever, placing the remission of culpa immediately after death, whether in virtue of our merit on earth or in virtue of an act of contrition immediately elicited after death. Yet there was a group that held to a certain indirect connection. While they refused to collapse the notions of culpa and reatus poenae, they held that satispassio indirectly achieves the remission of culpa insofar as the fire acts quasi-sacramentally as an instrument of God in order to induce the holy souls to make acts of contrition, which remit the venial culpa.</p><p>With these distinctions, we are able to consider what essentially differs in each theory and which details merely concern the accidental details of the system. Since the question here concerns the culpa of venial sin, the essential question is how the culpa of venial sin is removed. There are ultimately four answers to this, although I will treat them below under five headings, since the third admits of two accidentally different forms. First, some hold that venial culpa is removed at the end of this mortal life by a final grace. Second, others hold that the remission of venial culpa occurs in virtue of our merits on earth. Third, others hold that the remission of venial culpa occurs in virtue of a non-meritorious act of contrition, whether immediately after death or mediately by the infliction of punishment (the third and fourth accounts below). Fourth, others hold that there is no distinct remission of venial culpa, due to the identity between the full payment of the reatus poenae and culpa (the fifth account below).</p><p>Before we begin, it is important to note that the second position can be taken in two senses. For nearly every position holds (in a way) that the remission of venial culpa happens in virtue of our merits on earth. Yet the other positions hold that the earthly merit operates through some distinct medium, i.e., it merits the final grace at the moment of death, the charity that issues forth in contrition, etc. The second position properly holds that the merit immediately removes the venial culpa. Therefore, there are many authors who speak of &#8220;merit&#8221; yet do not hold to the second position.</p><p>Further, it is also important to note that there are two distinct positions under the third, which differ only accidentally and whose authors often call each other&#8217;s view probable. It matters very little whether we hold that the first act or the last act is that contrition which removes venial culpa, since the medium is identical in each. Those holding to the immediate view give very many arguments from fittingness in order to establish that their view is the more probable, while those holding the non-immediate view argue that their view is more in conformity with the teaching of various Fathers and recent statements of the magisterium. Yet the demonstrative theological arguments given by each side do not differentiate the positions, but merely prove that contrition is that medium.</p><h3><strong>Lombard&#8217;s Position</strong></h3><p>Before we begin, I would like to make a few notes of importance on Lombard&#8217;s position on this matter, since he sets the stage for the later medieval positions that become the classical articulations of this doctrine. It should be noted first that Lombard does not stand to the medievals in the way that St. Thomas stands to the later scholastic tradition. Lombard&#8217;s discussions were seen primarily as an occasional discussion setting the state of the question, rather than as an authoritative account from which one should depart only begrudgingly.</p><p>His locus classicus on this matter occurs in Book 4, Distinction 21 of his Sentences, which is where the later scholastics comment on this same issue. The question on which Lombard gives a determination is whether venial culpa exists after this life. It was indisputable that poena can exist after this life, to be inflicted upon us by purgatorial punishments, but it was not as clear to the scholastics that any culpa existed after this life to be purified. Therefore, the question needed to be posed. As we will see, certain authors, considering the lack of merit after death, thought that culpa (both venial and mortal) had to be remitted before death. Yet Lombard takes the opposite position, holding that both culpa and the reatus poenae can be remitted after death.</p><p>The idea of venial culpa is usually described simply as &#8220;venial sin&#8221; among authors of this era. While this may seem confusing, there is a reason for it. When we look at the reatus paid in purgatory, it is NOT simply the reatus of venial sin or the reatus of mortal sin, but the reatus of temporal punishment, whether this temporal punishment is due to remitted mortal sin, remitted venial sin, or non-remitted venial sin. Therefore, it is inaccurate to label the reatus as &#8220;venial,&#8221; but it is accurate to label the culpa as &#8220;venial,&#8221; since mortal culpa is ALWAYS remitted in the just (which is not the case with the other categories).</p><p>He adheres to the following conclusion: &#8220;Here it is plainly indicated that those who build with wood, hay, and straw carry with them certain combustible structures, that is, venial sins, which are burned up in the corrective fire. Hence it is established that certain venial sins are effaced after this life.&#8221; (IV.21.2&#8211;6)</p><p>How should we classify Lombard? His account is naturally compared with the fourth account, in which fire assists the removal of what remains, yet it is not as developed as later versions of it.</p><h3><strong>First account: a final grace removes venial guilt at the end of life</strong></h3><p>Sources: Summa Halensis IV.15.3.3&#8211;4, &#167;2; Alexander of Hales, De iudicio; Glossa on IV.21; St. Albert the Great, Summa II.XVIII.114.4.5; St. Bonaventure, IV.21.I.II.1; V&#225;squez, In III.87.1.II; Su&#225;rez, De poenitentia XI.IV; Gonet, De poenitentia IV.IV.</p><p>The first account takes the easiest approach to solving this problem. If we cannot merit or satisfy after death, then we should explain the removal of venial culpa as occurring in virtue of some final grace, whether during or immediately after death. While the option of &#8220;immediately after&#8221; may be confusing, seemingly akin to the account that places it immediately after death in virtue of an act of contrition, there is a stark difference. For this view, the already present grace is what removes venial culpa, rather than a distinct act of contrition (i.e., the third account). It argues that grace is already present, yet the concupiscence and disorder of the flesh prevent the full dominion of grace; therefore, when the body is put off, grace takes full dominion, and venial culpa is consequently expelled.</p><p>Many theologians reject this solution insofar as it places the remission of venial culpa at the last instant of our earthly lives, since such could not occur simultaneously with death. An example of this can be found in St. Bonaventure&#8217;s account of the matter (which is almost identical to the account given in the Summa Halensis):</p><blockquote><p>It must be said that some masters, who understood these matters well, held the opinion that no sin is forgiven after death, because the exercise of free choice with respect to merit or demerit ceases altogether. Hence they say that venial sins are entirely forgiven either through penance or through final grace, if there is no opportunity for penance&#8212;for example, if a just man dies overtaken by death. For when the soul is separated from the flesh, the propensities and disturbances that were in the soul from the flesh withdraw, and the powers of the soul become tranquil and subject to grace. In this way venial sins are wiped away, whether they are in the rational part of the soul or in its sensitive part. Thus no venial sin is forgiven after this life, but at that point at which one can say: this is final grace, which claims dominion for itself and expels every fault. (IV.21.I.II.1)</p></blockquote><p>There are a number of different arguments given by the supporters of this position, although its strongest claim is that it does not require an affirmation of merit after death, since the final grace that eliminates venial culpa is merely a continuation after death of what was already present before death. This position is strong (in my opinion, much stronger than most other accounts) insofar as it seems that sanctifying grace is sufficient (when not impeded) to completely sanctify the soul from all of its indispositions, including venial culpa.</p><p>Yet the position cannot be held, for a simple reason. The mere lack of the fomes peccati in the casting off of the body does not lead to the consummation and full actualization of the effects of sanctifying grace. While it is certainly true that such a full flowering of sanctifying grace would remove the venial culpa, it is false that such occurs in us before the beatific vision. Lastly, venial culpa is founded in its opposition to actually tending to God, just as mortal culpa is founded in its opposition to habitually tending to God. Therefore, just as mortal culpa is extinguished by the infusion of a certain habit (i.e., sanctifying grace), so also is venial culpa extinguished by a certain contrary act (i.e., contrition). As Gonet points out:</p><blockquote><p>This account lacks probability and is refuted by the fact that grace not yet consummated through the beatific vision, such as that with which a person dies at the first instant of the soul&#8217;s separation, is not incompatible with or opposed to venial sin; otherwise even in the present life it would not allow it to coexist with itself. For being at the first instant of the soul&#8217;s separation, or being the final grace of this life, adds nothing to grace outside the state of beatitude except conjunction with death, which certainly is not a remedy against venial sin. Therefore this remission does not take place through the habit of grace alone, but through some act of it. (De poenitentia IV.IV.83)</p></blockquote><p>This critique was not lost on its author, who draws a horrific conclusion: that actual contrition must be united to the final grace removing the fomes. Therefore, the individual who dies while persevering in a venial sin without contrition for it will have this venial culpa turned into mortal culpa, leading to the damnation of the man dying in venial sin:</p><blockquote><p>Next it is asked whether grace alone suffices for the erasure of venial sin, namely grace without interior penance or contrition.</p><p>I answer: it must be said, without prejudice, that because venial sins are in some way voluntary, they are not erased without a movement of the will, actually and habitually wishing not to have done them, or grieving for the venial sins committed, either generally or particularly... To make this clear, it must be understood that there are three kinds of sin: original sin, actual mortal sin, and venial sin... The third, however, which is voluntary in some way, is erased when free choice consents to grace and dissents from sin, or wishes not to have sinned...</p><p>But if an objection is made concerning a just person who has some venial sin together with charity and dies while sleeping, as mentioned above, it can be said that, when he fell asleep, he either repented of the venial sin specifically or generally, and did so actually or habitually, or in purpose, or he did not. If he did, that venial sin is erased by final grace. If he did not repent actually or habitually, or in purpose, specifically or generally, but remained in an actual or habitual will to persist in it without a purpose of repenting, it has already become mortal through complacency, in the way Augustine says that no sin is so venial, etc. For that lust, I believe, is mortal which brings about so much complacency that a person wills to remain in it without the purpose and will of repenting. (IV.15.3.4)</p></blockquote><p>V&#225;squez (In III.87.1.II) argues that those authors who represent this view as holding that the remission occurs before or during death interpret Alexander of Hales (its main exponent) wrongly. The exponents of this first position teach that this remission is the result of final grace immediately after death, not that it results before or during death. When &#8220;before&#8221; is used, it indicates when the grace is given, and when &#8220;during&#8221; is used, it is meant to express the immediacy with which this remission follows death. Therefore, refutations based on timing are not persuasive, both insofar as they seem to misinterpret the author, and insofar as they critique this view on the basis of an accidental detail in the exposition.</p><p>Beyond this, Alexander of Hales seems to have a more subtle view than has been imputed to him in previous generations. For Alexander, there seems to be a distinction between actual culpa, which consists in actual complacency in a slight pleasure, and the habitual disorder that involves the habitual complacency in creatures (which is described not as culpa, as in later authors, but as &#8220;something following upon culpa&#8221;). The former is described as &#8220;culpable impurity,&#8221; while the latter is described as &#8220;penal impurity.&#8221; When he speaks of the dominion of grace removing the fomes, joined with actual contrition for these sins, he seems to be shutting off the actual culpa, whose occasion is the fomes and whose form is actual complacency. Then, when describing the removal of the habitual complacency in creatures, he actually does concede that this occurs through the punishments of purgatory, which is closer to the fourth account taken by other authors of the 13th century. He writes the following in his De iudicio:</p><blockquote><p>Grace is opposed without qualification to fault insofar as it is fault; therefore grace removes venial and mortal fault. It does so either in the present or in the future. But it does not do so in the future, since justification from fault pertains to merit. Hence this justification comes from merit through grace. But grace merits only insofar as it informs free choice in the present. Merit, therefore, exists only in the present. Thus faults are not removed by grace in the future, but in the present. Therefore all fault is removed in the present and none in the future. Consequently that purification through fire after death is not purification of fault.</p><p>That purification, therefore, is from something which follows upon fault. It is therefore asked: from what? For what follows upon fault is liability to punishment, or punishment itself, or some consequence of fault. But punishment, as such, is not opposed to punishment. Therefore punishment is not removed through punishment, and thus there is no purification from punishment there. Likewise, liability to punishment is not purified there, since what is to be removed through purifying punishment must be an impurity. But no impurity remains in a soul departing in charity, since the soul&#8217;s impurity comes from mortal or venial fault, and it has been established that justification from any fault whatever takes place through grace in the present. Therefore none remains in the soul after death, provided it departed in charity. Thus no liability or anything of that kind is purified in it after death. If it is said that some consequent effect, a consequence of fault, is purified, it has impurity by its nature....</p><p>When, therefore, it is asked what properly undergoes purification, it must be said that there is purification from the liability itself which follows upon fault. And if it is objected that purification is always of something impure, whereas there is no impurity once fault is removed, it must be said that there is the impurity of fault, or culpable impurity, and this is removed through grace in the present. But there is another impurity, a penal impurity, namely, one following from the former; this remains in the soul after the first has been removed. This impurity is the inability to see God on the part of the intellect, and the inability to turn fully toward God on the part of the affective power, whose turning toward God is through the affection of love. This impurity, therefore, is removed there. Hence it must be said that penal impurity remains in the soul, in intellect and affective power; it is removed by that fire as something combustible before the judgment, and it is a habitual delight which the soul has contracted from delight in earthly things. This is the fire&#8217;s fuel: although actual delight is removed through grace, nevertheless a certain disposition or impurity still remains in the soul from its failure to turn toward God. Hence it is still not as that soul which turned wholly toward God in this life. This impurity is removed, and with it the liability to punishment with which the soul passes over. And to state the same thing more clearly: the materiality already spoken of is itself removed, and it is itself the disposition according to which the soul receives suffering from the fire. For when I say materiality, I say two things, namely, a certain impurity and suffering. Passibility itself, then, is the disposition in the soul to receive passibility from the fire. The impurity itself, however, is what is removed and what is combustible by fire, and what is called the fire&#8217;s fuel; together with it liability, or obligation to punishment, is removed. Therefore Augustine says in The City of God that &#8220;grief must burn as much as love had clung.&#8221; Hence, just as temporal delight had proceeded from this temporal good, so temporal sadness and affliction proceed from that fire.</p></blockquote><p>It is to be noted that practically no author (to my knowledge) after Alexander of Hales holds this position except St. Albert the Great in his Summa II.XVIII.114.4.5. It is also said that William of Auxerre and Praepositinus hold to the same account, but I have not verified this claim. Su&#225;rez claims that John Mair (d. 1550) teaches this, but I have not been able to confirm this attribution, and his text seems to teach a different position (although, as with St. Albert and many others, authors change positions on such issues).</p><p>Unfortunately, I have not been able to obtain the other works of Alexander that possibly discuss this question, i.e., the Quaestiones disputatae de peccato veniali et de conscientia and the Quaestiones disputatae de novissimis. It seems that this description from Alexander can shed light on the scope of the medieval dispute. Alexander&#8217;s position was rightly censured for his insistence that actual culpa be removed by a final grace, yet he seems to approach the other accounts when pressed on the topic of penal impurity, allowing for it to be removed after this life (even gradually!). Another point of difficulty concerns the authorship of the Summa Halensis, where the most controversial statements about the final grace occur. When we read his Glossa on the Sentences, he speaks more in conformity with the De iudicio and seems to speak contrary to the positions imputed to him in the Summa Halensis.</p><p>Ultimately, due to the lack of clarity and the mutually contradictory accounts (not all of which I have presented to you, since this does not enter into the scope of this article), we can be glad to proceed to read the clearer accounts of others, who write with a more developed and uniform terminology, in debates whose terms have already been set.</p><h3><strong>Second account: God remits guilt in view of merits acquired during life</strong></h3><p>Sources: Bl. Scotus, IV.21.1; Mastri, Disputationes theologicae V.IX.IV&#8211;V; Brancati, IV.II.XV.XIII; Fabri, Disputationes theologicae XLII; Almain, IV.21.1; Bl. Denys, IV.21.1; Su&#225;rez, De poenitentia XI.IV.</p><p>The second account avoids the problem of merit after death by conceding that venial culpa is removed by meritorious acts, but denying that such meritorious acts occur after death: they are the meritorious acts of this life. These authors argue that meritorious acts may be performed at a different time from their effects. Therefore, it is reasonable that meritorious acts of this life may effect the remission of venial culpa after death. Bl. Scotus provides two ways of explaining this. First, it may happen that an obstacle was present which prevented the effect from occurring during this life (e.g., actual complacency in a venial fault). Second, it may happen that God reserved the effect of the meritorious acts until after death.</p><p>For the understanding of this account, two things must be noted. First, Bl. Scotus and the Scotists do not posit that this is the view; rather, they simply hold that this is a probable view that can be defended (especially on the supposition that the full payment of the reatus poenae is not the same as culpa). Second, this view is not unique in invoking the merits of this life; rather, it is unique simply in positing these as immediately achieving the effect, rather than through the medium of some other merited gift.</p><p>Bl. Scotus argues here on the supposition that the culpa of venial sin must be opposed by some act. With this in mind, he concedes the principle and then argues that the act does truly remove the culpa of venial sin, yet not at the time it is performed, but in a delayed manner, once the act of venial sin ceases immediately after death:</p><blockquote><p>Although the works of one dying in charity are not referred by him after death to the remission of the venial sin in which he dies, nor does he have any new meritorious act through which the venial sin is erased, nevertheless those works previously done can be referred by God to remission of this venial sin after death. It occurs in this way: a cause capable of being impeded does not produce its effect while impeded, but produces it when not impeded. Yet the merits of this person dying in charity would be a sufficient cause of the erasure of his venial sins, either referred by him or accepted by God in relation to this. They are impeded while he lives if he always remains actually in venial sin; but after death they are not impeded, because he then does not commit an act of venial sin. Therefore through them venial sins will be erased after this life. (IV.21.1.8)</p></blockquote><p>On the point of timing, however, it is to be noted that Bl. Scotus and the Scotists are a bit loose in their descriptions. Ordinarily, they speak of such a remission occurring &#8220;at the instant of death&#8221; (ibid., n. 9), but they will also speak of both &#8220;after death or at the instant of death&#8221; (Frassen II.III). One of the reasons why they speak of such occurring &#8220;at the instant of death&#8221; is to avoid certain inconveniences that may follow from holding that it must occur after death. Therefore, Brancati gives the following example:</p><blockquote><p>If a martyr, for example, should die while taking complacency in some venial sin up to the instant of death, he would certainly ascend to heaven, and the venial sin would be remitted neither after death nor before it; therefore, at the instant of death... for nothing prevents a just person, however holy, from persisting with venial sin up to the instant of death, unless by a special privilege of God he is immune even from venial sin. A martyr could, however, expose himself to death with fervent charity and a desire for martyrdom, and meanwhile sin venially and suddenly be killed. Then the remission of the venial sin would take place neither in purgatory nor before death; therefore, at death. (IV.II.XV.XIII.504&#8211;505)</p></blockquote><p>This instance matters for the same reason we explained in the introduction. In cases where we have individuals who &#8220;skip&#8221; purgatory due to their lack of reatus (whether by baptism, martyrdom, or indulgence) while possessing venial culpa, we have to account for the removal of their culpa without any appeal to purgatory, whether temporally or causally. The Scotists therefore hold that death itself is the penitential operation that removes the venial culpa. This is possible due to the character of meritorious causality, which is able to bring about its effect at some moment other than when it is performed.</p><p>In response to the second account, various objections have been brought forward by the supporters of the other opinions. Jacques Almain (d. 1515) objected that this account does not adequately consider the case of a man who dies without any meritorious works. In the case of a man who is baptized and then sins venially continuously until death without any meritorious works, such a man is not healed in virtue of his meritorious acts, since he has none. In response to this, it may be replied that the removal of culpa takes place in virtue of the merits of Christ rather than the personal merits of the individual. Yet this supposes that meritorious acts can merit the forgiveness of a future fault without the mediation of an act retracting this fault. While a meritorious act can immediately merit an essential reward, it can hardly be assumed that it can immediately merit the forgiveness of a fault. With this consideration, the Scotistic position appears ad hoc and hardly able to stand when considered in light of the fact that present works may merit future rewards, but they never merit the forgiveness of future faults.</p><p>Besides this, the Scotistic position places the removal of culpa in the genus of acts wrongly and superficially. Since venial culpa is placed in the man as a certain actual disorder, the reason why the act of contrition expels venial culpa is the formal opposition that stands between the motion of the will and the actual disorder; therefore, it is not sufficient simply to indicate some relation to an act; rather, the act must be considered terminatively, in the very motion that formally opposes the actual disorder. This appears quite starkly in the case of a man who dies with actual complacency in a venial fault, which cannot be formally opposed except by a certain motion retracting such complacency, rather than by the simple application of merits. Therefore, the meritorious act before death must be considered terminatively and with a motion that is formally opposed to the actual disorder, which is simply to teach that the act of contrition is infused into the soul of the departed in virtue of the meritorious acts of this life&#8212;which is the Thomistic position. Or, if it is simply considered in itself and not as it terminates in some motion of contrition in the believer, then it is false to say that it formally opposes venial culpa, which will still remain.</p><h3><strong>Third account: an act of charity retracts the fault before paying its punishment</strong></h3><p>Sources: St. Thomas, De malo 7.11; Su&#225;rez, De poenitentia XI.IV; Lugo, De poenitentia IX.II.34&#8211;42; V&#225;squez, In III.87.1.II; Coninck, De poenitentia II.XVII; Tanner, Universa theologia scholastica IV.VI.IV.V; Reding, Theologia scholastica VII.IVII.IV; Mezger, Theologia scholastica IV.XVIII.XL.I.IV; Henriquez, Summa theologiae moralis IV.15.9; Salmanticenses, In III.87.4.6&#8211;12; Sylvius, In III.87.1.I&#8211;II; Gonet, De poenitentia IV.IV; Hugon, De novissimis IV.III.VI; Hurter, Compendium III.826.9; Pesch, Praelectiones IX.598; Zubizarreta, Theologia IV.788&#8211;790; L&#233;picier, De novissimis V.III; Palmieri, De novissimis 22; Sag&#252;&#233;s, Sacrae Theologiae Summa IV.250; Durandus, IV.21.1; Peter of Palude, IV.21.1.2; Almain, IV.21.1; Capreolus, IV.21.1; Gotti, Supplementum III.I.42&#8211;44; Doronzo, De poenitentia, art. 62; Billuart, De peccatis VII.IV.II; Contenson, Theologia mentis et cordis XI.III.I.</p><p>As mentioned above, this position and the next differ in an accidental mode. Both positions hold that venial culpa is remitted in the same manner as in life (i.e., by a motion of charity), yet the third account holds that this is performed by a single act of charity immediately elicited after death, while the fourth account holds that this is performed by multiple acts of charity, with the purgatorial punishments concurring. Yet even these differences are simply common rather than proper to the positions. If one denies the instrumentality of the purgatorial punishments in the remission of venial culpa, it is possible to hold that the requisite contrition occurs immediately, or in a number of acts, or even after all of the punishments are completed. Further, if one holds to the instrumentality of the purgatorial punishments in the remission of venial culpa, it is equally possible to do something similar, holding that such occurs immediately upon the apprehension of the punishments (which St. Thomas denies), or gradually in the process of suffering the purgatorial punishments, or even at the end, once the purgatorial punishments have been paid. These are tertiary differences.</p><p>Personally, the account that I find the most convincing (which is the position of St. Thomas and the Thomists) is that the act of contrition is made immediately upon entrance into purgatory. I also prefer to explain this in relation to the particular judgment, as an act of contrition proceeding from charity, retracting each of the sins for which he will be punished and accepting this punishment for the removal of the reatus of temporal punishment. I do not dare, however, to claim anything beyond fittingness and probability.</p><p>These positions hold that the axiom concerning merit is to be taken as referring to the essential reward given after death, which is not at issue in the present case. It can even be said that such an effect may be referred to as a case of an &#8220;accidental reward,&#8221; which is the usage followed by Tanner and Henriquez. As John de Bassolis (one of Bl. Scotus&#8217; greatest students) points out, such a manner of speaking is not unusual, as we frequently speak in a similar way of the blessed angels:</p><blockquote><p>He can likewise merit such remission of venial guilt, although he cannot sin or merit anything further by way of essential reward or an increase of grace, just as it is said of the blessed angels that, by ministering to human beings daily and guarding them, they merit something by way of accidental reward. (IV.20&#8211;21.1.2)</p></blockquote><p>Since satisfaction does not occur after death so as to eliminate the reatus of temporal punishment by voluntary acts, as on earth, it does not follow that this act of contrition removes the reatus of temporal punishment, which must be paid by satispassio. What has been said applies only to venial culpa. The reason for this removal concerns the entity of venial culpa, which an act of contrition, formally opposing it, physically expels (although other authors, e.g., Su&#225;rez, do not approve of this manner of speaking; yet, as the Salmanticenses teach, it seems that such an opposition is merely verbal). From this it can be clear why the act of contrition removes the venial culpa but not the reatus of temporal punishment; for the act of contrition either removes by some intrinsic opposition or it does not. If the former, then the effect naturally occurs, since a form cannot exist with its privation. If the latter, then it only follows in virtue of some extrinsic consideration (merit), which ceases after this life, giving way to punishment. This reasoning is followed by St. Thomas:</p><blockquote><p>And therefore we must say that venial sins are remitted to them after this life even as regards guilt, in the same way as they are remitted in this life: namely, through an act of charity toward God, resisting the venial sins committed in this life. Nevertheless, because after this life there is no state of meriting, that movement of love in them indeed removes the impediment of venial guilt; but it does not merit release from or diminution of punishment, as it does in this life. (De malo 7.11)</p></blockquote><p>The Salmanticenses explain in greater detail:</p><blockquote><p>From this it is clear that the aforesaid act, as removing what obstructs, tears away the stain and is physically and morally incompatible with it, because of the retraction of the preceding will which it involves. But it exercises no such opposition toward punishment, which is not removed there by the exercise of grace. Thus it suffices to wipe away the stain and does not avail to exempt one from undergoing punishment. (In III.87.4.12)</p></blockquote><p>While this principle is clear and demonstrative, what is less clear is whether the act of the soul after death immediately issues forth in an act of contrition that is sufficient to oppose the entirety of the venial culpa present in the soul of the departed. It must be noted that, according to these theologians, a maximally intense act of contrition is not required for the remission of venial culpa, but only one that is universal and true. Theologians admit that this conclusion is not demonstrative, but hold it to be highly probable for a number of different reasons. Su&#225;rez gives a summary of this, reasoning from the lack of the impediments that weaken our acts of contrition on this earth:</p><blockquote><p>At that moment such a soul knows its state most fully and is unimpeded in acting; on God&#8217;s side it has most efficacious help according to the measure of its grace; and it itself immediately acts without delay, tends perfectly toward God, and turns away from all venial sins. Therefore that act suffices for all those sins immediately to be taken away as regards guilt. Thus it is clear that penance can remit these sins even after this life. Nor must acts be multiplied at that instant, as some have said, when the sins to be remitted are many and various, because, as was shown above, one efficacious and universal act suffices to take them all away. (De poenitentia XI.IV.13)</p></blockquote><p>It is to be recalled that it is particularly fitting that this occurs in relation to the particular judgment. At the particular judgment, the soul entering purgatory is sentenced in particular to suffer punishment for the reatus of all those sins for which it has not satisfied on earth. Therefore, it seems quite probable that the soul will make an act of contrition for each of these sins and accept the punishment appointed for it, as Abulensis notes: &#8220;the soul, at that very instant, wills freely to endure all the subsequent punishment assessed by God.&#8221; (In Matthaeum 25, q. 722) This &#8220;willingness to endure&#8221; quite cleanly connects the act of contrition with the punishment to be suffered, without a causal account. It is for this reason that authors like St. Robert Bellarmine will use the language of &#8220;virtual penance.&#8221;</p><p>When we consider the nature of the opposition between the act of contrition and the culpa of sin, theologians explain this in a variety of ways. Lugo (who follows Su&#225;rez) describes it as follows:</p><blockquote><p>It is required only as removing a hindrance, insofar as it takes away the positive indisposition and impediment previously obstructing pardon while the person does not come to his senses or acknowledge the offense. Therefore pardon is not given in consideration of that disposition as a merit, but as a condition necessary by the nature of the case, so that the sin may be remitted wholly gratuitously. (De poenitentia IX.II.36)</p></blockquote><p>The Salmanticenses (who generally represent the Thomistic position, which seems also to be the position of V&#225;squez) describe it in a slightly different manner: &#8220;because the obstacle cannot coexist with what removes it, that act is said to exclude venial stain in the manner of an incompatible form or quasi-form.&#8221; (In III.87.4.9) As noted above, however, it matters little how one describes it, since the descriptions seem to reduce to the same.</p><p>Against these positions, the Scotists bitterly complain that we destroy the axiom concerning merit in sense while vainly holding to it in words. As Mastri argues, &#8220;this solution destroys itself, because it is wholly contradictory that the act of penance elicited in Purgatory should be justifying and not meritorious, since it cannot justify in any other way than meritoriously.&#8221; (V.IX.IV.266)</p><p>Yet if they were to consider the foundation of the axiom more than its bare words, they would see that we hardly oppose it, insofar as its principal concern is to exclude the acquisition of any further essential merit or demerit after death. Further, it is not clear that even accidental merit needs to be invoked when we consider an act simply removing an impediment as a condition (which cannot be a meritorious cause, insofar as conditions are not generically a cause), or if we consider it as inducing a certain form which is incompatible with the opposing privation (which does not influence as a moral cause, which places it outside the genus in which meritorious causes are found).</p><p>It is to be noted that theologians speak in various ways as to the particular timing of this act of contrition. Some speak of it as occurring &#8220;before purgatory,&#8221; while others speak of it as occurring &#8220;in purgatory,&#8221; as exemplified in the treatment of Gonet:</p><blockquote><p>Some answer that such an act is elicited by the separated soul at the very instant of the soul&#8217;s separation from the body. For the soul, immediately upon being separated from the body, recognizes its faults as an impediment to glory and perfect intimacy with God; hence it immediately detests them and breaks forth into a fervent act of charity or contrition before it enters Purgatory, in which only the punishments left over from past sins are purged. This response and opinion is not without probability. Nevertheless, another opinion seems more probable...that the soul separated from the body elicits that act of charity or contrition by which it detests venial sins upon entry into Purgatory. (De poenitentia IV.IV.92)</p></blockquote><p>Certain theologians who approve of this opinion even delay the effect of the act until purgatory, in order to connect the contrition for sin with the punishments of purgatory, e.g., Sylvius:</p><blockquote><p>Although the soul elicits the aforesaid act immediately upon its departure, it is nevertheless not necessary that the abolition of guilt should take place at that very same instant, before it has descended into Purgatory. It suffices that it take place when the soul is in the place of Purgatory and feels its punishments, because the effect does not necessarily occur at the first instant at which the disposition exists; it is enough that it follows. (In III.87.1.II)</p></blockquote><p>This position can hardly be reconciled with the authors of this account, due to the fact that the influence of the punishments on the act of contrition is specifically denied by the authors of this opinion. It is one thing to make an act of contrition in purgatory; it is another to make an act of contrition through purgatory, so that the act is motivated by the punishments experienced in purgatory, which seems to be admitted by Sylvius. It is to be noted, however, that the &#8220;initial&#8221; versions of the third and fourth accounts are sometimes quite difficult to distinguish.</p><p>Yet the issue of timing seems to matter little, insofar as there is no temporal duration that separates the moment in which the soul leaves the body and the moment in which the soul enters purgatory, as indicated by the Salmanticenses:</p><blockquote><p>At the very entrance into purgatory, or, what is the same, at the very moment of the soul&#8217;s separation from the body, when it is true to say, It is now not in the body, and immediately before it was, an act of charity and detestation of all venial sins is elicited, or, if you prefer, also an act of penance and contrition. Through this all are expelled as regards stain, and the entire debt of punishment alone remains thereafter to be purged and discharged. (In III.87.4.12)</p></blockquote><h3><strong>Fourth account: punishment assists grace in removing guilt</strong></h3><p>Sources: St. Bonaventure, IV.21.I.II.1&#8211;2; Breviloquium VII.2; St. Thomas, IV.21.1.3; St. Albert the Great, IV.21.1; Bl. Peter of Tarentaise, IV.21.II.II; Richard of Middleton, IV.21.II.1; Bl. Denys, IV.20.2 and 21.1; Soto, IV.15.2.2; Valencia, IV.VII.IV.I; Abulensis, In Matthaeum 25, qq. 719&#8211;724; St. Bellarmine, De purgatorio I.14; Minges, Theologia dogmatica specialis II.693&#8211;698.</p><p>This position differs from the third insofar as it connects the removal of the venial culpa with the purgatorial punishments inflicted in purgatory. Therefore, ordinarily, it holds that such a removal takes place successively (although, as we saw with Sylvius above, even some authors of this opinion still hold that it takes place immediately upon entering purgatory, insofar as the act of contrition takes place upon entering purgatory, or at some other time before the full discharge of punishment). This position is held by many medievals (e.g., St. Bonaventure) and by some of the post-Reformation period (e.g., Soto and Valencia). It is important to note that this is distinguished from two other considerations. First, this position is not the same as that of those who hold that habitual attachments are in some way discharged as distinct from venial culpa (e.g., Alexander of Hales). Second, this position differs from that of those modern authors who attempt to identify the penal discharge with the removal of venial culpa (this position identifies the removal of venial culpa as a response to the penal discharge, which serves as an instrument in the removal of venial culpa through the contrite acts of the will).</p><p>In identifying those who adhere to this position, we run into a number of difficulties, as mentioned above. This is especially difficult insofar as it is perfectly possible to hold to an initial remission of venial culpa and an ongoing removal of certain reliquiae peccati without a clear explanation of whether the initial act is done in virtue of the purgatorial punishments or whether the reliquiae peccati include venial culpa. In some cases, it is impossible to describe clearly the position taken.</p><p>The description of St. Bonaventure is the most precise articulation of this account, holding that it is grace (with the concurrence of the will and punishment) that is able to remove the venial culpa:</p><blockquote><p>Therefore the position of others seems more correct: that fire both punishes and purifies by the same nature, because by punishing it assists grace. And grace, having the assistance of punishment and the concurrence of our will (which, although it does not assist, nevertheless does not impede) is able to purge away guilt and the dross of sin. Thus such purification comes from grace, with free choice concurring and external punishment assisting, in conformity with the remission of venial sins that takes place in this life. (IV.21.I.II.2)</p></blockquote><p>He gives an analogy, stating that the punishment assists the removal of venial culpa in a similar way as a grave illness &#8220;makes the soul sober,&#8221; which is to say that it provides a certain occasion for the conformity of the soul with Divine Justice, i.e., &#8220;virtue brings this about, assisted in some way by punishment.&#8221;</p><p>Richard of Middleton provides a similar description, explicitly denying that it happens in virtue of the punishment, but only with its assistance and in response to it:</p><blockquote><p>This is not to be understood as though they were consumed without penance through purgatorial fire, as the tarnish of silver is consumed through fire. Rather, souls are assisted through punishment in repenting of venial sins of which they did not repent in this life; and through the charity with which they departed from their bodies, their penance is informed and accepted, and thus their venial faults are forgiven them. (IV.21.II.1)</p></blockquote><p>Similarly, St. Albert the Great says that &#8220;it must be said that punishment of itself frees only from punishment. But punishment in a subject informed by grace can also free from guilt; and those who are in purgatory are such subjects.&#8221; (IV.21.1)</p><p>It is to be noted how close this position is to the third account in its fundamental affirmations. St. Bonaventure himself (the chief exponent of this position) holds either position probable when discussing the time at which the venial culpa is discharged:</p><blockquote><p>But if you ask whether, as soon as grace has that assistance, it wipes away guilt and purges away the dross, it can be said that either alternative is sufficiently probable: either grace is strengthened immediately, so as to wipe away venial guilt when it is assisted by punishment, and thereafter the person is punished on account of the outstanding liability; or it can be said that punishment disposes more and more, and afterward, once it has disposed sufficiently, grace itself wipes away the guilt in an instant, if any guilt is present. Whichever of these is said, it does not seem capable of being easily disproved. (IV.21.I.II.2)</p></blockquote><p>This same refusal to judge is found in many other authors of this opinion. Soto, the most famous exponent of this position in the Thomistic school, does the same:</p><blockquote><p>One of two accounts must therefore be given. Either all venial sins are remitted upon first entering purgatory through that elicited act of charity which lasts throughout the time in purgatory, even if the person died with complacency in them: for that charity is then, by reason of the state, firm, incapable of turning toward evil, and free of all concupiscence, and is thus virtual repentance for all venial sins... Or, much more plausibly, one should say that guilt is remitted through the act of charity and patience continued during the time when the venial sin is punished: for it is an act pleasing to God and most suited to remission. (IV.15.2.2)</p></blockquote><p>Valencia does the same:</p><blockquote><p>In precisely what manner are venial sins remitted in purgatory, if not properly through the payment of punishment? St. Thomas... intimates that they are remitted through the act of charity that the soul has when it first enters purgatory and afterward continues. Soto... considers it more likely that these same sins are remitted to the soul as regards guilt through the very act of charity and repentance by which it properly accepts and undergoes those punishments due to venial sins. Both accounts are probable, and I favor Soto&#8217;s opinion. (IV.VII.IV.I)</p></blockquote><p>Another point of interest concerning this position is that the connection between the punishments and the remission of guilt allows these authors to avoid the objection that this position fails to account properly for how such an act is non-meritorious. As St. Bonaventure argues, the purgatorial fire acts like the sacrament of baptism, inducing its effect without any consideration of merit on the part of the recipient.</p><h3><strong>A Thomistic Change?</strong></h3><p>Sources: St. Thomas, IV.21.1.3 and De malo 7.11; Sylvius, In III.87.1; Gotti, Supplementum III.I; L&#233;picier, De novissimis V.III; Capreolus, IV.21.1; Salmanticenses, In III.87.4; Doronzo, De poenitentia, art. 62.</p><p>Some recent authors have glossed over the distinction between the third and fourth accounts when interpreting the text of St. Thomas. These authors interpret St. Thomas&#8217; teaching as a somewhat mitigated account, similar to the one articulated above from Alexander of Hales, wherein there is an immediate discharge of venial culpa, but there are certain effects of sin that must be slowly purged.</p><p>However ingenious this account may be on intrinsic grounds, it is not the position taught by St. Thomas in his Commentary on the Sentences. Rather, he seems simply to teach the fourth account, wherein the purgatorial fire takes a &#8220;sacramental&#8221; role in the removal of venial culpa by inducing the soul to make contrary acts:</p><blockquote><p>We must say that in one who dies with grace, venial guilt is forgiven after this life through the fire of Purgatory, because that punishment, being voluntary in some way, will have, by the power of grace, the power to expiate every guilt that can coexist with grace. (IV.21.1.3)</p></blockquote><p>When we compare such statements to other authors of the era, e.g., St. Bonaventure, St. Albert the Great, Bl. Peter of Tarentaise, Richard of Middleton, etc., his sense is quite obvious. He explicitly retracts this earlier position concerning the instrumentality of fire in the remission of venial culpa later in life, in his De malo, by affirming the immediacy of the act of contrition without reference to the instrumentality of the purgatorial punishments, which he proves from a consideration of the charity necessary to remit venial culpa:</p><blockquote><p>Purgatory effects the remission of venial sin regarding punishment, and human beings by suffering the punishment of purgatory discharge the debt they owe, and so their punitive liability ceases. But regarding moral fault, punishment does not remit venial sin insofar as one actually undergoes punishment, since punishment is not meritorious. Nor does punishment remit venial sin insofar as one reflects on the punishment, since it would not be a movement of charity for one to detest venial sin because of the punishment; rather, it would be a movement of servile or natural fear. Therefore, the power of grace remits venial sin in purgatory regarding moral fault both as grace is habitual, for then it is compatible with venial sin, and as grace issues in an act of charity detesting venial sin. (De malo 7.11, ad 9)</p></blockquote><p>Still less can such an account be quoted in favor of the novel theory which holds that purgatory should be considered as a medicinal cleansing, so that venial culpa and the reatus poenae are identified. In this section, St. Thomas explicitly teaches that the reatus poenae has no foulness in itself, but only in relation to its cause: &#8220;The obligation to punishment, although it does not carry any foulness in itself, nevertheless is related to foulness by its cause.&#8221; (IV.21.1.3.2, ad 1) Further, this clearly contradicts what St. Thomas says of those who remove all venial culpa before death by an act of contrition, yet suffer purgatorial punishments after this life.</p><p>Certain authors interpret St. Thomas&#8217; text as referring to certain disordered effects and indispositions that follow from sin. Yet, if we recall that &#8220;venial sin&#8221; was used in such passages by the medievals to refer to venial culpa, then the sense of such passages is clear:</p><blockquote><p>It should be said that some venial sins adhere more than others, according as the affections are more inclined to them and are fixed upon them more strongly. And because the ones that adhere more take longer to purify, for this reason some people are tormented in purgatory longer than others, according as their affections were more steeped in venial sins. (ibid., 3)</p></blockquote><h3><strong>Fifth account: the remaining venial guilt consists in liability to the full temporal punishment</strong></h3><p>Sources: Bl. Scotus, IV.21.1; Biel, IV.16.5.I.2 and III.2; Mair, IV.21.1; Almain, IV.21.1; Mastri, V.IX.IV&#8211;V.</p><p>As noted above, this fifth account relies on the position that identifies venial culpa simply with the obligation to the full discharge of the reatus poenae. Therefore, it follows from this that the very completion of the suffering of temporal punishment is the remission of the venial culpa, since culpa is identified with the full discharge of penal liability. This position was defended by a minority of theologians after the 13th century (especially Scotists and &#8220;Nominalists&#8221;), usually as an alternative account set alongside the second account.</p><p>The proof of this position relies solely, in the words of Bl. Scotus, on the position that identifies venial culpa with the full discharge of the reatus poenae:</p><blockquote><p>After the passing act the guilt that remains is nothing other than liability to the punishment due. But this liability for venial sin is only to temporal punishment...consequently, once the temporal punishment for this venial sin has been paid in Purgatory, by that very fact the venial guilt itself has been remitted. (IV.21.1.7)</p></blockquote><p>This position is often connected with the thesis that venial sin is remitted in hell, as Mair teaches: &#8220;I embrace that way, because in my judgment it is much more probable that venial sin is forgiven in hell. I therefore say that for venial sin to be wiped away in purgatory or hell is nothing other than enduring the punishment due to venial sin.&#8221; (IV.21.1)</p><p>Yet Mastri clarifies a certain subtle point, due to the commutation of punishment (which I have often indicated by adding qualifications such as &#8220;full&#8221; or &#8220;entire&#8221;). According to the Scotists, there still remains a distinction between the liability of guilt and the liability of punishment, insofar as it happens that God may commute the liability of punishment into some lesser punishment when the liability of guilt is removed (e.g., in the case of mortal sin, or when satisfaction is accepted). When they speak of the two as identical, they only mean to say that &#8220;guilt in our opinion formally consists in obligation to the whole temporal punishment deserved by and equal to the fault committed.&#8221; (V.IX.V.273)</p><p>It is to be noted, however, that there is a distinction among the authors who hold to this position. Some may be (rightly) horrified by the idea that venial culpa can be remitted for those in hell simply because there has been a discharge of the full temporal punishment. Most theologians flatly deny that either a discharge of temporal punishment or a remission of venial culpa is possible in hell. Yet the Scotists commonly distinguish between the discharge of temporal punishment (which they hold to be possible) and the remission of venial culpa, since for the latter they require that there be an acceptance on the part of God of the temporal punishments suffered in order to remit the venial culpa.</p><h2><strong>What these disagreements establish against the apologetic shortcut</strong></h2><p>Sources: Tourn&#233;ly, De Deo, XII.II; St. Bellarmine, De purgatorio II.9; Su&#225;rez, De poenitentia XLVII.I.</p><p>As we have seen, there are many points of disagreement on the definition of guilt, on what rectifies the will, on when that rectification occurs, and on what role punishment has in it. While I have classed these into five accounts, as we saw throughout this exposition, the combination of these positions and additional inquiries can further distinguish how we articulate this matter. None of these concern issues of dogma, but only of theological inquiry. Yet what cannot be denied without an error in faith is that there remains an obligation to temporal punishment which must be remitted in purgatory by purgatorial punishments:</p><blockquote><p>The manner in which venial sins are remitted to the just in purgatory (namely, whether at death or after death; whether through repentance or through the fervor of charity and virtual displeasure; whether through the gift of perseverance or through satisfaction or punishment) is not a matter of faith and has not been defined by the Council of Trent. What has been defined is only that guilt is not remitted and liability to eternal punishment blotted out without some liability to temporal punishment remaining, to be discharged either in this age or in the age to come, in purgatory, before freer access to the kingdom of heaven can lie open. (Tourn&#233;ly, De Deo, XII.II)</p></blockquote><p>The point always to be held by divine and Catholic faith is that we retain an obligation before Divine Justice to suffer purgatorial punishments. Whether and how one articulates the remission of venial culpa or the rectification of bad dispositions matters little for the dispute. One can hold any position that pleases him, yet we must hold the dogma concerning temporal punishment.</p><p>Contemporary authors will frequently identify the reatus of temporal punishment with the effects of sin upon the soul. If that pleases them, then that is their prerogative, since the entity of the reatus and its foundation has always been a point of dispute among Catholic theologians. While I find the position to be novel and groundless, theologians are permitted novelty on disputed points. On the other hand, what they cannot deny by this identification is that this reatus is a true reatus, founding an obligation to punishment before Divine Justice. Theologians of other traditions often judge something similar in articulating an account that permits the effects of sin to be removed after death in a period of &#8220;purification.&#8221; Yet, unless they affirm that these effects place a true reatus before Divine Justice and are removed by way of punishment, they hold to a heretical position. It is one thing to say that the effects of sin are discharged after death and a completely different thing to say that the effects of sin constitute a true reatus and are discharged by punishment after death. Some outside the Catholic tradition will even inch closer by describing the process of removal as &#8220;painful,&#8221; yet even this does not necessarily articulate the dogma. There are many painful experiences which remove bad dispositions that are not &#8220;punishments.&#8221; To stay within the bounds of dogma, one must hold that such afflictions are inflicted upon the faithful departed in the manner of a punishment, inflicted by Divine Justice.</p><p>NOTE. The next section concerns the removal of vicious inclinations and the increase of the virtues in purgatory. It still remains as a &#8220;rough draft.&#8221; Therefore, I am putting it behind a paywall. </p><h1><strong>What about the habits of the virtues?</strong></h1>
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   ]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[A Thomistic Overview of Protestantism: On the Protestant Sects]]></title><description><![CDATA[Part 2. Catholic Unity and Protestant Fragmentation]]></description><link>https://thomism.com/p/protestantism-catholic-unity-and-protestant-fragmentation</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://thomism.com/p/protestantism-catholic-unity-and-protestant-fragmentation</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Christian B. Wagner]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 23 Oct 2026 11:01:51 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/d6fc7533-cf07-45d2-9b88-281a239596d6_1200x800.jpeg" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<h1>A General Introduction</h1><p>In my opinion, the greatest theologian of the twentieth century was Fr. Francisco Mar&#237;n-Sola, O.P. His greatness lay in his power of synthesis: he understood a whole system in its relation to all of its parts, in harmonious unity. From that vantage he could lay out a problem in its full depth and then give a solution that does justice to whatever is legitimate in the contrary objections. He was meticulous by temperament, spending his entire scholarly energy on two problems: the development of doctrine and the grace controversies.</p><p>Born in 1873 in C&#225;rcar, Navarre, he entered the Dominican Order and was sent as a young priest to the Philippines, where he taught at the University of Santo Tom&#225;s in Manila, was taken prisoner during the revolution, and afterwards began a short career in the Catholic press. From 1911 he taught in the Dominican house of studies at Rosaryville, Louisiana; from 1918 he held the chair of dogmatic theology at Fribourg, where he wrote <em>The Homogeneous Evolution of Catholic Dogma</em> and fought his famous battle over efficacious grace in the pages of <em>La Ciencia Tomista</em>. He returned to Manila and died there in 1932 while working on a lengthy treatment of the grace controversies titled <em>Concordia Tomista</em>. </p><p>Around four years ago, while reading <em>The Homogeneous Evolution of Catholic Dogma</em>, I learned that Fr. Mar&#237;n-Sola, during his years in the Catholic press, wrote a series of articles on another subject I care about: Protestantism. These were written in the form of a popular presentation in a Manila daily newspaper called <em>Libertas</em>. Their erudition and fairness were praised by the Protestants themselves; as Fr. Manuel Pi&#241;on, O.P., notes, an Anglican bishop (Irving Spencer) commended their &#8220;gentle and fair tenor.&#8221;</p><p>My excitement was soon crushed. Fr. Mar&#237;n-Sola was on the staff of <em>Libertas</em> for four years and its editor for two, so his output was enormous. Two further facts made things worse. First, he never wrote under his own name, but under a pseudonym or anonymously. Second, <em>Libertas</em> was a daily, which means thousands of issues were printed during his time there. To my knowledge, apart from general indications of the years of publication and some topics, no bibliography of these articles has ever been produced. Michael Torre records that Mar&#237;n-Sola himself gathered them into twenty-two notebooks, which appear to be lost:</p><blockquote><p>According to Velasco (&#8220;Ensayo de Bibliograf&#237;a,&#8221; 111), Mar&#237;n-Sola collected his brief articles published in <em>Libertas</em> (published anonymously or under the pen names &#8220;Euripio&#8221; and &#8220;Quicoy&#8221;) in 22 notebooks, which he had to leave in the parish of St. Anthony of Padua, in New Orleans, when he left for Europe in 1918. These notebooks, if they still exist, may now be in the Dominican archives of the University of Santo Tomas.</p></blockquote><p>At the time, collecting them seemed impossible. But things have changed. I discovered that the entire run of <em>Libertas</em> has been digitized and is, in principle, searchable. With the pen names &#8220;Euripio&#8221; and &#8220;Quicoy&#8221; as leads, it seemed possible at least to gather the signed articles. This hope, too, was quickly disappointed: many of the scans are poor, and the OCR, defeated by the multi-column layout, is poorer still. I had to shelve the project.</p><p>Then I tried something else. It was now technically possible for an AI to read through the whole corpus page by page and look for the pen names as a matter of image recognition rather than text search, which sidesteps the broken OCR entirely. So I did a complete pass over more than ten thousand newspaper pages across over a thousand web pages to search for articles written by &#8220;Euripio&#8221; and &#8220;Quicoy.&#8221; </p><p>After many, many hours of running, it returned 127 certain identifications and 3 likely ones. (A targeted search for his anonymous articles would be a far harder problem, but with these tools it is no longer an unthinkable one.)</p><p>I now have every one of those pages collected and OCR&#8217;d, the text extracted, and provisional translations made. This series will present those translations, publishing every article of doctrinal interest, grouped by subject, beginning with his classic 1902&#8211;1903 series on Protestantism and then moving on to the rest. It will run to fifteen posts, each containing a handful of related articles released every friday:</p><ol><li><p><a href="https://thomism.com/p/a-thomistic-overview-of-protestantism">On Lutheranism &#8212; 4 articles</a></p></li><li><p><strong>On Catholic Unity and Protestant Fragmentation &#8212; 4 articles [you are here]</strong></p></li><li><p>On the Reformed Church and Calvinist Objections &#8212; 2 articles</p></li><li><p>On the Origins and Constitution of Anglicanism &#8212; 3 articles</p></li><li><p>On Puseyism and Ritualism &#8212; 3 articles</p></li><li><p>On the Oxford Movement and Its Outcome &#8212; 3 articles</p></li><li><p>On the Three Parties of Anglicanism &#8212; 5 articles</p></li><li><p>On Anglicanism and the Church of Rome &#8212; 2 articles</p></li><li><p>Appendix A: Prayer, Miracles, and the Natural Order &#8212; 3 articles</p></li><li><p>Appendix B: Papal Authority, Obedience, and Catholicity &#8212; 4 articles</p></li><li><p>Appendix C: Holy Orders and the Minister of Ordination &#8212; 6 articles</p></li><li><p>Appendix D: Marriage and the Religious State &#8212; 3 articles</p></li><li><p>Appendix E: Catholic Unity, Christian Liberty, and Religious Truth &#8212; 4 articles</p></li><li><p>Appendix F: Indulgences and Forbidden Books &#8212; 2 articles</p></li><li><p>Appendix G: Religion, Patriotism, and Public Life &#8212; 3 articles</p></li></ol><p>Once a human review of each batch is complete, I will publish the collections for the general public. Until then, I am releasing them one post at a time for my Substack members and Patrons. If you want to read Fr. Mar&#237;n-Sola on Luther, Calvin, and the Church of England before anyone else does, this is the place to do it.</p><p>While I will eventually publish each of these together for the general public, for now, while the human overview process is under way, I am going to post these for my Substack members and Patrons. </p><p>If you are not yet a member, here is a 30-day free trial to read these articles for the next month:</p><p class="button-wrapper" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://thomism.com/subscribe?coupon=38ae34f1&amp;utm_content=220277967&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Get 30 day free trial&quot;,&quot;action&quot;:null,&quot;class&quot;:null}" data-component-name="ButtonCreateButton"><a class="button primary" href="https://thomism.com/subscribe?coupon=38ae34f1&amp;utm_content=220277967"><span>Get 30 day free trial</span></a></p>
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   ]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[A Response to Joel Webbon]]></title><description><![CDATA[Yes, Traducianism is Heresy.]]></description><link>https://thomism.com/p/a-response-to-joel-webbon</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://thomism.com/p/a-response-to-joel-webbon</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Christian B. Wagner]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Thu, 22 Oct 2026 10:31:12 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/cd209c8b-1f9b-4489-9911-7c4e2fc8b8fe_2400x1260.png" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<h2>Introduction</h2><p>I really never thought I would see the day when the error of traducianism (i.e., the teaching that the soul of the child is derived from the parents rather than immediately created by God) would become a topic of popular discourse.</p><p>This error has been rejected repeatedly by the Church over the last 1,500 years. Anastasius II (A.D. 498) refutes traducianism as a &#8220;new heresy&#8221; at length in his Letter to the bishops of Gaul:</p><blockquote><p>We have praised the solicitude of Our brother... [who has provided] necessary matter for preaching against a heresy that he affirms has arisen within Gaul &#8212; which would seek to persuade by this rationale, that, just as parents are to the human race, since they hand on bodies from material dross, so they also bestow the spirit of life on souls. Whom your brotherhood ought to recall by your admonitions and preachings from a vain and false persuasion. <strong>(</strong><em>Letter VI</em>, ch. I, &#167;2; cf. DB 170.<strong>)</strong></p></blockquote><p>Pope St. Leo IX (d. 1054) included the creation of the soul ex nihilo as part of his profession of faith:</p><blockquote><p>&#8220;I believe and preach that the soul is not a part of God, but created from nothing... This faith the Holy Roman and Apostolic See believes with the heart unto justice and confesses with the mouth unto salvation.&#8221; (<em>Congratulamur vehementer</em>; cf. DB 348.)</p></blockquote><p>This is not merely an &#8220;old teaching&#8221; either, but has been repeated a number of times in the last century. Ven. Pius XII taught that &#8220;the Catholic faith obliges us to hold that souls are immediately created by God&#8221; (<em>Humani generis</em>, n. 36). St. Paul VI, in his Credo, which is a summary of the Catholic faith, included the teaching that God is the &#8220;creator in each man of his spiritual and immortal soul&#8221; (<em>Solemni hac liturgia</em>, n. 8). The current Catechism of the Catholic Church repeats this same teaching: &#8220;The Church teaches that every spiritual soul is created immediately by God&#8212;it is not &#8216;produced&#8217; by the parents&#8221; (CCC 366).</p><p>Yet, I recently came across the following tweet from Joel Webbon, the Protestant pastor and conservative commentator:</p><div class="twitter-embed" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://x.com/JoelWebbon/status/2112901992460734756?s=20&quot;,&quot;full_text&quot;:&quot;Traducianism is not heresy.\n\nModern theologians consider it heresy because it contradicts Liberalism, not Historic Christianity.\n\nTraducianism contradicts the idea of universal homogeneous souls, created ex nihilo as blank slates, ensuring all people have the same potential.&quot;,&quot;username&quot;:&quot;JoelWebbon&quot;,&quot;name&quot;:&quot;Joel Webbon&quot;,&quot;profile_image_url&quot;:&quot;https://pbs.substack.com/profile_images/2037656698425327616/Y2Wtb6Rb_normal.jpg&quot;,&quot;date&quot;:&quot;2026-10-21T13:41:05.000Z&quot;,&quot;photos&quot;:[],&quot;quoted_tweet&quot;:{},&quot;reply_count&quot;:29,&quot;retweet_count&quot;:20,&quot;like_count&quot;:170,&quot;impression_count&quot;:8842,&quot;expanded_url&quot;:null,&quot;video_url&quot;:null,&quot;video_preview_media_key&quot;:null,&quot;belowTheFold&quot;:false}" data-component-name="Twitter2ToDOM"></div><p>To anyone who has read about traducianism, this tweet may seem quite confusing. What does the question of the origin of the soul in relation to God&#8217;s creative act have to do with liberalism? </p><div class="twitter-embed" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://x.com/JoelWebbon/status/2112962260037775649?s=20&quot;,&quot;full_text&quot;:&quot;For today&#8217;s pastors and theologians&#8230;\n\nHeresy is determined by that which offends modern Liberalism, not historic Christianity.&quot;,&quot;username&quot;:&quot;JoelWebbon&quot;,&quot;name&quot;:&quot;Joel Webbon&quot;,&quot;profile_image_url&quot;:&quot;https://pbs.substack.com/profile_images/2037656698425327616/Y2Wtb6Rb_normal.jpg&quot;,&quot;date&quot;:&quot;2026-10-21T17:40:34.000Z&quot;,&quot;photos&quot;:[],&quot;quoted_tweet&quot;:{},&quot;reply_count&quot;:17,&quot;retweet_count&quot;:14,&quot;like_count&quot;:172,&quot;impression_count&quot;:6078,&quot;expanded_url&quot;:null,&quot;video_url&quot;:null,&quot;video_preview_media_key&quot;:null,&quot;belowTheFold&quot;:true}" data-component-name="Twitter2ToDOM"></div><p>There are many tweets like this from Joel and others in his circle, but why is traducianism even up for consideration? The controversy seems to have arisen from a <a href="https://x.com/RealDonMarshall/status/2112562286585905247?s=20">clip</a> in which Joel Webbon and Wesley Todd use the idea of traducianism to explain distinctions between ethnic groups.</p><p>This line of argumentation has long been invoked in favor of traducianism. It begins with a certain evident fact: when we look at individuals, they resemble their parents not merely in physical qualities (e.g., skin color, bone structure, etc.), but even in certain qualities pertaining to the life of the soul (e.g., behaviors, dispositions towards vice, etc.). Therefore, the traducianists conclude that not only the body that bears physical qualities, but even the soul that bears spiritual qualities must come from the parents.</p><p>The accusation of &#8220;liberalism&#8221; seems to be directed against the opposing position insofar as many of its defenders hold that heredity has no influence whatsoever upon the life of the soul, but only upon certain physical qualities that they regard as unimportant. When behavioral differences are invoked which seem to imply an influence of heredity upon psychological qualities, they explain such differences purely on the basis of social factors. Clearly, this manner of explaining the problem dissolves the union of the soul and body into a form of &#8220;spiritualism,&#8221; rejecting the influence of our corporeal organs on the operations of the soul. Therefore, the question arises: are we bound to ignore the obvious due to our insistence on this doctrine?</p><p>Here, we seem to be stuck between a rock and a hard place. On the one hand, the Catholic Church teaches that the rational soul of the person is immediately created by God and united to the body as its substantial form. The Church rejects the teaching that the substance of an individual&#8217;s soul is derived from the substance of the souls of the parents. On the other hand, it is unreasonable, from an empirical perspective, to explain the behavior of particular individuals without any reference to heredity. Its influence has been extensively studied in experimental psychology, including studies of twins separated early in life and raised apart. Further, denying every influence of the body upon the life of the soul would imagine the human person as merely a soul in a body, rather than as a composite of body and soul. </p><p>This is a question treated by theologians in a number of different places, depending on the aspect under which it is considered. First, it is treated philosophically in natural philosophy, in the treatise on the human person. Second, it is treated theologically in the doctrine of creation, in reference to the creation of man. Third, it is treated morally in general moral theology, in reference to the influences upon human acts and their freedom and imputability.</p><p>Additionally, the magisterium treats this under two aspects: first, in its teaching on creation and the human person, especially against materialistic accounts of human origins; second, in its teaching against biological determinism. A materialistic account attempts to explain the whole human person, in both his corporeal and spiritual life, as the result of material processes. Against this, the Church insists upon the soul&#8217;s spiritual nature and its origin in an immediate creative act of God. Biological determinism denies the freedom of the human person, teaching instead that the qualities inherited from our ancestors determine our behavior as a necessary expression of this heredity (i.e., as some sort of &#8220;racial impulse&#8221;).</p><p>The solution proposed by Catholic theologians avoids the opposed errors by adhering to two principles. First, the rational soul is not produced by the parents, whether directly or through an instrument, but is immediately created by God. Second, the life of the soul is neither wholly disconnected from the body and its inherited dispositions nor wholly determined by them. To put it positively, bodily dispositions incline the person towards certain acts, but they do not of themselves necessitate the consent of the will. </p><h2>On Inherited Dispositions, Heredity, and Biological Determinism</h2><p><strong>NOTE.</strong> It is completely free to sign up to keep reading:</p>
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   ]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[Penal Substitutionary Atonement: The Foundation of Catholicism]]></title><description><![CDATA[Guilt, Punishment, and the Offense Against God]]></description><link>https://thomism.com/p/how-penal-substitution-refutes-protestantism</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://thomism.com/p/how-penal-substitution-refutes-protestantism</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Christian B. Wagner]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Tue, 20 Oct 2026 21:05:36 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/0c9cf78d-4e5f-47e5-acf2-adb6ca96e642_1200x800.png" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em><strong>A note for the reader.</strong> I began to research and write this article a while ago. As I expanded my notes more and more, I realized that I could not fit all the information into a single article. I needed to break it up into a series (lest I post a small book on Substack). The <a href="https://open.substack.com/pub/scholasticanswers/p/penal-substitution-a-catholic-dogma?r=dgylx&amp;utm_campaign=post-expanded-share&amp;utm_medium=web">first article</a> of this series set the stage for the reader, introducing the main theses that concern the doctrine of &#8220;penal substitution&#8221; as the tradition defines it. The rest of this series will be a deeper explanation of these theses. This second article begins with an explanation of the effects of sin. </em></p><p><em>Since you will not be able to read this in one go, but will have to follow along over the next few weeks, you will be forced to subscribe to get my articles in your inbox!</em></p><p class="button-wrapper" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://thomism.com/subscribe?&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Subscribe now&quot;,&quot;action&quot;:null,&quot;class&quot;:null}" data-component-name="ButtonCreateButton"><a class="button primary" href="https://thomism.com/subscribe?"><span>Subscribe now</span></a></p><p>A <a href="https://scholasticanswers.substack.com/subscribe">paid subscription</a> is what makes the next article possible (and it gets you a premium article every Friday). If you&#8217;d like to go further and fund this research directly, there&#8217;s now a Benefactor tier. As a thank you, I will be giving my Benefactors priority DM access on Substack (click <a href="https://scholasticanswers.substack.com/founding">here</a> to sign up as a Benefactor or upgrade your membership). Thank you!</p><div><hr></div><h2><strong>Introduction</strong></h2><p>In the first article of this series, I set out the broad outline of the doctrine of Penal Substitutionary Atonement in its Scholastic form. In the remainder of this series, I will simply be explaining how these theses cohere in a synthesis. It is important to note that, when the authors write on Penal Substitution, they are treating the coalescence of different doctrines taken from other tracts of theology and applying them to the question at hand. They are taking theses from the tract on grace, the tract on sin, the tract on the Incarnation, the tract on God, and many others in order to apply these theses to the question at hand.</p><p>Unfortunately, the way in which most readers study a question is one of isolation. The same unfortunately applies to many writers. From this perspective of isolation, they are not able to understand how a doctrine fits into the entire synthesis, and they are able neither to resolve questions concerning a doctrine nor to understand entirely its meaning and foundation. To avoid this, I must treat this doctrine with especial care and sometimes dwell on issues that may not seem related to the problem at hand in order to give a sufficient explanation to the reader. For the reader, this will involve patience and a discipline that shuns quick and easy solutions.</p><p>Interestingly, what we will see in this article is that a precise consideration of each of these effects of sin and their manner of removal verifies Catholic dogmas that may seem quite disconnected from satisfaction: purgatory, penance, eucharistic sacrifice, justification, etc. From these considerations, the profound unity of the work of Christ and its vital connection with the &#8216;Catholic system&#8217; stands forth in all its sublimity. </p><p>So, where do we start? While some may be tempted to begin with considerations of justice, God, redemption, or the passion itself, none of these is able to provide us with a foundation for considering our problem, logically speaking. To know where to begin, we must remember the axioms that &#8220;that which is first in intention is last in execution&#8221; and &#8220;the end is the cause of causes.&#8221; Therefore, when considering the passion under this particular aspect of the removal of sin, we must begin by considering sin, for unless we consider sin and its effects, we will never understand the other matters which are ordered to the removal of sin.</p><p>When we treat sin in this fundamental article, we can consider it in two ways: either in itself and in its effects, or in its removal in general. Clearly, the consideration of sin in itself and in its effects comes first, insofar as we will be apt to consider the removal of sin and its effects once we have learned the character of sin and the character of the effects of sin. After we have adequately treated the removal of sin and its effects in general, then we are able to treat the removal of sin and its effects particularly in the work of the passion. After we consider the passion as a particular instrument that removes sin and its effects as its proximate end, we will be able to consider various questions touching the passion historically and analyze how it verifies the concepts laid out in our general treatments.</p><h2><strong>The Order of the Article</strong></h2><p>We can consider sin and its effects either from the side of the sinner who commits the sin or from the side of God against whom the sin is committed. From the side of the sinner, there are three effects: the diminution of the good of nature, the stain of guilt, and the obligation to punishment. From the side of the one against whom the sin is committed, there is one effect: offense. When authors wish to distinguish the first category from the second category, the former is simply called the &#8220;malice of sin,&#8221; while the latter is called the &#8220;offense of sin.&#8221;</p><p>Therefore, there will be two parts to this article. First, we will treat the three effects of sin on the part of the sinner. Second, we will treat the effect of sin on the part of the one sinned against.</p><h2><strong>Part 1. The Three Effects of Sin on the Part of the Sinner</strong></h2><p>The most relevant preparatory study to understanding this doctrine concerns the &#8220;effects of sin.&#8221; St. Thomas treats this in <em>Prima secundae</em>, qq. 85&#8211;87, distinguishing three effects: the diminution of the good of nature, the stain of sin, and the debt of punishment.</p><h3><strong>The Diminution of the Good of Nature</strong></h3><p>The first (q. 85) of these concerns those defects that are contracted due to original and actual sin which diminish those goods which flow from nature, whether of the body (e.g., death, sickness, etc.) or of the soul (e.g., the loss of the proper ordering of the appetites). On this first point, it is to be noted that the diminutions of the good of nature are inflicted as a punishment for sin. Yet, in the case of Christ, some of these penal defects (i.e., the ones that are not contrary to the perfection of Christ&#8217;s humanity, as, e.g., ignorance would be) are voluntarily assumed by Christ in order to redeem mankind. We will return to this first effect when we treat Christ&#8217;s penal defects and the material aspect of satisfaction which corresponds to this effect of sin.</p><p>These defects can be either of the soul or of the body. When we consider the defects of the soul, we must consider the original state of man, wherein the lower powers of the soul were subjected to the higher power (reason), and reason was subjected to God. By refusing subjection to God in sinning against Him, Adam lost this original justice for himself and for the entire human race; fittingly, the reason that refused subjection to God will now have to suffer from the lower powers refusing subjection to it, causing disorder within the soul. Each of the four powers of the soul (reason, will, irascible appetite, concupiscible appetite) is now in a certain way destitute of its proper order, which is referred to as the wounding of nature:</p><blockquote><p><em>Inasmuch, therefore, as reason is destitute of its order to the true, there is the wound of ignorance; inasmuch as the will is destitute of its order to the good, there is the wound of malice; inasmuch as the irascible is destitute of its order to the arduous, there is the wound of weakness; inasmuch as concupiscence is destitute of its order to the delightful as moderated by reason, there is the wound of concupiscence. (ST I-II, q. 85, a. 3)</em></p></blockquote><p>The same principle follows when we consider the defects of the body. The proper order of man not only demands that the lower powers of the soul be subjected to the higher, but also that the body be subjected to the soul. Original justice brought about rectitude of order between the body and soul, so that the body and soul were to be united without corruption, i.e., an immortality that was free from bodily death. Further, the rectitude was so perfect as to subject the bodily members perfectly to reason and to keep the body free from the bodily defects that lead to death. Yet, when original justice was taken away, what followed was the rebellion and corruption of the bodily members against the soul and, ultimately, bodily death, which was inflicted upon us as a punishment for sin:</p><blockquote><p><em>The sin of our first parent is the cause of death and all such like defects in human nature, insofar as by the sin of our first parent original justice was taken away, whereby not only were the lower powers of the soul held together under the control of reason, without any disorder whatever, but also the whole body was held together in subjection to the soul, without any defect. Wherefore, original justice being forfeited through the sin of our first parent; just as human nature was stricken in the soul by the disorder among the powers, as stated above, so also it became subject to corruption, by reason of disorder in the body. Now the withdrawal of original justice has the character of punishment, even as the withdrawal of grace has. Consequently, death and all consequent bodily defects are punishments of original sin. (ST I-II, q. 85, a. 5)</em></p></blockquote><p>This is important to consider for two reasons. First, we ought to remember that the evil of punishment is not only something that is inflicted upon individuals for their personal sins, but is also something that falls upon the entire human race as ordained by divine justice. Second, which is even more important, we have to remember that wherever these exist, they have the character of punishment. Therefore, certain authors speak nonsensically when they teach that every punishment, whether eternal or temporal, is removed by Christ in this life. What we suffer in our body has the character of punishment inflicted upon us by God in chastisement for our personal sins and for what remains in us from Adam as the sin of nature. Even baptism, which removes the whole debt of punishment (both eternal and temporal), does not remove the penal inflictions (even while it removes their <em>reatus</em>). Penal afflictions can exist without actual sin (as they do in infants), without the debt of punishment (as they do in the newly baptized), and even without any sin whatsoever (as they do in Christ). Therefore, it is important to consider this as a distinct effect of sin, apart from the stain of guilt and the obligation to punishment.</p><p>Christ voluntarily assumes these penal defects in order to make penal satisfaction for sins as our surety. God permits these to remain even in those without an obligation to temporal punishment, in order that we may be conformed to Christ, who had these same penal defects, and win a crown of glory by conquering these afflictions (cf. <em>ST</em> III, q. 69, a. 3). We will return to this later when we consider in more detail the question of the temporal punishment remaining after the remission of sins.</p><p>The second and third effects require a much longer treatment, both in themselves and in their relation to one another, and to these we now turn.</p><h3><strong>The Stain of Guilt (</strong><em><strong>Macula Culpae</strong></em><strong>)</strong></h3><h4><strong>The Stain in General</strong></h4><p>The second (q. 86) of these, the <em>macula culpae</em>, concerns the privation of the soul&#8217;s splendor that follows upon the sinful act and remains after it. St. Thomas explains the name from its use in bodily things, where something bright loses its brightness by contact with something else:</p><blockquote><p><em>Now the soul of man has a twofold brightness: one from the shining of the natural light of reason, by which it is directed in its acts; the other from the shining of the divine light, namely of wisdom and grace, by which man is also perfected for acting well and fittingly. Now there is, as it were, a certain touch of the soul when it adheres to some things by love. But when it sins, it adheres to some things against the light of reason and of the divine law. Hence the very detriment of brightness arising from such contact is metaphorically called a stain of the soul. (ST I-II, q. 86, a. 1)</em></p></blockquote><p>From the outset, it is important to clarify a common misconception. Since we often speak of such a stain as a &#8220;privation&#8221; (which is the absence of a due perfection, e.g., as blindness is to sight), some understand the <em>macula culpae</em> as a mere privation, so as to denote merely the absence of sanctifying grace. Yet, if this were true, one of the consequences of this would be absurd. For, if the <em>macula culpae</em> denoted a mere privation of sanctifying grace, then the stain of different sins in the soul would not differ from one man to another, nor would it differ from one sin to another. Yet, since the <em>macula culpae</em> denotes the adherence to things against the light of reason, we know that the <em>macula</em> is diverse for diverse sins, since diverse sins involve an adherence to distinct creatures in distinct modes. Therefore, St. Thomas concludes that it denotes a privation with order to its cause, so that diverse sins diminish the brightness of the soul in diverse modes, yet without denoting something positive:</p><blockquote><p><em>The stain is neither something positive in the soul, nor does it denote a pure privation: it denotes a privation of the soul&#8217;s brightness in relation to its cause, which is sin; wherefore diverse sins occasion diverse stains. It is like a shadow, which is the privation of light through the interposition of a body, and which varies according to the diversity of the interposed bodies. (ST I-II, q. 86, a. 1, ad 3)</em></p></blockquote><p>This qualification will become important below, since it is what allows the school to explain how one sinner is more stained than another, though the privation of grace, considered in itself, is one and the same in all.</p><p>The consideration of the <em>macula culpae</em> is important in order to explain what remains of the sin after the act of sin has passed. How is the soul continually affected by this transgression? While the first effect of sin explains the punishments imposed for the sin and the third effect explains the obligation to punishment incurred by sin, this second explains the effects for the soul in itself. Catholic theology determines that, even after the act has passed, the stain remains. Even if a man were to forget about the act or were to regret the act, this stain bitterly clings to the soul, defiling him. The only way to remove this stain is by what theologians term &#8220;sanctifying grace,&#8221; which formally removes this privation. Just as darkness cannot continue so long as light is present, so also the stain of guilt cannot continue so long as sanctifying grace continues:</p><blockquote><p><em>The stain of sin remains in the soul, even when the act of sin has passed. The reason is that a stain, as has been said, implies a certain defect of brightness through withdrawal from the light of reason or of the divine law. And therefore as long as a man remains outside this light, the stain of sin remains in him; but after he returns to the divine light and to the light of reason, which is done through grace, then the stain ceases. But although the act of sin by which man departed from the light of reason or the divine law ceases, nevertheless man does not at once return to that in which he had been: there is required some movement of the will contrary to the first movement. (ST I-II, q. 86, a. 2)</em></p></blockquote><p>The analogy that St. Thomas frequently gives for this process is that of local motion. When we move away from something, we do not <em>ipso facto</em> return simply because we stop moving away from it. In a similar way, just because we have stopped the act of sinning does not mean that the stain is eliminated. Further, just because we forget about our journey or regret it, it does not mean that we are any closer to our original location. Rather, what is needed is a contrary motion that brings us back to our original location, a return journey. In this case, it is sanctifying grace. Further, just as our return home by a contrary motion <em>ipso facto</em> excludes our being away from home, so also sanctifying grace <em>ipso facto</em> excludes our having the <em>macula culpae</em>.</p><p>Among later theologians, the <em>macula culpae</em> is referred to as &#8220;habitual sin&#8221; (<em>peccatum habituale</em>), i.e., the state of being a sinner that remains after the sinful act has passed. The Salmanticenses note that St. Thomas never uses this phrase, but always speaks of the same reality under the name of the stain:</p><blockquote><p><em>The stain (we speak of the stain of mortal sin) is, in reality, not distinguished from what we call habitual sin: it is the same privation of grace, which is called &#8220;stain&#8221; because it takes away the brightness and beauty which came from the assistance and shining of the divine light, and leaves the soul soiled and unclean; and it is called habitual sin because it is the terminus of the actual sin and remains when that is past, as aversion in facto esse from the last end, and it denominates its possessor habitually a sinner. (Salmanticenses, Cursus theologicus, Tr. XIII, in I-II q. 86, n. 4)</em></p></blockquote><p>The same identification is common among Thomists, for good reason. The habit stands between act and power, disposing the faculty towards making certain acts with facility. Therefore, the man with the habit of cooking will have his intellect and bodily members well disposed for cooking, so as to perform the act well and with ease. Further, a privation reduces to the same genus as its perfection, as the privation of an act reduces to the genus of act and the privation of a habit reduces to the genus of habit. Now, when we articulate the <em>macula culpae</em>, we are describing the privation of the soul of some habit (i.e., sanctifying grace) in relation to its cause (i.e., actual sins); therefore, there is no better term than habitual sin, &#8220;habitual&#8221; expressing the genus to which the privation reduces and &#8220;sin&#8221; expressing the cause of the privation.</p><h4><strong>What Formally Constitutes the Stain</strong></h4><p>While all Catholic theologians agree that something remains after the act of sin by which a man continues to be a sinner until he repents, there is a famous dispute over what this is, i.e., what formally constitutes the stain. The positions may be reduced to three.</p><p>First, Bl. Scotus holds that after the act of sin nothing real remains in the sinner, neither absolute nor relative, positive nor privative, by which he is called a sinner. What remains in the sinner is only a relation of reason, insofar as the sinner is considered by God and ordained to punishment on account of this act of sin. Therefore, he concludes that the offense, stain, and obligation to punishment are one and the same in reality, differing only by the aspect under which they are considered (cf. Scotus, <em>Ordinatio</em> IV, d. 14, q. 1; also Durandus, <em>In II Sent.</em>, d. 42, q. 3). As an illustration, he compares this to a man who offends a great prince. After the offensive act, nothing remains in the offender, but there is something in the prince, who ordains the man to punishment on account of the offensive act.</p><p>Second, Su&#225;rez and some later authors hold that the stain is constituted by something morally in the soul of the offender, rather than something physical. This moral constituent (formally speaking) is the continual aversion from God as the last end, which is the &#8220;voluntary deformity&#8221; which remains in the soul. In one ordained to a supernatural end, this includes the privation of grace and charity, which is the material element of the stain (cf. Su&#225;rez, <em>De vitiis et peccatis</em>, disp. VIII).</p><p>Third, the Thomists hold that the stain is the privation of sanctifying grace (which is the root of the soul&#8217;s supernatural brightness) as caused by the actual sin. Billuart gives the received formula of the school:</p><blockquote><p><em>The stain of mortal sin is the privation of the brightness of grace, or what is the same, of grace itself, connoting the preceding actual sin by which it is caused. &#8230; If the stain consisted in the privation of sanctifying grace without respect to the actual sin that causes it, since the privation of such grace is one, indivisible, and of the same species in all, it could not be explained how the stains are many, diverse, and unequal. But, granted that the stain consists in the privation of grace with respect to the actual sin by which it is caused, and the actual sins are many, diverse, and unequal, it is excellently explained how the stains are many, diverse, and unequal. (Billuart, De peccatis, diss. VII, a. II)</em></p></blockquote><p>The first position is to be rejected for a number of different reasons. First, an ordination to punishment is willed because a man is a sinner, and not vice versa; just as a man is ordained to the punishment of the law because he is a breaker of the law, and is not a breaker of the law because he is ordained to the punishment of the law. God&#8217;s ordination to punishment cannot be the cause of a man&#8217;s being denominated a sinner, since such an ordination already supposes that he is a sinner. The stain of sin is, as it were, a medium between the act of sin and the obligation to punishment, effected by the act and the foundation for the obligation. Second, even if the ordination to punishment were not decreed, the soul would still be stained and have habitual sin; therefore, the ordination to punishment cannot be the basis for the stain. Third, the damned incur new stains, and habitual sin is further radicated in their souls eternally, yet they do not demerit (since only the wayfarer merits and demerits). Fourth, in justification, while there is a remission of guilt and removal of the stain, the ordination to punishment still remains vis-&#224;-vis temporal punishments. Fifth, and most importantly, the stain of guilt is an evil of guilt, while the ordination to punishment is an evil of punishment. Now, whereas the evil of punishment is a certain good that can be produced by God, the same does not apply to the evil of guilt. Therefore, it is incoherent to teach that these are both distinct aspects of the same thing. Man is not a sinner from the divine will, but he is obligated to punishment by the divine will (cf. Cajetan, <em>In I-II</em>, q. 86, a. 2). Lastly, while not directly condemned, this position is less in accordance with the condemnation of proposition 56 of Baius: &#8220;In sin there are two things, the act and the <em>reatus</em>; when the act passes, nothing remains but the <em>reatus</em>, or the obligation to punishment.&#8221;</p><p>The second opinion arrives quite close to the position of the Thomists, insofar as it holds that the material element of the <em>macula</em> is the privation of sanctifying grace and charity. Yet, it goes too far in assigning a moral element on top of this. For, just as a man is not called just and is not justified by some moral perseverance in an act, but by the presence of a certain habit (i.e., sanctifying grace), so also is a man not called unjust due to some moral perseverance in an act, but by the privation of a certain habit (i.e., the privation of sanctifying grace). Yet, it seems as if there is little difference between the positions (especially when compared to the position of Bl. Scotus). For, even the Thomists admit that the moral permanence of the past act makes the privation voluntary and culpable.</p><h4><strong>Three Consequences</strong></h4><p>First, the stain is in the sinner&#8217;s own soul, and it is a privation of grace in order to his own act. Therefore, it is the one thing in sin that cannot, by its very nature, be transferred to another. On this point, it is to be noted that the stain of guilt is NEVER said to be taken by Christ. While there are disputes on how we articulate the use of <em>poenae</em> vis-&#224;-vis Christ and His Passion, there is no dispute on this point. Christ could not be deprived of grace, nor could any act of his be the cause of such a privation; and, as we will see, even the obligation which he took upon himself as our surety was not the <em>reatus</em> of one guilty, but the obligation of one who freely undertook to pay another&#8217;s debt.</p><p>Second, the stain is distinct from the obligation to punishment. The obligation to punishment follows upon the stain while the stain remains; yet the obligation can remain in some way after the stain is removed. This is precisely what we must now consider in the third effect of sin. This is why we say that the <em>macula</em> stands between the act and the obligation to punishment, effected by the act and the foundation for the obligation to punishment. In a similar way, we can say that sanctifying grace stands between God&#8217;s justification of the soul and His promise of eternal life, the effect of the former and the foundation for the latter. Therefore, just as we are formally constituted unjust by the privation, so are we formally constituted just by the presence.</p><p>Third, as I indicated on the second point, this notion of the <em>macula culpae</em> is quite important for the notion of justification, insofar as the sanctifying grace which is merited by Christ is formally and immediately opposed to this stain. Now, reader, draw out the implication of making the stain really identical to the ordination to punishment on the part of God, and you will see the effects in how we articulate the removal of this in the act of justification. Out of reverence for Bl. Scotus, I will not draw what could be consistently drawn.</p><p>Remember how I told you that you needed to become a free subscriber to follow this series? You have to become one to finish this article as well. It costs nothing to become a free subscriber and you are never charged. Just type in your email and keep reading! </p>
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   ]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[A Thomistic Overview of Protestantism: On Lutheranism]]></title><description><![CDATA[Part 1. The Lutheran Church]]></description><link>https://thomism.com/p/a-thomistic-overview-of-protestantism</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://thomism.com/p/a-thomistic-overview-of-protestantism</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Christian B. Wagner]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 16 Oct 2026 11:01:14 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/039a10da-9eab-4010-8015-d174280e3000_1200x800.jpeg" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<h1>A General Introduction</h1><p>In my opinion, the greatest theologian of the twentieth century was Fr. Francisco Mar&#237;n-Sola, O.P. His greatness lay in his power of synthesis: he understood a whole system in its relation to all of its parts, in harmonious unity. From that vantage he could lay out a problem in its full depth and then give a solution that does justice to whatever is legitimate in the contrary objections. He was meticulous by temperament, spending his entire scholarly energy on two problems: the development of doctrine and the grace controversies.</p><p>Born in 1873 in C&#225;rcar, Navarre, he entered the Dominican Order and was sent as a young priest to the Philippines, where he taught at the University of Santo Tom&#225;s in Manila, was taken prisoner during the revolution, and afterwards began a short career in the Catholic press. From 1911 he taught in the Dominican house of studies at Rosaryville, Louisiana; from 1918 he held the chair of dogmatic theology at Fribourg, where he wrote <em>The Homogeneous Evolution of Catholic Dogma</em> and fought his famous battle over efficacious grace in the pages of <em>La Ciencia Tomista</em>. He returned to Manila and died there in 1932 while working on a lengthy treatment of the grace controversies titled <em>Concordia Tomista</em>. </p><p>Around four years ago, while reading <em>The Homogeneous Evolution of Catholic Dogma</em>, I learned that Fr. Mar&#237;n-Sola, during his years in the Catholic press, wrote a series of articles on another subject I care about: Protestantism. These were written in the form of a popular presentation in a Manila daily newspaper called <em>Libertas</em>. Their erudition and fairness were praised by the Protestants themselves; as Fr. Manuel Pi&#241;on, O.P., notes, an Anglican bishop (Irving Spencer) commended their &#8220;gentle and fair tenor.&#8221;</p><p>My excitement was soon crushed. Fr. Mar&#237;n-Sola was on the staff of <em>Libertas</em> for four years and its editor for two, so his output was enormous. Two further facts made things worse. First, he never wrote under his own name, but under a pseudonym or anonymously. Second, <em>Libertas</em> was a daily, which means thousands of issues were printed during his time there. To my knowledge, apart from general indications of the years of publication and some topics, no bibliography of these articles has ever been produced. Michael Torre records that Mar&#237;n-Sola himself gathered them into twenty-two notebooks, which appear to be lost:</p><blockquote><p>According to Velasco (&#8220;Ensayo de Bibliograf&#237;a,&#8221; 111), Mar&#237;n-Sola collected his brief articles published in <em>Libertas</em> (published anonymously or under the pen names &#8220;Euripio&#8221; and &#8220;Quicoy&#8221;) in 22 notebooks, which he had to leave in the parish of St. Anthony of Padua, in New Orleans, when he left for Europe in 1918. These notebooks, if they still exist, may now be in the Dominican archives of the University of Santo Tomas.</p></blockquote><p>At the time, collecting them seemed impossible. But things have changed. I discovered that the entire run of <em>Libertas</em> has been digitized and is, in principle, searchable. With the pen names &#8220;Euripio&#8221; and &#8220;Quicoy&#8221; as leads, it seemed possible at least to gather the signed articles. This hope, too, was quickly disappointed: many of the scans are poor, and the OCR, defeated by the multi-column layout, is poorer still. I had to shelve the project.</p><p>Then I tried something else. It was now technically possible for an AI to read through the whole corpus page by page and look for the pen names as a matter of image recognition rather than text search, which sidesteps the broken OCR entirely. So I did a complete pass over more than ten thousand newspaper pages across over a thousand web pages to search for articles written by &#8220;Euripio&#8221; and &#8220;Quicoy.&#8221; </p><p>After many, many hours of running, it returned 127 certain identifications and 3 likely ones. (A targeted search for his anonymous articles would be a far harder problem, but with these tools it is no longer an unthinkable one.)</p><p>I now have every one of those pages collected and OCR&#8217;d, the text extracted, and provisional translations made. This series will present those translations, publishing every article of doctrinal interest, grouped by subject, beginning with his classic 1902&#8211;1903 series on Protestantism and then moving on to the rest. It will run to fifteen posts, each containing a handful of related articles released every friday:</p><ol><li><p><strong>On Lutheranism &#8212; 4 articles [you are here] </strong></p></li><li><p>On Catholic Unity and Protestant Fragmentation &#8212; 4 articles</p></li><li><p>On the Reformed Church and Calvinist Objections &#8212; 2 articles</p></li><li><p>On the Origins and Constitution of Anglicanism &#8212; 3 articles</p></li><li><p>On Puseyism and Ritualism &#8212; 3 articles</p></li><li><p>On the Oxford Movement and Its Outcome &#8212; 3 articles</p></li><li><p>On the Three Parties of Anglicanism &#8212; 5 articles</p></li><li><p>On Anglicanism and the Church of Rome &#8212; 2 articles</p></li><li><p>Appendix A: Prayer, Miracles, and the Natural Order &#8212; 3 articles</p></li><li><p>Appendix B: Papal Authority, Obedience, and Catholicity &#8212; 4 articles</p></li><li><p>Appendix C: Holy Orders and the Minister of Ordination &#8212; 6 articles</p></li><li><p>Appendix D: Marriage and the Religious State &#8212; 3 articles</p></li><li><p>Appendix E: Catholic Unity, Christian Liberty, and Religious Truth &#8212; 4 articles</p></li><li><p>Appendix F: Indulgences and Forbidden Books &#8212; 2 articles</p></li><li><p>Appendix G: Religion, Patriotism, and Public Life &#8212; 3 articles</p></li></ol><p>Once a human review of each batch is complete, I will publish the collections for the general public. Until then, I am releasing them one post at a time for my Substack members and Patrons. If you want to read Fr. Mar&#237;n-Sola on Luther, Calvin, and the Church of England before anyone else does, this is the place to do it.</p><p>While I will eventually publish each of these together for the general public, for now, while the human overview process is under way, I am going to post these for my Substack members and Patrons. </p><p>If you are not yet a member, here is a 30-day free trial to read these articles for the next month:</p><p class="button-wrapper" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://thomism.com/subscribe?coupon=38ae34f1&amp;utm_content=220262760&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Get 30 day free trial&quot;,&quot;action&quot;:null,&quot;class&quot;:null}" data-component-name="ButtonCreateButton"><a class="button primary" href="https://thomism.com/subscribe?coupon=38ae34f1&amp;utm_content=220262760"><span>Get 30 day free trial</span></a></p>
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   ]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[Penal Substitution: A Catholic Dogma? ]]></title><description><![CDATA[A General Overview]]></description><link>https://thomism.com/p/penal-substitution-a-catholic-dogma</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://thomism.com/p/penal-substitution-a-catholic-dogma</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Christian B. Wagner]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Mon, 12 Oct 2026 23:13:20 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/930929eb-2c0b-489a-a01b-81155eb58d98_2000x1806.jpeg" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em><strong>A note for the reader.</strong> I began to research and write this article a while ago. As I expanded my notes more and more, I realized that I could not fit all the information into a single article. I needed to break it up into a series (lest I post a small book on Substack). This first article sets the stage for the reader, introducing the main theses that concern the doctrine of &#8220;penal substitution&#8221; as the tradition defines it. In the following articles, we will return to these theses and expand on them in much more detail.</em></p><p><em>Since you will not be able to read this in one go, but will have to follow along over the next few weeks, you will be forced to subscribe!</em></p><p class="button-wrapper" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://thomism.com/subscribe?&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Subscribe now&quot;,&quot;action&quot;:null,&quot;class&quot;:null}" data-component-name="ButtonCreateButton"><a class="button primary" href="https://thomism.com/subscribe?"><span>Subscribe now</span></a></p><div><hr></div><h2>Introduction</h2><p>The topic of &#8220;penal substitution&#8221; has been controversial as of late. The controversy runs along a few distinct lines, both among co-religionists and between members of distinct groups. Among Catholics, the most popular exponent of the doctrine in the modern era is Erick Ybarra, who has put together an extensive florilegium on the topic titled <em><a href="https://link.amazon/B0a5GTuiO">He Bore Our Punishment: Discovering Penal Substitution in the Church Fathers and Beyond</a></em>.</p><p>While I have been asked about the topic countless times, I have never written on it extensively, for a number of reasons. With a topic of such weight and delicacy, I was firmly convinced that I should not be hasty in giving my own exposition. Further, I sought out certain obscure treatments of this question by authors of no small repute in order to better acquaint myself with the doctrine of the more recent scholastics.</p><p>At last, I feel somewhat prepared to give a treatment of this question, following in the footsteps of authors of every sort: preachers, ascetical writers, scholastic theologians, and exegetes. Most surprisingly, the theologians who prepared the schemata for the First Vatican Council even drafted a document touching on this topic (although the document was never promulgated, owing to the abrupt suspension of the council).<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-1" href="#footnote-1" target="_self">1</a> Equally curious is the debate that took place in the twentieth century, in which the eminent scholastics Fr. Christian Pesch, S.J. and Fr. &#201;douard Hugon, O.P., and the equally renowned patrologist Fr. Adh&#233;mar d&#8217;Al&#232;s, S.J., upheld the traditional place of penal expiation in the doctrine of Christ&#8217;s satisfaction against the criticisms of Abb&#233; Jean Rivi&#232;re. This was followed by the exegetical work of Alexis M&#233;debielle and the scholastic work of Jes&#250;s Solano, along with countless other studies vindicating the traditional doctrine along many lines.</p><p>Unfortunately, Rivi&#232;re was taken as an authority on the redemption by Fr. Philippe de la Trinit&#233; (who cites him by name), whose work appeared in English in 1961 as a criticism of the (putative) excesses of many different preachers and ascetical writers. This would stamp the doctrine with infamy in the English-speaking world. Even more unfortunately, the defenses of Pesch, d&#8217;Al&#232;s, Hugon, and others have been completely forgotten.</p><p>Fr. d&#8217;Al&#232;s summarizes the sense of the tradition in which these defenders stand, the tradition in which I myself will also stand:</p><blockquote><p>&#8220;In order to guard against their [i.e., the Lutherans&#8217;] impious excesses, must we renounce a notable portion of the Christian heritage? The theory of penal substitution answers too well to our instincts of justice, it has too strong attachments in Scripture and in tradition, it has too often inspired preachers of the divine judgments and broken the souls of sinners, to disappear easily from our pulpits.&#8221; (<em>&#201;tudes</em> 135 [1913], pp. 184&#8211;185)</p></blockquote><p>Yet, before I begin, it is important to give a number of clarifications so that the reader may enter upon this study with the proper dispositions for understanding the tradition.</p><p><strong>First Clarification.</strong> As in many areas of theology, the words we use are taken in an &#8220;acquired&#8221; sense. Terms often carry a sense among creatures that is unfitting when applied to divine and supernatural realities. Therefore, it will be necessary to strip some of the terms we use of certain aspects of their ordinary meaning, so as to impose nothing unfitting on the passion of Christ. As Fr. d&#8217;Al&#232;s put it, while the principle of penal substitution is &#8220;unacceptable as a general thesis and in strict law,&#8221; it &#8220;takes on an entirely different value with regard to the Redemption&#8221; (ibid., p. 180).</p><p>From this, the reader should conclude that he ought to pay very close attention to the various clarifications that the tradition provides when treating this doctrine. Often, one gathers the wrong notion when he takes a term in its ordinary sense without stripping away the aspects that come along with its creaturely mode. For example, the word &#8220;punish&#8221; or &#8220;punishment,&#8221; taken simply, carries the idea of something inflicted against the will of the one punished. Yet in the case of Christ this is not so, owing to the superabundant charity that aligned his will with the suffering inflicted upon him. Therefore, many authors clarify that &#8220;punish&#8221; and &#8220;punishment&#8221; are not taken according to the aspect under which they exist among natural realities.</p><p><strong>Second Clarification.</strong> Following from the first clarification, it is important to consider the purpose of the author in treating this mystery. This is especially important in a topic like the passion, which is so often the subject of homilies and meditations that are (a) meant for a non-technical (i.e., lay) audience and (b) framed according to certain rhetorical conventions meant to move the audience to certain affective acts (e.g., sorrow) in light of the mystery. Therefore, many authors leave unsaid the distinctions that would clarify the notion. This does not make what they say false or in any way misleading, since these distinctions are tacitly accepted insofar as such authors intend to adhere to the sense of the Church and of theologians in expounding this mystery. What it does mean is that their statements are of less scientific value. The fact that they did not explicitly state these distinctions ought not to lead either to (a) the acceptance of a crude understanding of what is said or (b) an unfair and harsh rejection of what was said, as if these distinctions were not latent or implicit. For this reason, it is important to consider the scientific aspects of this mystery in light of the scientific treatments that theologians have given to this problem, rather than pretending that scholastic precision is to be found in devotional or homiletic expositions of this doctrine. That would be quite unfair. For more, cf. d&#8217;Al&#232;s, &#8220;R&#233;demption,&#8221; <em>Dictionnaire apolog&#233;tique de la foi catholique</em> IV (1922), col. 571.</p><p><strong>Third Clarification.</strong> It also follows from the first clarification that a multiplicity of images must be used in order to explain the supernatural reality. Since each of these images, taken apart, is inadequate to represent the full sublimity of the passion, the sacred writers, the Fathers, and the theologians use a number of different images, each highlighting one aspect in a dim manner, so that, taken together, they give us a clearer understanding of the mystery. Therefore, images such as sacrifice, ransom, example, punishment, conquest, etc., are used, each with its own value in providing an understanding of this mystery. It is inappropriate and un-Catholic for anyone to take one of these images and set it against another, as if they were mutually exclusive. This tendency to set the images against one another follows from the tendency to consider terms in their created and natural sense without properly clarifying the force of the term when applied to supernatural mysteries. For more, cf. St. Thomas&#8217;s treatment of these figures in <em>ST</em> III, q. 48, aa. 1&#8211;6.</p><h2>The Theses</h2><p>Another point of clarification must be made: one ought to consider and judge each thesis in the sense in which the tradition takes it. Many understand something like &#8220;penal substitution&#8221; in a cartoonish manner. They define penal substitution in a number of different ways, drawing from countless theologians within and outside the Catholic tradition, writing in a variety of contexts. Therefore, I must begin by setting out the several theses that make up the doctrine before I go on to explain and quote. In order that the reader may properly understand what is said throughout the article, it is vital to understand the whole before descending into the details of the particular theses, explanations, and quotations. A proper understanding of the matter resolves most objections.</p><h3>Thesis I</h3><p><em><strong>Poena</strong></em><strong> (punishment) properly and simply so called (</strong><em><strong>poena simpliciter</strong></em><strong>, </strong><em><strong>formaliter</strong></em><strong>, </strong><em><strong>vindicativa</strong></em><strong>) requires (a) an afflictive evil, (b) against the will of the sufferer, (c) inflicted by a judge passing sentence, (d) in vengeance of the sufferer&#8217;s own fault.</strong></p><p><strong>Note.</strong> St. Thomas&#8217;s account of what belongs to the notion of punishment (<em>De malo</em>, q. 1, a. 4) explicitly includes (a), (b), and (d): punishment is suffered &#8220;for something that one has committed,&#8221; it is contrary to the will, and it consists in a passion. Later Thomists compress these into a formula such as Billuart&#8217;s: <em>malum punitivum et afflictivum, inflictum contra voluntatem passi in vindictam sui peccati</em> (<em>De peccatis</em>, diss. VII, a. 4). Later authors make (c) explicit, although it is implicit in the earlier authors. In my opinion, the development of (c) is one of the most important lines in clarifying this question and its sense is the most obscure in traditional authors. </p><h3>Thesis II</h3><p><strong>We deny that Christ was punished properly and simply so called, insofar as (b), (c), and (d) do not apply to Christ in their proper and simple senses.</strong> First, the sufferings of Christ were not against the will of Christ <em>simpliciter</em>, but were voluntarily accepted. Second, the sufferings of Christ were not inflicted by God as a judge passing sentence upon him, but were inflicted by men: by his persecutors among the Jews, whose rulers delivered him up, and by the Gentiles, through whose hands his passion was completed (<em>ST</em> III, q. 47, aa. 4&#8211;5). Third, there was no fault in Christ for which the sufferings were inflicted. Therefore, we deny that the penal satisfactions (the <em>poenalitates</em>) of Christ had the formal character of punishment properly so called.</p><p><strong>Note 1.</strong> The distinction between the notions of <em>poena simpliciter</em> and <em>poena satisfactoria</em> is important because they repair the violated order of justice in distinct modes. <em>Poena simpliciter</em> repairs the violated order of justice insofar as it is inflicted and endured, while <em>poena satisfactoria</em> repairs it precisely insofar as its acceptance and endurance proceed from the free will of the one suffering. In the first case, justice is satisfied regardless of the dispositions of the one suffering; in the second, justice is satisfied by the moral quality of the one suffering through his suffering.</p><p>This is often lost on modern readers, who do not properly distinguish either between the offense caused by sin and the malice caused by sin (Gonet, <em>De peccatis</em> disp. VIII a. 3) or between the stain of guilt and the obligation of punishment that inhere in the sinner. Many imagine that the primary purpose of punishment is the moral reformation of the one punished. With this assumption, we lose vital doctrines touching purgatory, jurisprudence, and, in this case, the passion of Christ. On purgatory, many understand it primarily (or even exclusively) as a moral reformation of the faults of the holy souls. On jurisprudence, many understand judicial punishments as ordered primarily toward the reformation of the individual. On the passion of Christ, many eliminate the penal aspect of the atonement, understanding it simply as an act meriting grace for the faithful. Along with this, acts of penance lose their satisfactory value, and hell&#8217;s punishments seem empty and cannot be understood in light of the justice of God.</p><p>While it is true that the voluntary acceptance of the punishment perfects the punishment (for it is a greater thing for punishments to be purgatorial, both repairing the offense and healing the malice), this does not pertain to the essence of punishment. It is in light of this that we are able to understand most profoundly the passion of Christ and the necessity of his suffering. While God certainly could have given grace without Christ&#8217;s meriting, or forgiven sins without Christ&#8217;s propitiating, there is no reparation of the order of justice and no expiation of the punishments due to sin without Christ&#8217;s voluntarily suffering and offering that suffering to the vindictive justice of God.</p><p><strong>Note 2.</strong> This distinction between the two senses of punishment (clearly given by St. Thomas) was presented in an <em>adnotatio</em> to the first schema <em>De doctrina catholica</em> (cap. XIV), which the preparatory theologians drafted for the First Vatican Council: </p><blockquote><p>&#8220;Nor therefore was the man Christ punished in that sense in which punishment properly signifies an evil inflicted on the guilty in vengeance of a fault contracted by him. . . . If, then, by the name of punishment is signified a laborious satisfaction for the offenses of men, whose head and surety Christ was constituted, he certainly bore punishments for us and in our stead&#8221; (Mansi 50, cols. 106&#8211;107).</p></blockquote><p><strong>Note 3.</strong> By &#8220;as judge&#8221; we mean: as a judge inflicts punishment upon one who is guilty. We do not deny that God ordained that Christ should bear this penalty (Thesis III) or that this proceeds from his justice; we deny that God passed sentence upon Christ as upon a guilty man.</p><h3>Thesis III</h3><p><strong>We affirm that Christ can be said to be punished in the sense of a &#8220;satisfactory punishment&#8221; (</strong><em><strong>poena satisfactoria</strong></em><strong>), insofar as the afflictive evils suffered by Christ fulfill the notions of (b), (c), and (d) in an improper sense.</strong> First, the sufferings of Christ were voluntary simply speaking (<em>simpliciter</em>), yet involuntary relatively speaking (<em>secundum quid</em>), insofar as they were against the natural inclination of human nature (<em>voluntas ut natura</em>) to flee afflictive evils, so that they may be said to be involuntary considered in themselves (<em>in se</em>) but voluntary according to the circumstances of the act (<em>in casu</em>). Put another way, they were involuntary according to Christ&#8217;s antecedent will but voluntary according to his consequent will. Second, the sufferings of Christ were not inflicted by God as a judge passing sentence on Christ; yet God concurred in the sufferings in four senses: (a) insofar as he permitted them to occur; (b) insofar as Jesus was delivered up by the preordination of God (Acts 2:23); (c) insofar as he inspired the will of Christ to accept the sufferings voluntarily; and (d) insofar as he withheld various consolations from Christ (not in his higher faculties, in which he had the beatific vision, but in their overflow into the lower). This is to be understood both permissively and positively, contrary to those who teach that God merely permitted the passion of Christ so that we can say Christ was &#8220;truly cursed by God, because God ordained that he should endure this punishment in order to free us.&#8221; (<em>Super Gal.</em>, c. 3, lect. 5, n. 150) Further, while God did not afflict Christ by passing sentence on him, the passion of Christ was offered to God&#8217;s vindictive justice (which is the aspect under which he is judge). Third, there was no fault in Christ for which the sufferings were inflicted; yet the sufferings were undertaken for the sake of fault by the union of charity, i.e., for our faults, and therefore they include the notion of fault in the sufferings of Christ.</p><p>It is for this reason that we deny punishment <em>simpliciter</em>, insofar as none of these notions is verified <em>simpliciter</em>, yet we concede punishment <em>secundum quid</em>, insofar as these notions are verified <em>secundum quid</em>: involuntary as against human nature, offered to God as judge, and undertaken for the sake of the fault of another.</p><p><strong>Note 1.</strong> There is a dispute among Catholic authors over whether the terms &#8220;punish&#8221; and &#8220;punishment&#8221; should even be used, in light of the distinction between <em>poena</em> properly taken and <em>poena</em> improperly taken. Yet the more ancient usage confirms this practice (as Pesch shows at length in <em>Das S&#252;hneleiden unseres g&#246;ttlichen Erl&#246;sers</em>; d&#8217;Al&#232;s, in his <em>De Verbo Incarnato</em>, lib. III, th. XXI, gives a lengthy overview, along with copious references to secondary sources), and such a dispute is over a word rather than over the sense. Therefore, the question is of little worth to our consideration, which is scientific in nature. It should be noted that the annotation to the first schema proposed for Vatican I explicitly distinguished the senses, and both its denial and its acceptance are given in qualified forms: Christ is not punished in the sense in which &#8220;punishment properly signifies,&#8221; and he is punished in the sense of &#8220;a laborious satisfaction for the offenses of men&#8221; (cf. also Franzelin, <em>De Verbo Incarnato</em>, th. XLVII, &#167; I).</p><p>It should also be noted that many eminent Thomists remark on the (apparent) absence of the term from St. Thomas. Yet there are a number of texts that should be considered before judging hastily on this matter. St. Thomas&#8217;s testimony in his Commentary on Galatians is sometimes cited: &#8220;And in this way Christ was thought to be cursed, when he hung on the cross, because he was being punished with an extraordinary punishment&#8221; (<em>Super Gal.</em>, c. 3, lect. 5, n. 150). Yet some may explain this, in continuity with the remainder of the passage, as St. Thomas treating the state of Christ with respect to the exterior appearances of his passion in the understanding of the Jews. The same language is used in his Commentary on Psalm 16, where the case is clearer: &#8220;Spiritually, this is said about Christ, who was punished between the thieves like a malefactor&#8221; (<em>In Ps.</em> 16, n. 1). Therefore, this text is ambiguous. Moreover, it should be noted that the sentence from Galatians stands within St. Thomas&#8217;s exposition of the curse as an evil of guilt, which he says is verified of Christ &#8220;only in the estimation of the Jews,&#8221; so that the punishment spoken of is that which men inflicted.</p><p>Yet there seems to be another text, which is indisputable, where St. Thomas writes: &#8220;By baptism man is incorporated into Christ and made his member; therefore, the punishment that Christ underwent is reckoned to him as satisfaction. . . . And therefore God in Christ punished those sins&#8221; (<em>In IV Sent.</em>, d. 4, q. 2, a. 1, qc. 2, ad 1). Someone may object to this text that the object of this punishment is &#8220;sins&#8221; rather than Christ. To this it must be said that the concrete subject in which these sins were punished is Christ, since these sins could never be punished in themselves, or in their guilt, or in the obligation to punishment, or in those who committed them. Therefore, God is here said to punish, and that in which he punishes these sins is Christ, namely, in the satisfactory punishment which Christ bore (cf. <em>ST</em> III, q. 69, a. 2, ad 1). While this satisfactory punishment &#8220;diminishes something of the notion of punishment&#8221; (<em>ST</em> I-II, q. 87, a. 6), it does not remove it altogether. Many have read &#8220;diminishes&#8221; as if St. Thomas taught that it removed the notion altogether, yet this seems impossible given the qualification that it diminishes &#8220;something,&#8221; which is not said when a notion is removed entirely, but only when it is applied in a less proper or relative sense, which is exactly what those defending the term argue.</p><p><strong>Note 2.</strong> When we speak of the &#8220;permission&#8221; of the sins of the killers, we have to be careful not to confuse this with the will that God has toward the passion of Christ. Some speak as if God only permitted the passion, negatively and permissively, rather than willing it positively. This is an error, owing to two misunderstandings. First, these authors do not understand that we ought to distinguish between the passion of Christ (which was essentially a good) and the sins of the Jews (which were moral evils). Second, they do not understand the difference between a moral evil and a physical evil. Evil is never willed by God <em>per se</em>, but physical evils (e.g., afflictive evils as punishments) are willed by God <em>per accidens</em> on account of some good (which, in this case, is the redemption of mankind).</p><p>To free myself from accusations of blasphemy, I will simply give the words of Solano:</p><blockquote><p>&#8220;The Father not only permitted but also willed this concrete expiation of Christ through his passion and death. . . . The passion and death of Christ had the very grave sin of the Jews as its proximate cause. But God only permitted this sin. However the passion itself was good, &#8216;and this was by an absolute preordained will, just as it was also willed by Christ himself with an absolute will&#8217; [Su&#225;rez, <em>De mysteriis vitae Christi</em>, in III, q. 46, a. 10]. However, lest an absolute volition of this kind of Christ&#8217;s passion on the part of God be badly understood, it must be noted that God cannot will <em>per se</em> physical evils and evils of punishment, that is, by willing them as they are in themselves, but only <em>per accidens</em>, that is, by ordaining them to a good that has a greater value than the good prevented by those evils. However, he does will them, and does not just permit them, while he only permits moral evils.&#8221; (<em>Sacrae Theologiae Summa</em> IIIA, <em>On the Incarnate Word</em>, n. 681)</p></blockquote><p>How exactly do we explain the coherence between the mere permission of the sins of the Jews and the absolute willing of the passion? This is explained according to the different systems of the divine decree and free will set out in <em>De Deo Uno</em> (i.e., the Molinist, the Thomist, etc.); therefore, it is outside the scope of this article, which does not concern itself with such questions.</p><h3>Thesis IV</h3><p><strong>The satisfaction which Christ offered to the Father has, as an essential element, expiation, i.e., &#8220;penal compensation offered to the vindictive justice of God&#8221; (Solano, n. 668), which includes some material suffering dignified by some moral quality, without which there could not be condignity and sufficiency in an intrinsic manner.</strong></p><p><strong>Note 1.</strong> This is precisely the point on which the twentieth-century quarrel was most heated. Pesch and his followers taught as Catholic doctrine that Christ &#8220;rendered satisfaction in the strict sense by bearing for men the punishment due to sin&#8221; (<em>Praelectiones dogmaticae</em> IV, n. 415, ed. 4&#8211;5 [1922], p. 243). Rivi&#232;re, on the other hand, held that the suffering of Christ played &#8220;only a secondary and accidental role&#8221; (in a letter printed in <em>Revue thomiste</em> 21 [1913], p. 204). For Rivi&#232;re and his followers, what was primary and essential in satisfaction was the &#8220;moral element&#8221; of the passion, i.e., the act of submission and love on the part of Christ (<em>Le dogme de la R&#233;demption: &#201;tude th&#233;ologique</em> [1914], pp. 181&#8211;182).</p><p>Contrary to this, it is to be firmly held that the penal element (while not absolutely necessary for the forgiveness of sins, the meriting of grace, etc.) was necessary in order for there to be a condign satisfaction for sins offered to the vindictive justice of God (Solano, n. 669). It should be noted that the suffering we hold to be necessary for such an end is not the suffering of his whole passion, but any degree of suffering on the part of Christ, although it was supremely fitting for Christ to suffer and die in the manner that he did.</p><p>As Scheeben notes: &#8220;Christ could have merited grace and glory for us without suffering for us, whereas suffering is essentially required for satisfaction. For without self-renunciation, self-denial, self-abasement, God&#8217;s ravaged honor cannot be restored&#8221; (<em>The Mysteries of Christianity</em>, &#167; 67). St. Thomas teaches that &#8220;satisfaction must be penal&#8221; (<em>In III Sent.</em>, d. 20, q. 1, a. 4, qc. 2, ad 4) and that one satisfies for another &#8220;by taking on himself the punishment due to the sin of the other&#8221; (<em>ST</em> III, q. 14, a. 1); cf. <em>Compendium theologiae</em> I, cc. 226&#8211;227.</p><p>As to the terminology of &#8220;through&#8221; versus &#8220;in&#8221; suffering, Pesch&#8217;s statement stands:</p><blockquote><p>&#8220;It is all the more surprising that even certain Catholic theologians, out of fear of these attacks, strive to change at least the manner of speaking and advise that one ought to say: Christ suffering redeemed us (<em>Christus patiens nos redemit</em>), but not: Christ redeemed us by his passion (<em>Christus passione sua nos redemit</em>). But one must hold to the manner of speaking which Scripture, the Fathers, the theologians, the councils have sanctioned: Christ redeemed us by his passion, blood, death.&#8221; (Pesch, <em>Compendium theologiae dogmaticae</em> III, n. 134 d, ed. 5 [1935], p. 75)</p></blockquote><p><strong>Note 2.</strong> We say that this is an &#8220;essential element,&#8221; but not that it is the primary element. In fact, this element is secondary. The suffering is, as it were, the matter, while the principle is charity, the habit of soul from which Christ is inclined to will to satisfy for another and from which the satisfaction has its efficacy (<em>ST</em> III, q. 14, a. 1, ad 1). Therefore, it is not secondary in the sense of &#8220;accidental,&#8221; but as that which is less principal within what is essential.</p><h3>Thesis V</h3><p><strong>Satisfaction is not </strong><em><strong>per se</strong></em><strong> necessary for the forgiveness of sins by God, yet it is supremely fitting.</strong></p><p><strong>Note.</strong> Satisfaction is not necessary simply and absolutely, since God could have forgiven sins without injustice. Yet there is some hypothetical necessity, insofar as God has willed a certain end. First, on the supposition that God requires condign satisfaction, there must be a satisfier of infinite dignity. Second, on the supposition that God requires a satisfaction strictly so called, there must be one who voluntarily suffers penal afflictions. Third, on the supposition that God wills that there be expiation before his vindictive justice, there must be penal afflictions offered to his vindictive justice.</p><h3>Thesis VI</h3><p><strong>The penal defects were not contracted by Christ, but voluntarily assumed by him.</strong></p><p><strong>Note.</strong> Here we do not mean all penal defects, but only those which are compatible with his fullness of grace and knowledge, since &#8220;No one offers satisfaction to God by being deprived of grace, or by being ignorant of God, or by the fact that his soul is in a state of disorder, even though such afflictions are punishment for sin; man can satisfy only by enduring some pain in himself and by undergoing loss in external goods&#8221; (St. Thomas, <em>Compendium theologiae</em> I, c. 226).</p><h3>Thesis VII</h3><p><strong>Christ did not suffer the pains of hell, the pains of the damned, or the sense of divine wrath toward him, because Christ satisfied for the </strong><em><strong>reatus poenae</strong></em><strong> by a penalty that is equivalent in value but not identical in kind, since the value of the satisfaction is from the dignity of the person and the charity of the offering, not necessarily from the species of the penalty.</strong></p><h3>Thesis VIII</h3><p><strong>Christ did not substitute for us insofar as the very </strong><em><strong>reatus</strong></em><strong> of guilt or punishment passed to him, but insofar as he was our head and voluntary surety. Therefore, we say that Christ was substituted for us insofar as Christ&#8217;s satisfaction is vicarious (and thus can be said to be &#8220;ours&#8221;).</strong></p><p><strong>Note 1.</strong> This substitution is explained at length by St. John Paul II in his General Audience of October 26, 1988.</p><p><strong>Note 2.</strong> By the <em>reatus</em> of punishment we mean the liability to punishment which arises from one&#8217;s own guilt. We do not deny that Christ, as our surety, took upon himself the debt of satisfying for us and the penalties due to our sins.</p><h3>Thesis IX</h3><p><strong>Christ made an act of propitiation toward God, which is rightly said to placate or appease his wrath; yet we ought not to say that the wrath of God fell on the Son. The relation of Christ and his passion to the wrath of God is ascending (i.e., from Christ to God), not descending (i.e., from God to Christ).</strong></p><p><strong>Note 1.</strong> It is for this reason that we say that Christ&#8217;s satisfaction was not an exercise of the vindictive justice of God toward Christ, but an act of commutative justice of Christ toward the vindictive justice of God. As an analogy, the action of a debtor toward a creditor is an exercise of commutative justice toward the creditor, while the action of a judge toward the debtor who does not pay is an act of vindictive justice. Christ acted the part of the debtor as our voluntary surety.</p><p><strong>Note 2.</strong> While we deny that the wrath of God fell on the Son as on its object, as though God were angry with Christ or punished him as one guilty, the decree, the command, and the delivering up to the passion do descend from God in his justice. This explains how we can speak of God as &#8220;judge&#8221; in a certain sense, insofar as (a) Christ offered his satisfaction to God&#8217;s vindictive justice, and (b) God&#8217;s concurrence was exercised through the attribute of justice.</p><h3>Thesis X</h3><p><strong>Christ&#8217;s satisfaction was of itself, and not by extrinsic acceptation, a condign satisfaction according to the whole rigor of divine justice; therefore, through the passion of Christ, God&#8217;s justice was truly satisfied and not waived.</strong></p><div><hr></div><p><em>If you really enjoyed this and want to help support this series, please consider becoming a Patron <a href="https://www.patreon.com/militantthomist">here</a>. If you become a Patron, you get access to the Telegram groupchat for as little as $5 per month. Thank you!</em></p><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-1" href="#footnote-anchor-1" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">1</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>First schema in Mansi 50, cols. 69-70; clarifications are made in an <em>adnotatio</em> (note 33) in cols. 106-107: &#8220;Vicarious satisfaction is declared, namely one rendered in our place. <strong>Christ the immaculate Lamb certainly did not take upon himself, nor could he, our sins themselves formally, so that they should be his; nor therefore was the man Christ punished in that sense in which punishment properly signifies an evil inflicted on the guilty in vengeance of a fault contracted by him.</strong> But Christ himself, by his human will also, made himself surety before God to satisfy the offended God for the fault and punishment of the whole human race. <strong>If then by the name of punishment is signified a laborious satisfaction for the offenses of men, whose head and surety Christ was constituted, he certainly bore punishments for us and in our stead.</strong> In this sense in almost innumerable places of holy Scripture God is said to have laid on Christ our sins and iniquities, and to have made him sin, i.e. a victim for expiating sin. Because the genuine concept of satisfaction and redemption is perverted not only by wholly impious men but also by some out of ignorance, the same dare to affirm that according to the notion of vicarious satisfaction an innocent is punished for the guilty against justice. Against such errors, then, an explanation of the doctrine is necessary, by which all Catholic faithful profess that this very act, by which God delivered his Son for us, is no less of infinite justice than of infinite mercy toward us, in which all God&#8217;s other mercies toward the fallen human race are founded, and on which they depend.&#8221; The reformed schema is given in Mansi 53, cols. 171&#8211;176. It is to be noted that the first schema already said that Christ &#8220;truly satisfied for us&#8221; (<em>vere pro nobis satisfecisse</em>; Mansi 50, col. 70), and that when the reformed schema was laid before the Deputation on Faith, the insertion of &#8220;truly and properly&#8221; (<em>vere ac proprie</em>) was requested on 17 March 1870, the formula then adopted by the Deputation for its draft canon, which was never put to the Council, being <em>vere et proprie satisfecisse</em> (Mansi 53, cols. 204, 228, 237).</p></div></div>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[The Eastern Orthodox ‘Forgeries’ Lie]]></title><description><![CDATA[The Historical Reality]]></description><link>https://thomism.com/p/the-eastern-orthodox-forgeries-lie</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://thomism.com/p/the-eastern-orthodox-forgeries-lie</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Christian B. Wagner]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Sat, 03 Oct 2026 02:18:15 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/5f0392d7-559b-4d80-b82e-95a1be0a12f3_1066x914.png" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Please consider becoming a patron <a href="https://www.patreon.com/militantthomist">here</a> for as little as $5 per month. With your contribution, I am able to continue writing articles and making videos. Alternitively, you can become a paid (or free) for the SAME price for the next year by taking advantage of <strong>50% off</strong> the normal monthly price. If you want to sign up, now is the time! Click <a href="https://thomism.com/bf97bf0c">here</a> to get the discount. </p><h1><strong>Introduction</strong></h1><p>A frequent talking point among Eastern Orthodox apologists concerns a short work that St. Thomas Aquinas wrote in 1263 or early 1264, known as the <em>Contra errores Graecorum</em>. The claim is that St. Thomas bases his entire refutation of Eastern Orthodoxy on a mass of forgeries. The conclusion drawn from this (supposed) fact is that the medieval Latin synthesis on the papacy, the Filioque, and the other points disputed with the Greeks was founded on forgeries rather than on a genuine study of the Fathers. The same claim then becomes the explanatory framework for the unions of Lyons II and Florence, which remain an embarrassment for the Orthodox.</p><p>In this article I want to focus especially on the Filioque, since it is a particular interest of mine and, in my opinion, was regarded as the more important dogmatic question at both Lyons II and Florence.</p><p>In reality, this narrative is a fabrication on several different levels, and nowhere more so than on the composition of the <em>Contra errores Graecorum</em> itself. As the scholarship of the last century has decisively shown, the <em>Contra errores Graecorum</em> is nothing like a florilegium (i.e., an ancient &#8220;quote mine&#8221;) against Orthodoxy, and to call many of its quotations &#8220;forgeries&#8221; does no justice to their origins, least of all in the case of the Trinitarian texts. </p><p>Further, as a supposed disproof of Catholicism the objection is self-defeating. These apologists betray their ignorance of how inauthentic texts were used in the patristic era and in the Byzantine East, and the same standard would just as easily refute the Church of the first millennium and the Byzantines of the second. </p><p>Finally, the idea that the Eastern Orthodox at Florence were chiefly convinced by forgeries is a fairy tale. Both sides at Florence did put forward some inauthentic texts in the debate on the Filioque, but the great majority of the texts cited were authentic. In fact, when explicitly commenting on what convinced them, the Greek bishops pointed to the lengthy excerpts from authentic texts, against the claims of Mark of Ephesus (which could hardly be verified). To explain the defection of the Eastern bishops and the ensuing union by the small number of forgeries is delusional.</p><h1><strong>I. Spurious texts in the councils and in Byzantine controversy</strong></h1><p>NOTE. The examples that follow are given <em>ad hominem</em> in the classical sense: they show the disastrous conclusions that follow from discrediting doctrines, councils, and the like on the basis of the inference the apologists draw. None of them is meant to discredit the doctrine in whose service the text was cited. They are meant to show that the inference from &#8220;spurious texts were used&#8221; to &#8220;the doctrine is false&#8221; cannot be drawn by anyone who accepts the first seven councils and the later Byzantine tradition.</p><h2><strong>1. The Apollinarian forgeries</strong></h2><p>The first example of dubious texts entering a theological dispute comes from the Council of Ephesus (431). At its first session a florilegium of sixteen patristic extracts was read. Two of them were Apollinarian writings under orthodox names: one read as Pope Julius comes from a letter of Timothy the Apollinarian, and one read as Pope Felix is an Apollinarian fragment. Another famous example from the same dispute concerns the origin of St. Cyril&#8217;s celebrated formula, &#8220;one incarnate nature of God the Word,&#8221; which came from a tract of Apollinarius lying in the Alexandrian archive under the name of St. Athanasius. These forgeries were not exposed by modern scholarship but a century after the dispute by Leontius. [1]</p><h2><strong>2. The Dionysian corpus</strong></h2><p>The corpus of Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite first appears in controversy at the Collatio of 532, where it was cited by the Severians. Some contemporary Orthodox pretend that concern over the origin of the Dionysian corpus is a modern invention; in fact there were doubts about its authorship at the very moment it first appeared. Hypatius of Ephesus objected to the quotations as soon as the Severians produced them, arguing that they could not be genuine, since St. Cyril never cites them. [2] The corpus was nevertheless received by both East and West, and quoted by the Lateran Synod of 649, by the Sixth and Seventh Councils, by St. Maximus, by St. John Damascene, and by many others. How, then, are we to receive a corpus whose authorship is, at the very least, dubious on both intrinsic and extrinsic grounds? <em>The Encyclopedia of Eastern Orthodox Christianity</em>, in its article on Pseudo-Dionysius, states the following: the Dionysian writings &#8220;lose none of their credibility owing to the &#8216;problem&#8217; of authorship; they rise or fall in Orthodox esteem on the basis of their content alone.&#8221; [3] This is a good principle, and it should apply equally to texts of dubious origin used in the East and in the West.</p><h2><strong>3. Constantinople III</strong></h2><p>The history of Constantinople III (680&#8211;681) is a complete mess. The council was almost entirely taken up with questions about the authenticity of texts. The trouble began when the official acts of the Fifth Council, held in the same city roughly a century earlier, were suspected of having been falsified in a Monothelete sense. After a great deal of investigation, a monk named George confessed that, at the instigation of Macarius of Antioch, he had falsified every copy of the Fifth Council that came into the patriarch&#8217;s hands. Macarius&#8217;s own patristic florilegium was then found to consist of mutilated extracts, and he was condemned. What makes the affair stranger still is that recent scholarship has argued that the documents the council denounced as forgeries were in fact authentic, so that the council&#8217;s own proof of forgery was unsound to some degree. [4]</p><h2><strong>4. The Quinisext Council and the &#8220;Apostolic&#8221; Canons</strong></h2><p>One of the most egregious examples of the use of forgeries comes from the Council in Trullo (691&#8211;692), also known as the Quinisext Council. Ironically, the council accepted the eighty-five canons &#8220;handed down to us in the name of the holy and glorious Apostles&#8221; (can. 2) while accusing the <em>Apostolic Constitutions</em> of having been corrupted by heretics. In reality, the <em>Apostolic Constitutions</em> is a compilation of fourth-century Syrian liturgical and canonical material from a variety of sources, and the same is true of the <em>Apostolic Canons</em>, which is exactly why the <em>Canons</em> were attached to the <em>Constitutions</em>: they came out of the same ecclesiastical community and were gathered for the same purpose. Some may accuse me of relying on &#8220;modern scholarship,&#8221; but here, as with the Cyrillian texts and the Dionysian corpus, the objection is ancient. That is why the Gelasian decree lists the <em>Apostolic Canons</em> among the apocrypha. The example may look minor, but these canons are <em>the</em> foundation of the Byzantine canonical tradition. If we are to throw out everything built on texts of dubious authorship, the whole Byzantine canonical tradition goes out with it.</p><p>Another ironic instance concerns the canons on clerical continence. To support their practice of not binding priests to perpetual continence, the fathers of Trullo appealed to a canon of the Council of Carthage, claiming to stand in line with the North African discipline. Yet when we look at the sources, the African canons say the opposite. The Council of Carthage of 390, received into the African Code of 419, decreed that bishops, priests, and deacons be &#8220;continent in all things,&#8221; and called this &#8220;what the Apostles taught and antiquity itself observed.&#8221; [5] Some chalk this up to an atrocious misreading of the canons, but it is far more likely that the text was mangled in translation, whether by accident or on purpose. This dubious text became the foundation (together with other spurious material) of a distinctive Greek practice that has lasted more than thirteen hundred years.</p><p>And this is not even the best part. Why did I call this &#8220;ironic&#8221;? If you are paying attention, you may have noticed that the mangled version of the Carthaginian canon, as the Greeks read it, said that <strong>bishops</strong> as well as priests and deacons needed to remain continent only at certain times. Their own source, in other words, supported the continued use of marriage by bishops too. Yet their legislation refused to go that far and denied the concession to bishops, as remains the practice to this day. The fathers of Trullo did not even follow their own dubious texts when they legislated. [6]</p><h2><strong>5. Nicaea II</strong></h2><p>An oft mentioned example occurred at the Second Council of Nicaea. The pseudo-council of Hiereia had cited a litany of dubious texts, and its florilegia were &#8220;riddled with fragments of dubious attribution and genuineness,&#8221; [7] something the contemporary enemies of iconodulia rarely mention. Nicaea II, with this in mind, made a genuine attempt to avoid the same risk in its own citations. The Seventh Council insisted that whole books, and not loose extracts, be produced in session, precisely because Hiereia had worked from sheets of doubtful texts. Yet the precaution was not completely successful, and a number of dubious texts slipped through, among them the pseudo-Basilian letter to Julian the Apostate, read as Basil&#8217;s. (As I said above, it would be far too rash to proclaim all such texts &#8220;forgeries&#8221; with absolute certainty.)</p><h2><strong>6. Photius, St. Andrew, and Constantine</strong></h2><p>While many Byzantines are quick to point out the use of forgeries in support of the papal dogma, there are plenty of examples of Byzantines doing the same thing in order to oppose the authority of the Bishop of Rome.</p><p>First, at the Photian council of 879&#8211;880, letters of Pope John VIII were read in a Greek version heavily redacted to remove the passages unfavorable to Photius and the council. Francis Dvornik, who is more than fair to Photius, says that the letters &#8220;were changed, with the consent of the legates,&#8221; and that &#8220;John VIII protested against the changes made in his letters by the Greeks.&#8221; [8]</p><p>Second, one of the chief difficulties for Constantinople was that the see of Byzantium was not an apostolic see but a later foundation. A legend was therefore produced in which the Apostle Andrew founds the see and ordains Stachys its first bishop, circulating under the name of Dorotheus of Tyre. Dvornik showed that these episcopal lists were compiled around the turn of the ninth century, which is probably not a coincidence. The legend became a standard tool in the hands of Byzantine polemicists and went a long way toward shaping their ecclesiology of the see of Constantinople and its relation to Rome. [9]</p><p>Third, one of the most ironic examples is the use of the Donation of Constantine in the East. Orthodox polemicists often cite the Donation as one of the forgeries on which the papal dogma was supposedly built. Yet in the East the Donation of Constantine was received into the Byzantine canonical tradition in the twelfth century and used to argue for the claims of Constantinople as the New Rome. [10]</p><h2><strong>7. The azymes</strong></h2><p>The controversy over the azymes (the use of unleavened bread in the Eucharist) does not get much attention today, but it was a major point of dispute in earlier eras. A tract under the name of St. Athanasius and fragments attributed to St. John Damascene, both titled <em>On the Azymes</em> (<em>De azymis</em>), circulated in the centuries after 1054 to supply some sort of patristic support for the Eastern position against the West.</p><h2><strong>8. Lyons and Florence</strong></h2><p>There were plenty of shenanigans surrounding Lyons II and Florence on both sides, extending in some cases to the mutilation of manuscripts in order to destroy the other side&#8217;s evidence (although, to my knowledge, the only well-documented instances are Greek). After Lyons II, Patriarch John Bekkos had to defend his unionism against the great majority of Greeks who opposed him. He focused above all on the Filioque and produced many texts from the Fathers. In one case an &#8220;old codex&#8221; (old from the perspective of 1280!) of St. Gregory of Nyssa was found to have had the word &#7952;&#954; scraped off with a knife, at the very place where Gregory speaks of the Spirit as from the Son. When the matter was brought before Bekkos&#8217;s synod, it ordered that the gap be left empty and the facts recorded, since it would not be safe to write the word back in. [11]</p><p>Something similar came to light after the Council of Florence. In the middle of a textual dispute, Mark of Ephesus claimed that the Latin codices of St. Basil had been falsified, while admitting that four or five manuscripts in Constantinople itself carried the same reading. The Latins, for their part, knew their manuscript&#8217;s history well enough: it had been brought from Constantinople the year before by Nicholas of Cusa, it was a parchment book far older than the schism, and it bore no mark of alteration. To test the claim, Bessarion (a Greek, and later a cardinal) examined the manuscripts present at the council. Of the six copies there, five had the Latin reading, among them the ninth-century <em>Marcianus gr.</em> 58. [12] Then, upon returning to Constantinople, he searched the libraries of the monasteries and found that the copies written after the controversy began lacked the Latin reading, while the older ones had it. Beyond this, in the monastery of Christ Pantepoptes he found two old codices from which the words had been removed, one by a blade and the other by ink. [13]</p><p>(More on this later). </p><h2><strong>9. Gregory Palamas</strong></h2><p>In the Palamite controversy one of the texts most often cited by Gregory Palamas and his party was a homily on the Annunciation ascribed to St. Athanasius. It supplied the language about the realities &#8220;around God&#8221; that served the distinction of essence and energies. Palamas cites it in his letters, in the <em>Hundred and Fifty Chapters</em>, in the <em>Antirrhetics</em>, and in the treatises on the procession, and it is quoted twice in the synodal Tome of 1351. The homily is a seventh-century pseudepigraphon, &#8220;now almost unanimously recognized as spurious.&#8221; [14] Here we have one of the key articulations of the doctrine resting on a &#8220;forged&#8221; text.</p><h2><strong>Conclusion</strong></h2><p>The point of this section is not to disparage or disprove any of the doctrines mentioned, which should be obvious enough from the fact that I hold many of them. What the examples show is that the unqualified assertion &#8220;if doctrine x is supported by forgeries, then it is false&#8221; is simplistic and self-defeating. Many of the qualified versions of the assertion fail as well. In several of these cases the forgeries were not merely incidental but quite fundamental to the formulation and defense of the doctrine (St. Cyril, Palamas, the azymes, the laws on priestly continence, the role of Constantinople, etc.).</p><h1><strong>II. Were the Greeks deceived by forgeries?</strong></h1><p>At Florence the texts of the Fathers were debated at length in the sessions of March 1439, with John of Montenero speaking for the Latins and Mark of Ephesus for the Greeks. The Orthodox apologists argue that the Greeks were won over by a great number of Latin forgeries. If that were really the case, we would expect at least a majority of the texts Montenero cited to be of dubious origin.</p><p>Fr. Thomas Crean, O.P., has done exactly this work, tallying the authorities Montenero read in the March sessions, sixty-one testimonies in all, and checking them against the authenticity judgments of the <em>Clavis Patrum</em>. Of the twenty-nine Latin authorities, twenty-two are indisputably authentic, three inauthentic, two disputed, and two unidentified. Of the thirty-two Greek authorities, twenty-nine are authentic (counting the fifth book <em>Against Eunomius</em> as the ancient witness it is, and taking St. Jerome&#8217;s version of Didymus at face value), two inauthentic, and one unidentified. That is fifty-one authentic testimonies against five inauthentic and five disputed. [15] By modern standards such a rate of inauthentic texts would be troubling; by medieval standards it was a remarkable feat, and very few florilegia could boast such accuracy. What is also notable is the accuracy with which it cited texts from original manuscripts, rather than from other florilegia wich often included interpolations, glosses, and bad translations (as we shall see later in the case of Nicholas of Crotone). </p><p>On the Orthodox account we would expect a high rate of inauthentic texts, wildly out of proportion to the authentic ones. Yet, we see the opposite. Not only is there a mere handful of inauthentic texts, but, relative to the era, there are far fewer than one would expect, with the remaining texts quoted with precision often from the most ancient condices they could find with a clear chain of custody. Consider the total number of inauthentic texts presented: are we really to believe that the Greek bishops would have capitulated at sixty-one texts but not at fifty-six? From this consideration alone it is incredible to me that anyone would dream of making the claim.</p><p>Among the disputed points the most attention has gone to the aforementioned <em>Against Eunomius</em> III, 1, which makes an interesting case study. The variant used by the Latins is attested in manuscripts well before the schism, some of them from regions outside any Latin influence. The exact origin of the variant is still debated, and most scholars hold that it is not from St. Basil himself. But, as I said before, it is an early interpolation in a text that was read, studied, and taught in the East for centuries before the schism. Quite a few of the &#8220;forgeries&#8221; are cases exactly like this, minor manuscript variants present long before the schism, which hardly support the grandiose claims of the Orthodox apologists.</p><p>When we look at the testimonies of the unionist Greeks, the reason they joined the Latins was not isolated discrepancies among manuscripts but the fact that so many of the testimonies simply could not have been forged: to forge them one would have had to create whole homilies, commentaries, and chapters. These men, many of them humanists with experience of manuscript variation, understood perfectly well that small corruptions and insertions happen. But when they studied these texts they saw that the arguments for the Filioque drawn from the Fathers went far beyond anything such variants could account for. Bessarion famously said that if all such passages were removed from the books of the Latin Fathers there would be &#8220;nothing left but blank pages.&#8221; [16] To claim that these men were convinced by isolated insertions or corruptions is absurd, since they deliberately sought out the long passages that could not have been corrupted.</p><h1><strong>III. St. Thomas and the </strong><em><strong>Contra errores Graecorum</strong></em></h1><p>The popular picture of the <em>Contra errores Graecorum</em> is that St. Thomas sat down one day to write a book refuting the Greeks and filled it with whatever texts came to hand. This is far from the truth. The work was written at the request of Urban IV, who sent St. Thomas a <em>libellus</em> (a florilegium) compiled by Nicholas of Durazzo, a Greek by birth, and asked for his assessment of it. The <em>libellus</em> was troubling because many of its quotations contained language offensive to Latin ears, especially in the way they spoke of the Trinity. St. Thomas accordingly sets himself two tasks in his prologue: first, to explain how these seemingly erroneous statements can be understood in an orthodox sense; second, to show how the same authorities can be used to teach and defend the Catholic faith.</p><p>It would be a complete distortion to imagine that St. Thomas collected these quotations himself in order to deploy them against the Greeks, or that he authenticated them on his own authority. The work is a commentary on a florilegium, nothing out of the ordinary before the modern era, and in works of this kind the fault obviously lies not with the commentator but with whoever compiled the quotations in the first place.</p><p>This is universally recognized by the scholars who have studied the <em>Contra errores Graecorum</em>. The title itself, which St. Thomas did not give the work and which was attached to it decades after his death, is something of a misnomer. As Hyacinthe-Fran&#231;ois Dondaine, who edited the text for the Leonine edition, puts it, the title &#8220;purely and simply misreads the intention of the author.&#8221; Antoine Dondaine called the work &#8220;less a treatise against the Greeks than an inquiry into the <em>Libellus</em>.&#8221; Mark Jordan describes it as &#8220;an occasional commentary upon a missionary polemic. It is not itself a polemic.&#8221; Martin Hubert writes that &#8220;this piece of writing, poorly named <em>Contra errores Graecorum</em>, is the benevolent examination of a <em>libellus</em>.&#8221; [17]</p><p>This is obvious from even a cursory look at the work&#8217;s content and context. Lost for centuries, the original <em>libellus</em> of Nicholas of Durazzo was brought to light by Pietro Antonio Uccelli in 1869, and Dondaine, comparing the two texts, found that of St. Thomas&#8217;s 205 citations of the Greek Fathers, 200 come from the <em>libellus</em>. [18] If this were a polemical work of St. Thomas&#8217;s own (rather than a commentary on a florilegium), it would be incredible that he did not bring forward the many citations of the Fathers that he regularly employs on these topics, as he does in every one of his polemical works. Funnily enough, of the five authorities he did supply from his own stock, none is a forgery. [19]</p><p>This is confirmed by a quick reading of the text itself (which, to my astonishment, none of these people seem actually to have done). In the epilogue St. Thomas sets out a series of criticisms of the very work the Pope had asked him to comment on; he faults, for instance, the translation of many passages in the <em>Libellus</em>. His distrust is confirmed by a simple historical observation. As students of St. Thomas know, he is one of the most consistent authors in the history of the world. You can read texts on the same topic written decades apart and he will give the very same patristic quotations. From this simple fact we should be able to gather whether St. Thomas trusted this work or not. We would expect him to pick up a few quotations from the <em>libellus</em> and begin using them in his other works, as we see so many times when St. Thomas gets hold of a new source (after his Roman period, for example, when he gained access to many new texts, or in the compiling of the <em>Catena</em>). If St. Thomas trusted the genuineness of the 200 quotations he reproduced from the <em>libellus</em>, we would expect to see at least some of them turn up in his later works on the same topics, right? Yet we see almost nothing of the sort. </p><p>In fact, we have one instance that should put every other interpretation to rest. In <em>Summa contra Gentiles</em> IV, 24, written at the very time he was writing the <em>Contra errores</em>, St. Thomas has an excursus in which he demonstrates the doctrine of the Filioque from the Greek Fathers. If St. Thomas were really composing a polemical tract in the <em>Contra errores</em>, rather than a simple commentary, it would have been nearly impossible for him to avoid the dozens of quotations in the <em>Contra errores</em> attributed to the Greek Fathers. Yet not a single citation from the <em>Libellus</em> appears in that passage.How much clearer could it be?</p><p>I can go even further. In <em>De potentia</em> q. 10, a. 4, St. Thomas quotes St. Cyril&#8217;s synodical letter to Nestorius from the acts of the councils, together with the declaration of the Fifth Council on the authority of the Fathers. The sentence of Cyril also stands in the <em>libellus</em>. Yet St. Thomas quotes it in a completely different translation, that of the <em>Collectio Casinensis</em>, rather than in the version of the <em>libellus</em> he had used shortly before. [20]</p><p>All of this could be gathered even without a detailed textual study of the <em>libellus</em>. The Dominicans &#201;chard and De Rubeis had already answered, in the eighteenth century, that these texts were collected by someone else and handed to St. Thomas for his commentary, [21] and the collection itself would not be rediscovered for more than a century.</p><p>St. Thomas understood quite well that texts can carry critical errors, and he did the best he could with the tools he had to root them out and avoid misattributions. Besides the remarkable work done in Rome gaining access to conciliar collections and works of the Fathers that were not commonly read, St. Thomas showed flashes of critical genius in his judgment of particular works: his rejection of the Augustinian authorship of the <em>De spiritu et anima</em> and of the <em>De ecclesiasticis dogmatibus</em>, his being the first to identify the origin of the <em>Liber de causis</em> in Proclus, and his correctly naming Theophylact rather than St. John Chrysostom as the author of certain texts on which the <em>libellus</em> erred. [22] In the <em>Catena</em> the same critical sense is on display, carefully and methodically distinguishing the Fathers&#8217; own words from glosses. Elsewhere he recognizes faulty translations from the Greek (especially in the works of St. John Chrysostom) and remedies them, and in order to study the Fathers he had a number of Greek commentaries translated into Latin. [23]</p><p>Here, too, we can praise the genius of St. Thomas on another point that few have given him credit for. The first part of the <em>Contra errores</em> is almost entirely taken up with critical explanations of the texts of the <em>libellus</em>. Dondaine notes that the passages St. Thomas singled out in this section as doubtful in their phrasing turn out almost all to be corrupted in some way (by translation, by gloss, etc.). Without knowing it, his theological judgment had picked out what was spurious. [24] Far from being ashamed of this work, Catholics should be glad of the genius of the Common Doctor in pulling off this superhuman feat.</p><p>As noted above, Nicholas of Durazzo was a Greek by birth. His <em>libellus</em> was prepared for the Byzantine emperor and written in Greek. The irony should not be lost on any reader that the supposed &#8220;Latin forgeries of St. Thomas&#8221; were written by a Greek, for Greeks. When the work came to Pope Urban IV he evidently had his suspicions about it (interestingly, there is no record of the Greeks suspecting the work, only the Latins), and he sent it to St. Thomas for review, as both Dondaines and Plested note. [25]</p><h1><strong>IV. Forgery, pseudepigraphy, and scholarship before criticism</strong></h1><p>In the remainder of this article I go into more detail about the strange origins of the <em>libellus</em>. We will see that modern scholarship has argued, convincingly in my view, that the core of the <em>libellus</em> comes from a late eighth-century Roman collection, and that its Filioque section goes back to a mid-seventh-century collection gathered in the time of St. Maximus the Confessor by the Greek and Palestinian monks around him which had been translated from Greek into Latin, then back into Greek, before being translated back into Latin by a translator with very little skill, and even less skill at sourcing, distinguishing glosses, etc.. I also explain in some detail why the charge of &#8220;forgery&#8221; is not so simple after all.</p>
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   ]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[Schism and the Reformation: A Reply to Redeemed Zoomer]]></title><description><![CDATA[The &#8216;Constance&#8217; Objection]]></description><link>https://thomism.com/p/schism-and-the-reformation-a-reply</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://thomism.com/p/schism-and-the-reformation-a-reply</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Christian B. Wagner]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Tue, 29 Sep 2026 23:18:24 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/4e8f7cd5-872d-4804-8301-12a5d55feb34_872x582.png" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Appreciate this article? Consider becoming a patron <a href="https://www.patreon.com/militantthomist">here</a>. Patron members get access to our Telegram group and help support my articles and videos. </p><h2>Introduction</h2><p>Earlier this week, I released a video titled &#8220;A Thorough DEBUNKING of Redeemed Zoomer.&#8221; In this video, I discuss a number of different problems with Richard&#8217;s understanding of schism, his arguments against the papacy, and certain statements he has made on Mariology.</p><p>Many found the schism section especially helpful, even certain Protestants (although for the opposite reason). One of Richard&#8217;s common themes is his opposition to other Protestant groups on the grounds that they are schismatic. He argues that the traditional Protestant view of schism did not allow for the division of the Church on grounds of corruption in doctrine and morals. Along with this, he views schism as an inherited sin that affects not only the progenitors of the schism but also those who remain in the body they formed. Therefore, in the Presbyterian world, members of groups like the OPC, PCA, EPC, and others would be required to join the mainline denomination of which Richard is a member, the PCUSA. In the Anglican world, members of groups like the ACNA or the Continuing Anglican churches would need to join the Episcopal Church. You get the point.</p><p>The response to this from Catholics and Protestants alike is obvious: if this is really the case, then the Protestant Reformation itself is unjustified. Therefore, the only consistent way of holding to what Richard teaches is to join the Roman Catholic Church (since this would be the proper ecclesiastical body in the West). Therefore, the Protestants reject the premises in order to reject the conclusion, while Catholics positively draw out the conclusion from Richard&#8217;s premises.</p><h2>Richard&#8217;s Distinction</h2><p>Yet Richard has a response to this objection. To resolve it, he distinguishes between two situations: that of those who have not been unjustly excommunicated and that of those who have. He likens the latter to the Apostles, who remained joined to the Old Testament Church until they were unjustly excommunicated by the Sanhedrin (there are plenty of exegetical and theological problems with this analogy, but I will let it pass for the sake of argument). Someone who is unjustly excommunicated may leave the body that excommunicated him and start a new group; but unless this happens, it is a grave sin to split the Church, even where there is severe moral and doctrinal decay.</p><p>Now, there are two ways of responding to Richard&#8217;s distinction. First, we can deny that the unjustly excommunicated are licensed to set up a new hierarchy and form a new ecclesiastical body. (In my video, I quoted St. Augustine to this effect, since Richard frequently uses him as an authority on this matter, although other arguments could be cited as well.) Second, we can deny that this was an instance of unjust excommunication. This can be done in two ways. First, we can argue that the excommunications that did happen were just, on the grounds of the truth of Catholic doctrine on the individual matters for which the Reformers were excommunicated. While this is true, it is not an effective way of arguing the point against those who deny Catholic doctrine. Second, we can argue historically, establishing that the schismatic acts took place before the excommunication. From this, we can draw the same conclusion from his own principles. Those who set up a rival ecclesiastical structure without having been unjustly excommunicated are schismatics; now, most of the Reformers set up rival ecclesiastical structures without being personally excommunicated; therefore, most of the Reformers (on Richard&#8217;s principles) are schismatics. Now, as he has stated elsewhere, those adhering to these structures in whatever generation are likewise schismatics; therefore, the Protestant communities are schismatic.</p><div class="subscription-widget-wrap-editor" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://thomism.com/subscribe?&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Subscribe&quot;,&quot;language&quot;:&quot;en&quot;}" data-component-name="SubscribeWidgetToDOM"><div class="subscription-widget show-subscribe"><div class="preamble"><p class="cta-caption">To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber.</p></div><form class="subscription-widget-subscribe"><input type="email" class="email-input" name="email" placeholder="Type your email&#8230;" tabindex="-1"><input type="submit" class="button primary" value="Subscribe"><div class="fake-input-wrapper"><div class="fake-input"></div><div class="fake-button"></div></div></form></div></div><h2>Who Was Actually Excommunicated?</h2><p>The assumption that each of the Reformers was personally excommunicated comes from a misunderstanding of how ecclesiastical censures actually function. Such censures are not declared simply because someone holds an error or does something gravely wrong, but only in particular circumstances, as determined by the ecclesiastical judge. Therefore, oddly enough, only a handful of Reformers were declared excommunicate (e.g., Luther, Bucer, Henry VIII). Moreover, in Bucer&#8217;s case, the excommunication was declared because of his refusal to submit to the ecclesiastical process (which established formal contumacy, quite apart from his doctrinal errors).</p><p>In a word, his argument is corrosive to the Protestant Reformation. Nearly every group that came from the many Reformers who were not personally excommunicated would fall under his definition of &#8220;schism.&#8221; Maybe the Lutherans are left standing? Yet even this runs into insoluble difficulties.</p><p>As canonists and theologians commonly teach (which I will explain in more detail later), an excommunication cannot be personally declared against a social body. It would be unjust, for example, for the pope to attempt to place all of England under major excommunication. There are certain lesser penalties where this might be just with a proportionately grave cause (e.g., interdict, although it seems this has been abused more often than it has been justly imposed), but major excommunication is not one of these censures.</p><p>What would Richard&#8217;s distinction prove if we granted both the doctrinal error that the unjustly excommunicated can form rival ecclesiastical structures and the error of fact that the Reformers were unjustly excommunicated? It would prove that the men who were personally excommunicated could form rival ecclesiastical structures, but that nobody could join them, since those who would join them had not been personally excommunicated. If at this point you are eager to mention <em>latae sententiae</em> excommunications, be patient; I will explain later why they do not help Richard&#8217;s case.</p><h2>The Hussite Objection</h2><p>Yet to all of this, Richard has a response. At the Council of Constance, he says, the Hussites were excommunicated for the Utraquist heresy (i.e., teaching that lay communion in both kinds is necessary by divine law). Now, in the condemnations, both Hus and his followers were excommunicated. Further, the Reformers held the Utraquist heresy. Therefore, they were excommunicated the moment they began to preach it.</p><p>There are two responses to this, one historical and the other canonical.</p><h3>The Historical Response: The Church of England</h3><p>First, the history of the Church of England seems to have slipped Richard&#8217;s mind. While the continental Reformers preached the Utraquist heresy from the beginning, the same cannot be said of the Anglicans. Under Henry VIII, the Church of England was not only not Utraquist; it specifically rejected the Utraquist heresy as one of the grounds for its refusal to have communion with the continental Reformers. The most famous example of this is the Six Articles of 1539, which punished Utraquists with death or imprisonment.</p><p>From what Richard concedes, we can construct an argument. The Church of England established a rival ecclesiastical structure before any personal excommunication was declared (e.g., by the 1531 acknowledgment of Henry as Supreme Head, the 1532 Submission of the Clergy, and the 1533 Act in Restraint of Appeals); further, schismatic acts are inherited by anyone who adheres to the rival ecclesiastical structure in perpetuity; therefore, anyone who adheres to Anglicanism, in any generation, is a schismatic.</p><h3>The Canonical Response: <em>Ipso Facto</em> Excommunication</h3><p>Second, we can also treat this as a canonical matter. Here, Richard and his followers confuse two things: a declared personal excommunication and an <em>ipso facto</em> excommunication. This is quite significant for his argument. The very foundation of his justification of the Protestant Reformation is that the Reformers were &#8220;kicked out&#8221; by an unjust excommunication and that, therefore, their formation of rival ecclesiastical structures was justified. When we keep in mind the nature of ecclesiastical censures, we see that his appeal to Constance and to <em>ipso facto</em> excommunications is nonsensical.</p><p>An <em>ipso facto</em> excommunication is incurred by one who pertinaciously commits a certain offense. It supposes culpability and is established in the internal forum before any declaration by the Church. There are two important corollaries of this that allow us to see why even mentioning such excommunications is nonsensical. First, there is no &#8220;social&#8221; effect in the external forum until it is declared. The individual who incurs an <em>ipso facto</em> excommunication is said (in the old canonical terminology) to be <em>toleratus</em> (i.e., tolerated), rather than <em>vitandus</em> (i.e., to be avoided), until a judicial process has judged him guilty of the crime and declared the excommunication.</p><p>Pope Martin V (who approved the condemnation of the Hussites at Constance) declares the following in <em>Ad evitanda scandala</em>:</p><blockquote><p>Henceforth no one will be obliged, under the pretext of any sentence or ecclesiastical censure generally promulgated by law or by man, to avoid the communion of any person, in the administration or reception of the Sacraments, or in any other matters sacred or profane, or to eschew the person, or to observe any ecclesiastical interdict, unless a sentence or censure of this kind shall have been published by a judge, and denounced specially and expressly&#8230;</p></blockquote><p>The entire foundation of Richard&#8217;s position that an unjustly excommunicated person may start a rival ecclesiastical structure is the effect that excommunication has <em>in foro externo</em> (i.e., the excommunicated are, in his words, &#8220;kicked out&#8221;). Yet in the case of an <em>ipso facto</em> excommunication, we see that those who violate generally promulgated censures (as holding to Utraquism would) are not &#8220;kicked out&#8221;; they are to be tolerated until sentence is specifically declared against them.</p><p><strong>Note.</strong> There are certain effects in the external forum vis-&#224;-vis one&#8217;s own obligations when conscious of the censure, and in the authority of a judge when the offense is notorious. Yet neither of these two is relevant to the question at hand, which concerns the social relations of the excommunicated.</p><p>Second, he draws a specific distinction between unjust and just excommunication. He does not seem to realize that this distinction has no place when discussing <em>ipso facto</em> excommunications. How could it? For such a censure to take effect, one would need to hold an error pertinaciously or to commit some act with pertinacity. Therefore, there is no such thing as an unjust <em>ipso facto</em> excommunication, since all those who fall under such a censure firmly adhere to error. Further, in his mind, these <em>ipso facto</em> excommunications did not even take effect, since he denies that any of the Reformers were pertinacious.</p><h2>The Dilemma</h2><p>We can construct the following dilemma: either the Reformers were justly excommunicated <em>ipso facto</em>, or they were not excommunicated at all. There is no third option, since <em>ipso facto</em> excommunications touch only the pertinacious and no personal excommunication was declared in this case. If the former, then, by Richard&#8217;s standards, the formation of rival ecclesiastical structures was schismatic, since they were justly excommunicated. If the latter, then, by Richard&#8217;s standards, the formation of rival structures was schismatic, since there was no excommunication at all.</p><p><strong>Note.</strong> Since the original censures were general and undeclared, under Martin V&#8217;s <em>Ad evitanda</em> they left the Reformers <em>tolerati</em>, and no one was obliged to avoid them. For Richard to state that such a general censure left them &#8220;kicked out&#8221; is an abuse of language. </p><h2>No Excommunication of Social Bodies</h2><p>Lastly, as I mentioned above, corporate excommunications of social bodies have long been recognized as unjust, well before the Council of Constance and as far back as the early Church, as St. Augustine declared against Bishop Auxilius in a letter that was included in Gratian. The same is taught commonly by canonists and theologians. In fact, Innocent IV (who wrote on the same topic in his canonical commentaries) established this as law in the decretal <em>Romana ecclesia</em>, in the section beginning <em>Ceterum</em>:</p><blockquote><p>We altogether forbid a sentence of excommunication to be pronounced against a corporation or college, wishing to avoid the peril to souls that could follow, since it would sometimes happen that the innocent were entangled in such a sentence; but let it be promulgated only against those of the college or corporation who are established to be culpable.</p></blockquote><p>In his canonical commentaries, he gives two reasons for this. First, the frequency with which the innocent mix with the guilty in such groups (e.g., if you condemned &#8220;the Hussites&#8221; personally, many who are not pertinacious would be included). Second, the fact that the group is perpetual, extending beyond the members who originally sinned.</p><h2>General Sentences Are Not Personal Sentences</h2><p>Unfortunately, Richard understands a general sentence in canonical form as equivalent to a certain &#8220;social excommunication&#8221; in which each person who falls under the general sentence receives a declared personal excommunication. Therefore, with this supposed, the conclusion he draws would obviously follow in his framework. Yet this is not at all how such a general sentence works.</p><p>Even if a specific condition is given (e.g., &#8220;those holding,&#8221; &#8220;followers,&#8221; etc.), the sentence remains general and non-personal until it is declared (and so falls back under what was said above about <em>ipso facto</em> excommunication). St. Alphonsus gives the example of an excommunication declared for arson against &#8220;Peter and his accomplices.&#8221; In such a case, even if the involvement of the accomplices was notorious, one would not be bound to avoid them as <em>vitandi</em>; they would remain <em>tolerati</em>, since &#8220;accomplices&#8221; is a universal or general condition: &#8220;only Peter is to be avoided, not the others, even if they are notorious, because as to them the sentence is only general&#8221; (<em>Theologia moralis</em>, lib. VII, cap. II, dub. I, n. 134). Therefore, Busenbaum concludes (quoted by St. Alphonsus) that &#8220;in Germany Catholics safely communicate with those who are notoriously heretics, and consequently excommunicated, because they are not excommunicated by name and publicly denounced&#8221; (ibid.; cf. Su&#225;rez, <em>De censuris</em>, disp. 9, sect. 2, nn. 4&#8211;5).</p><p>The following statement from Lateran IV has been interpreted in the same way: &#8220;We excommunicate and anathematize every heresy raising itself up against this holy, orthodox and catholic faith which we have expounded above. We condemn all heretics, whatever names they may go under.&#8221;</p><p>It is also important to recall that Innocent IV, who issued a decree on the injustice of corporate excommunication (and explained it in more detail in his canonical commentaries), became pope around 30 years after Lateran IV, and that the same principle had been included in Gratian a century before. Therefore, any other interpretation that could be given is completely unfounded.</p><p>The same holds for the bull <em>Decet Romanum Pontificem</em> of 1521, which declared Martin Luther &#8220;and others who follow him in the obstinacy of his depraved and damnable purpose&#8221; to fall under &#8220;the sentences of excommunication, of anathema, of our perpetual condemnation and interdict&#8230; and the other sentences, censures and punishments which are inflicted by canon law on heretics.&#8221;</p><p>It is incredible to me that Richard chooses this strange argument about Utraquism rather than quoting the clear sentences in the excommunication of Luther. Yet, for the aforementioned reason, even this does not prove his case.</p><div class="subscription-widget-wrap-editor" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://thomism.com/subscribe?&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Subscribe&quot;,&quot;language&quot;:&quot;en&quot;}" data-component-name="SubscribeWidgetToDOM"><div class="subscription-widget show-subscribe"><div class="preamble"><p class="cta-caption">To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber.</p></div><form class="subscription-widget-subscribe"><input type="email" class="email-input" name="email" placeholder="Type your email&#8230;" tabindex="-1"><input type="submit" class="button primary" value="Subscribe"><div class="fake-input-wrapper"><div class="fake-input"></div><div class="fake-button"></div></div></form></div></div><p></p>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[6 Misconceptions About the Perverted Faculty Argument]]></title><description><![CDATA[A Short Study]]></description><link>https://thomism.com/p/6-misconceptions-about-the-perverted</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://thomism.com/p/6-misconceptions-about-the-perverted</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Christian B. Wagner]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Tue, 22 Sep 2026 23:41:48 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/bb026358-8209-47db-8204-cc0c4051617d_924x640.png" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Enter your email below to get all my new articles in your inbox:</p><p class="button-wrapper" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://thomism.com/subscribe?&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Subscribe now&quot;,&quot;action&quot;:null,&quot;class&quot;:null}" data-component-name="ButtonCreateButton"><a class="button primary" href="https://thomism.com/subscribe?"><span>Subscribe now</span></a></p><p>EDIT. I explain more about the relevance of the eating-sex parallel and the vices of certain modern treatments <a href="https://substack.com/@scholasticanswers/note/c-344151112?utm_source=notes-share-action&amp;r=dgylx">here</a> and <a href="https://substack.com/@scholasticanswers/note/c-344159781?utm_source=notes-share-action&amp;r=dgylx">here</a>. </p><h2><span>Introduction</span></h2><p><span>The phrase &#8220;Perverted Faculty Argument&#8221; entered the English-speaking world through a brief debate that took place in the </span><em><span>American Ecclesiastical Review</span></em><span> in 1928&#8211;1929 between four Catholic priest-theologians: E. J. Mahoney, John A. Ryan, John M. Cooper, and Henry Davis.</span></p><p><span>In the early twentieth century, among certain novel strains of Catholic moral theology, the argument was quite unpopular. While these authors held to the moral conclusions drawn from the argument, they denied the validity of the argument itself. The debate of the late 1920s provides us with a particular iteration of this dispute, with the fullest treatment coming from one of the greatest moralists of the era, Henry Davis.</span></p><p><span>While the phrase itself was first introduced to the English-speaking world in this debate, the argument goes back much further. Its classical formulation is found in St. Thomas&#8217;s treatment of fornication in the </span><em><span>Summa contra Gentiles</span></em><span> (III, c. 122). Among the later scholastic authors, as in many areas, the formulation became more definite: they clarified the sense of the terms, drew forth certain conclusions, applied the argument to more problems, set out the sequence of the argument in greater detail, and answered objections.</span></p><p><span>Unfortunately, much of the modern discourse surrounding the Perverted Faculty Argument has lost the &#8220;bite&#8221; that previous generations of scholastics had when treating the argument. Among many moderns, key distinctions are lost, the foundation of the argument is obscured, and the principles are applied wrongly. This concerns not merely those who would count themselves opponents of the argument, but even its defenders.</span></p><p><span>In this article, I want to gather in one place the many distinctions that are often invoked by traditional authors when explaining the argument and its relevance. It is important to note that these distinctions are not </span><em><span>ad hoc</span></em><span>. Each of them flows naturally and necessarily from the principles employed to make the argument, when the argument and its sequence are properly considered in light of the entire moral system in which it is employed. Therefore, what might seem arbitrary to the beginner is not arbitrary whatsoever, but carefully worked out from higher principles, even if the application of these principles to the distinction remains latent.</span></p><p><strong><span>NOTE.</span></strong><span> This is an article about moral theology. More than that, it is an article about moral theology related to an argument that is most often applied to sexual morality. If you struggle with scrupulosity, or will be scandalized in some other way by reading this article, then don&#8217;t read it. </span><em><span>Curiositas</span></em><span> is a vice.</span></p><h2><span>Misconception 1. The Term &#8220;Faculty&#8221;</span></h2><p><span>The first misconception concerns the term &#8220;faculty.&#8221; If you look at the argument given by St. Thomas in </span><em><span>SCG</span></em><span> III, cap. cxxii, there is a conspicuous absence of the term &#8220;faculty.&#8221; In fact, when you look through the chapter, the phrase that is used is </span><em><span>emissio seminis</span></em><span>, i.e., the emission of seed (the genus for the act, whether it be solitary, fornicatory, or conjugal). The argument is not actually about the &#8220;faculty&#8221; of a person, but about the act that follows from this faculty. What is the ordination inherent in the operation of a faculty?</span></p><p><span>This is a clarification that was given by Fr. Davis during the dispute in the </span><em><span>American Ecclesiastical Review</span></em><span>:</span></p><blockquote><p><span>It appears to the writer to be of the utmost importance to distinguish between the faculty and the use of it, or the act. In contraception, it is the act that is frustrated, but the faculty is used. The misuse of the faculty consists in the abuse or frustration of the act.</span></p></blockquote><p><span>In this way, we see how silly many of the objections to the argument are that are concerned with non-acts, or with something outside the ordination of the act considered in itself. Celibacy does not fall under the Perverted Faculty Argument because it is a non-act: the faculty is simply not used. Periodic continence (NFP) does not fall under it either for a similar reason. On the days the couple abstain, the faculty is not used; on the days they do not abstain, they perform the natural act in its integrity, and its infertility on that day is accidental to the act (as I will explain below). Therefore, the act must be judged from the intention of the couple and its circumstances. The argument couldn&#8217;t be used against either of these and has nothing to say about them. Since the argument concerns the operation of the faculty, the only cases in which it could be applied concern the proper or improper operation of the faculty based on its orientation, not the non-operation of the faculty.</span></p><h2><span>Misconception 2. The </span><em><span>Finis Operis</span></em></h2><p><span>It is important here to distinguish between the </span><em><span>finis operis</span></em><span> and the </span><em><span>finis operantis</span></em><span>. The first concerns the &#8220;end of the work&#8221; and the latter the &#8220;end of the worker.&#8221; When we say the &#8220;end&#8221; or &#8220;purpose&#8221; or &#8220;orientation&#8221; of the act, we are not concerned with the good that is being sought psychologically or experientially by the individual when he operates. Rather, by the &#8220;end&#8221; or &#8220;purpose&#8221; or &#8220;orientation&#8221; of the act, we are speaking about the intrinsic order that is present in the work. This principle is immediately justified from the order of finality present within things, which is available to natural reason.</span></p><p><span>In this way, we see that objections from the individual intention of the operator fail. For example, someone may object to the argument on behalf of a couple who perform the marital act without any intention of generating a child. This is not a case in which the Perverted Faculty Argument applies and confuses the </span><em><span>finis operis </span></em><span>and </span><em><span>finis operantis</span></em><span>. The act may be sinful due to a failure as to its circumstances or an improper </span><em><span>finis operantis </span></em><span>like any other act, but the </span><em><span>finis operis </span></em><span>is not improperly ordered. Therefore, each case must be judged individually. </span></p><h2><span>Misconception 3. Not the &#8220;Only Rule&#8221;</span></h2><p><span>It is common for many (even many priests) to believe that the Perverted Faculty Argument is the only thing relevant to sexual morality. Therefore, they conclude that if there is not the complete use of the sexual organs outside of the proper </span><em><span>vas</span></em><span>, then it must always be considered at least a morally unobjectionable practice when done with one&#8217;s spouse. Yet this misunderstands the purpose of the argument.</span></p><p><span>The Perverted Faculty Argument is able to judge the species of the act. It is not able to judge whether such an act was done with the proper circumstances and end, which may render the act morally vicious. For example, there is the well-known condemnation by Bl. Innocent XI of the proposition that sexual union for pleasure alone is free of all fault and venial defect. This has nothing to do with the &#8220;perverted faculty&#8221;; it has to do with the </span><em><span>finis operantis</span></em><span> when performing the act.</span></p><p><span>The argument is not an exhaustive, one-size-fits-all argument that can determine whether any act is virtuous or vicious. It merely concerns one aspect of this question. We can take an example to clarify this: marital relations with a pregnant wife. Some may object that the Perverted Faculty Argument must be against the teaching of the Fathers and the older theologians insofar as they condemned relations with a pregnant wife as either a mortal or a venial sin (whether universally, or in most cases).</span></p><p><span>Yet this leaves out a third option, which is in fact the case. These Fathers and theologians didn&#8217;t justify their sentence on this issue by an appeal to the </span><em><span>finis operis</span></em><span>, but by something else, e.g., the </span><em><span>finis operantis</span></em><span>, the danger to the child, etc. The Perverted Faculty Argument is giving you one fact about the act, i.e., whether it is or is not against the </span><em><span>finis operis</span></em><span>, not whether an act should be approved as moral in individual cases (which requires that the act be integral in all of its causes).</span></p><p><span>The fact of the matter is that the counsels and precepts given by the Fathers and many moralists on a variety of moral issues touching the marriage bed are dependent on factors besides the </span><em><span>finis operis</span></em><span>. This is an excellent point brought out in all its details by Fr. William A. Wallace, O.P., in his work </span><em><a href="https://isidore.co/misc/Res%20pro%20Deo/TheCatholicArchive_OCRed/Image_and_OCR_layers/343.pdf"><span>The Role of Demonstration in Moral Theology</span></a></em><span>. The greatest moralists are able to distinguish clearly between (a) the judgment of moral science concerning what is to be done </span><em><span>per se</span></em><span> by the virtuous man in such and such circumstances, which reaches the individual case only as an </span><em><span>individuum vagum</span></em><span>; (b) the judgment of prudence concerning this singular act here and now; and (c) those rules that are true only </span><em><span>ut in pluribus</span></em><span> (for the most part) developed through generations of pastoral work by moralists and directors of souls.</span></p><p><span>When we read an author and hear his judgment on a question, it is important to distinguish which judgment he is making, in order not to misapply what is being said as to the certitude and universality of his judgment.</span></p><h2><span>Misconception 4. </span><em><span>Per se</span></em><span> vs. </span><em><span>per accidens</span></em></h2><p><span>As I mentioned above, when we are using the Perverted Faculty Argument, we are considering the question from the perspective of the </span><em><span>finis operis</span></em><span>. There are certain factors that can be added to this ordination that are </span><em><span>per se</span></em><span> and others that are </span><em><span>per accidens</span></em><span>. For example, if we consider the copulation of two men, their copulation removes the </span><em><span>finis operis per se</span></em><span> and in principle. The copulation is such that its order to procreation is removed. Yet, if we consider the copulation of a man with his sterile wife, their copulation does not attain its end due to some defect that is </span><em><span>per accidens</span></em><span> to the act. The act that they perform is still, intrinsically, essentially, and in principle, ordered towards procreation. It is the type of act that results in procreation. Yet, due to some defect in one of the agents (i.e., sterility), the act does not attain its effect.</span></p><p><span>To put it another way, when we give the Perverted Faculty Argument, we are not merely arguing in a consequentialist manner (whether or not such an act has its effect). Rather, we are arguing from the essential and intrinsic character of the act and its </span><em><span>per se</span></em><span> ordering to its end. If the act retains its essential and intrinsic character and its </span><em><span>per se</span></em><span> ordering to the end, failing due to something that is </span><em><span>per accidens</span></em><span> (sterility, pregnancy, etc.), then the argument does not apply to the question at hand. We are considering the </span><em><span>finis operis</span></em><span>, i.e., the end of the very operation or work which is done. Questions of circumstance, the intention of those entering upon copulation, etc., are not relevant here.</span></p><p><span>In this way, you can see how most of the rejoinders related to copulation between the married concern something that is </span><em><span>per accidens</span></em><span>. When we combine this with the clarification that the argument does not provide an exhaustive norm of Catholic sexual morality, and is concerned with the </span><em><span>finis operis</span></em><span> rather than the </span><em><span>finis operantis</span></em><span>, most of the objections are easily dissolved.</span></p><p><span>This also occurs in the contrary case. One of the arguments given against fornication is that it is </span><em><span>per se</span></em><span> contrary to the end of procreation insofar as the good of procreation also includes the raising of children, not merely their generation. Now, the governance of children requires a certain determinate and stable bond between the couple in order to raise them properly. Therefore, where this is absent, the act is </span><em><span>per se</span></em><span> contrary to the end of procreation.</span></p><p><span>To this argument, many object that such a case is not universal insofar as a woman may, perhaps, be very wealthy and hire tutors and caregivers who are able to govern the children she has through fornication.</span></p><p><span>In response to this, St. Thomas emphasizes that this argument isn&#8217;t taken from the case of individual goods distributively taken, but from the good of the species (</span><em><span>ST</span></em><span> II&#8209;II, q. 154, a. 2). Now, when it concerns the good of the species, exceptions are merely accidental to our consideration of the morality or immorality of the act. Therefore, even in the case where the bad effect may be mitigated in some way </span><em><span>per accidens</span></em><span>, the immorality is still clear from what follows </span><em><span>per se</span></em><span> from the act.</span></p><p><span>This is what was said in the contrary case about the sterile or pregnant wife. It is not necessarily immoral to engage in acts whose </span><em><span>finis operis</span></em><span> is intrinsically ordered towards its end simply because something </span><em><span>per accidens</span></em><span> removes the acquisition of this good. In the same way, it is not moral to engage in acts whose </span><em><span>finis operis</span></em><span> is intrinsically ordered towards a contrary end simply because something </span><em><span>per accidens</span></em><span> removes the evil effect.</span></p><h2><span>Misconception 5. &#8220;Beside&#8221; the End</span></h2><p><span>Unfortunately, many commentators will describe the argument as follows: &#8220;using a faculty for anything other than its natural end is sinful.&#8221; This is not the principle from which the argument proceeds. It would obviously be more than absurd to argue that using a faculty for anything other than its natural end is sinful. Unfortunately, this formulation (as false as it is common) has led to two disastrous effects: (a) many Catholics imbibe certain oddities about the moral life, especially concerning the marital use, and (b) many opponents of the Church are given an opportunity to mock Catholic teaching.</span></p><p><span>The more accurate formulation of the principle from which the argument proceeds would be as follows: &#8220;any operation that frustrates the proper good to which the operations of the faculty are ordered is sinful.&#8221; In this formulation, the malice is not found in acting in any way that is beside the ordinary use of the faculty, but in eliciting an operation of the faculty that contradicts or excludes the good to which the operations of the faculty are ordered.</span></p><p><span>Sylvester of Ferrara clarifies this quite well:</span></p><blockquote><p><span>&#8220;From this reply it is to be noted that the total reason why fornication (or any emission of seed from which the generation of offspring, or its fitting upbringing, cannot follow) is a sin, is not to be taken to be that whenever the use of some part of the body is not according to the order of nature, it is then a sin; for it is plain that this is not universally true in the use of the hands and feet. Rather, one must add that such a disordered use be of such a kind that an evil of nature follows from it: namely, that the good of nature is either wholly taken away by it, or impeded.&#8221; (In C. Gent. III, c. 122)</span></p></blockquote><p><span>When we have an act whose end is that good ordered by nature, we have an act that is good according to its species; when we have an act whose end is contrary to the good ordered by nature, we have an act that is evil according to its species. Between these lie the acts that are &#8220;beside&#8221; the end, and this can be distinguished into those acts that are </span><em><span>praeter naturam </span></em><span>and those acts that are merely instrumental. Unfortunately, many modern exponents of this argument have not kept these apart.</span></p><p><span>First, there is the case where the natural operation of the faculty is elicited, but in a mode that departs from the natural mode without defeating the end. This is what the scholastics call </span><em><span>praeter naturam</span></em><span>, beside nature, and it is not simply indifferent. Most say that such acts are somehow against the good of man, yet lightly. Therefore, many theologians give what may seem to be &#8220;odd&#8221; judgments concerning the position in which one engages in copulation. They say that it is unnatural as to mode insofar as it is beside nature and somehow departs from the natural order; therefore there is something of the character of evil to it, yet it is lightly evil. Yet, since it is not contrary to the grave good that is sought by nature in such acts, it follows that (a) it is not gravely evil (i.e., not a mortal sin), and (b) it can be justified by a sufficient reason. The example commonly given is the change of position in copulation with a woman who is pregnant. In such a case, there is sufficient justification to change the position for the health of the child and to engage in the act more easily. Therefore, they do not mark such changes with the censure of sin, but say that there is some adequate justification for the deficiency of mode.</span></p><p><span>Second, it is possible that a part be used purely as an instrument for something else, its natural operation being set aside altogether (as when we use our hands to walk on, or our tongue to lick a stamp). Here the act is indifferent according to its species, rendered good or evil by the agent&#8217;s end and the circumstances. This is Ferrariensis&#8217;s own solution to the objection from walking on the hands: reason may use any part of the body as an instrument even for a use other than that for which nature instituted it; what it may not do is elicit the natural operation of the part in a way contrary to the end of that operation. Some of the cases frequently brought forward as &#8220;contrary to the end&#8221; are actually instances of something being used instrumentally. For example, in the case of eating foods that have zero calories, the mouth is being used instrumentally for the sake of taste. Therefore, the act should be judged from circumstance and end.</span></p><p><span>A related case, but not the same one, is the principle of totality: the hands are for the sake of the good of the whole man, and so a hand may be cut off in order to save the life of the body. Why the same reasoning cannot be applied to emission for the sake of the health of the body, or to save someone&#8217;s life, we will gather later when we treat the good to which generation is ordered.</span></p><p><span>One caution should be added here. Some say that when the organs are excited so as to prepare for the marital act, they are being used &#8220;instrumentally.&#8221; This is not accurate. The preparation for the marital act is not a use of the organs beside their natural operation; it is the beginning of the natural operation itself, and it is licit precisely because it is ordered to that act. Objections drawn from such preparation therefore cannot be invoked against the argument.</span></p><p><span>This distinction between those acts that are contrary to the good towards which the operations are ordered vs. those that are beside, instrumental, or according to that good is quite important for setting out fair parallel cases to which the same argument applies. Often, parallels will be sought with nutrition. The act of eating is for the sake of the preservation of the body of the person. For an act of eating to be gravely contrary to the good towards which the operation is ordered, the act of eating would have to, by its very nature, induce the removal of this end. Fr. Davis gives the example of the person who eats a large quantity of sand so as to remove his natural life. Cases like chewing gum (not an act of nutrition), eating food for the sake of pleasure alone (concerned with the </span><em><span>finis operantis</span></em><span>), and the other common examples that are stated are in no wise akin to the case of the misuse of the sexual faculties. In order to be parallel, it would have to be the case that the act is </span><em><span>per se</span></em><span> contrary to, and excludes, a grave good to which the acts of the faculty are ordered.</span></p><p><span>Here we are able to better understand what exactly would need to be verified in a proper counterexample, i.e., the act is a use of a faculty which excludes the grave good of human nature to which it is ordered </span><em><span>per se</span></em><span>. If you use your teeth to rip open a package, you are not excluding a grave good of human nature to which the teeth are ordered </span><em><span>per se</span></em><span>, but using the faculty instrumentally and the use participates in the morality of the principal act. If a man copulates with his pregnant wife, the act is not </span><em><span>per se </span></em><span>excluding the good of offspring, but is excluded by something outside the act and attached to it </span><em><span>per accidens</span></em><span>. </span></p><h2><span>Misconception 6. The Good Intended</span></h2><p><span>When we are considering the Perverted Faculty Argument in the case of generation, the good that is intended by the act is generation, i.e., the conservation of the species by the creation of new life. This good is a grave good, surpassed among the goods of nature only by the good of life itself (which is violated contrarily by murder).</span></p><p><span>This is one issue where the modern defenses of the principle are weakest. Many speak of acts of generation as if they were ordered towards the good of the individual (as, e.g., nutrition is) rather than rightly regarding the act of generation as ordered towards the good of the species. Therefore, it often happens that its defenders are deprived of some of the strongest arguments for refuting objections, and of the grounds for explaining the gravity of sexual sins.</span></p><p><span>If we were merely to explain the evil of sexual sins on the grounds of the individual good, then we would have no other grounds for opposing them than we have for any other sin against temperance, which cannot adequately explain the universal prohibition that the natural law gives against such acts.</span></p><p><span>This leads us to two corollaries of note.</span></p><p><span>First, anything contrary to the end in sexual matters is gravely sinful. For a grave sin is a violation of a grave good. In the cases where a grave good is violated, e.g., blasphemy, the entire genus of the sin that is contrary to the acquisition of this good is grave and does not suffer lightness of matter. Therefore, the only cases wherein sins against such a precept are considered light are (a) when there is some mitigating factor in the will or intellect, or (b) when the fault concerns something accidental to the act (e.g., the mode, certain light circumstances, the </span><em><span>finis operantis</span></em><span>, etc.).</span></p><p><strong><span>NOTE.</span></strong><span> The gravity of the act is not being taken from the exclusion of good in general, but from the exclusion of a grave good in particular. Therefore, in cases where the good that is excluded is light (e.g., a small lie), the act will likewise be lightly sinful.</span></p><p><span>Second, there is no exception that can justify the violation of this precept. As I mentioned above, there are certain cases where the goods of the part may be sacrificed for the goods of the whole, e.g., a limb is amputated in order to save the entire body to which it is ordered. In the case of generation, the act is not ordered to the good of the individual, but to the good of the species. Let&#8217;s take two examples to illustrate this point. First, a man is told that he will die unless he procures an emission of seed. Second, a man is told that he will die unless his hand is cut off. In either case, the act that is being done is contrary to a certain good, yet the Christian conscience recoils from the first case, while in the second case it ordinarily approves of the act as reasonable. Why? In the first case, the good that is being violated is the good of the species, which is not at the disposal of any individual, whereas in the second case, the good that is being violated is the good of the individual, which may be sacrificed for a higher good of the same individual.</span></p>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[Understanding Mortal and Venial Sin]]></title><description><![CDATA[Some Notes]]></description><link>https://thomism.com/p/understanding-mortal-and-venial-sin</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://thomism.com/p/understanding-mortal-and-venial-sin</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Christian B. Wagner]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 18 Sep 2026 18:50:37 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/893d9004-3533-461f-9557-92486e42ac96_1213x977.webp" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<h2>Introduction</h2><p>The study of moral theology begins with a consideration of the ultimate end of man. Therefore, many problems in moral theology are solved by meditating on our ultimate end and on how our acts are ordered towards this end. In fact, we may extend this and be so bold as to affirm that every problem in moral theology is solved by such a consideration. The entire concatenation of the supernatural organism, which moral theology studies, is ordered towards, as St. Thomas notes, &#8220;the rational creature&#8217;s advance towards God,&#8221; who is the rational creature&#8217;s last end (<em>ST</em> I, q. 2, prol.).</p><p>This consideration of the end, and of how we are ordered towards it, is especially illuminating in solving the problems that arise in our consideration of sin, which is to be considered as the act that deviates from our ultimate end. In these notes, I hope to help the reader&#8217;s understanding of this on two points that are often difficult to grasp.</p><p>First, I will explain the distinction between the notions of imperfection, venial sin, and mortal sin from the perspective of how one may intend the ultimate end.</p><p>Second, I will explain, in light of the same, how we are to consider the problem of whether the unbeliever sins in all that he does (or, to the contrary, whether he may in certain deliberate acts be free from sin).</p><p>In my opinion, the teaching of certain heretics on these two points derives from the same root, namely their doctrine of the ultimate end, as does the distinction on these points wherein the schools differ from one another.</p>
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   ]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[On the Use of Typology in Apologetics]]></title><description><![CDATA[Answering a Protestant Objection]]></description><link>https://thomism.com/p/on-the-use-of-typology-in-apologetics</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://thomism.com/p/on-the-use-of-typology-in-apologetics</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Christian B. Wagner]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Thu, 17 Sep 2026 00:13:53 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/94c78795-252e-4266-9d33-6c4d61125e17_1006x862.png" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>If this kind of work is useful to you, I would ask you to consider supporting it. Everything I do at Scholastic Answers depends on the support of readers. The most helpful thing you can do is to become a paid subscriber on <a href="https://scholasticanswers.substack.com/subscribe">Substack</a> or a supporter on <a href="https://www.patreon.com/militantthomist">Patreon</a> for as little as $5 a month, which allows me to keep writing. If you have already done so, thank you!</p><p>Or, at least enter your email to get my articles in your inbox and give this article a like:</p><p class="button-wrapper" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://thomism.com/subscribe?&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Subscribe now&quot;,&quot;action&quot;:null,&quot;class&quot;:null}" data-component-name="ButtonCreateButton"><a class="button primary" href="https://thomism.com/subscribe?"><span>Subscribe now</span></a></p><h2><strong><span>Introduction</span></strong></h2><p><span>Often, Catholic theologians will use arguments derived from one of the spiritual senses of Scripture in order to demonstrate a Catholic dogma. As an example, we can look at the commonly cited text of Ezekiel that has been used since the patristic era in order to argue in favor of Our Lady&#8217;s perpetual virginity: &#8220;This gate shall be shut, it shall not be opened, and no man shall pass through it: because the Lord the God of Israel hath entered in by it&#8221; (Ezek. 44:2). The &#8220;gate&#8221; is taken for the Blessed Virgin, and the &#8220;entering in&#8221; of the Lord God is the conception of Our Lord. Therefore, the statement that &#8220;no man shall pass through it&#8221; is taken as an assertion of her perpetual virginity. St. Thomas himself makes this text the </span><em><span>sed contra</span></em><span> of his article on whether the Mother of God remained a virgin after the birth of Christ.</span><a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-1" href="#footnote-1" target="_self">1</a></p><p><span>Another famous example is an argument in favor of Our Lady&#8217;s Assumption, which quotes the Psalm: &#8220;Arise, O Lord, into thy resting place: thou and the ark, which thou hast sanctified&#8221; (Ps. 131:8). The ark is identified with Our Lady and the Lord is taken for Christ. Therefore, the arising into the resting place is taken for Our Lord taking Our Lady into his resting place, which is identified with her Assumption into heaven. Ven. Pius XII records this very argument in the constitution defining the Assumption.</span><a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-2" href="#footnote-2" target="_self">2</a></p><p><span>A third example is the sacrifice of Melchisedech. Genesis records that Melchisedech, king of Salem and priest of the most high God, &#8220;bringing forth bread and wine,&#8221; blessed Abraham (Gen. 14:18). The Council of Trent teaches that Our Lord, &#8220;declaring himself constituted a priest forever according to the order of Melchisedech,&#8221; offered his body and blood to the Father under the species of bread and wine at the Last Supper, so that the sacrifice of the Mass was prefigured by the offering of Melchisedech.</span><a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-3" href="#footnote-3" target="_self">3</a><span> The bread and wine of Genesis are taken as a figure of the Eucharistic sacrifice.</span></p><p><span>I can give countless examples of this move taken by scholastic theologians, dogmatic theologians, magisterial texts, and exegetes.</span></p><p><span>In response to these citations, an interesting objection has taken shape among Protestant apologists in response to Roman Catholicism. Rather than dealing individually with each use of the spiritual sense, they give a certain universal principle in the words of St. Augustine against the practice of demonstrating dogmas in this mode (which is quoted by St. Thomas):</span></p><blockquote><p><span>The multiplicity of these senses does not produce equivocation or any other kind of multiplicity, seeing that these senses are not multiplied because one word signifies several things, but because the things signified by the words can be themselves types of other things. Thus in Holy Writ no confusion results, for all the senses are founded on one&#8212;the literal&#8212;</span><strong><span>from which alone can any argument be drawn, and not from those intended in allegory, as Augustine says (Epis. 48).</span></strong><span> Nevertheless, nothing of Holy Scripture perishes on account of this, since nothing necessary to faith is contained under the spiritual sense which is not elsewhere put forward by the Scripture in its literal sense. (</span><em><span>Summa theologiae</span></em><span> I, q. 1, a. 10, ad 1)</span></p></blockquote><p><span>The letter of St. Augustine to which St. Thomas refers is his letter to Vincent the Rogatist (Epistle 48 in the old numbering, Epistle 93 in the numbering now in use). The Donatists had claimed that the Church was prophetically said to one day only exist in Africa on the basis of the words of the Canticle, &#8220;where thou feedest, where thou liest in the midday,&#8221; taking &#8220;midday&#8221; for the hot southern lands they inhabited. St. Augustine replies: &#8220;But who would not most impudently attempt to interpret in his own favor something set down in allegory, unless he also has manifest testimonies by whose light the obscure things may be illuminated?&#8221;</span></p><p><span>The difficulty presented here is obvious. If it is true that the literal sense is that &#8220;from which alone any argument can be drawn,&#8221; then countless arguments we give for dogmas from the spiritual senses of Scripture are null.</span></p><p><span>How do Catholic theologians respond? While some may expect them to deny this principle (chalking up the statements of Ss. Augustine and Thomas to a minor error), such is not the case. Catholic theologians universally accept this principle. In my research, I have not found a single one who rejects it. But I have also not found a single one who accepts it without qualification, i.e., that the axiom is true of the spiritual sense considered in itself and known from the text alone, and that it ceases to apply as soon as the spiritual sense has been made certain by some other means.</span></p><p><span>In order to answer this question in greater detail and vindicate the axiom in its traditional sense, we need to consider in greater depth the nature of the spiritual senses and of dogmatic argumentation.</span></p><h2><strong><span>What Are the Spiritual Senses?</span></strong></h2><p><span>In order to resolve this question properly, we must first determine what is meant by the &#8220;spiritual senses.&#8221; This phrase, &#8220;spiritual sense,&#8221; is composed of a generic term, &#8220;sense,&#8221; and a specifying term, &#8220;spiritual,&#8221; which distinguishes it from the &#8220;literal sense.&#8221;</span></p><p><strong><span>On the notion of the &#8216;sense&#8217;.</span></strong><span> A &#8220;sense&#8221; is a meaning, that is, what a sign signifies. To see what this involves, we can follow the doctrine of St. Thomas in the opening lectures of his commentary on Aristotle&#8217;s </span><em><span>On Interpretation</span></em><span>. Words are signs. What they signify first and immediately are what Aristotle calls the &#8220;passions of the soul,&#8221; which St. Thomas explains to be the conceptions of the intellect, that is, what we ordinarily call concepts or ideas. These conceptions are likenesses of things. Therefore words also signify things, but mediately: they signify the conceptions of the intellect immediately, and through these conceptions they signify the things of which the conceptions are likenesses. The concept is something that formally resides in the soul. Yet, by a manner of speaking, &#8220;sense&#8221; is frequently taken for something that formally resides in the signs that are produced by man in order to communicate the concepts that reside in the soul, whether written or oral (i.e., written or oral words). The &#8220;sense&#8221; is the relation or referentiality that these signs have towards those conceptions of the intellect insofar as they are artificially formed in order to signify these concepts.</span></p><p><span>It is to be noted (following St. Thomas) that these signs do not directly or immediately signify things in reality, but directly and immediately signify the ideas or concepts of these things as they exist in the understanding. Our words signify our ideas or concepts, which themselves are intentional beings that have the same nature as external things, but with a distinct mode of existence (real </span><em><span>esse</span></em><span> vs. intentional </span><em><span>esse</span></em><span>). Therefore, the &#8220;sense&#8221; of a word can either be taken as the property of the word to conventionally refer to such-and-such a nature (immediately as it exists in the intellect and mediately as it exists in reality), or it can be taken for the very nature itself as it exists in the intellect.</span></p><p><strong><span>On the literal sense.</span></strong><span> Since the specifying term of the phrase &#8220;spiritual sense&#8221; is the term &#8220;spiritual,&#8221; we can determine the notion from the opposite which adequately distinguishes the genus, i.e., the term &#8220;literal.&#8221; This is especially important due to a common misunderstanding about the term &#8220;literal&#8221; in relation to Scripture. The &#8220;literal&#8221; is that which is related to the &#8220;letter,&#8221; which is why literal exegesis is sometimes referred to as exegesis </span><em><span>ad litteram</span></em><span>, i.e., &#8220;to the letter.&#8221; The &#8220;literal,&#8221; in contemporary English, is often taken for the exegesis of a certain passage that excludes certain literary devices, e.g., a metaphor is &#8220;non-literal&#8221; insofar as it speaks with a certain literary device which takes the word outside of its ordinary signification. For example, if we were to refer to Christ as the &#8220;Lion of Judah,&#8221; many would state that this is speaking in a way that is not &#8220;literal.&#8221;</span></p><p><span>Yet, in theology, we speak otherwise. That which is </span><em><span>ad litteram</span></em><span> is that which the letter is intended to signify concretely, i.e., in the context in which it was written, not abstractly, i.e., taken without the context. St. Thomas says as much when he treats the sense of the term &#8220;the arm of God&#8221;:</span></p><blockquote><p><span>The parabolical sense is contained in the literal, for by words things are signified properly and figuratively. Nor is the figure itself, but that which is figured, the literal sense. When Scripture speaks of God&#8217;s arm, the literal sense is not that God has such a member, but only what is signified by this member, namely operative power. Hence it is plain that nothing false can ever underlie the literal sense of Holy Writ. (</span><em><span>Summa theologiae</span></em><span> I, q. 1, a. 10, ad 3)</span></p></blockquote><p><span>It is for this reason that theologians will often distinguish between the &#8220;proper literal sense&#8221; (when words are taken properly and in their ordinary sense) and the &#8220;improper literal sense&#8221; (when words are taken improperly and their ordinary signification is changed by some literary device). To give one example, when there are disputes over whether the first chapters of Genesis should be taken in their ordinary historical sense or in some other literary genre, the dispute is not over whether the first chapters are &#8220;literal,&#8221; but over whether the literal sense is proper or improper.</span></p><p><span>As a corollary to this, we can more exactly state the dogma concerning the inerrancy of Scripture. It is Catholic dogma that Scripture teaches no falsehood, whether historical, scientific, or theological. Yet, it is not Catholic dogma that Scripture teaches no falsehood if each of its words is taken merely in the proper literal sense, e.g., if &#8220;God&#8217;s arm&#8221; is not taken as a figure of speech. Therefore, the dogma can be plainly stated as &#8220;no falsehood underlies the literal sense,&#8221; as long as the &#8220;literal sense&#8221; is taken indeterminately so that it may be taken properly or improperly.</span></p><p><span>Positively, how ought we to take the term &#8220;literal sense&#8221;? The literal sense is what is signified by the letter (whether properly or improperly). We can gather an important clarification from the extensive description of &#8220;sense&#8221; that was stated above. The word is a certain sign that immediately signifies the idea or concept existing in the mind of the author, which signifies real being through the mediation of what exists in the intellect (since the nature of the intentional being and real being are the same). Therefore, the term &#8220;literal sense&#8221; can be taken in the two ways in which the idea of &#8220;sense&#8221; was considered above. First, it can be taken for the very relation of signification that the word has towards the intellectual intention. Second, it can be taken for the intellectual intention that is signified by the word. We can illustrate it with the following chart:</span></p><div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!e8qV!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F1e88f714-d0cf-4aff-8e4c-436b67623fea_4800x2700.png" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!e8qV!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F1e88f714-d0cf-4aff-8e4c-436b67623fea_4800x2700.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!e8qV!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F1e88f714-d0cf-4aff-8e4c-436b67623fea_4800x2700.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!e8qV!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F1e88f714-d0cf-4aff-8e4c-436b67623fea_4800x2700.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!e8qV!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F1e88f714-d0cf-4aff-8e4c-436b67623fea_4800x2700.png 1456w" sizes="auto, 100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!e8qV!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F1e88f714-d0cf-4aff-8e4c-436b67623fea_4800x2700.png" width="1456" height="819" data-attrs="{&quot;src&quot;:&quot;https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/1e88f714-d0cf-4aff-8e4c-436b67623fea_4800x2700.png&quot;,&quot;srcNoWatermark&quot;:null,&quot;fullscreen&quot;:null,&quot;imageSize&quot;:null,&quot;height&quot;:819,&quot;width&quot;:1456,&quot;resizeWidth&quot;:null,&quot;bytes&quot;:502585,&quot;alt&quot;:null,&quot;title&quot;:null,&quot;type&quot;:&quot;image/png&quot;,&quot;href&quot;:null,&quot;belowTheFold&quot;:true,&quot;topImage&quot;:false,&quot;internalRedirect&quot;:&quot;https://thomism.com/i/216073308?img=https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F1e88f714-d0cf-4aff-8e4c-436b67623fea_4800x2700.png&quot;,&quot;isProcessing&quot;:false,&quot;align&quot;:null,&quot;offset&quot;:false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!e8qV!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F1e88f714-d0cf-4aff-8e4c-436b67623fea_4800x2700.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!e8qV!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F1e88f714-d0cf-4aff-8e4c-436b67623fea_4800x2700.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!e8qV!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F1e88f714-d0cf-4aff-8e4c-436b67623fea_4800x2700.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!e8qV!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F1e88f714-d0cf-4aff-8e4c-436b67623fea_4800x2700.png 1456w" sizes="auto, 100vw" loading="lazy"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-tqxFUX" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-tqxFUX" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a></figure></div><p><span>Therefore, for our definition, we can simply describe the literal sense as the &#8220;significatory relation of words towards the concept or idea.&#8221;</span></p><p><strong><span>On the spiritual senses.</span></strong><span> Now that we have the description of the &#8220;literal sense&#8221; out of the way, we can now move on to determining the &#8220;spiritual senses&#8221; of Scripture. While the literal sense is the sense of the letter signifying the nature (immediately, as it exists in the intellect; mediately, as it exists in reality), the spiritual sense is the sense of the reality insofar as it signifies some other reality. In order for there to be a sense, there needs to be a sign, a signification, and a reality. The sign is the thing which signifies; the signification is the order of sign to thing signified; the thing signified is the reality to which the sign is ordered. In the case of the spiritual sense, the thing which signifies is the reality itself that the letter speaks of, rather than the words that are the conventional signs; the signification is the intention of God to order these realities to other realities of which they are signs; the thing signified is the reality which the first reality is meant to be a sign of.</span></p><p><span>It is to be noted carefully what the sign is in the spiritual order. St. Thomas says that &#8220;the things signified by the words can themselves be signs of other things.&#8221;</span><a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-4" href="#footnote-4" target="_self">4</a><span> The things in question are the concrete things, persons, and events of which the letter speaks: this gate of the sanctuary which the prophet saw, this ark which David carried into Jerusalem, this priest Melchisedech who met Abraham. It is not the nature of a gate in the abstract that signifies the Blessed Virgin, for then every gate in the world would be a figure of Our Lady. It is the gate of Ezekiel&#8217;s vision, that particular thing with its particular history, which God has ordered to signify her.</span></p><p><span>Let&#8217;s take the example of the &#8220;gate&#8221; which is taken by Fathers and Theologians to be the Blessed Virgin. In the case of the literal sense, the word &#8220;gate&#8221; is the sign, the signification is the convention whereby we name gates with the term &#8220;gate,&#8221; and the thing signified is the gate of the sanctuary of which the prophet speaks, conceived by the intellect. In the case of the spiritual sense, rather than starting with the word, we begin with the reality. Therefore, the sign is that gate itself, the signification is the connection willed by God between that gate and the Blessed Virgin, and the thing signified is the Blessed Virgin.</span></p><p><span>Hence, we can compare the order of signification between the two senses like this:</span></p><div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!oAse!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fc3446923-b166-4baa-9d77-8c75c1aa9835_4800x2880.png" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!oAse!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fc3446923-b166-4baa-9d77-8c75c1aa9835_4800x2880.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!oAse!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fc3446923-b166-4baa-9d77-8c75c1aa9835_4800x2880.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!oAse!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fc3446923-b166-4baa-9d77-8c75c1aa9835_4800x2880.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!oAse!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fc3446923-b166-4baa-9d77-8c75c1aa9835_4800x2880.png 1456w" sizes="auto, 100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!oAse!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fc3446923-b166-4baa-9d77-8c75c1aa9835_4800x2880.png" width="1456" height="874" 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srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!oAse!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fc3446923-b166-4baa-9d77-8c75c1aa9835_4800x2880.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!oAse!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fc3446923-b166-4baa-9d77-8c75c1aa9835_4800x2880.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!oAse!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fc3446923-b166-4baa-9d77-8c75c1aa9835_4800x2880.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!oAse!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fc3446923-b166-4baa-9d77-8c75c1aa9835_4800x2880.png 1456w" sizes="auto, 100vw" loading="lazy"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-tqxFUX" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-tqxFUX" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a></figure></div><p><strong><span>On the connection between the two senses.</span></strong><span> Here, theologians draw the consequence that the spiritual senses are &#8220;based on the literal sense.&#8221; We can easily see this by considering the chart used to compare the two senses above. The thing that is signified by the literal sense becomes the sign in the order of the spiritual sense. Therefore, in order to even have the spiritual senses, we need to begin by deriving the literal sense of the passage. I cannot understand that the Blessed Virgin is the thing signified by the &#8220;gate&#8221; of Ezekiel unless I am able to understand what the term &#8220;gate&#8221; signifies in the first place. Therefore, in the chart, &#8220;the thing signified by the letter becomes itself a sign&#8221; connects the &#8220;thing signified&#8221; in the order of the literal sense to the &#8220;sign&#8221; in the order of the spiritual sense.</span></p><p><span>As a corollary, it is to be noted that every passage has a literal sense. This is common among both the Fathers and Theologians. It is common for many to misunderstand the spiritual senses of Scripture as if some passages are to be interpreted as to the literal sense and other passages are to be interpreted as to some spiritual sense. Yet, this is a false understanding that has led to many errors among contemporaries. Every passage has a literal sense (otherwise, the words would be empty), and this literal sense is true (whether taken properly or improperly depending on the context). It is misguided to speak as if some passages had a literal sense and others a spiritual sense insofar as the literal sense is said to be the foundation or basis for the spiritual senses. Since the spiritual senses consider the significatory value of the realities which are signified by the letter, it would be impossible to speak of spiritual senses if there were not a literal sense underlying the spiritual senses.</span></p><p><span>Although, the diversity of speaking can often obscure this truth. Let&#8217;s say we were to consider the conquest of Canaan. Some say that this conquest is not to be taken &#8220;literally.&#8221; This can be taken in two ways, one committing an error of doctrine and the other committing an error of fact.</span></p><p><span>The first sense in which this can be taken is to say that the literal sense of the passage is that the Israelites conquered a certain land and that this conquest is false, never having occurred in reality, arguing that we ought merely to take what is signified by the words (i.e., the conquest which never happened) and interpret this spiritually (e.g., the conquest of sin in the life of the believer), holding that what is signified by the letter is false, yet what is signified by the false reality is true. This is a doctrinal error insofar as it denies the dogma of inerrancy.</span></p><p><span>The second sense in which this can be taken is to say that the literal sense of this passage (due to some literary form) is something besides a certain conquest of a land occurring in reality. These exegetes would argue that the intention was never false insofar as the intention was never to write a historical account of a certain conquest. They would hold that what is signified by the letter (taken in its literary form) is not false, but that the letter was intended to signify some spiritual reality (such as, e.g., a parable would be primarily intended to communicate some spiritual reality). Directly, this commits no doctrinal error, but only an error of fact insofar as it can be scientifically established that the intention of the sacred writer was to communicate something that did historically occur in reality. Yet, indirectly, this error has doctrinal implications insofar as the exegetes who interpret this passage contradict the decree of Trent and Vatican I (which is formally disciplinary, yet fundamentally doctrinal) and the teaching of various Popes of the last century (for more about this particular question, cf. my video on the topic </span><a href="http://link"><span>here</span></a><span>).</span></p><p><strong><span>Why do we have the spiritual senses?</span></strong><span> Here, we are able to consider another angle that clearly shows exactly why theologians formed the common axiom. This is also a point that quite a few moderns have not adequately understood.</span></p><p><span>Many believe that the spiritual senses cannot be used as the foundation for an argument because these senses are human (an &#8220;application&#8221;) and not intended by God. This cannot possibly be further from the truth. According to the common teaching of theologians, the spiritual senses are true senses. They are truly intended by the Holy Spirit as much as the literal sense is. Catholic theologians affirm that in the same act that the Holy Spirit willed to express x reality by a certain sign, so also did the Holy Spirit will that x reality itself be a sign for another reality. Ven. Pius XII teaches the same: &#8220;For the things which were said or done in the Old Testament were so wisely ordered and disposed by God that past things prefigured in a spiritual manner those things which were to come in the new covenant of grace&#8221;; and he commands that &#8220;this spiritual sense, intended and ordered by God himself,&#8221; be set forth by Catholic exegetes with the diligence the dignity of the matter demands.</span><a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-5" href="#footnote-5" target="_self">5</a></p><p><span>The difference between the two orders concerns the origin of signification. Our words are signs by convention. We invent words that are able to be signs of natures. Conventional signification implies some sort of dominion over the sign since conventionality requires a &#8220;creative&#8221; act. The inventor of words creates the words and establishes their significatory value towards the thing signified.</span></p><p><span>This is the exact basis for the distinction between the two orders and will resolve the difficulty quite easily. We can create words, we do not create natures. Natures are created by God and by God alone. We can invent the significatory value of words, but we cannot imbue realities with a significatory value that orders them to other realities, but only by way of &#8220;appropriation&#8221; (e.g., we appropriate a black cat as a bad omen). Therefore, the case of God and creatures towards signification is radically different. We make conventional signs that conventionally signify, God makes natural signs that naturally signify. Therefore, properly speaking, only Scripture has spiritual senses; human compositions do not, properly speaking, have spiritual senses. This is the express teaching of St. Thomas: </span></p><blockquote><p><span>The spiritual sense of Sacred Scripture is taken from this, that things running their course signify something else, which is grasped through the spiritual sense. But things are so ordered in their course that such a sense can be taken from them by him alone who governs things by his providence, who is God alone. (</span><em><span>Quodlibet</span></em><span> VII, q. 6, a. 3)</span></p></blockquote><p><span>John of St. Thomas draws out the reason. Men too use things to signify, as a branch before the door signifies wine for sale; but to designate things to signify in the mystical manner belongs only to him whose it is to order things to a supernatural end, &#8220;because he alone can hand down certain and determinate signs with respect to such an end, as is clear from the fact that only God, or one by his authority, can institute the Sacraments, which are signs of grace.&#8221;</span><a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-6" href="#footnote-6" target="_self">6</a><span> Here is a chart comparing the two:</span></p><div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!HzlD!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F4718202e-d5ea-4f4c-b0a9-79a3ffd35839_4800x3060.png" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!HzlD!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F4718202e-d5ea-4f4c-b0a9-79a3ffd35839_4800x3060.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!HzlD!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F4718202e-d5ea-4f4c-b0a9-79a3ffd35839_4800x3060.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!HzlD!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F4718202e-d5ea-4f4c-b0a9-79a3ffd35839_4800x3060.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!HzlD!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F4718202e-d5ea-4f4c-b0a9-79a3ffd35839_4800x3060.png 1456w" sizes="auto, 100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!HzlD!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F4718202e-d5ea-4f4c-b0a9-79a3ffd35839_4800x3060.png" width="1456" height="928" data-attrs="{&quot;src&quot;:&quot;https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/4718202e-d5ea-4f4c-b0a9-79a3ffd35839_4800x3060.png&quot;,&quot;srcNoWatermark&quot;:null,&quot;fullscreen&quot;:null,&quot;imageSize&quot;:null,&quot;height&quot;:928,&quot;width&quot;:1456,&quot;resizeWidth&quot;:null,&quot;bytes&quot;:626626,&quot;alt&quot;:null,&quot;title&quot;:null,&quot;type&quot;:&quot;image/png&quot;,&quot;href&quot;:null,&quot;belowTheFold&quot;:true,&quot;topImage&quot;:false,&quot;internalRedirect&quot;:&quot;https://thomism.com/i/216073308?img=https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F4718202e-d5ea-4f4c-b0a9-79a3ffd35839_4800x3060.png&quot;,&quot;isProcessing&quot;:false,&quot;align&quot;:null,&quot;offset&quot;:false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!HzlD!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F4718202e-d5ea-4f4c-b0a9-79a3ffd35839_4800x3060.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!HzlD!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F4718202e-d5ea-4f4c-b0a9-79a3ffd35839_4800x3060.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!HzlD!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F4718202e-d5ea-4f4c-b0a9-79a3ffd35839_4800x3060.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!HzlD!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F4718202e-d5ea-4f4c-b0a9-79a3ffd35839_4800x3060.png 1456w" sizes="auto, 100vw" loading="lazy"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-tqxFUX" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-tqxFUX" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a></figure></div><p><span>It is to this doctrine that we draw the corollary concerning the demonstrative character of the spiritual senses. The reason why the spiritual senses cannot be used demonstratively isn&#8217;t a judgement on the reality of the spiritual senses (they exist as intended by the Holy Spirit). The reason why the spiritual senses cannot be used demonstratively concerns the knowability of the spiritual senses. When we consider the literal sense, we have access to the signification of the signs presented before us since they are established by human convention. Therefore, of itself, the literal sense can be made certain. Yet, the same cannot be said of the spiritual senses.</span></p><p><span>The spiritual senses concern a free act of God above nature, constituting such-and-such a thing to have significatory value towards another reality. This is neither gathered from the words of Scripture, nor from the things. It is not gathered from the words since the words terminate their signification in the reality signified by the literal sense. It is not gathered from the things since this is a free act of God that is above the nature. Now, that which is freely willed by God above the natural order is only known through Divine Revelation. Yet, the spiritual sense goes beyond the literal sense of the passage insofar as it terminates beyond what the letter signified; therefore it follows that the spiritual senses are not made certain by the text which contains them.</span></p><p><span>This is precisely the reason St. Thomas himself gives when treating this question. In the seventh Quodlibet he is asked whether the fact that no efficacious argument can be drawn from the spiritual sense does not show that this sense has less authority. He answers:</span></p><blockquote><p><span>It is not on account of a defect of authority that an efficacious argument cannot be drawn from the spiritual sense, but from the very nature of the likeness on which the spiritual sense is founded. For one thing can be like many things; whence, from that thing, when it is set forth in Sacred Scripture, one cannot proceed to any one of those things determinately, but there is a fallacy of the consequent. For example, the lion on account of some likeness signifies Christ and the devil; whence from the fact that something is said of a lion in Sacred Scripture, no process of argument can be made in Sacred Scripture to either of them. (St. Thomas, </span><em><span>Quodlibet</span></em><span> VII, q. 6, a. 1)</span></p></blockquote><p><span>The reason, then, is not the authority of the sense but the indeterminacy of the sign which can signify a multiplicity of things. The nature upon which God builds the spiritual sense is determined by him to signify a number of different things, and the text does not tell us which of the many he intends. Sylvius states this quite clearly: </span></p><blockquote><p><span>[The reason] is not that one sense is of greater authority than the other, but because for the most part it is more easily and more certainly established to us which sense is the literal than which is the mystical. For the literal is sometimes known from the words alone and from the native signification of the vocables, sometimes from the collation of other Scriptures and from the doctrine of the Church; but the mystical cannot be known from the words and the signification of the words, but only from other Scriptures and from the doctrine of the Fathers and of the Church, for it is not signified immediately through the words but through the things signified by the words. (</span><em><span>Commentarii in Primam Partem</span></em><span>, q. 1, a. 10)</span></p></blockquote><p><span>How does this not necessarily lead us to conclude that the Protestant contention against various Catholic theologians is true? In order to understand this, it is important to make two notes.</span></p><p><span>What was demonstrated in the above demonstration was that the text in which the literal sense is expressed cannot make certain the spiritual sense which the reality signified in the text itself signifies. Yet, if you keep in mind that the spiritual sense is truly intended by the Holy Spirit, this does not mean that demonstration cannot occur either through a different medium or in a different mode.</span></p><p><strong><span>First note.</span></strong><span> In a different medium, because the connection between the thing signified by the word and the reality which it itself signifies can be made clear by some other authority. For example, let&#8217;s say we considered the text of the ark and its relationship to the Assumption. The literal sense of the text itself does not allow us to certainly conclude that the reality of the ark has a signification towards Mary in the text. Yet, this does not mean that there could not be some other medium which does make this connection. This follows from the fact that the spiritual senses are real senses intended by the Holy Spirit. Therefore, the connection is something that can be revealed to us as any other free act of God above nature and within the extensive object our intellect can be revealed to us.</span></p><p><span>Like any other revelation, we would fall back on the tract </span><em><span>de locis</span></em><span> in order to determine how exactly we determine and judge whether something is revealed. The Protestant critique is correct if we were to take that such a connection was made certain by the text itself, but if we were to make the connection by some other means (e.g., another text of Scripture), then the same critique would be fallacious.</span></p><p><span>It is for this reason that the very Fathers and Theologians who quote this axiom in other parts of their works use the spiritual senses of Scripture to establish matters of faith. Often, this is in the context of gathering the spiritual senses of various prophetic texts whose signification has been made clear by their fulfillment in the New Testament. Our Lord himself and the Apostles do this quite frequently against those who do not accept their authority.</span></p><p><span>You may object that Our Lord and the Apostles were Divine Legates, therefore they had the authority to declare these matters by an act of Divine Revelation.</span></p><p><span>To this, the qualification &#8220;against those who do not accept their authority&#8221; is to be carefully considered. Our Lord and the Apostles would argue fallaciously against those opponents who did not accept their authority if no certain argument under any circumstance could ever be drawn from one of the spiritual senses. Yet, we see them freely drawing from such senses where the signification had been made clear. Therefore, the axiom that &#8220;no certain argument can be drawn from the spiritual senses&#8221; concerns the spiritual senses and the text considered in itself, not the cases in which the spiritual sense had been made certain through some other means.</span></p><p><strong><span>Second note.</span></strong><span> In a different mode, because not all arguments are meant to draw the conclusion in a certain or necessary way, but may be a dialectical argument that draws the conclusion in a probable manner. Now, while the text does not indicate the spiritual sense in the letter so as to certify the precise spiritual sense intended by the Holy Spirit, the same cannot be said for certain probable arguments that are drawn in order to confirm a doctrine or theological opinion.</span></p><h2><strong><span>The Accommodated and Consequent Sense</span></strong></h2><p><span>Here, it is important to disambiguate the spiritual sense from two other &#8220;senses&#8221; of Scripture: the accommodated and consequent sense. Among moderns, a great deal of confusion has arisen over not distinguishing these &#8220;senses&#8221; properly.</span></p><p><span>First, the accommodated sense is the human application or appropriation of scripture towards some fitting object. This is frequently done in liturgical documents, especially about the lives of the saints (e.g., when certain texts of scripture are applied to confessors, doctors, virgins, etc., in the liturgy). The accommodated sense arises when a reader applies the words of Scripture to some matter that the Holy Spirit did not intend, either in the words or in the things, on account of some likeness that the reader himself perceives. Such applications may be pious and fitting, but they are not senses of Scripture at all, because the signification comes from the one applying the text and not from the author of the text.</span></p><p><span>There is no (direct) demonstrative value to the accommodated sense since it is not a sense intended by the Holy Spirit, but by man. As John of St. Thomas teaches: &#8220;The accommodated sense is not properly an expository sense, but by an allusion of one thing to another it applies to one what is said of another through some likeness, which is done according to the judgment of the speaker and not according to the sense set down and intended by the author of Scripture, whether in the words or in the things.&#8221; And therefore, he says, it &#8220;neither explains nor proves anything from Scripture, nor confirms a truth, but only makes an allusion of one thing to another.&#8221;</span><a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-7" href="#footnote-7" target="_self">7</a><span> The Benedictines of Salzburg go so far as to say that it does not yield even a probable theological argument, since it rests on a merely human judgment and the sacred words concur only materially.</span><a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-8" href="#footnote-8" target="_self">8</a><span> Ven. Pius XII warns exegetes in the same sense: &#8220;Let them religiously beware of setting forth other transferred significations of things as though they were the genuine sense of Sacred Scripture.&#8221;</span><a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-9" href="#footnote-9" target="_self">9</a></p><p><span>In many cases, when the Protestant says that the Catholic is arguing from a sense he has invented, he is describing the accommodated sense, and against that the axiom of Augustine holds without any qualification whatsoever. But the spiritual sense, as the theologians define it, is by definition intended by God; and so the axiom&#8217;s application to it must be qualified, as we have seen.</span></p><p><span>Second, theologians will also speak of the &#8220;consequent sense.&#8221; The &#8220;consequent sense&#8221; concerns those immediate conclusions that are drawn from Sacred Scripture. These only have value as theological conclusions, as I have extensively argued </span><a href="https://thomism.com/p/a-complete-refutation-of-sola-scriptura"><span>here</span></a><span>.</span></p><p><span>The following chart lays out the whole division:</span></p><div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!nQO8!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fc82c0c17-403b-47c8-8948-6dd1b4ef9c7f_4800x2820.png" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!nQO8!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fc82c0c17-403b-47c8-8948-6dd1b4ef9c7f_4800x2820.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!nQO8!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fc82c0c17-403b-47c8-8948-6dd1b4ef9c7f_4800x2820.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!nQO8!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fc82c0c17-403b-47c8-8948-6dd1b4ef9c7f_4800x2820.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!nQO8!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fc82c0c17-403b-47c8-8948-6dd1b4ef9c7f_4800x2820.png 1456w" sizes="auto, 100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!nQO8!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fc82c0c17-403b-47c8-8948-6dd1b4ef9c7f_4800x2820.png" width="1456" height="855" data-attrs="{&quot;src&quot;:&quot;https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/c82c0c17-403b-47c8-8948-6dd1b4ef9c7f_4800x2820.png&quot;,&quot;srcNoWatermark&quot;:null,&quot;fullscreen&quot;:null,&quot;imageSize&quot;:null,&quot;height&quot;:855,&quot;width&quot;:1456,&quot;resizeWidth&quot;:null,&quot;bytes&quot;:572039,&quot;alt&quot;:null,&quot;title&quot;:null,&quot;type&quot;:&quot;image/png&quot;,&quot;href&quot;:null,&quot;belowTheFold&quot;:true,&quot;topImage&quot;:false,&quot;internalRedirect&quot;:&quot;https://thomism.com/i/216073308?img=https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fc82c0c17-403b-47c8-8948-6dd1b4ef9c7f_4800x2820.png&quot;,&quot;isProcessing&quot;:false,&quot;align&quot;:null,&quot;offset&quot;:false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!nQO8!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fc82c0c17-403b-47c8-8948-6dd1b4ef9c7f_4800x2820.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!nQO8!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fc82c0c17-403b-47c8-8948-6dd1b4ef9c7f_4800x2820.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!nQO8!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fc82c0c17-403b-47c8-8948-6dd1b4ef9c7f_4800x2820.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!nQO8!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fc82c0c17-403b-47c8-8948-6dd1b4ef9c7f_4800x2820.png 1456w" sizes="auto, 100vw" loading="lazy"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-tqxFUX" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-tqxFUX" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a></figure></div><h2><strong><span>How the Theologians Have Answered</span></strong></h2><p><span>In the introduction to this article, I said that the theologians universally accept the axiom in a qualified sense. It remains to show this.</span></p><p><strong>The axiom is affirmed without exception.</strong> No Catholic theologian I have found denies that, of the spiritual sense considered in itself and taken from the text alone, no efficacious argument can be drawn. Ba&#241;ez, whom the later authors cite as the classic treatment, puts it as his first conclusion. Zumel sets out the same authorities and adds St. Jerome, who, reporting those who saw the Trinity in the three measures of meal, said: &#8220;A pious sense indeed, but never can a parable and the doubtful understanding of enigmas profit unto the authority of dogmas.&#8221;<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-10" href="#footnote-10" target="_self">10</a><span> Su&#225;rez: the spiritual sense &#8220;is more obscure, and of itself does not avail for the confirmation of dogmas, unless it be authentically explained elsewhere, according to St. Thomas, I, q. 1, a. 10.&#8221;</span><a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-11" href="#footnote-11" target="_self">11</a><span> This is also commonly taught by Medieval theologians, who I hardly need to cite.</span></p><p><strong><span>The reason is the knowability of the sense, not its authority.</span></strong><span> We have already heard St. Thomas and Sylvius on this. The Dominican Berthier states this quite clearly: the mystical sense &#8220;does not prove immediately and of itself. The reason is that it does not exist necessarily, but hypothetically, that is, from the free will of God; nor is it expressed by natural signs but by arbitrary ones, whose force of signifying no one can perceive unless the will of him who at his pleasure gave the signification becomes known to him from elsewhere.&#8221;</span><a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-12" href="#footnote-12" target="_self">12</a><span> Doronzo, in the last of the great manuals, gives the same account: the literal sense is &#8220;more manifest and more certain, since it does not require a revelation, as the typical sense does, in order to be known with certainty; and therefore, consequently, it is scientifically more efficacious and so more apt for theological argumentation.&#8221;</span><a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-13" href="#footnote-13" target="_self">13</a></p><p><strong><span>Where the spiritual sense is made certain by another means, it yields a demonstrative argument.</span></strong><span> This is the key qualification given by the theologians, which I showed from the nature of the case above. Zumel gives it as his second conclusion:</span></p><blockquote><p><span>When the Holy Spirit, either through the Apostles, or through the Prophets, or through the other sacred writers, has explained to us some place of Sacred Scripture in the spiritual sense, then from such a testimony and from such a sense of Scripture an efficacious argument may be taken for faith and morals; indeed, that spiritual place would have to be held by us as though it were literal. The reason for this conclusion is that such a sense would be intended by the Holy Spirit; and further, because that sense is now contained in Sacred Scripture, and Sacred Scripture is efficacious for proving the faith. And so that rule, &#8220;the mystical sense is not to be admitted as efficacious for the proof of any dogma,&#8221; is not always and everywhere to be observed. For if it is established from other places of Scripture that that mystical interpretation is intended by the Holy Spirit, or is according to the genuine and true sense of the passage, then indeed from such a mystical sense an argument can be drawn for establishing some doctrine. Whence Paul, in 1 Corinthians 9, from the text &#8220;Thou shalt not muzzle the mouth of the ox that treadeth out the corn,&#8221; proves that we are bound to support the ministers of the Church. St. Augustine plainly indicates this in the words just cited. For after he had said that it was impudence to adduce in one&#8217;s own favor something set down in allegory, he immediately excepts a special case from this general sentence, saying: &#8220;unless he also has manifest testimonies, by whose light the obscure things may be illuminated.&#8221; Therefore, when it can be established that such a mystical sense is the true sense of that letter, an argument is very well deduced from it. (ibid., concl. 2.)</span></p></blockquote><p><span>Notice that Zumel finds the qualification in Augustine&#8217;s own sentence. The &#8220;unless&#8221; clause of the letter to Vincent is exactly what the Theologians develop this qualification from (for, if the argument holds good for one theological locus, i.e., the explicit testimony of a text of scripture, then it holds good for the other theological loci as well).</span></p><p><span>Sylvius makes the same point: &#8220;But where it has been established concerning the mystical sense of some Scripture, whether through another place of Scripture, or through the unanimous consent of the Fathers, or through the doctrine of the Church, then a firm argument can be drawn from that sense, since the mystical sense is also a true sense of Sacred Scripture, and intended by the Holy Spirit, and consequently of the same authority and certainty as the literal.&#8221; Reding makes it his third conclusion: &#8220;The mystical sense, if it be established that it is intended by the Holy Spirit, furnishes a firm theological argument; but because it is for the most part unknown from infallible authority, it can more rarely be suitable for demonstrative theological argumentation.&#8221;</span><a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-14" href="#footnote-14" target="_self">14</a><span> The anonymous </span><em><span>Brevis tractatus de locis theologicis </span></em><span>explains the same: </span></p><blockquote><p><span>From the spiritual sense considered in itself an irrefragable argument can be deduced; but since we sometimes know only probably that a spiritual sense is contained in some text of Scripture, therefore from it we then draw only probable arguments; but if it is certainly established to us, from it we can argue efficaciously. And indeed Christ himself and the Apostles argued most efficaciously from it: Christ (John 3), from the lifting up of the brazen serpent in the desert, efficaciously proves his own lifting up on the cross, spiritually figured in that serpent; and Paul (1 Cor. 9), from the text &#8216;Thou shalt not muzzle the mouth of the ox that treadeth out the corn,&#8217; proves that stipends are owed to the ministers of the Gospel. </span></p></blockquote><p><span>Pesch warns that a false conclusion must not be drawn from the words commonly used by theologians: </span></p><blockquote><p><span>[What Ss. Thomas and Augustine intend] is this: that it is not lawful to gather from the figures whatever possible likenesses one pleases and to argue from them. But it is another thing if Sacred Scripture teaches that some thing is a figure of another thing under this or that aspect&#8230; For as soon as it is certainly established that a past thing by divine institution figures a future thing under this or that respect, without doubt one may argue with absolute certainty that the thing and the aspect figured by the type are necessarily found in the antitype. (</span><em><span>De inspiratione Sacrae Scripturae</span></em><span>, n. 176) </span></p></blockquote><p><span>And Doronzo: </span></p><blockquote><p><span>From the same reason of its divine origin it follows that this sense has probative force, and that of itself apodictic, provided that its existence be certainly demonstrated, which cannot be done otherwise than from the revelation of God himself; thus, from the fact that, as the Apostle testifies, Melchisedech in his priesthood is certainly a type of Christ, it can be apodictically inferred that Christ, no less than Melchisedech, offered a sacrifice. (loc. cit., n. 386) </span></p></blockquote><p><strong><span>The means by which a spiritual sense is made certain are three.</span></strong><span> The authors are again unanimous in enumerating them. First, Scripture itself, when a later text declares the sense of an earlier one, as the New Testament declares the figures of the Old. Second, the definition of the Church, whether by a Pope or a Council. Third, the unanimous consent of the Fathers. The anonymous Thomist just quoted lists them in this order and calls the unanimous understanding of the Fathers &#8220;a firm argument.&#8221; Reding gives the same three, with the example of Romans 9 declaring Jacob and Esau to be figures of the Gentile and Jewish peoples, and the common consent of the Fathers establishing that the Synagogue was a type of the Church and Solomon of Christ. Buonpensiere, commenting on St. Thomas in the last century, lays down the rule in the same terms: that sense &#8220;is to be retained as certainly intended by the Holy Spirit which is declared in express words either in another place of Sacred Scripture, or by the definition of a Pope or Ecumenical Council, or by the unanimous consent of the Fathers&#8221;, and where a sense is not so supported it &#8220;remains within the bounds of probability.&#8221;</span><a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-15" href="#footnote-15" target="_self">15</a></p><p><strong><span>What remains is a probable argument.</span></strong><span> This is the second note that I gave above and applies to those places where the sense is not certainly established. Zumel argues that, in such a case, the spiritual sense &#8220;is not superfluous, for it profits to persuade and to draw men to the good.&#8221; He goes further, and notes the practice of the Church: </span></p><blockquote><p><span>We see that the Church and the holy Pontiffs, when they often prove matters of faith, use testimonies of Sacred Scripture in the spiritual sense, when the figure fits very well with the thing proposed and to be proved. For a figure well placed and explained has much strength in disputation, especially when the thing itself is established from other places of Scripture in the literal sense; therefore, when the thing figured has somewhere in Sacred Scripture a literal sense, the argument from the figure is an excellent one. (loc. cit.) </span></p></blockquote><p><span>Reding classes such arguments, &#8220;resting at least probably on divine revelation,&#8221; as belonging to theology, &#8220;whether scientific or at least opinative.&#8221;</span><a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-16" href="#footnote-16" target="_self">16</a><span> Doronzo adds two cautions: not to suppose too easily that a typical sense exists at all, and not to extend an established type beyond the respect under which it was established. It is because of such uncertainties, he says, that St. Thomas &#8220;seems, to the surprise of some, to deny it all efficacy,&#8221; and that the modern theologian ought to use the argument from the typical sense &#8220;sparingly and safely.&#8221;</span><a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-17" href="#footnote-17" target="_self">17</a></p><p><span>The whole matter can be gathered into one chart:</span></p><div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!7sWN!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F40dd79da-bad8-4865-a944-17031a8b08da_4800x3060.png" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!7sWN!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F40dd79da-bad8-4865-a944-17031a8b08da_4800x3060.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!7sWN!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F40dd79da-bad8-4865-a944-17031a8b08da_4800x3060.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!7sWN!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F40dd79da-bad8-4865-a944-17031a8b08da_4800x3060.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!7sWN!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F40dd79da-bad8-4865-a944-17031a8b08da_4800x3060.png 1456w" sizes="auto, 100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!7sWN!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F40dd79da-bad8-4865-a944-17031a8b08da_4800x3060.png" width="1456" height="928" data-attrs="{&quot;src&quot;:&quot;https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/40dd79da-bad8-4865-a944-17031a8b08da_4800x3060.png&quot;,&quot;srcNoWatermark&quot;:null,&quot;fullscreen&quot;:null,&quot;imageSize&quot;:null,&quot;height&quot;:928,&quot;width&quot;:1456,&quot;resizeWidth&quot;:null,&quot;bytes&quot;:591663,&quot;alt&quot;:null,&quot;title&quot;:null,&quot;type&quot;:&quot;image/png&quot;,&quot;href&quot;:null,&quot;belowTheFold&quot;:true,&quot;topImage&quot;:false,&quot;internalRedirect&quot;:&quot;https://thomism.com/i/216073308?img=https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F40dd79da-bad8-4865-a944-17031a8b08da_4800x3060.png&quot;,&quot;isProcessing&quot;:false,&quot;align&quot;:null,&quot;offset&quot;:false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!7sWN!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F40dd79da-bad8-4865-a944-17031a8b08da_4800x3060.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!7sWN!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F40dd79da-bad8-4865-a944-17031a8b08da_4800x3060.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!7sWN!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F40dd79da-bad8-4865-a944-17031a8b08da_4800x3060.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!7sWN!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F40dd79da-bad8-4865-a944-17031a8b08da_4800x3060.png 1456w" sizes="auto, 100vw" loading="lazy"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-tqxFUX" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-tqxFUX" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a></figure></div><h2><strong><span>Conclusion</span></strong></h2><p><span>From the spiritual sense of a text, considered in itself and gathered from that text alone, no demonstrative argument can be drawn, because the spiritual sense is a free ordination of God above the nature of things, which the text does not declare and which the likeness of the things does not determine. This is the common testimony of the Fathers and Theologians.</span></p><p><span>Yet, we ought to be careful not to transfer an axiom about the knowability of the Holy Spirit&#8217;s intention in a text to a denial of the Holy Spirit&#8217;s intention in a text. The spiritual sense is a true sense, intended by God as much as the literal, and where God has made his intention known by some other means (by another text of Scripture, the judgment of his Church, the unanimous voice of the Fathers, etc.) the argument from the figure is as firm as any argument from the literal sense. Where the intention is not certain, the argument from the figure remains a probable argument, of real weight in theology and of great use in persuasion, and the Church herself uses it as such.</span></p><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-1" href="#footnote-anchor-1" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">1</a><div class="footnote-content"><p><em><span>Summa theologiae</span></em><span> III, q. 28, a. 3, sed contra.</span></p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-2" href="#footnote-anchor-2" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">2</a><div class="footnote-content"><p><span>Pius XII, </span><em><span>Munificentissimus Deus</span></em><span>, n. 26.</span></p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-3" href="#footnote-anchor-3" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">3</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>Council of Trent, Session XXII, cap. 1</p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-4" href="#footnote-anchor-4" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">4</a><div class="footnote-content"><p><em><span>Summa theologiae</span></em><span> I, q. 1, a. 10, ad 1</span></p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-5" href="#footnote-anchor-5" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">5</a><div class="footnote-content"><p><span>Pius XII, </span><em><span>Divino afflante Spiritu</span></em><span>, nn. 26&#8211;27</span></p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-6" href="#footnote-anchor-6" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">6</a><div class="footnote-content"><p><span>John of St. Thomas, </span><em><span>Cursus theologicus</span></em><span>, In I, q. 1, disp. 2, a. 12, nn. 13&#8211;14</span></p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-7" href="#footnote-anchor-7" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">7</a><div class="footnote-content"><p><span>loc. cit., n. 17</span></p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-8" href="#footnote-anchor-8" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">8</a><div class="footnote-content"><p><span>Reding, </span><em><span>Theologia scholastica</span></em><span>, t. I, q. 1, a. 4, controv. 4, concl. 4.</span></p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-9" href="#footnote-anchor-9" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">9</a><div class="footnote-content"><p><em><span>Divino afflante Spiritu</span></em></p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-10" href="#footnote-anchor-10" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">10</a><div class="footnote-content"><p><span>St. Jerome, </span><em><span>Commentarii in Matthaeum</span></em><span> II, on 13:33</span></p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-11" href="#footnote-anchor-11" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">11</a><div class="footnote-content"><p><span>Su&#225;rez, </span><em><span>De fide</span></em><span>, disp. 5, sect. 3, n. 12</span></p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-12" href="#footnote-anchor-12" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">12</a><div class="footnote-content"><p><span>Berthier, </span><em><span>Tractatus de locis theologicis</span></em><span>, pars I, lib. I, n. 254</span></p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-13" href="#footnote-anchor-13" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">13</a><div class="footnote-content"><p><span>Doronzo, </span><em><span>Theologia dogmatica</span></em><span>, vol. I, </span><em><span>De locis theologicis</span></em><span>, n. 386</span></p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-14" href="#footnote-anchor-14" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">14</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>loc. cit.</p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-15" href="#footnote-anchor-15" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">15</a><div class="footnote-content"><p><span>Buonpensiere, </span><em><span>Commentaria in Primam Partem</span></em><span>, q. 1, a. 10, nn. 133&#8211;134</span></p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-16" href="#footnote-anchor-16" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">16</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>loc. cit., <span>concl. 4, n. 25.</span></p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-17" href="#footnote-anchor-17" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">17</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>loc. cit., n. 387. </p></div></div>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[Here’s Why Most Biblical Arguments for the Papacy Suck (and how to fix them)]]></title><description><![CDATA[Some Brief Considerations]]></description><link>https://thomism.com/p/heres-why-most-biblical-arguments</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://thomism.com/p/heres-why-most-biblical-arguments</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Christian B. Wagner]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Tue, 15 Sep 2026 21:48:41 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/53929b97-fb1c-49f6-90cf-4a3eb399a1be_750x558.webp" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>If you enjoy my writing (and would like to keep up to date!) consider becoming a free subscriber by entering your email here:</p><p class="button-wrapper" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://thomism.com/subscribe?&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Subscribe now&quot;,&quot;action&quot;:null,&quot;class&quot;:null}" data-component-name="ButtonCreateButton"><a class="button primary" href="https://thomism.com/subscribe?"><span>Subscribe now</span></a></p><p>What helps even more is becoming a Patron <a href="https://www.patreon.com/militantthomist">here</a> for as little as $5 per month! If you sign up, you get access to the Telegram group. </p><h2><span>Introduction</span></h2><p><span>One of the verses commonly used by Catholic apologists in defense of the Papacy is Luke 22:31&#8211;32. In this passage, immediately after the Last Supper and before the events of the Garden of Gethsemane, Our Lord says the following to St. Peter:</span></p><blockquote><p><span>&#8220;Simon, Simon, behold, Satan demanded to have you, that he might sift you like wheat, but I have prayed for you that your faith may not fail; and when you have turned again, strengthen your brethren.&#8221;</span></p></blockquote><p><span>Protestant apologists often respond to the quotation of this passage with &#8220;so what?&#8221; At first glance, it can seem quite arbitrary for Catholic apologists to quote such passages about St. Peter and then, by a hidden line of reasoning, arrive at &#8220;therefore the Papacy&#8221; at the end of it. Some time ago there was a &#8220;Johannine Pope&#8221; meme going around which demonstrated Ephesian supremacy by simply quoting verses about St. John. The implication is that the Papal methodology amounts to quoting any and every verse about St. Peter and then assuming a chain of reasoning it cannot substantiate.</span></p><p><span>In my opinion, Catholics should be sensitive to what is legitimate in this criticism. Frequently it is not made clear how these texts are being employed, or what precise line of reasoning would lead us to a conclusion as large as &#8220;the Papacy is true.&#8221; In order to properly construct an argument, the inference must be clear to the reader. That is a basic rhetorical and logical axiom.</span></p><p><span>Yet, as is often the case, the Protestant opponents of the Catholic case are not fair to the Catholic position either. They do not carefully research the exegesis of these passages, nor the explicit reasoning found in the manuals, polemical works, journal articles, monographs, and commentaries that would illuminate how we get from </span><em><span>x</span></em><span> to </span><em><span>y</span></em><span>. This does not require that the Protestant agree with that line of reasoning. It requires only that, for proper and fruitful disputation, such research actually be carried out. The inference has in fact been stated, </span><em><span>ex professo</span></em><span> and repeatedly, for the better part of seven centuries. To pretend as if our use of these texts only proceeded by a hidden line of reasoning without any real substantiation is defamatory.</span></p><h2><span>Inflating the burden of proof</span></h2><p><span>Another point in the dispute over &#8220;Papal proof-texting&#8221; that I believe gets misunderstood by critics of the Papacy concerns the burden of proof. A common line of argumentation employed by the Protestant critic of Catholic exegesis is simply to elevate that burden past anything the subject matter can bear.</span></p><p><span>We see crude forms of this everywhere in religious disputation. A famous example is the Muslim question, &#8220;Where does Jesus say, &#8216;Bow down and worship me&#8217;?&#8221; The demand presupposes that a doctrine can be proved only by a text in which the doctrine is verbally recited; yet, it is not incompossible that Christ both ought to be worshipped and that he did not say this in so many words. That Christ is to be adored follows demonstratively from the fact that He is God together with the fact that God alone is to be adored; and the first of those is established from what Scripture ascribes to Him, not from the verbal recitation demanded from our opponents.</span></p><p><span>Protestant apologists run a more respectable version of the same manoeuvre when they demand explicit scriptural testimony to each Papal prerogative taken singly, along with the succession and the location of the Roman Pontiff. This line of argumentation overlooks three facts that complicate the matter.</span></p><p><span>First, if we are disputing concerning the divine institution of the Church, then we cannot argue for an &#8220;abstract papacy,&#8221; but only one that concretely exists. Concretely, the Papacy that exists is the Papacy that holds Vatican I and will always hold certain dogmatic claims wholly incompatible with Protestantism. It follows necessarily that if the Papal office belongs to the divine constitution of the Church at all, then the &#8220;Vatican I Papacy&#8221; is true (or else divine revelation is false, supposing Christ to be a divine legate). There is no other Papacy except the concrete form in which it now exists.</span></p><p><span>There is a certain illusion in Protestant and Orthodox polemics that there exists some &#8220;third way&#8221; here&#8212;the Vatican I Papacy, a mitigated Papacy, and no Papacy&#8212;and that one may retreat to the middle term in order to save face before the vast historical witness to the Papal prerogatives. It is worth separating two very different things that go under that name.</span></p><p><span>The first is a mitigated Papacy understood as a </span><em><span>human</span></em><span> construct within the constitution of the Church: a primacy that grew up by custom, conciliar arrangement, or ecclesiastical law, and which may therefore be modified or dissolved. This is a coherent position. Catholics deny it, but we deny it as a matter of </span><em><span>fact</span></em><span>, on the historical and exegetical evidence.</span></p><p><span>The second is a mitigated Papacy said to belong to the </span><em><span>divine</span></em><span> constitution of the Church while lacking the prerogatives the office actually claims. This is not merely false; it is incoherent. In the concrete, such an office does not exist. The only papacy to exist is the one that the Catholics claim. Let&#8217;s suppose, for the sake of argument, that this mitigated Papacy did exist. Two things would follow. First, Protestantism, Orthodoxy, etc., would be false insofar as they lacked an element of the divine constitution of the Church. Second, Catholicism would be false insofar as it dogmatically defined certain divine prerogatives to be present in the Roman Pontiff that are not truly present. When the Protestant or Orthodox argue for the &#8220;mitigated papacy&#8221; in this way, they are refuting themselves and providing an incoherent line of argumentation for something that does not concretely exist.</span></p><p><span>Therefore, it is completely legitimate for Catholics to go from &#8220;x office is divinely instituted&#8221; to &#8220;x office is divinely instituted in its current form&#8221; since the office is something that is unique. </span></p><p><span>Second, it restricts the range of demonstration far too much. This point is closely connected with the first. In a dogma like the Papacy, where the thing has a determinate concrete form, the demonstration of something unique and proper to it is the demonstration of the whole. If I demonstrate the supremacy of St. Peter&#8217;s successors, I have demonstrated their infallibility. If I demonstrate the infallibility of St. Peter&#8217;s successors, I have demonstrated their supremacy. Any prerogative of the Pope that is proper to him is a demonstration of the entire dogma.</span></p><p><span>An analogy to Christology makes this clear. Suppose we sought to demonstrate the true humanity of Jesus Christ. If we demonstrated the reality of the physical parts of human nature in Him (a human body and a rational soul) we would thereby have demonstrated His true humanity, without needing to descend into the particular faculties and properties that follow from that nature. Or suppose we sought to demonstrate His true divinity. A single divine act (creation, say) or a single divine attribute (omnipotence) would suffice, without proving one by one every action and attribute proper to God.</span></p><p><span>Third (and to my mind this is where the debate truly lies) the demand ignores the objective standards for judging continuity and discontinuity between the Apostolic and the Post-Apostolic Church.</span></p><p><span>On the particular exegesis of the Petrine passages, once all passion is removed, the unique office and prerogatives of St. Peter are quite clear. A great deal of the exegesis historically given to these passages by anti-Papalists is driven by its usefulness in anti-Roman polemic rather than by the text itself.</span></p><p><span>Yet this is not where the more important question lies. The more important question is whether the unique office and prerogatives of St. Peter </span><em><span>continue in his successors</span></em><span>, not in whether the unique office and prerogatives existed in St. Peter. It matters little how securely we rest on our exegesis of these passages if we cannot go the distance and demonstrate the continued presence in the Church of what those passages contain.</span></p><p><span>This point has not been adequately recognized by many Protestant apologists. Often they will grant, for the sake of argument, that certain unique prerogatives and a unique office were given to St. Peter, and rest their refutation on a denial of the continuity of that office. Yet, the bare denial usually arrives without any alternative account of continuity and discontinuity. In order to be convincing, such an account would have to: a) explain the points of continuity and discontinuity that they themselves affirm and deny in the New Testament; b) apply consistently to the cases they accept and reject, while still excluding the Papacy; and c) be grounded in theological reasoning or authority, so as to be true and non-arbitrary rather than merely convenient.</span></p><p><span>Until those three are supplied, the denial is of no weight.</span></p><h2><span>The problem, stated</span></h2><p><span>At first glance this might seem a simple matter. It is in fact a peculiarly complex question, and it underlies many debates between Catholics and Protestants, and a great many debates among Protestants.</span></p><p><span>How are we able to discern between continuity and discontinuity from the Apostolic to the Post-Apostolic Church?</span></p><p><span>Every Christian affirms some discontinuity. The standard example is the unique mission and extraordinary prerogatives of the Apostolate: no college of twelve was ever reconstituted in the Church with that mission and those prerogatives. And every Christian affirms some continuity. Few Christians deny that there is some permanent clerical order in the Church descending from the Apostolic age.</span></p><p><span>What few have reckoned with is the arbitrariness with which the justification for this line is usually supplied. Everyone has the distinction on his lips; very few can state an objective standard for </span><em><span>why</span></em><span> this endures and that does not. The problem surfaces constantly in intra-Protestant disputes over the interpretation (or rather the </span><em><span>application</span></em><span>) of Acts, 1 and 2 Corinthians, and the Pastoral Epistles, where ecclesiological questions are most concentrated. This diversity is, more than any other single cause, responsible for the diversity of contemporary Protestantism.</span></p><p><span>One solution to this problem, and a particularly minimalist one, is to restrict the points of continuity to those which Scripture explicitly says are continuous.</span></p><p><span>This labors under a difficulty concerning the very purpose of many of the books of the New Testament. These books are </span><em><span>occasional</span></em><span> in their primary intention and composition: they are addressed to particular communities about particular difficulties at particular moments. The ecclesiastical structures the Apostles establish therefore rarely if ever come with an explicit or even implicit indication that they belong to the divine constitution of the Church. This rule fails on both practical and on theoretical grounds.</span></p><h2><span>The Catholic answer</span></h2><p><span>It may be an interesting project to collect each of the disputed points and compare how each proposed solution handles them. Here I am using the problem only to frame the question and to offer the Catholic solution, which I believe is the most sensible one. This is also one, it is to be noted, that, from my reading, is presented quite frequently among classical Protestant authors.</span></p><p><span>It should be noted before I continue that the Catholic solution is a solution in point of </span><em><span>principle</span></em><span>. It often happens that different Catholic theologians will apply the same clear rule differently to the more obscure texts of Scripture. There was, for instance, a real controversy over how the prayer &#8220;that your faith may not fail&#8221; is or is not fulfilled in the Roman Pontiff. Some read it as an extraordinary and personal prerogative of St. Peter; others as a personal prerogative of St. Peter and of his successors; others as a personal prerogative of St. Peter and an </span><em><span>official</span></em><span> prerogative of his successors, that is, in the exercise of their office.</span></p><p><span>The solution itself is relatively simple and intuitive.</span></p><p><span>When we look at any institution (a mission, an office, a law, a precept, etc.) its reason for existing is some end. An accountant is hired so that the finances of a business may be squared away. Sanitation services are set up so that a city&#8217;s garbage may be collected. A tutor is employed so that a student may learn a subject. The Catholic looks at the end of the institution and judges its perpetuity by that end.</span></p><p><span>If we consider the tutor, without knowing anything else about the arrangement, we understand that the tutor continues as long as the student requires that end, and that his work ceases when the end is no longer in place (e.g., when the student passes the examination or graduates). A tutor is, by his end, something temporary; and so tutors are ordinarily hired temporarily.</span></p><p><span>If we consider the accountant, his end is the finances of the business, and those continue as long as the business continues. So if a particular accountant quits, dies, or is dismissed, he must ordinarily be replaced by another accountant doing the same job. A business does not &#8220;outgrow&#8221; having an accountant, because it does not outgrow having finances.</span></p><p><span>An institution endures as long as the end for which it was instituted endures. If the end is proper to a passing state of affairs, the institution passes with it. If the end is one the society will always have, the institution is permanent, and the death or removal of the man who held it is the occasion for appointing another.</span></p><p><span>The reason this works is that every institution is correlative to its object. Battle formations are drawn up for the battle; the army exists for the defense of the nation. The formations last as long as the battle; the army lasts as long as the nation must be defended. Correlatives posit one another: where one is given, so is the other. If we can identify the one, we can determine the other.</span></p><p><span>The leaves us with a relatively clear principle for interpreting texts. We simply must investigate whether the reason given by the text (or draw from the nature of the thing) is something perpetual or is something temporary. If it is perpetual, then the grant is perpetual. If it is temporary, then the grant is not </span><em><span>de facto </span></em><span>perpetual (although, from the Divine Will, God may establish it as perpetual if he so wills).</span></p><h2><span>The rule applied</span></h2><p><span>Catholic theologians apply this standard to the institutions of the Apostolic age. After Our Lord&#8217;s Ascension, the Church had not yet been spread among the nations. She could not have functioned on ordinary governance alone. She required a foundational age in which the Gospel was carried through the whole world, churches were founded, a governmental structure was established, and the Scriptures were written. Our Lord therefore founded the Apostolic college, in which the Twelve were given certain unique charisms and a universal jurisdiction enabling them to act independently, led immediately and directly by the Holy Spirit. We can therefore reasonably conclude that the extraordinary mission and charisms of the Apostles were not handed on, but died with them.</span></p><p><span>On the other hand, consider the ordinary pastors of the local churches which the Apostles established. Is ordinary day-to-day governance and pastoral care something peculiar to the extraordinary circumstances of the founding era &#8212; or is it something required for as long as there are flocks to be governed? Plainly the latter. We can therefore conclude without difficulty that it is the will of God that the Church continue to appoint local clergy to govern her at the local level.</span></p><p><span>St. Thomas applies this precise principle to the continuity of the power of orders. The power of orders was given for the edification of the Church. Edification is something the Church continuously needs. Therefore the power of orders is something the Church continuously needs:</span></p><blockquote><p><span>&#8220;It is not, however, to be said that this power was given to Christ&#8217;s disciples in such a way that it was not to be derived through them to others; for it was given them unto the edification of the Church, as the Apostle says. Therefore this power must be perpetuated for as long as it is necessary that the Church be edified&#8212;which is necessary after the death of Christ&#8217;s disciples, until the end of the world.&#8221; (</span><em><span>Summa contra Gentiles</span></em><span> IV, c. 74, n. 3)</span></p></blockquote><p><span>The same principle sorts a case everyone already grants is discontinuous. Of the four items in the decree of Jerusalem, abstention from idolatry and from unchastity belong to the moral law, and are perpetual in the Church for that very reason. Abstention from &#8220;what is strangled and from blood&#8221; is another matter. What was the reason for that precept? It was given to facilitate unity between Jew and Gentile in the Apostolic Church: the Jews would have been gravely offended had the Gentiles eaten strangled meat or blood, and so the Apostles forbade an otherwise indifferent thing. Consider the end of the law, and you see at once that the end was temporary. So, therefore, was the law and the Church does not keep it now.</span></p><p><span>This is the exact argument given by the First Vatican Council for the perpetuity of the office of chief shepherd and rock bestowed on St. Peter:</span></p><blockquote><p><span>&#8220;That which our Lord Jesus Christ, the prince of shepherds and great shepherd of the sheep, established in the blessed apostle Peter, </span><strong><span>for the continual salvation and permanent benefit of the Church</span></strong><span>, must of necessity remain for ever, by Christ&#8217;s authority, in the Church which, founded as it is upon a rock, will stand firm until the end of time.&#8221; (</span><em><span>Pastor aeternus</span></em><span>, c. 2)</span></p></blockquote><p><span>So when Catholic theologians interpret the particular texts about St. Peter, what they are looking for is whether the prerogatives and the office given there rest on something perpetual in the Church or on something temporary. And when we look at those texts, the exegetes argue convincingly that the metaphors themselves establish a visible exercise of authority, and that the reasons given are perpetual ones. The office established is therefore perpetual as well, and not merely transitional for the founding era.</span></p><h2><span>Office and mission</span></h2><p><span>In a particularly useful application of this rule, the theologians distinguish between an </span><em><span>office</span></em><span> and a </span><em><span>mission</span></em><span>.</span></p><p><span>A mission concerns the sending of a legate for some particular task, as when the Pope sends a legate to an ecumenical council he cannot personally attend. A mission is by its very nature contracted by two factors. First, it ends with the completion of the task: the legate&#8217;s existence as legate is measured by the duration of the task, and when the task ends, the legation ends. Second, it depends immediately on the will of the sender for its existence and continuance. A legate who falls ill and cannot continue does not have authority of himself (though it may be deputed to him) to name a successor with the fullness of his own authority. The legation depends immediately on the sender, who may revoke it whenever he wishes.</span></p><p><span>An office has no such temporality. An office is constituted for the governance of a society, and it is coextensive with the society governed. Nobody questions the propriety of an office continuing under a new office-holder; it is assumed to continue unless the competent authority abolishes it.</span></p><p><span>This is simply the previous distinction between temporary and perpetual institutions, applied to what is given to a man. Theologians use it to explain why we distinguish so sharply between the continuance of St. Peter&#8217;s office and the uniqueness of his mission. As Cajetan puts it (quoted below), there is no successor to St. Peter in his Apostolic mission, which was temporary, but there is a successor to St. Peter in his office as chief pastor of the universal Church.</span></p><p><strong>NOTE. This article is not directed at anyone in particular. This is just something I&#8217;ve noticed in the common discourse.</strong> </p><p><span>To thank my members, I have added a handful of texts below that illustrate what I stated above:</span></p>
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   ]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[A Complete Refutation of Sola Scriptura]]></title><description><![CDATA[Scholastic Arguments]]></description><link>https://thomism.com/p/a-complete-refutation-of-sola-scriptura</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://thomism.com/p/a-complete-refutation-of-sola-scriptura</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Christian B. Wagner]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 11 Sep 2026 23:54:37 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/9b048a25-b76e-4193-9e46-df0b93e9e3a8_660x570.png" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I spent many hours writing this detailed article. Please consider becoming a Patron <a href="https://www.patreon.com/militantthomist">here</a> or becoming a Substack member <a href="https://scholasticanswers.substack.com/subscribe">here</a> so I can keep setting aside the time to write these longer articles and keep as many free as possible.</p><p>At least sign up to be a free member by clicking the button below so you can receive all my new articles. Enjoy!</p><p class="button-wrapper" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://thomism.com/subscribe?&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Subscribe now&quot;,&quot;action&quot;:null,&quot;class&quot;:null}" data-component-name="ButtonCreateButton"><a class="button primary" href="https://thomism.com/subscribe?"><span>Subscribe now</span></a></p><h1>Introduction</h1><p>The Other Paul recently did a live stream video, &#8220;A Response to Christian Wagner on Private Judgement,&#8221; which, as the name indicates, is a response to a certain video I released earlier this year titled &#8220;You CAN&#8217;T Just Work Off Your Interpretation...&#8221;</p><p>In this response, I believe that Paul correctly identified the point of dispute, i.e., whether theological conclusions properly so called add an additional motive to our assent. He also rightly noted that, in many of my videos, I seek to explain the general sequence of an argument while leaving unstated certain more extensive demonstrations of the principles I use or certain corollaries I could draw. I followed this practice in this video by explaining the sequence of how the Thomistic position on theological conclusions could be applied to Protestant theology without explaining in much detail why exactly the contrary position (taken by a handful of Catholic theologians, mostly of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and by the Protestant scholastics) is false, except to give general indications.</p><p>I do not think that this is problematic in principle. It is a practice commonly followed by scholastic theologians. In all honesty, it is actually sensible on the basis of the target audience of most of these videos. Most of my audience consists of Roman Catholics who have, in one way or another, received poor formation from certain formulations commonly given by apologists. As I have noted in many articles and videos, I believe that this poor formation poses a particular danger for these listeners. If the sequence of the arguments they have received is exposed, then, in some cases, they are shaken in a fundamental way. I have seen it happen many times. Therefore, I have chosen this path. Yet there is another path I can follow, which I will follow in this article, i.e., establishing these premises polemically rather than merely explaining them scholastically.</p><p>Unfortunately, I must bluntly admit that Paul&#8217;s treatment of the matter in that stream was not good. He frequently uses technical terminology in a sense that shows he does not know what the terms actually mean (e.g., &#8220;simple apprehension,&#8221; &#8220;motive of credibility,&#8221; &#8220;formal motive,&#8221; etc.) in key parts of his arguments. The arguments that he does give are either tu quoques that display a weak grasp of our doctrine on this matter, arguments against positions that I have never affirmed, examples that aren&#8217;t even relevant to the line of argumentation, or arguments formed with serious formal defects. Most of the two-hour-long stream is him repeating a distinction that I already grant (i.e., between the use of reason as an instrument and the formal motive of assent) along with a judicious misuse of the term &#8220;equivocates&#8221; (the irony of which I hope is lost on none).</p><p>This article will consist of four parts, followed by a brief conclusion. First, I want to lay out the state of the question precisely. On multiple occasions, Paul did not properly understand what the exact point of dispute is between us; therefore it will be helpful to lay out exactly which point I am attempting to argue from. Second, I want to define the terms that the whole dispute turns on (above all, the formal motive) and give a few clarifications of what I said in my original video. Third, I want to give the various demonstrations of the thesis that a theological conclusion properly so called, drawn from a premise of reason, is not of divine faith without the definition of the Church. Paul complained that I only defined my terms and never proved my premises; therefore, I will give the proofs of the entire scholastic tradition, Thomist and non-Thomist alike. Fourth, I want to take the particular examples and objections that he gave and explain them. Unfortunately, he didn&#8217;t really give any sort of argument against my main contention except to point to certain examples, so I am forced to just repeat the examples and explain why they don&#8217;t work.</p><h1>The State of the Question</h1><p>NOTE. It has become very popular to hand-wave arguments by speaking about &#8220;paradigms&#8221; or whatever. Paul does this to my video. Before I even begin to lay out the state of the question, I want to remind you that the state of the question is just me explaining what I am vs. what I am not defending. So no, me explaining what I mean isn&#8217;t &#8220;assuming paradigms&#8221; and not demonstrating my principles. This is simply me explaining what I mean by terms and how I distinguish them from one another. Once I have stated the state of the question, then I can go on to prove the thesis and respond to arguments against the thesis.</p><p>From the perspective of reason, we can distinguish the relationship of a premise to its conclusion in two ways. First, in reasoning from the comprehension of the term. Second, in reasoning from the extension of the term. In the comprehension of the term, we can distinguish again between reasoning from what is nominally distinct, e.g., the defined thing to its definition, the thing to an essential note, etc., and reasoning from what is virtually distinct, e.g., the essence to its properties. In the extension of the term, we can distinguish between reasoning from an unconditioned universal to a particular (e.g., &#8220;all men will die&#8221; to &#8220;I will die&#8221;) and reasoning from a conditioned universal to a particular (e.g., &#8220;every man dying in a state of grace will be saved&#8221; to &#8220;this man, who died in a state of grace, will be saved&#8221;).</p><p>A word on terminology, since I will be quoting a great many authors who do not all speak the same way. The vocabulary I am using here (nominal distinction, virtual distinction, unconditioned and conditioned universal) is Fr. Mar&#237;n-Sola&#8217;s, and I use it because it is the clearest (<em>La evoluci&#243;n homog&#233;nea del dogma cat&#243;lico</em>, ch. I sec. II&#8211;III, nn. 23&#8211;35). Fr. Mar&#237;n-Sola distinguishes three degrees of distinction between a conclusion and the principle from which it is drawn: the nominal distinction (one and the same concept under two formulae, e.g., &#8220;man&#8221; and &#8220;rational animal&#8221;), the virtual or conceptual distinction (two concepts, really identical in the object, e.g., &#8220;spiritual&#8221; and &#8220;immortal&#8221;), and the real distinction (two realities, e.g., &#8220;accident&#8221; and &#8220;actual inherence in a subject&#8221;).</p><blockquote><p>&#8220;In the case of nominal distinction the concepts or the propositions are identical not only really but also logically or formally. In the case of real distinction the concepts or the propositions differ not only logically or formally but also really. In the case of virtual distinction the concepts or the propositions are logically or formally distinct, but really or objectively identical.&#8221; (ibid., n. 23)</p></blockquote><p>Reasoning across the first is what he calls improper discourse, because &#8220;there are many oral acts, but only one intellectual act&#8221;; reasoning across the second or the third is proper discourse. (ibid., n. 27) Other authors say the same thing in other words. Su&#225;rez, Lugo, and the Salmanticenses call what is reached by the first degree &#8220;formally (though implicitly) revealed&#8221; and what is reached by the second and third &#8220;virtually revealed&#8221;; the Salmanticenses call the first kind of reasoning &#8220;improper or explicative discourse&#8221; and the second &#8220;proper or illative discourse&#8221;; Billuart distinguishes containment &#8220;by reason of signification&#8221; from containment &#8220;by reason of natural connexion&#8221;; Pesch distinguishes the &#8220;explicative&#8221; from the &#8220;rigorous&#8221; discourse; Garrigou-Lagrange and Schultes, following Mar&#237;n-Sola, speak of the &#8220;formally implicit,&#8221; the &#8220;virtually inclusive&#8221; and the &#8220;virtually connexive&#8221;; Doronzo of the conclusion &#8220;improperly so called or merely explicative&#8221; and &#8220;properly so called or truly illative.&#8221; These are the same distinctions under different names. Whenever I say &#8220;proper theological conclusion&#8221; or &#8220;proper illation&#8221; in what follows, I mean Mar&#237;n-Sola&#8217;s second and third degrees, the older authors&#8217; &#8220;virtually revealed,&#8221; and nothing else. Whenever I say &#8220;nominally distinct&#8221; or &#8220;improper illation,&#8221; I mean the first degree, what the older authors call &#8220;formally implicit.&#8221;</p><p>All Catholic authors concede that both reasoning from what is nominally distinct and reasoning from an unconditioned universal can be of faith. There is no dispute here. The dispute is over reasoning from what is virtually (or really) distinct and from the conditioned universal (although we can distinguish here again between what can become morally certain in a strict sense and what cannot become morally certain in a strict sense). On the second point, the problem of the canon of Scripture takes central importance, since the fact of inspiration is a supernatural fact (a charism) that can be known only by divine revelation, because it cannot become morally certain in the strict sense by any natural means; yet &#8220;all Scripture is inspired&#8221; is a conditioned universal, since which writings are Scripture is precisely what the proposition supposes and does not assert. I have treated this elsewhere and will only touch on it below where Paul raises the canon.</p><p>From the perspective of the definition of the Church, we can consider something before the definition of the Church and something after the definition of the Church.</p><p>According to a minority of theologians, proper theological conclusions (i.e., reasoning from what is virtually distinct) can be assented to by faith even before the definition of the Church. This was the position of Vega, of Gabriel V&#225;zquez, and of Melchior Cano in book VI of the <em>De locis</em>, a position he qualified in book XII (cc. 4&#8211;5). According to others, proper theological conclusions can be assented to by faith only if they are defined by the Church. This is the common position of the Thomists (Capreolus, Cajetan, Ba&#241;ez, Zumel, John of St. Thomas, the Salmanticenses, Gonet, Ferre, Gotti, Billuart, Mar&#237;n-Sola) and of Su&#225;rez and Lugo. Lastly, according to some, a proper theological conclusion can never be of divine faith, even after the Church defines it, but remains at most an object of &#8220;ecclesiastical faith.&#8221; This position began with Molina and is held in modern times by Franzelin, Pesch, Billot, Schultes and Garrigou-Lagrange. Since Paul made a great deal of the claim that my argument is &#8220;just Thomism,&#8221; it should be recalled that many of the aforementioned authors are not Thomists. The reader should also take note that the thesis common to the last two groups (that such conclusions are not of faith before the definition of the Church) is held by many Scotists and Nominalists as well (according to the testimony of Su&#225;rez). To call this a uniquely &#8220;Thomistic&#8221; thesis with &#8220;Thomistic&#8221; definitions is simply absurd.</p><p>On the issue of the conditioned universal, theologians are again divided. I am not aware of any who hold that the particular under a conditioned universal (when it is not morally certain in the strict sense by our natural powers) can be of faith before the definition of the Church. Therefore, theologians are divided into two camps. First, there are those who hold that the infallible promulgation of these particulars underlying the conditioned universal can be given the assent of divine faith. Second, there are those who hold that the assent is somehow different, distinguishing divine faith from ecclesiastical faith.</p><p>From the perspective of the propositions themselves, we can distinguish between those syllogisms which have two revealed premises and those syllogisms which have one revealed premise and one non-revealed premise. According to some, a proper theological conclusion can be of faith if both premises are revealed (since there is no additional motive added outside of divine revelation), whereas, according to others, the very mode of scientific reasoning is what excludes proper theological conclusions; therefore, even if both premises are revealed, the conclusion cannot be of faith. The former group places more emphasis on the additional motive added by the natural premise, whereas the latter group places more emphasis on the very process of reasoning.</p><p>As you can see, there are a number of different questions that could be asked when we consider the issue of &#8220;theological reason&#8221; and its relationship to divine faith. Paul notes in his reply to me that this is my argument&#8217;s &#8220;Achilles&#8217; heel&#8221; and relies on an adherence to &#8220;a Thomist account of these prolegomena.&#8221; There are two points to be said to this (beside the explanation already given in the introduction).</p><p>First, while it is certainly true that there is a multiplicity of accounts of these problems among Catholic authors, the diversity on this question in particular is a bit overstated. For a theologian to hold that a mixed syllogism can receive the assent of faith before the definition of the Church is quite rare among Catholic authors of the past few centuries. There were holdouts, as I have said, but the other schools mostly agree with the Thomists on this point, and the Jesuits who wrote the classic treatments of the question agree with the Thomists entirely on the point that matters against Paul.</p><p>Second, even if the Thomists were alone in this endeavor, it wouldn&#8217;t make much of a difference. Let me give you a good analogy to a similar situation. Thomists have a particular argument from the nature of relative opposition in order to refute the Photian denial of the Filioque. Yet, famously, the Scotists (in their account of disparate relations in the Godhead) reject that this argument necessarily follows. Does this stop me from using this argument against the Photians? No. It shouldn&#8217;t. When I dispute with outsiders, I use reason (whether natural or theological) and commonly held authorities (e.g., Scripture) in order to refute their position. My position does not rest on the authority of my school (which they don&#8217;t accept); it rests on the validity of the arguments that are given by my school.</p><p>In fact, this dispute between Catholic theologians actually serves my argument. Scholastics have had to fight with the holdouts on both of these points for centuries. We have written extensive, detailed arguments refuting their position on this point. These arguments are the exact arguments that I can present to the Protestant in order to persuade him. Vega and V&#225;zquez made the case for Paul&#8217;s position better than Paul did, and Su&#225;rez, Lugo and the Salmanticenses answered them. That is what the third part of this article is.</p><p>I find statements such as these (made in response to a clip of Kevin, whose remarks Paul played during the stream) to be seriously problematic: &#8220;Kevin here notes again this is just the Thomistic account; the other Roman schools are going to say something different. So they have a stronger burden, in that this isn&#8217;t just Roman teaching 101; this is a particular school within Rome that says this. So if you don&#8217;t accept the articulation of that school on this issue, the argument is kind of bunk.&#8221;</p><p>An argument follows upon the strength of its premises. It matters little whether there is or is not a dispute between Catholic theologians on a certain point. Therefore, it is beside the point whether there is agreement or disagreement if what I present follows. Hence, &#8220;if you don&#8217;t accept the articulation of that school on this issue, the argument is kind of bunk&#8221; is not true. My agreement or disagreement with this argument is not a matter of whether I am a Thomist or not a Thomist, but whether I find the arguments to be strong or weak.</p><p>From all this, gather that I will argue from the case of proper theological conclusions (i.e., not universal/particular or nominal) where there is a premise of reason (i.e., not two revealed premises, although this can be argued as well) before the definition (i.e., abstracting from debates on ecclesiastical faith). Stated as a thesis:</p><p><strong>A theological conclusion properly so called, i.e., one drawn by proper illation from one premise of divine faith and one premise of natural reason, is not, before the definition of the Church, an object of divine faith, but of theology.</strong></p><p>I must note this before I begin because Paul, unfortunately, seems far too attached to &#8220;the syllogism.&#8221; He seems to think that I am making my argument from the nature of syllogistic reasoning. Therefore, if he can find a syllogism where I assent to the conclusion on the basis of divine faith, he declares victory.</p><p>It is to be remembered that terms, propositions, and syllogisms are products of distinct acts of the intellect (simple apprehension, judgement, reasoning). Therefore, rather than looking at the external form that is presented to you, it is necessary that you actually inquire into what these various products are meant to indicate in the intellect of the one making such acts. A syllogism can be used to express wildly different things, everything from the transition from the definition to the defined, to the process of induction, to the transition from the universal to the particular. In a similar way, even a single term can have diverse significations and suppositions that make it impossible to communicate if we rest on the bare external form.</p><p>There were times in the stream where he played clips where I qualified quite precisely that I was speaking about the role of a premise in a syllogism that was meant to indicate scientific reasoning. Then, to &#8220;refute&#8221; this, he gives a number of examples that are not scientific reasoning.</p><p>I hope that what was laid out above expresses precisely what is meant when I state my thesis about proper theological conclusions.</p><h1>A Definition: The Formal Motive</h1><p>Since I am particularly critiquing the Protestant understanding of the theological conclusion on the basis of the formal motive, I need to treat particularly of the formal motive.</p><p>Throughout his video, Paul applied the term &#8220;motive&#8221; or &#8220;formal motive&#8221; to quite a number of different things. For example, he gives the instance of the investigation into the resurrection, saying that the investigation is the &#8220;formal motive&#8221; of the assent of faith in this case, before also saying that the authority of God is the &#8220;formal motive,&#8221; and then concluding that it doesn&#8217;t really matter which formulation is used because they basically mean the same thing.</p><p>It is quite unbelievable that he came to the conclusion that practically everything used in the reasoning process is basically the motive of the conclusion, which is how he &#8220;refutes&#8221; the argument I gave in my original video.</p><p>Here, it is important to recall what is actually meant by the &#8220;formal motive&#8221; of the assent to some proposition.</p><p>St. Thomas explains the formal motive at the beginning of his tract on Faith:</p><blockquote><p>The object of every cognitive habit includes two things: first, that which is known materially, and is the material object, so to speak, and, secondly, that whereby it is known, which is the formal aspect of the object. Thus in the science of geometry, the conclusions are what is known materially, while the formal aspect of the science is the medium of demonstration, through which the conclusions are known.</p><p>If we consider, in faith, the formal aspect of the object, it is nothing else than the First Truth. For the faith of which we are speaking, does not assent to anything, except because it is revealed by God. Hence the medium on which faith is based is the Divine Truth. If, however, we consider materially the things to which faith assents, they include not only God, but also many other things, which, nevertheless, do not come under the assent of faith, except as bearing some relation to God, inasmuch as, to wit, through certain effects of the Divine operation, man is helped on his journey towards the enjoyment of God. Consequently from this point of view also the object of faith is, in a way, the First Truth, inasmuch as nothing comes under faith except in relation to God, even as the object of the medical art is health, for it considers nothing save in relation to health. (ST II-II q. 1 a. 1)</p></blockquote><p>In any demonstrative science, the formal reason of knowing the conclusion is the medium of demonstration. In faith, the formal reason of knowing the conclusion is the authority of God revealing as the First Truth. The formal motive is simply that on which the intellect rests when it assents, that which induces it to make its act.</p><p>There is nothing wrong with saying that reason can be instrumental (as all our faculties can be instrumental in the process of reasoning); the exact point in dispute is the grounds or basis upon which one formally adheres to the judgement at hand. When my mother says &#8220;I love you,&#8221; my ears are acting instrumentally insofar as they capture the sound; yet when I am resolving this into the line of judgement so as to ask &#8220;what is the motive or grounds upon which I base my adherence to the fact that my mother loves me,&#8221; I do not explain this on the basis of my hearing. That is a necessary condition, but it is something material to the judgement. I can easily show this from a hypothetical. Let&#8217;s say that God internally impressed what data is received by my sense of hearing without my hearing entering into the process. Would I still have the same formal motive that moves my intellect to the fact that my mother loves me? Yes, of course. In both cases, I believe it on the basis of the testimony of my mother, whether this is received by hearing or by extraordinary sense impression. No matter how I shift the example, the formal motive remains the same.</p><p>How much clearer is it that my senses enter the process of reasoning as mere conditions and not as the formal motive of reasoning? While this is intuitive if we just turn in upon ourselves, this is also plain and evident from the process of reasoning. Can the greater come from the less? No, it cannot. If the senses formally entered in as true motives, true causes of the rational certitude of our conclusions, would not the greater come from the less? The indeterminate in a certain order into the determinate of a higher order? What use is there for the agent intellect?</p><p>When we are distinguishing between something that is &#8220;instrumental&#8221; in the process of reasoning and the &#8220;formal motive&#8221; in the process of reasoning, we are describing two things that could not possibly be more different. The instrument enters in only to communicate something to the intellect. My eyes in reading the page of Scripture exist only to communicate the words into my mind. The formal motive induces the intellect to adhere to the judgement and make its act. In certain cases, the intellect is induced by evidence contained in the proposition, which are those &#8220;self-evident&#8221; (<em>per se nota</em>) principles. In other judgements, the intellect is induced by the testimony of another, whether human (human faith) or divine (divine faith). In other judgements, the intellect is induced by the light of other principles illuminating a conclusion that can be drawn from their virtuality (scientific conclusion).</p><p>St. Thomas gives this precise division:</p><blockquote><p>Faith implies assent of the intellect to that which is believed. Now the intellect assents to a thing in two ways. First, through being moved to assent by its very object, which is known either by itself (as in the case of first principles, which are held by the habit of understanding), or through something else already known (as in the case of conclusions which are held by the habit of science). Secondly the intellect assents to something, not through being sufficiently moved to this assent by its proper object, but through an act of choice, whereby it turns voluntarily to one side rather than to the other: and if this be accompanied by doubt or fear of the opposite side, there will be opinion, while, if there be certainty and no fear of the other side, there will be faith. (ST II-II q. 1 a. 4)</p></blockquote><p>Garrigou-Lagrange lays this out quite well:</p><blockquote><p>The motive of the assent of experience is sensible evidence [as abstracted by intellection]; the motive of scientific assent is the truth of the principle from which the conclusion is elicited; the motive of the understanding of principles is their intellectual evidence [i.e., as <em>per se nota</em> first principles]; the motive of opinion is a probable reason on account of which we assent with uncertainty and fear of erring. Faith, on the contrary, is a certain adhesion to the inevident object of some testimony, whence it cannot rest on any other motive than the veracity of the one testifying. (<em>De revelatione</em>, t. I, c. XIV a. 2 &#167; I n. 2)</p></blockquote><p>Where Paul speaks of &#8220;instrument&#8221; and &#8220;motive,&#8221; the scholastics speak of &#8220;condition&#8221; and &#8220;cause.&#8221; The condition is distinguished from the cause insofar as the condition does not positively influence the effect, while the cause does positively influence the effect. The role of the condition is to supply some necessary supposition that must be posited or removed in order that the cause may take its effect. Garrigou-Lagrange explains this quite well: &#8220;A motive or cause positively influences the effect, as fire by its action burns the wood; a condition, on the contrary, does not positively move or influence, but is necessary in order that the cause may influence, and only applies the cause actually acting to the patient, as the application of the fire to the wood.&#8221; (ibid., n. 3)</p><p>He gives three examples that illustrate this distinction quite well:</p><blockquote><p>A professor, as proposing to his students the doctrine of St. Thomas, is only a condition; the motive is the authority of St. Thomas, not the authority of this professor. Again, the intellect beholds the truth of first principles on account of their evidence, and the explication of the terms in which the principles are expressed was only a condition. Again, the will is moved by the good itself, but cannot love it unless it be proposed by the intellect; this proposal is only a condition. (ibid., n. 4)</p></blockquote><p>My eyes are a condition of my reading the canon list; they are not the cause of my assent to it. The explication of the terms of a revealed proposition is a condition; it is not a new motive. If you are to understand why Paul&#8217;s examples do not follow, then you must understand this distinction quite well. Paul&#8217;s entire stream is an attempt to blur this distinction in order to make every condition into a &#8220;sub-motive&#8221; (whatever that is supposed to mean) so that he can transform every real motive into a mere &#8220;instrument.&#8221;</p><p>I find Scheeben&#8217;s treatment of this issue (as on all matters of faith) to be particularly excellent. He is able to lay aside the type of loose usage and equivocation that underlies Paul&#8217;s entire treatment of this question:</p><blockquote><p>In another sense, we sometimes call a motive for faith everything that in any way whatsoever influences faith itself or the genesis thereof, whether by inciting it, like preaching or reading, or by proving or indirectly determining its obligatory character, like the <em>motiva credibilitatis</em>, or by guiding and determining it instrumentally, like the rule of faith, or by producing, urging, and supporting it, like interior grace. In the narrower sense, however, the objective, direct, and independently operating motives are to be considered as <em>motiva</em>. (<em>Handbook</em> I.2, &#167; 40 n. 668)</p></blockquote><p>Everything that Paul calls a &#8220;sub-motive&#8221; is listed by Scheeben first. Yet, he refuses to name them &#8220;motives&#8221; in the proper sense since the formal motive, when speaking properly, is that which specifies the act. These are called &#8220;motives&#8221; insofar as they prepare the intellect for the act of faith, yet are not proper &#8220;motives&#8221; in the sense in which we speak because the formal motive is that which specifies the act and moves the intellect to properly assent. He continues:</p><blockquote><p>They are a motive of the act of faith itself merely <em>quoad exercitium</em> [with regard to the exercise], not <em>quoad essentiam</em> [with regard to the essence] ... they function here not as an adequate, not even as an independent motive, but only instrumentally. Hence they determine a person to faith, without defining it internally in its essence; they support faith, without sustaining it internally; they pave the way to it, without producing it from themselves. (ibid., &#167; 42 n. 756)</p></blockquote><p>This distinction is not arbitrary, but spontaneously arises from interior reflection. There are motives to the exercise of the act that are not motives that essentially constitute the act. In the example of my adherence to the fact that my mother loves me, I can reflect on the process of hearing and the sensible pre-requisites to my intellectual judgement and see that these processes do not in any way enter into the essence of the act. For, were they not to exist, I would still be able to adhere to such a judgement. A thing can move me <em>to make</em> an act (<em>quoad exercitium</em>) without being any part of <em>what the act is</em> (<em>quoad essentiam</em>, or, as the Thomists say, <em>quoad specificationem</em>). The senses, the reading, the explication of the terms, the judgement of credibility, the Church&#8217;s proposal, etc., move me to the act of faith, or apply its object to me, but none of them is any part of the motive that specifies it and enters into its essence.</p><p>Here is where we are able to see, in a general and confused way, why exactly Paul&#8217;s insistence that the proper reasoning process does not enter the formal motive is so absurd. When we draw any sort of conclusion by a proper process of reasoning, the premises of the antecedent concur essentially in eliciting the assent to the conclusion. Each premise enters per se into the conclusion both as to the content of the conclusion drawn from them and as to the certitude that induces the intellect to rest in it. The premises in such a case are not mere occasions of assent, they are not mere conditions, they do not merely remove some sort of impediment, they are both what is assented to and why the intellect assents to it. It enters <em>quoad specificationem</em>. Paul&#8217;s examples, without exception, are things that enter <em>quoad exercitium</em>. That is why they are all beside the point.</p><p>Paul&#8217;s understanding of this matter cannot but strike me as one of pure empiricism. As I repeated above, the plane of reasoning is above the plane of sense. We begin with simple apprehension, which involves the abstraction of the concept from the state of sense data. Without this, we have no formal motive for our intellectual judgement. The phantasm existing in our minds is not yet in the order of reason, not yet fruitful for bringing forth the conclusion. How could it be? It must be abstracted. After this abstraction, we combine these concepts into judgements, which judgements are then ultimately used in the process of reasoning. How can Paul follow the philosophy of his own scholastic tradition and deny this? Does the formal motive for our assent stray from the order of reason existing in the intellect? I cannot see how this can be held.</p><p>The entire point of my argument isn&#8217;t based on just any kind of reasoning or on the nature of the motive in general, but specifically on scientific conclusions, where the conclusion&#8217;s entire force is taken from the antecedent. Let&#8217;s think about what the intellect is actually doing when we make a properly scientific judgement. We have one judgement that we have made on the basis of whatever sort of evidence is proportioned to it (e.g., &#8220;Christ is a man,&#8221; on the basis of divine authority); then we make another judgement with whatever sort of evidence is proportioned to it (e.g., &#8220;risibility is a property of man,&#8221; on the basis of human authority, e.g., my professor told me). Then what my intellect does in this case is that it recognizes that Christ is included under &#8220;man,&#8221; and therefore it draws forth the conclusion that &#8220;risibility is a property of Christ.&#8221;</p><p>Paul would like to hold that this conclusion is also on the basis of divine authority and that we can hold it by divine faith. He would say that the formal motive for my assenting to &#8220;risibility is a property of Christ,&#8221; the very principle that induces my intellect to assent to this, is divine authority. It is my argument that this is absurd. The intellect in this simple process that I outlined is taking something it knows by human faith (the authority of my professor) and then combining it with something that it knows by divine faith (i.e., the humanity of Christ). This isn&#8217;t a case adjacent to my eyes in reading the word of God, where my eyes do not induce my intellect to assent to what is read. In this case, the intellect is induced to the very judgement that &#8220;risibility is a property of man&#8221; by the authority of the professor. How is it anything but absurd to assert gratuitously (as Paul likes to accuse me so much of) that the motive of the authority of the professor simply disappears in the conclusion? In this, the lesser has produced the greater. The conclusion rests on the stronger part.</p><p>Let me give you an example. Let&#8217;s say a man gave a speech in a classroom. He begins by setting out some self-evident principles that the entire class accepts. Then, all of a sudden, he begins to quote a few of my greatest tweets. Then he draws a conclusion from a combination of self-evident principles and a few of my tweets, declaring, &#8220;These are, likewise, self-evident!&#8221; It would be absurd. He would be laughed out of the room. Yet this is what Paul tells us he can do. He says that we can have a conclusion whose motive follows the stronger part. He says that the lesser can produce the greater.</p><p>What &#8220;Thomisms&#8221; did I need to produce here to show the absurdity?</p><p>Inevitably, we are met with a flood of tu quoques from our opposition. You can find the answer to these in the objections. They are not difficult, but proceed from vague notions of things.</p><h1>Some Clarifications</h1><p>Here, I should present some important clarifications in order to understand what was said in my original video.</p><p><strong>First Clarification.</strong> Paul states the following: &#8220;He&#8217;s simply saying private judgment is the inclusion of human elements, of rational elements, into the motive for why you believe something. It&#8217;s when it goes from simple apprehension to discursive reasoning, premises to conclusion.&#8221;</p><p>Here, there is an important point of clarification to disambiguate what I said. There are three acts of the intellect: simple apprehension, judgement, and reasoning. Simple apprehension concerns the apprehension of the quiddity of the thing (e.g., &#8220;man&#8221;). Judgement concerns the affirmation or negation of something about that thing (e.g., &#8220;man is an animal&#8221;). Judgement combines the simple apprehension of two terms (or what is equivalently two terms) by the copula &#8220;is&#8221; or separates them by the negation &#8220;is not.&#8221; Reasoning concerns the conclusion of a new judgement by the combination of two premises and the derivation of a third from these two premises (e.g., &#8220;All men are rational; Socrates is a man; therefore, Socrates is rational&#8221;).</p><p>Each of these three acts builds upon the last one, judgement upon simple apprehension, reasoning upon judgement. As to faith, I am <em>not</em> saying that faith is the simple apprehension of the quiddities of things. Faith is an assent, requiring affirmation or negation, e.g., &#8220;Christ is Lord.&#8221; Simple apprehension has no truth or falsity in it and nothing is assented to in it, so &#8220;the simple apprehension of divine faith&#8221; (a phrase Paul uses over and over) is a contradiction in terms.</p><p>St. Thomas explicitly says this, which should be evident to anyone who considers the case:</p><blockquote><p>Our understanding has a twofold operation. There is one by which it forms the simple quiddities of things, such as what a man is, or what an animal is. This operation of itself does not involve truth or falsity, just as simple words do not. The second operation of the understanding is that by which it joins and divides concepts by affirmation or denial. Now, in this operation we do find truth and falsity, just as we do in the proposition, which is its sign. Belief, however, does not occur in the first operation, but only in the second, for we believe what is true and disbelieve what is false. (<em>De veritate</em> q. 14 a. 1 c.)</p></blockquote><p>The particular point of critique concerns whether the combination of two judgements and the derivation of a third can possess the same motive when the motives are &#8220;mixed,&#8221; one judgement being upon the motive of divine revelation (e.g., &#8220;Christ is man&#8221;) and another upon natural reason (e.g., &#8220;all men are risible&#8221;). Whether the conclusion can have the same motive when the motives are not mixed (as would happen if both premises are divinely revealed) is a separate question and does not concern us here.</p><p><strong>Second Clarification.</strong> Paul indicates in a few places that I do not hold that theological conclusions are revealed.</p><p>I am not stating that theological conclusions are &#8220;not revealed.&#8221; That is not my claim. Theology is a science that proceeds under the light of virtual revelation when it draws conclusions. This should be clear from the fact that, in logic, the conclusion of a syllogism is virtually contained in its premises.</p><p>Rather, the particular claim that is made is that virtual revelation requires that something outside the motive of divine revelation enter into the conclusion. I will give an analogy, taken from the rule of logic concerning quantity (I use it here only to illustrate the rule, not as an instance of proper illation, since the application of a universal to a singular is, as I explain below, not proper discourse). Let&#8217;s say we made the following syllogism: all men are mortal; Socrates is a man; therefore, Socrates is mortal. The conclusion is virtually contained in the major premise. Otherwise, the conclusion would not follow. Yet the conclusion is restricted by the minor premise and cannot extend beyond the minor premise: the conclusion follows the weaker part. Therefore, I cannot have an assent that is universal in the conclusion, but only singular. In a similar way, when I combine a premise of revelation and a premise of reason in a proper illation, the conclusion follows the weaker part, and the conclusion is formally of reason, since the &#8220;weaker part&#8221; in this case is the premise of reason. (I will state this axiom with more precision below; for now it is enough to see that the conclusion cannot be stronger than what it is drawn from.)</p><p>This has nothing to do with whether the conclusion is virtually revealed or not (it is), but whether the conclusion&#8217;s motive is something natural (formally yes, radically no; but the virtue follows what is formally the motive, not what is radically the motive, since virtues are specified by their formal motive).</p><p>Mar&#237;n-Sola states this quite clearly, removing any suspicion that I deny that such conclusions are &#8220;revealed&#8221;:</p><blockquote><p>&#8220;It is obvious that no thing can be of divine faith if it is not truly said by God; ... theological conclusions, if they are inclusive, are what God has truly said because they are included in what God has said; nonetheless, as long as they are not defined by the Church, they are what God said <em>explicated by man</em>.&#8221; (<em>Evoluci&#243;n</em>, n. 304; cf. nn. 168 and 301)</p></blockquote><p>This is my position on the matter. As in any scientific conclusion, the object is there (lest we fall into &#8220;nominalism&#8221;) insofar as the antecedent enters into the conclusion virtually. The revealed premise is there since the conclusion is contained as property to essence. Yet, our access to it is not on the basis of God&#8217;s word alone (which, in itself, is simple). In order to get to this conclusion, we have to supply some sort of premise that per se concurs in the production of the conclusion on some different formal motive. Therefore, the assent that we give to the conclusion is theological, what God said explicated by man, not merely adhered to by man.</p><p>This should evidently show that I do not view theological conclusions as &#8220;not revealed.&#8221;</p><p>NOTE. It is to be noted that the motive of the conclusion does not follow upon discursion as such. St. Thomas notes that we may speak of a certain discursus wherever the intellect is moved first to one thing and from that to another. The relevant distinction is whether we know something <em>in</em> something or <em>through</em> something:</p><blockquote><p>Properly speaking, to discourse is to come to the knowledge of one thing through another. There is a difference, however, between knowing something in another and knowing it from another.</p><p>For when one thing is known in another, the knower is, by one motion, directed to both. This is clearly the case when a thing is known in another as in an intelligible form. This kind of knowledge is not discursive. Moreover, in this regard, it makes no difference whether the thing be seen in its own species or in a different one; for sight is not said to know discursively when it sees a stone either by means of a species received from the stone itself or by seeing the stone&#8217;s species reflected in a mirror.</p><p>A thing is said to be known from another, however, when the motion to both is not the same, but the intellect is first moved to one and from this is moved to the other. Consequently, discourse takes place here, as it evidently takes place in demonstrations. For the intellect is first directed only to principles, then it is directed through the principles to conclusions. (<em>De veritate</em> q. 8 a. 15)</p></blockquote><p>Woodbury applies this text to the difference between the formal and the instrumental sign: the concept is a formal sign, in which the thing is known &#8220;by the same act&#8221;; a spoken or written word is a conventional instrumental sign, bearing only a relation of reason to what it signifies, so that the intellect must be moved first to the word and from the word to the concept, and only in the concept, which is the formal sign of the thing, is the reality itself known (<em>Logic</em>, n. 63).</p><p>The point matters for what follows. If discursion in this wide sense were to require a new motive for the conclusion, then even the process whereby we understand what is spoken or written by conventional signs (i.e., language) would also require a new motive, which cannot be the case without an infinite regress of motives. Hence, while a plurality of movements is a necessary condition for a new motive, it is not a sufficient condition of itself for a new motive. What is required for a new motive is discourse in the strict sense, which St. Thomas distinguishes from the loose sense in the very article on whether God&#8217;s knowledge is discursive:</p><blockquote><p>In our knowledge there is a twofold discursion: one is according to succession only, as when we have actually understood anything, we turn ourselves to understand something else; while the other mode of discursion is according to causality, as when through principles we arrive at the knowledge of conclusions. (ST I q. 14 a. 7 c.)</p></blockquote><p>Only the second kind has a medium; only the second kind knows the one thing <em>from</em> the other as a conclusion from its principle; and therefore only the second kind can carry the motive of the prior cognition into the later one. The word on the page is not the reason I hold the proposition true; it is only that in which the proposition reaches me. The premise of a demonstration is the reason I hold the conclusion true.</p><p>Tournely summarizes this excellently: &#8220;The sole formal motive of the assent which is given to faith is divine revelation; discourse, reasoning, etc., is only a previous condition, or the organ and instrument which the human mind uses to discover what has been revealed.&#8221; (<em>Praelectiones theologicae de Deo</em>, Quaest. III a. II, Secunda conclusio)</p><p><strong>Third Clarification.</strong> Paul states the following: &#8220;Let&#8217;s say I reason by good and necessary consequence to doctrine X. It wasn&#8217;t explicit in Scripture in as many words. I just saw: look, Scripture reveals this; it also reveals this; by necessary consequence, it means this as well.&#8221;</p><p>It is to be noted that this isn&#8217;t the particular point of critique that presses the Protestants most violently. It is a genuinely disputed point among Thomists whether a theological conclusion drawn from two revealed premises can be a matter of faith. Some Thomists argue that the very mode of reasoning in such a case adds an additional motive (and, therefore, that such cannot be of faith before the definition of the Church), while others argue that the mode of reasoning does not add an additional motive (and, therefore, that such can at least be of faith after the definition of the Church).</p><p>The point that particularly presses the Protestants concerns the mixture of a premise that is formally revealed and a premise that is of natural reason. In this case, one can easily see that reason is not simply acting as an instrument, but relies on the premise of natural reason as a motive, and this motive is transported into the conclusion.</p><p><strong>Fourth Clarification.</strong> Since Paul&#8217;s two favorite examples (the resurrection and the canon) are related to the issue of the motives of credibility, I must issue an additional clarification on the motives of credibility. Unfortunately, Paul does not have a clear notion on what we mean by the &#8220;motives of credibility&#8221; in relation to the assent of Divine Faith. Here, I will follow Garrigou-Lagrange&#8217;s excellent exposition in <em>De Revelatione</em>.</p><p>The motives of credibility (miracles, prophecies, the marks of the Church, the sublimity of the doctrine, etc.) are the signs by which it becomes evident that a given revelation is credibly from God. Garrigou-Lagrange defines credibility, in substance, as the aptitude of the mysteries to be believed, insofar as from most certain signs they appear to our reason to be revealed by God (<em>De revelatione</em> I, c. XV a. 1 &#167; III). This definition makes it clear that we are not saying that the motives of credibility make the mysteries evident. If such were the case, faith would no longer be an &#8220;obscure&#8221; assent (contrary to the words of the Apostle). Further, this also does not make the fact of revelation itself evident, as theologians commonly teach (cf. Scheeben, <em>Handbook</em> I.2, &#167; 42 n. 730). Rather, the particular aspect in which the motives of credibility terminate is revealed by the name. These motives <em>of credibility</em> show that the mysteries are evidently <em>credible</em>. For something to be &#8220;credible&#8221; is quite distinct from something as &#8220;true.&#8221; It makes the truths &#8220;believable.&#8221;</p><p>From this, Garrigou-Lagrange draws out the four properties of credibility from the teaching of St. Thomas and other theologians (<em>De revelatione</em> I, c. XV a. 1 &#167; III). First, &#8220;credibility is something common to all revealed things.&#8221; This is taught by St. Thomas in ST II-II q. 1 a. 4 ad 2. Second, &#8220;the truth of credibility is extrinsic to the things revealed. For the evidence of the credibility of the mysteries is not their intrinsic evidence; the mysteries remain obscure in themselves, but are said extrinsically to be evidently credible, insofar as from certain signs they appear to be revealed by God.&#8221; Third, credibility is &#8220;a speculative-practical truth,&#8221; which bears on the act of faith to be placed. Fourth, it is a <em>conditio sine qua non</em> of the act of faith insofar as rationality is a condition of the act of faith. It would be the vice of credulity to, in ordinary circumstances, assent to matters of faith without such a revelation being rationally credible. To lightly believe something is the work of the fool as Sacred Scripture itself testifies: <em>Qui credit cito, levis corde est, et minorabitur.</em> (Sir. 19:4)</p><p>There are two important points to highlight here. First, the motives of credibility terminate in the judgement of credibility. The judgement of credibility judges that the revelation of the mysteries is CREDIBLE, not that the revelation of the mysteries is TRUE. The latter assent is the assent of faith which has no created formal motive, but is the very uncreated truth. Otherwise, the supernaturality of the mysteries would be completely destroyed. Second, the judgement of credibility relates to the assent of faith as its CONDITION, not as its CAUSE. The assent of faith merely supposes that we have some rational certitude about revelation&#8217;s credibility, not that we are able to naturally demonstrate that such is true. The Salmanticenses summarize this quite well:</p><blockquote><p>To have the evidence of credibility, it suffices that one evidently judge that there are here and now sufficient motives for believing something as said by God, although he sees neither the object nor God&#8217;s speaking. For credibility does not consist either in the object proposed or in the testimony of God, but in that relation and disposition of things by which the object appears evidently worthy of faith. (<em>De fide</em> disp. III dub. I n. 3)</p></blockquote><p>From the consideration of the signs which constitute the motives of credibility, the intellect forms a certain judgement, i.e., that &#8220;this is credible.&#8221; From this judgement of credibility, there follows the judgement of credendity that &#8220;this ought to be believed&#8221; (the speculative-practical judgement) and that &#8220;this ought to be believed by me, here and now&#8221; (the practico-practical judgement). None of these judgements is the act of faith, but simply what precedes the act of faith. This is to make the act of faith reasonable, not to make the act of faith itself. These are natural judgements with natural certitude and with completely different objects than the object of the act of faith:</p><blockquote><p>From this it is plain what the office of the judgement of credibility is: it is a condition <em>sine qua non</em> of the act of faith, insofar as the obscure assent must be resolved at least materially and extrinsically into some evidence ... <em>The act of faith is not, therefore, the conclusion of the apologetic syllogism; rather this syllogism terminates in the judgement of credibility</em>, namely: Whatever God reveals is reasonably credible; but God has revealed the Christian doctrine, as is plain from the signs by which it is confirmed; therefore this doctrine is reasonably credible. (<em>De revelatione</em> I, c. XV a. 3 &#167; II)</p></blockquote><p>Scheeben treats this matter excellently, opposing the tendency of many to turn faith into some sort of syllogism. In a different article, I laid out Scheeben&#8217;s opposition to the common misunderstanding. He explains quite well what the fact of God&#8217;s external revelation (and, a fortiori, the motives of credibility) is for:</p><blockquote><p>The fact of God&#8217;s external revelation, or the real divine origin of a given word, is not the motive of faith itself ... It is merely a condition for God&#8217;s trustworthiness to support the content of the word in question and to make it internally trustworthy. Through itself and by itself it moves us only to accept the fact that that content is actually covered by God&#8217;s trustworthiness, and therefore makes it not so much deserving of belief (<em>credendum</em>) as believable (<em>credibile</em>)... [the signs] are designated merely as <em>motiva credibilitatis</em>, not as <em>motiva credenditatis</em> [motives for judging that it ought to be believed], much less <em>fidei</em> [motives of faith], because here too they are not the adequate and decisive reason for the necessity of believing, but merely the condition and means for the effectiveness of the chief reason that determines that necessity. (<em>Handbook</em> I.2, &#167; 42 nn. 721&#8211;722)</p></blockquote><p>The &#8220;motive of credibility&#8221; names exactly what it says. It is a motive for the judgement that something is credible, not the motive of faith.</p><blockquote><p>So little are [the signs] in themselves the intrinsically determining motive and the intrinsically sustaining reason of the certainty of faith about the content of revelation, that strictly speaking they are not even a motive and reason of certainty about the fact of revelation ... They are a motive of certainty merely for the judgment of credibility, and even here not the adequate motive. They are a motive of the act of faith itself merely <em>quoad exercitium</em>, not <em>quoad essentiam</em>. (ibid., n. 756)</p></blockquote><p>There are two corollaries to draw from this doctrine which has been defined by the Church. First, the certitude of faith is a greater certitude than the certitude of the motives of credibility (which would be impossible if the motives of credibility named the motives for the assent of faith). Therefore, Bl. Innocent XI condemned the thesis that &#8220;the will cannot effect that the assent to faith be in itself stronger than the weight of the reasons impelling toward assent.&#8221; (DS 2119, cf. DS 2121) Scheeben explains this condemnation:</p><blockquote><p>Those reasons are understood to include the motives of credibility, whose rational certainty determines neither the measure of confidence with which the will adheres both to the content of the revelation and also to the fact of the revelation, nor the degree of decisiveness with which the intellect holds it fast at the inducement of the will. (ibid., n. 757)</p></blockquote><p>The second consequence is that the judgement of credibility does not necessarily posit the assent of faith (which Paul himself seems to admit when treating the Jews who hold to the resurrection of Christ). It is not impossible that someone make the judgement of credibility and not follow this judgement with those further acts disposing towards faith. As Garrigou-Lagrange clearly explains from Scripture:</p><blockquote><p>[The judgement of credibility] and even the speculative-practical judgement of credentity are found not only in those who come to faith, but also in those who with full advertence commit the sin of infidelity ... For some, like the Pharisees, when the Gospel preaching confirmed by miracles is proposed to them, resist interior grace ... Therefore they can, having seen the miracles, judge evidently of the credibility of the preaching proposed; indeed they can know the obligation of believing, and still they will not believe, out of their perversity. (<em>De revelatione</em> I, c. XV a. 3 &#167; II)</p></blockquote><p>To summarize, Paul uses &#8220;motive of credibility&#8221; as if it meant &#8220;motive of belief,&#8221; and once that mistake is made, every rational step that precedes faith becomes a &#8220;motive&#8221; of faith, and the whole of his critique follows. Yet, if we remove this crucial error, the entire critique he makes goes with it and the Catholic position can be easily defended against his examples.</p><h1>The Arguments</h1><p>Paul&#8217;s central complaint against my video is that I defined the terms held by my &#8220;paradigm,&#8221; but never demonstrated the premises upon which I based my critique. Therefore, he admitted that my argument would destroy Protestantism if these premises are demonstrated, holding that my argument was &#8220;valid but not sound&#8221; and a mere report of the &#8220;Thomistic account&#8221; rather than a proper demonstration.</p><p>The burden of this article, then (besides correcting the erroneous terminology and irrelevant examples given by Paul) is for me to demonstrate these principles. Since he has held that my argument is valid and stated explicitly the hypothetical that if I were to demonstrate this, then Protestantism is false, I must remind the reader that, if I am able to demonstrate these things to be true, then they ought to leave Protestantism. There is no other argument necessary.</p><p>Therefore, in order to achieve this weighty task, I will give the arguments commonly given in the schools (by both Thomists and non-Thomists). None of these arguments are mine, but have been repeated by Scholastics for centuries against Vega and V&#225;zquez.</p><p>Two notes before I begin. First, I will give as the stock example the one that the tradition uses: &#8220;Every man is risible; Christ is a man; therefore, Christ is risible.&#8221; The major is a premise of natural reason, the minor is a premise of divine faith, and the conclusion is a proper theological conclusion. Because the natural premise happens to be the major here, whereas in Paul&#8217;s own examples it is often the minor, I will generally speak of &#8220;the natural premise&#8221; and &#8220;the revealed premise&#8221; rather than of major and minor. Wherever I say &#8220;the conclusion,&#8221; I mean the conclusion <em>as</em> a conclusion, i.e., reduplicatively, insofar as it is inferred. If the very same proposition happens also to be formally revealed elsewhere, or to be defined by the Church, it can of course be believed by faith on that other title.</p><p>Second, my arguments will take two forms. First, I will argue from commonly held logical axioms about the nature of argumentation, the specification of habits, the nature of faith, etc., that are commonly held by Protestant and Catholic authors. Where necessary, I will explain the grounds for these axioms to better illuminate the reader on the absurdity of the Protestant position. Second, I will argue by a reduction to absurdity. If we can show that the positing of the Protestant leads to some sort of absurd conclusion then it follows that the Protestant position is absurd.</p><p><strong>First Argument.</strong> This argument proceeds from a consideration of the formal object of faith. This is the fundamental argument that is given by nearly every single author against Vega and V&#225;zquez.</p><p><strong>Major.</strong> Nothing can be of divine faith except what is believed because God has revealed and attested it, i.e., what God has said.</p><p><strong>Minor.</strong> But the object of a proper theological conclusion is not said by God; something else is said, from which, with the help of a natural principle, this other thing is inferred.</p><p><strong>Conclusion.</strong> Therefore the object of a proper theological conclusion is not of divine faith.</p><p><em>Proof of the major.</em> This is the definition of theological or divine faith that is commonly held by both Protestants and Catholics. Divine faith is the assent to what God has revealed <em>on the authority of God revealing</em>. It is important to note this last qualification. It is not merely the assent to what God has revealed (in such a case, one simply assenting to Sacred History would have Divine faith), but an assent to matters of faith on a particular motive, viz. the authority of God revealing.</p><p><em>Proof of the minor.</em> God revealed that &#8220;the Word was made flesh,&#8221; but not that &#8220;Christ is risible.&#8221; I do not assent to &#8220;Christ is risible&#8221; because God has revealed such to be the case, but because the authority of certain teachers has made this clear to me and reason has made this evident. When I assent to &#8220;Christ is risible,&#8221; a motive for my assent is the natural connection that I view between human nature and risibility. Therefore, I must include it in the motive of the conclusion and not as a mere instrument or condition. (That God has not <em>said</em> the conclusion, which the V&#225;zquez party denies, is proven formally below in the Sixth Argument, from the freedom of revelation; here I state the minor as it appears to anyone who reflects on his own act.) Lugo states the reason for this succinctly:</p><blockquote><p>Nothing can be of faith which is not believed because it has been revealed and attested by God. But the object of such a conclusion is not said by God; something else is said, from which, partially, this other thing is inferred. Therefore this cannot be believed by faith, since it does not share the formal reason and the proper motive of faith. For however much the revelation and the revealed object be explicated, the object of the conclusion will never be found said by God, nor indeed anything which could by itself move one to believe it. The intellect therefore is not moved by the testimony of God alone, but at the same time by that natural principle, which unless it were believed true, the object of the conclusion would not be believed. (<em>De virtute fidei divinae</em>, disp. I sect. XIII n. 261)</p></blockquote><p>Pesch treats the proof of the minor as well:</p><blockquote><p>To establish a theological conclusion two things concur, what God has said and what human reason dictates. Therefore the motive of assenting is not the authority of God alone, but also the authority of human reason. But the authority of human reason is not the motive of faith. (<em>Praelectiones dogmaticae</em> VIII, prop. XV n. 261)</p></blockquote><p>From among the Thomists, Schultes gives the same syllogism:</p><blockquote><p>Those things which are to be believed by divine faith are to be believed on account of the authority of God revealing, and not at the same time on account of another formal reason. But things only virtually revealed cannot be held on account of the sole authority of God revealing, but are held at the same time by reason of the discourse by which they are deduced. Therefore things virtually revealed cannot be believed by divine faith. (<em>De Ecclesia catholica praelectiones apologeticae</em>, a. LXVIII prop. II prob. 2)</p></blockquote><p>As the Salmanticenses lucidly explain, when we consider the proposition &#8220;Christ is risible,&#8221; this is not immediately founded upon the fact that God has revealed that Christ is risible, but on the fact that He is a man. It is one thing to say that &#8220;I adhere to Christ&#8217;s risibility because God revealed it&#8221; and another to say that &#8220;I adhere to Christ&#8217;s risibility because Christ is a man.&#8221; The former is proper of faith, the latter is common to both natural reason and theological reason. The proposition revealed by God that &#8220;Christ is a man&#8221; does not immediately or formally establish by itself that &#8220;Christ is risible,&#8221; but requires the essential, per se concurrence of the proposition that &#8220;risibility is a property of man.&#8221; Due to this essential, per se concurrence of the premise, the certitude, the motive of the premise (which is natural) is included in the conclusion. This is what it means for proper demonstration to occur. When we engage in such discourse, the conclusion is illuminated by the natural light of reason and by the motive of the premises concurring in the drawing of the conclusion.</p><p>It is this that I meant by a &#8220;mixed motive.&#8221; The motive for the conclusion is drawn from the motives of the premises that per se concur in the drawing of the conclusion. Therefore, if we have a premise of human faith and a premise of natural reason, human faith and natural reason concur in the motive of the conclusion; if we have a premise of human faith and a premise of probable reason, human faith and probable reason concur in the motive of the conclusion. What else would it even mean for us to properly draw a conclusion from premises if one of the premises does not provide a motive for the assent to the conclusion? To deny that such is the case is to hold that reasoning is simply apparent rather than real, that the premises do not concur in the conclusion. It is to deny that the third act of the intellect actually exists as a distinct act.</p><p>This will be further explained in the second argument.</p><p>The objection that was stated against this (i.e., that such is still revealed in an objective manner; therefore, we can hold to it by faith) leads to manifest absurdities. First, against all philosophy, it would hold that each premise in scientific reasoning does not per se concur in the certitude and enter into the motive of assenting to the conclusion. Second, it is arbitrary insofar as it makes the premise of faith the entire source of the certitude of the conclusion, ignoring the premise of reason. Why, upon this philosophy, could we not just as well gather the entire certitude of the conclusion from the premise of reason? It is purely arbitrary that the premise of faith, rather than the premise of reason, is chosen as the source of the conclusion&#8217;s certitude. Third, this would destroy the notion of faith in general. If we were to consider an instance of human faith, it would be absurd to say that we can hold, upon the authority of the speaker, whatever can be deduced from their words. For example, if a King says &#8220;John exists,&#8221; who would be so absurd as to argue that, on the authority of the King, we would be able to hold that &#8220;the King testifies that John is risible&#8221;? To make such an argument would so expand human authority as to draw with any testimony each and every conclusion that could be drawn from it, even contrary testimonies. Therefore, the notion of faith in general would be destroyed, holding things not precisely on testimony, but from a multiplicity of motives. Fourth, upon this line of reasoning, there is nothing stopping us from calling &#8220;of faith&#8221; whatever is drawn from a revealed premise together with a natural premise of <em>any</em> degree of certitude. For example, if I have the revealed premise &#8220;Christ is man,&#8221; I could equally argue that a conclusion drawn from it together with a premise held by human faith (including historical testimony), or by probable argumentation, or by any other degree of certitude, could be &#8220;of Divine Faith,&#8221; since Paul must admit that these natural premises do not per se concur in the certitude and motive of the conclusion.</p><p><strong>Second Argument.</strong> This argument answers the strange question of Paul of &#8220;why should we grant that the minor premise, as the demonstrative means, is the motive of belief?&#8221; He seems to be driven to a philosophical absurdity by his insistence on his Protestant doctrines. The natural premise is not, by itself, the demonstrative medium; neither premise is. The medium is the antecedent as one, compounded from both premises; and who can deny that each premise of a proper argument enters per se into that one medium? This is a more precise formulation of what was said in the first argument about the concurrence of the premises in the conclusion.</p><p><strong>Major.</strong> The formal motive of the assent to a conclusion, as a conclusion, is the antecedent from which it is inferred, i.e., the medium through which it is known.</p><p><strong>Minor.</strong> But in a mixed syllogism the antecedent contains a premise assented to on a natural motive, and this premise concurs in the inference <em>per se</em>, as a principle, not as a mere condition.</p><p><strong>Conclusion.</strong> Therefore the formal motive of the assent to the conclusion contains a natural motive; therefore it is not the sole authority of God revealing; therefore the assent is not divine faith.</p><p><em>Proof of the major.</em> Upon what foundation do we assent to the conclusion? It is either in itself or in another. It is not in itself, else it would not formally be a conclusion but something known in some other mode (as, e.g., a first principle). Therefore it is in another. This &#8220;other&#8221; (as should be evident from the very terms) is the antecedent, i.e., the premises that are stated together under the light of reason. In proper discourse, we proceed from the known to the unknown. The known is the cause of the knowing of the unknown. Now, the known are the premises that are placed under the light of reason. These cause the knowledge of the conclusion if reasoning is anything. This should be evident from the fact that the formal motive of some thing is what impels the assent to it. Now, in any proper reasoning, what impels the intellect to assent to the conclusion is the antecedent under the light of reason, not one or another of the premises taken distinctly. When we adhere to the conclusion, we do not adhere to it due to the immediate connection that the subject and predicate have with one another, but due to the connection that they have stated in the antecedent. This is what it means for there to be a formal motive. Faith has as the reason for the connection between the subject and predicate in the intellect the authority of God revealing; the theological conclusion has as the reason for the connection between the subject and the predicate in the intellect the antecedent under the light of reason with its distinct motives seen in the conclusion.</p><p><em>Proof of the minor.</em> While Paul calls the natural premise in the antecedent the &#8220;instrument&#8221; or &#8220;sub-motive&#8221; (whatever that is supposed to mean), if it acts as a premise in proper reasoning, then it concurs in the certitude of the conclusion. John of St. Thomas, disputing against V&#225;zquez, grants the objector&#8217;s premise that the natural premise &#8220;truly and properly influences the conclusion as a principle, and influences by reason of the natural light, which is all it has; therefore it furnishes a light distinct from the premises of faith,&#8221; and then draws out what follows:</p><blockquote><p>Nor can it be said that it stands not as a principle but only as a condition for inferring the conclusion. For in a syllogistic discourse both premises concur <em>per se</em> in the manner of a principle ... and there is no greater reason why this premise should be a condition rather than the other ... we grant that two premises concur, but say that from both there must be made one medium, as in all other syllogisms, since the conclusion inferred from two premises is reached by one judgement and assent, and consequently by one light or medium compounded from both premises ... and so one formal reason is constituted, which bespeaks virtual and mediate revelation, under which the premise of faith and the natural premise influence in the same way. (<em>Cursus theologicus</em>, In I q. 1 disp. II a. VII nn. XVIII&#8211;XXII)</p></blockquote><p>This is exactly what I have been repeating time and time again. What does it mean for something to be a premise in scientific reasoning? To concur per se in the eliciting of the conclusion, entering into its motive. To deny this is an incoherent confusion and must deny that scientific reasoning even exists. Further, as I stated above, &#8220;there is no greater reason why this premise should be a condition rather than the other.&#8221; On what basis is the one premise the motive and not the other? Why, on Paul&#8217;s standard, could we not just assert (as he does) that the entire conclusion solely rests on the natural premise? What is the difference? If the conclusion does not rest on both premises in scientific judgements, but only one, then it matters not which I assert. I could just as easily assert the one rather than the other.</p><p>Garrigou-Lagrange&#8217;s example of the professor illustrates this line of reasoning quite well. The professor proposing the doctrine of St. Thomas on St. Thomas&#8217; authority is merely a condition, not a cause. Now change the case. Suppose I hold a certain doctrine on the authority of the professor, because the professor has told me that it follows as a conclusion from St. Thomas&#8217; doctrine, without my seeing the inference myself. Upon what basis do I now hold the conclusion? Upon the professor&#8217;s authority, with St. Thomas&#8217; authority concurring originatively and fundamentally, but not formally. Take a third instance. Suppose the professor shows me the evident line of reasoning leading to this conclusion. Now the professor&#8217;s proposal is once again a mere condition; the reasoning itself is the cause of my assent, with the doctrine of St. Thomas as its originative and fundamental source. Why these per se causes concur in distinct modes will be explained below when I explain the axiom of the &#8220;weaker part.&#8221;</p><p>Paul&#8217;s entire error is that he does not distinguish between the speaker as condition (which does not positively concur in the conclusion) and the speaker as cause (which does positively concur in the conclusion). The cases are evident by simply considering the cases.</p><p>Yet, the same can be put as a dilemma. In the antecedent, I have the premise &#8220;risibility is a property of man,&#8221; which I hold on a natural motive (whether of natural reason or of human faith). Where does the motive go in the consequent? Either it does not enter into the consequent, or it does enter into the consequent. If it does not enter into the consequent, then neither does the premise upon which it is based (since the motive is the form of the premise in the order of assenting); therefore, the conclusion was not drawn from the premise at all, and such is not a conclusion. If it does enter into the consequent, then there is a natural motive that partially compounds with the supernatural motive of the premise of faith; therefore, it is not held on the authority of God speaking alone, but on some natural motive.</p><p>This argument (and others that I have previously given) is never directly answered by Paul. Rather, he simply lists a handful of tu quoques that are beside the point.</p><p>There is quite literally no other process of proper illation that works the way Paul needs this one to work. In any other case, the motives of the premises in the antecedent continue into the consequent. If you hold one premise by natural reason and then you hold the other premise by the authority of the wise, how is it possible that the motive of the authority of the wise does not enter into the conclusion when you are inferring the conclusion from each premise? What new philosophy allows us to reason in this way?</p><p>This should be clear from the opposite case. If someone denies what is revealed by God, then he is a heretic. For, by its very definition, heresy is the denial of God&#8217;s word. If someone were, for example, to deny that Isaac is the father of Jacob, he is a heretic. Yet, in the case of a theological conclusion, we do not call the denier a heretic, but give him some other censure. Why? Because his denial can be a denial of the premise of reason or authority, rather than the premise of Divine Revelation. Yet, in other instances, where the subsumed premise acts as a mere condition, we do call those heretics who deny the conclusion. For example, we call those heretics who deny that they are under original sin, since the unconditional universal that &#8220;all men are under original sin&#8221; is a premise of faith.</p><p><strong>Third Argument.</strong> This is the oldest Thomist form of the argument, given in substance by the commentators prior to the debate that took shape in the late-16th and 17th centuries. In order to understand this argument, we must understand the terms at play. There is the habit of first principles and then there is the habit of conclusions. In natural reason, by understanding, we apprehend certain first principles that immediately follow upon being. Then, by the process of reasoning, we apprehend certain conclusions that follow upon the first principles and form science. In the same way, matters of faith are, as it were, first principles that we apprehend from the authority of God revealing. Then theology comes into play and deduces certain scientific conclusions from the first principles of faith. Therefore, understanding is to science what faith is to theology. Both understanding and faith are habits of principles, whereas science and theology are habits of conclusions.</p><p><strong>Major.</strong> No habit of principles elicits the assent to the conclusions deduced from its principles; that assent belongs to another habit, the science that proceeds from those principles.</p><p><strong>Minor.</strong> But faith is the habit of the first supernatural principles from which theology proceeds.</p><p><strong>Conclusion.</strong> Therefore faith does not elicit the assent to theological conclusions; the assent belongs to theology.</p><p><em>Proof of the major.</em> This is a principle of common sense, which Aristotle clearly explains in the <em>Posterior Analytics</em> (I, 2&#8211;3; II, 19). The habit by which I hold that the whole is greater than the part is not the habit by which I hold the Pythagorean theorem, even though the theorem is drawn from such principles. The first is the habit of principles, the second is the habit of science. Who would be so absurd as to collapse the motive of the habit of principles (which follows from something that is self-evident) into the habit of conclusions (which proceeds from discourse from the first principles into scientific conclusions)?</p><p>This is explained well by Zumel:</p><blockquote><p>The habit of first principles too inclines to conclusions by means of discourse; yet immediately it inclines only to the principles, whose assent it elicits. So faith does not elicit the assent to theological conclusions. It is necessary to posit another habit, which is a science, which immediately inclines to the conclusions of theology; in no other way, beyond the habit of principles, is a scientific habit constituted which immediately inclines to and regards the conclusions. (<em>In Primam Partem commentaria</em> t. I, q. 1 a. 2 quaestiunc. 2)</p></blockquote><p><em>Proof of the minor.</em> This is included in the definition of theology, which is the science of faith. We know the first principles by the light of faith, then, by theology, we draw conclusions.</p><p>Here we can see that Protestant authors are driven to absurdities by their doctrine. The Protestant authors affirm, when treating this question, that faith believes the consequent. But the habit that reaches the consequent <em>as</em> a consequent is, by the very notion of a conclusion, a habit of conclusions, not of principles; and faith is the habit of principles. From this, it would follow that faith is a science, which is to abolish the distinction between faith and theology.</p><p><strong>Fourth Argument.</strong> This argument is taken from the common axiom that faith is &#8220;non-discursive,&#8221; i.e., that it is simple (not to be confused with the first act of the intellect, which is simple apprehension). What we mean by this is that faith reaches both what is believed and the reason for believing by one and the same act.</p><p><strong>Major.</strong> The act of faith is not discursive: by one and the same act it reaches the thing revealed (as <em>what</em> is believed) and the revelation itself (as <em>that by which</em> it is believed).</p><p><strong>Minor.</strong> But the assent to a proper theological conclusion, as such, is discursive: it reaches its object only through the illation from the premises.</p><p><strong>Conclusion.</strong> Therefore the assent to a proper theological conclusion is not the act of faith.</p><p><em>Proof of the major.</em> The theologians give three arguments for the major premise. First, from the unity of the act. Second, from infinite regress. Third, from the Church&#8217;s mode of defining. The third does not have any strength with the Protestants. Therefore, I will only give the first two arguments.</p><p>Gonet gives the first argument from the unity of the act as follows:</p><blockquote><p>In a discourse the assent which turns on the premise or on the principle must be really distinguished from that which is about the conclusion; but the assent of faith about the divine revelation is not really distinguished from the assent which is about the revealed thing itself; therefore it is not properly discursive ... by the same act by which one assents to the revealed thing one assents also to the revelation itself, and this because the formal object of the assent of faith is the revealed thing, not taken materially, but formally and reduplicatively as revealed... [just as] the act of vision by which the eye reaches color and light is one and simple, because color is only the material object of sight, light its formal object; but likewise the thing revealed by God is only the material object of the act of faith, the divine revelation its formal object; therefore by one simple act faith believes the revealed thing and the divine revelation; and consequently it is not discursive. (<em>Clypeus</em> t. IV, De fide, disp. VIII a. I nn. 23&#8211;24, Dico ultimo)</p></blockquote><p>The argument from regress is given by Gotti:</p><blockquote><p>Some assent of faith is had without discourse; therefore every one: for no habit can be discursive as to some acts and not as to others, since in all it must keep the same mode of proceeding. The antecedent is proved. Let us posit the discourse from which the adversaries want the act of faith to proceed: <em>Whatever God has revealed truly exists; but God has revealed the Trinity; therefore the Trinity truly exists.</em> In this discourse the minor, <em>God has revealed the Trinity</em>, is truly believed by faith; and yet it is not believed by discourse. Which I prove thus: if it is believed by discourse, then it is believed by a discourse proceeding from another proposition believed by faith; of which I shall ask whether it is had by discourse or not. If not, then I already have an act of faith without discourse. If so, we shall go on to infinity. (<em>Theologia scholastico-dogmatica</em>, In II-II, De fide q. 1 dub. IV &#167; VII)</p></blockquote><p>I explain the significance of this in my aforementioned article on Scheeben&#8217;s opposition to those &#8220;syllogizing&#8221; faith. It is evident from the character of faith as a personal adherence to the veracity of God revealing.</p><p>This is the answer to Paul&#8217;s claim that &#8220;even an alleged simple act of divine faith can be broken down syllogistically.&#8221; This is completely rejected if by &#8220;syllogistically&#8221; you mean &#8220;proceeding from the third act of the intellect.&#8221; Either there must be, fundamentally, an adherence that is not of the third act of the intellect, or there is no faith at all. For, each demonstration relies on first principles that are immediately apprehended. If each is mediately apprehended, then there would be an infinite regress. There must be a first immediate apprehension or the entire thing collapses and has no foundation.</p><p>It is with this that we are able to see, at its greatest depth, the incoherency of Paul&#8217;s understanding of the assent of faith and the consequences which follow upon it. Paul&#8217;s understanding of the act of faith is a syllogism: &#8220;whatever God reveals is true; God revealed this; therefore this is true.&#8221; In his description of the act of faith, revelation is a premise which is known by one act and the divine mystery is a conclusion that is drawn by another act. With this description, it makes sense to see the theological conclusion as another instance of the same kind. Yet, this description is false at its very root.</p><p>Revelation is not a premise in an argument. Revelation is the light in which the mystery is seen. The first principles of any knowledge are not conclusions of proper discourse; this is evident from philosophy, and it is held by the Fathers as well as the scholastics (as I showed in my recent article on &#8220;Thomistic epistemology&#8221; explaining defensive metaphysics). Revelation is both <em>id quo et quod creditur</em>. St. Augustine illustrates the point with the example of a lamp: &#8220;Light shows other things and shows itself. You light a lamp, for instance, to look for a tunic, and the burning lamp enables you to find the tunic; do you light a lamp in order to see the burning lamp?&#8221; (<em>In Ioannis Evangelium</em> tract. XXXV n. 4) Garrigou-Lagrange draws the consequence: &#8220;So the First Truth revealing, or the divine light, manifests itself, without vicious circle and without a process to infinity, for another revelation is not necessary in order that revelation be manifested.&#8221; (<em>De revelatione</em> I, c. XIV a. 3 &#167; II)</p><p>There is only a single act which reaches both the revealed thing as its object and the revelation as its light. There are not two acts, one adhering to the premise and the other to the conclusion. We adhere to God and to God alone. It is God who gives both the premise and its certitude in the act of revelation. Otherwise, the complete sublimity of faith is destroyed. This is what Scheeben calls the &#8220;logical-mechanical view of faith as a syllogism through which we demonstrate to ourselves the truth of the content of faith,&#8221; which &#8220;impoverishes the transcendent character of faith.&#8221; (<em>Handbook</em> I.2, &#167; 40 n. 681) He explains this impoverishment by an appeal to the personal and living character of faith which adheres to God and God alone as first truth:</p><blockquote><p>The knowledge of faith by its nature comes about not in the form of a logical conclusion, but rather in the form of a lively attachment to God and to His divine perfection. Accordingly the objective motive of the certainty of faith does not have to be apprehended with the same divine and supreme certainty as the material content of the revelation, as though its certainty in the strict sense were necessarily the cause of the certainty of the material content of the revelation, and the latter certainty is derived from the former through a formal or virtual logical conclusion. The objective motive is only the reason (<em>ratio formalis</em>) for the certainty of the material object, in much the same way as, in a comparison that became commonplace among theologians, the illumination of an object is the <em>ratio formalis</em> that makes it visible to the eye. Hence, just as in the latter case the illumination and the illuminated body are seen in one indivisible act, so too in the former case the <em>ratio</em> of the certainty of faith is apprehended as the formal object and its content as the material object with one and the same indivisible act of assent. (ibid., n. 691)</p></blockquote><p><em>Proof of the minor.</em> This is the very definition of a proper theological conclusion which is admitted by our adversaries. As the Salmanticenses write:</p><blockquote><p>A proposition which is contained as in a cause in another or others formally revealed cannot terminate in itself the assent of our intellect except by means of a rigorous discourse by which we deduce it from that cause; but faith is not rigorously discursive, nor does it rest on discourse; therefore it cannot reach that proposition in itself, and hence cannot assent to it. (<em>De fide</em> disp. I dub. IV n. 124)</p></blockquote><p>When we properly discourse, reasoning enters in as some sort of intrinsic medium. Therefore, Divine Revelation does not enter in adequately as that by which I adhere to the judgement. It is for this same reason that those theologians who say that a conclusion drawn from two revealed premises can be of faith before the definition of the Church are wrong.</p><p><strong>Fifth Argument.</strong> This argument is drawn from the axiom of the philosophers that the &#8220;conclusion follows the weaker part.&#8221; In theological discourse when there is a premise of natural reason, such premise is the weaker part, which determines the certitude of the conclusion. This is established on the immortal principle that something cannot give more than it has. The effect does not escape the virtuality of the cause. The premise of natural reason is a limiting factor in the antecedent. The same is easily seen from a number of different examples of stronger/weaker premises in the antecedent, e.g., a certain premise and a probable premise can only give a probable conclusion as conclusion.</p><p><strong>Major.</strong> The assent of faith is supernaturally and infallibly certain, resting on nothing but the First Truth; and all assents of faith are equally certain, because the First Truth is equal in all.</p><p><strong>Minor.</strong> But the assent to a proper theological conclusion, as such, does not have this certitude: (a) it cannot exceed the certitude of its adequate cause, the antecedent taken as one medium, and that antecedent includes a natural principle; (b) its certitude is participated from the premises through a nexus of which we are certain only by natural light; (c) its medium does not have the infallibility of the First Truth, but only that of natural reason, which is fallible on the part of the one reasoning.</p><p><strong>Conclusion.</strong> Therefore the assent to a proper theological conclusion is not the assent of faith.</p><p><em>Proof of the major.</em> This is a property of Divine Faith. It relies on the authority and infallibility of God revealing as the first truth.</p><p><em>Proof of the minor.</em> The minor premise is demonstrated from the nature of causality. The effect is limited by the strength of the cause and its natural properties. Now, the motives of the premises, in the intellectual order, are the causes of the motive of the conclusion. The motive of the conclusion is limited by the strength of the weakest motive in the antecedent. Therefore, formally speaking, the motive of the conclusion is the same as the motive of the weaker premise in the antecedent, although, in another manner, we can connect the conclusion&#8217;s dignity with the motive of the other premise, e.g., &#8220;fundamentally&#8221; or &#8220;originatively.&#8221; This is Lugo&#8217;s point: the conclusion follows the weaker part of the motive, since the conclusion cannot be believed more firmly than its motive warrants, and in our case the motive, at least as to one part, is not believed by faith (<em>De virtute fidei divinae</em>, disp. I sect. XIII n. 261; cf. n. 352, where he adds that the axiom holds as to the clarity and firmness of the assent, while the assent may be &#8220;nobler&#8221; from another side).</p><p>Here it is important to not interpret this axiom in a crude form that would place the theological conclusion on the same grounds as a conclusion of natural reason. For, it ought to be obvious that a conclusion drawn from two premises of natural reason has a lesser degree of certitude than a conclusion drawn from a premise of natural reason and a premise of divine faith. For, while, in each case, the premise of natural reason limits the motive of the conclusion, in comparison with the other premise, we see that the premise of divine faith is greater than the premise of natural reason. Therefore, while the weaker premise limits, it also &#8220;compounds,&#8221; able to dignify the conclusion, not formally, but originatively and fundamentally. To give an analogy, let&#8217;s say we have two houses. Each of these houses is able to be destroyed by a storm. One of these houses is built on a strong foundation and the other house is built on a weak foundation. In either case, the house, due to its very nature, can be destroyed. Yet, within this order of &#8220;destructibility,&#8221; the one house is less destructible, the other is more destructible, yet both are, essentially speaking, destructible. The house may exceed the destructibility of a mere house by the strength of its foundation, but it can never become indestructible while remaining a house. Certain theologians give the example of a mule. The mule is able to exceed the perfection of one of its inadequate causes (i.e., the donkey) by the participation of the other inadequate cause (i.e., the horse), but not the cause adequately taken (i.e., horse and donkey together). John of St. Thomas describes it as follows: &#8220;it is not necessary that the certitude of the conclusion be less than any premise taken by itself, but [less than] both, as they constitute one medium which results from both premises.&#8221; (<em>Cursus theol.</em> In I q. 1 disp. II a. IX n. XII)</p><p>This is clear from a number of different examples. If there is a particular premise in the antecedent, the conclusion as conclusion must not be universal. If there is a probable premise in the antecedent, the conclusion as conclusion must not be certain. The principle that &#8220;the conclusion follows the weaker part&#8221; means that the conclusion cannot exceed its adequate cause, which is the whole antecedent; the whole antecedent contains a natural principle; therefore the conclusion does not have the certitude of the premise of faith, and does not rest on God&#8217;s authority alone.</p><p>This can also be seen from the participated certitude of the conclusion. The conclusion participates in the certitude of the antecedent. Now, what is participated is either equal to or less than that which it participates in as its adequate cause physically influencing, yet never greater. Yet, the adequate cause physically influencing the effect contains a natural premise and a premise of faith as its adequate cause. Therefore, it does not exceed it as being solely a conclusion of faith. This is clearly explained by John of St. Thomas:</p><blockquote><p>What is had through evident consequence, as such, is not a believed truth but a deduced one, nor certified through immediate testification, but through connexion and consequence, which is always inferior to the immediate certitude of faith: both because it is participated from the principles of faith, and so less than it, as something participated; and because the discourse itself rests on syllogistic rules, of which we are certified by natural light alone, and so a certitude depending on such a discourse has something less than the immediate certitude of faith. The antecedent is evident, because faith rests on no human discourse but on the testimony of the Holy Ghost, and not only <em>because so it seems to us</em>, but <em>because so it seemed to the Holy Ghost</em>, as is said in Acts 15; therefore an assent which rests on discourse and consequence, because so it seems to us and is inferred, is not immediately of faith. (<em>Cursus theol.</em> In I q. 1 disp. II a. IV n. IV)</p></blockquote><p>This should be obvious to anyone simply reflecting on their reasoning process. They hold the conclusion they draw from premises with a lesser certitude than they hold the premises. As St. Thomas writes, &#8220;we know conclusions and give our assent to them because of the principles. Therefore, we know the principles with more conviction and give them stronger assent than the conclusion.&#8221; (<em>Expositio libri Posteriorum</em> lib. I lect. 6) He gives the reason for this evident principle: &#8220;Apropos of this reason it should be noted that a cause is always more noble than its effect.&#8221; (ibid.)</p><p>This is also known from the medium of knowing. The medium of human reasoning, as a medium of knowing (note: as a MEDIUM OF KNOWING), does not carry the infallibility of the First Truth; however evident the premise, the discourse rests on syllogistic rules &#8220;of which we are certified by natural light alone,&#8221; as John of St. Thomas says, and the one reasoning can err in applying them. Now, that which is of faith cannot be in error as to the medium of knowing, since the medium of knowing in faith is the very authority of God revealing. Therefore, the same conclusion follows.</p><p><strong>Sixth Argument.</strong> This argument is taken from the freedom of Divine Revelation. This is formulated to answer an objection by Vega that is taken up by Paul (&#8221;there is a divine intent with that which is implicitly drawn out&#8221;). The objection, taken in its technical form, is that God&#8217;s veracity covers everything objectively connected with it because God&#8217;s knowledge is simple and non-precisive, i.e., he knows all things with all their connections one to another, the conclusions in their principles with a simple act.</p><p><strong>Major.</strong> That alone is formally revealed which the words of the revelation signify, either always according to human usage or at least in the determinate circumstances in which they were spoken; because revelation is a free locution, and God reveals what He wills to say, not everything He knows.</p><p><strong>Minor.</strong> But the object of a proper theological conclusion is reached only by recourse to a principle plainly different from the words and the circumstances of the revelation, namely the natural premise.</p><p><strong>Conclusion.</strong> Therefore it is not formally revealed, and consequently is not an object of divine faith.</p><p><em>Proof of the major.</em> This is proven by the absurdity of the contrary. If such were not the case, then God&#8217;s revelation would not be free. For, in the very revelation of any mystery, each of the other mysteries would necessarily be revealed. Pesch argues in this way:</p><blockquote><p>The knowledge of God is necessary, but revelation is a free act. Therefore God by no means reveals at the same time everything that He knows at the same time. So God could reveal the unity of the divine nature and not reveal the trinity of persons. What God wills to express by words must be drawn partly from the words themselves, partly from the circumstances in which the revelation was made. That therefore is formally revealed which either the words of themselves always signify according to human usage, or which they signify at least in those determinate circumstances. But when recourse must be had to a principle plainly different from the words themselves and from the circumstances of the revelation, what is found by that way is not formally said by God, and consequently is not an object of divine faith. (<em>Praelectiones dogmaticae</em> VIII n. 266)</p></blockquote><p>If what is virtually contained in a revealed judgment were per se revealed by God, then this would either be necessary from the fact, or purpose, or nature of the thing. This is not from the fact, for God has newly revealed certain properties of some essence when he has already revealed the essence of the thing. It is not from the purpose since God can have a special purpose of revealing the essence, but not those things superadded to the essence. It is not from the nature of the thing since speech directly and immediately expresses the concept of the speaker and only indirectly expresses the nature of the thing through the medium of the concept (this is demonstrated in logic). The concept of the thing represented is distinguished really and formally from the thing represented; therefore, he who explicitly says x does not explicitly say the properties necessarily connected to x and virtually distinguished from it. There is no necessity upon declaring the nature of something to also declare the properties of that thing. (cf. Mazzella, <em>De virtutibus infusis</em>, Rome 1879, disp. II a. IX prop. XX n. 487)</p><p><em>Proof of the minor.</em> This is the very definition of a proper conclusion that we explained above in the state of the question. The predicate of the conclusion is not in the comprehension of the revealed subject, but must be drawn out by bringing in some exterior principle.</p><p><strong>Seventh Argument.</strong> This is drawn from the natural entity of the theological habit. While there are a handful of Thomists who hold that the habit of theology is entitatively supernatural, the much more common opinion is that the habit of theology is formally natural. The commentators (Cajetan, John of St. Thomas, the Salmanticenses) demonstrate this from the fact that theology can grow essentially by study and other natural means, which is incompossible with a supernatural habit whose entire increase comes essentially from God. An acquired habit can only be formally natural. It is also something that rests on our natural powers, which is evident from the fact that one with a sharper intellect becomes a better theologian.</p><p><strong>Major.</strong> It is contradictory that a natural essence have a supernatural property.</p><p><strong>Minor.</strong> But theology is an entitatively natural (acquired) habit, whose property is its certitude; and the assent it elicits is an entitatively natural act.</p><p><strong>Conclusion.</strong> Therefore the certitude of the theological conclusion is not the supernatural certitude of faith, and the assent is not the supernatural act of faith.</p><p><em>Proof of the major.</em> This is self-evident. Properties flow from the essence and cannot exceed its order.</p><p><em>Proof of the minor.</em> This was already stated in the introduction to the argument. There are a number of arguments for and confirmations of this thesis, which I will pass over since this is merely a confirming argument.</p><p>A final note on the arguments. The reader will notice that several of these arguments (especially the fourth, fifth, and seventh) are also used by the theologians who hold that a theological conclusion can <em>never</em> become of divine faith, even after the Church defines it. I take from them only what my thesis needs: that the conclusion, <em>as</em> a conclusion and before any definition, is not held by divine faith. Whether the Church&#8217;s definition can supply a new title on which the same proposition is believed is the further question about &#8220;ecclesiastical faith&#8221; from which, as I said in the state of the question, I abstract.</p><h1>Objections and Replies</h1><p>Paul did not give many arguments. He gave one argument (that I conflate the motive with the means) about eleven times, one syllogism about the canon, a handful of examples (the Trinity, the atheist, the resurrection, and the Sadducees), a quotation from Turretin, and the claim that it is all &#8220;just Thomism.&#8221; I have gathered his own statements under nine heads and answered each. Where he repeated himself, I have quoted the clearest version and noted the others.</p><p><strong>First Objection.</strong> The theological conclusion ultimately resolves itself in a premise of faith; therefore, it is of faith.</p><p><strong>Reply.</strong> Paul follows certain theologians who argue that the theological conclusion can be of faith simply because it ultimately resolves into the certitude of one of its premises, i.e., the premise of faith. Besides being arbitrary (it is quite convenient that it receives its certitude from the premise that you need to defend your doctrine, isn&#8217;t that interesting!), we can directly answer this objection as well by distinguishing the relationship between principles and conclusions in a non-subalternated science and a subalternated science.</p><p>A science that is subalternated to a higher science (as theology is subalternated to the knowledge of God and the blessed) receives its principles from that higher knowledge; but its conclusions belong to it, not to the higher knowledge, and they are resolved into the <em>light</em> of the higher knowledge only <em>per accidens</em> and not <em>per se</em>. The conclusions of metaphysics are ultimately resolved into the principles of metaphysics <em>per se</em>. The conclusions of physics are ultimately resolved into the principles of physics <em>per se</em>. Yet, it is otherwise when the principles of a science are received from another science. The conclusions of optics are resolved into the principles of geometry, as principles of geometry, <em>per accidens</em> and not <em>per se</em>. The same is the case with theology. Its conclusions are resolved <em>per se</em> into the articles of faith as into their principles; but they are resolved into <em>divine revelation as the formal motive of faith</em> only <em>per accidens</em>, for it is not under that motive that theology draws them. As the Salmanticenses explain:</p><blockquote><p>This proposition <em>Christ is risible</em>, and all other theological ones, are resolved into divine revelation only <em>per accidens</em>, in the way a musical conclusion is resolved into faith about the principles of arithmetic in one who lacks that science ... And also, and chiefly, because although the conclusions of a subalternate science are resolved ultimately into the principles of the subalternating science, they do not for that reason belong to it, but to the subalternate. (<em>De fide</em> disp. I dub. IV n. 126)</p></blockquote><p>Who would be so absurd as to say that the conclusions of a subalternate science are resolved <em>per se</em> into the light of the subalternating science so as to constitute conclusions in its order? A conclusion of music does not become a conclusion of mathematics because it is ultimately resolved into its principles, because this is <em>per accidens</em>, not <em>per se</em>. A conclusion of optics does not become a conclusion of geometry because it is ultimately resolved into its principles, because this is <em>per accidens</em>, not <em>per se</em>. For the same reason, the conclusions of theology are not conclusions of faith merely because they are ultimately resolved into the articles of faith, because their resolution into the <em>motive</em> of faith is <em>per accidens</em>, not <em>per se</em>.</p><p>The reason for this should be quite evident. Theology relies on the revealed principles presuppositively and not as its formal motive in drawing its conclusions. The same is true for all subalternated sciences. As Ferre puts it,</p><blockquote><p>I do not assent to &#8216;Christ is risible&#8217; because God revealed that Christ is a man; but, the faith that He is a man being supposed, from the fact that He is a man I infer that He is risible. Hence the revelation that Christ is a man is presupposed to the assent to the conclusion, but is not the formal reason moving to the assent to the conclusion; the formal reason is the intrinsic deducibility which the conclusion has from the revealed premise. (<em>Tractatus theologici in Primam Partem</em>, Tract. I q. 1, ad 2)</p></blockquote><p>From here, we are able to draw a very important corollary. While it is true that the proposition &#8220;Christ is risible&#8221; is mediately revealed, it is not the case that we adhere to the judgement because it is mediately revealed. Rather, we adhere to the judgement because Christ&#8217;s humanity is immediately revealed and we have evidently deduced this from the immediate revelation.</p><p><strong>Second Objection.</strong> &#8220;I submit the key problem is that, with his attack on the use of good and necessary consequence to establish articles of faith, Wagner is conflating the motive of belief with the means by which we come to that belief. Which is ironic, because later in the video he actually makes that very distinction when receiving potential counterarguments from Protestants on this issue. He makes the distinction, but I submit that he equivocates on these things in this issue.&#8221;</p><p>And again: &#8220;What this shows is that there is a distinction between that proper, ultimate motive for believing something, versus, if you want to speak improperly, the rational sub-motives for the same. It is the authority validating the belief versus the means by which we receive that knowledge. I submit, even though Wagner does recognize the distinction and uses it for his own defense a bit later in the video, he actually equivocates between those things here in order to make the critique of our paradigm. He is trying to say that for us, when we reason by good and necessary consequence, the divine motive and the rational means are actually on the same epistemic layer; therefore the motive of belief is no longer pure and divine. I submit, rather, that obviously these are two different epistemic layers. The grounding is still purely divine.&#8221;</p><p>And again: &#8220;Wagner subtly equivocates between the motive and the instrument by which we come to believe a thing. That is the only way in which he can say that we allow a human element to enter into the motive of belief.&#8221;</p><p>And at the end: &#8220;We agree the motive for believing, even in a doctrine derived by good and necessary consequence, is still because God revealed it.&#8221;</p><p><strong>Reply.</strong> As I have noted in a number of places, it is completely appropriate to distinguish between the motives for belief and the instruments whereby we come to believe such and such a thing. The instruments by which we come to believe something do not necessarily add an additional motive for our belief, but are as conditions that do not positively influence our assent to the conclusion, e.g., our ability to read, the explication of a definition, the identification of a particular under an unconditioned universal, etc. Hence, when I identify that &#8220;I am a man&#8221; in order to conclude that &#8220;I am under original sin by my origin from Adam,&#8221; my identification of &#8220;I am a man&#8221; does not add any particular additional motive to my conclusion, but simply acts as an instrument in my reasoning. Nor does the axiom of the &#8220;weaker part&#8221; touch this case, for here there is no illation: the assent bears on the revealed universal, &#8220;all men are under original sin,&#8221; and the identification of myself as a man is only the condition of its application to me. It is precisely where such an identification cannot be certain by natural means that we have the conditioned universal, which, as I said in the state of the question, no one holds to be of faith before the definition of the Church.</p><p>Now it seems as if Paul concedes (at least for the sake of argument) that an addition of some motive beyond divine revelation would allow the conclusion to follow that I have drawn against the Protestants. This is sensible, because a human motive would exclude the act of divine faith, which, as Protestants and Catholics both concede (beyond differences of terminology), consists in an act that affirms that such and such is the case on the basis of God revealing.</p><p>Therefore, the only question at hand is whether a theological conclusion (meant in the sense of the derivation of some virtually distinct property by a premise of reason) adds an additional motive of assent beyond the authority of God revealing, which is established from the seven arguments above.</p><p>Paul&#8217;s objection is that I distinguish motive from instrument in my own case, but that I collapse them when I consider the case of the Protestant drawing proper theological conclusions. Yet, this is not true. As I have established above, when there is a case of a premise of natural reason in proper discourse, it concurs per se in the eliciting of the conclusion, and, therefore, its certitude enters into the conclusion rather than simply being a condition of it. The tu quoques related to this are weak (as I will show below) and he never provides a formal argument for why the formal motive of assent must change in the other examples given by me. I apply the distinction consistently and carefully, considering these problems from the principles of theology.</p><p>In the cases I have given where I do not add a motive of human faith in the conclusion, the reason why should be simple and the test is easy. The Salmanticenses give this criterion:</p><blockquote><p>[Improper discourse] does not include this motion [from the known to the unknown], but, as it were remaining at the same point, only explicates in the consequent what in the premises was not so perspicuously signified ... because it is not fitted to generate a knowledge specifically diverse from the knowledge of the premises, which seems to be proper to discourse; but only perfects and illustrates it. Whence this kind of discourse cannot stand in the way of an act of faith, or of the habit of natural first principles, which are not discursive. (<em>De fide</em> disp. I dub. IV n. 122)</p></blockquote><p>There is no transition from unknown to known elicited by my eyes reading the canon list (for the senses lie outside the causality of the intellectual judgement and concur only by providing the necessary matter for the intellect to work upon); therefore, we call this conveyance. There is no transition from unknown to known by my clarification of the notion of &#8220;man&#8221; as &#8220;rational animal&#8221; since both are contained under the same formal concept; therefore, we call it explication. There is no transition from unknown to known by my identification of a certain singular under an unconditional universal; therefore, we call it application. Yet, in the case of scientific reasoning, there is a transition from the unknown to the known. We join the premise &#8220;risibility is a property of man&#8221; to &#8220;Christ is a man&#8221; in order to produce &#8220;Christ is risible,&#8221; which is a) formally a new judgement (unlike mere explication), and b) positively caused by the premises (unlike the cases where the senses enter in as a condition). In the case &#8220;Christ is risible,&#8221; we have a new judgement with a new predicate including new terms that are not identical to the concepts originally had.</p><p>As for &#8220;equivocation&#8221;: equivocation occurs when the same term is used in two different significations under the same verbal or written sign. As an example, I would be equivocating if I were to make the following argument: &#8220;A dolphin is a popular sport fish; now, a dolphin is a mammal; therefore, a mammal is a popular sport fish.&#8221; In the former case, I am using the term &#8220;dolphin&#8221; to indicate the mahi-mahi, while in the latter case I am using it to indicate the aquatic mammal. Where, in any of my treatments of the topic, have I done that? When someone is equivocating, they do not use qualifiers in order to communicate precisely how they are using the term. In my case, I frequently use terms like &#8220;formal motive&#8221; or &#8220;formal motive of assent&#8221; in order to indicate what formally moves the intellect to judge the truth of a certain proposition, and I use them in that sense every single time.</p><p>Beyond this, it is purely arbitrary and ad hoc to identify the motive of divine authority as the &#8220;true motive&#8221; whereas the motive of natural reason is the &#8220;sub-motive&#8221; (whatever that is supposed to mean) that has no positive influence (somehow) on the assent to the conclusion. Supposing that you are right here, why can&#8217;t I claim the contrary? There is no reason why the assent to the naturally knowable premise is &#8220;instrumental&#8221; rather than the assent to the premise of divine faith.</p><p>And the last version of the objection, &#8220;we agree the motive for believing is still because God revealed it,&#8221; is not an objection at all. The question at hand isn&#8217;t what you <em>say</em> is the motive of your assent to a certain doctrine. The question at hand is what actually <em>is</em> the motive of your assent. You have still failed to explain how the formal motive of one of your premises in proper illation does not enter into the conclusion. I have explained at length how it does. You haven&#8217;t explained how it is reasonable for you to include a premise of natural reason in the antecedent and then have the motive for that assent disappear in the consequent, conveniently saving your doctrine while you&#8217;re at it.</p><p><strong>Third Objection.</strong> &#8220;What is actually preventing me from saying, &#8216;I believe this because God revealed it,&#8217; even with the additional rational steps granted to get there? What is actually stopping me? What renders me a liar if I say, &#8216;I believe this because God revealed it&#8217;? That&#8217;s only the case if you presuppose that what God reveals is only those things which are express, and that there isn&#8217;t a divine intent with that which is implicitly drawn out with a firm theological conclusion. So if you don&#8217;t presuppose that &#8216;revealed&#8217; equals &#8216;verbatim stated,&#8217; but &#8216;revealed&#8217; also means &#8216;clearly concluded from A to B to conclusion,&#8217; if you don&#8217;t presuppose that, then I am perfectly able to say, &#8216;I believe in this derived article of faith because God revealed it.&#8217; Because God&#8217;s revealing is still the motive of belief.&#8221;</p><p>And the example: &#8220;Let&#8217;s just say the fullest explanation of the Holy Trinity. There are explicit statements in Scripture: Christ is God; the Holy Spirit is God; the Father is God; they&#8217;re all divine. But the full Trinitarian formula, that God is one, there is one divine essence instantiated in three persons, that is not in express words in Scripture. We have to conclude that from Scripture. That, I would submit, is a theological conclusion in that sense.&#8221;</p><p><strong>Reply.</strong> As I noted above, I am NOT denying that theological conclusions are revealed. The revealed judgement contains potentially every singular and virtually every proper conclusion. It is really and truly there, and I reject as completely senseless anyone who would say the contrary. So I do not &#8220;presuppose that &#8216;revealed&#8217; equals &#8216;verbatim stated.&#8217;&#8221; Nobody in the tradition does. The formally-implicit (the definition in the defined, the part in the whole, the particular in the unconditioned universal, the equivalent formula) is revealed and is of faith without any definition, and I said so in the video.</p><p>He asks &#8220;what is stopping me?&#8221; and the answer, in summary of the arguments given above, is that the natural premise and its formal motive are stopping it. You needed it as a true motive distinct from the motive of Divine Revelation. If God had said the conclusion, you would not have needed it as a motive. Since you needed it, God did not say the conclusion; and what God did not say, you do not believe God for.</p><p>I do not argue on the basis of the exigency of the revealed judgement (what it contains), but on the process of reasoning when there is an additional motive beyond what is revealed (how we get to what it contains). A man must use additional premises, with motives that are outside the motive of the revealed premise, in order to reason to the conclusion. These motives do not somehow disappear, as I noted above, when you reason. They truly enter into the conclusion and join with the motive for the revealed premise. It is on this basis that we are arguing and on no other basis (although, as I have frequently noted, I could argue on the very foundation of proper illation, as many Thomists do).</p><p>As to the Trinity. The dogma of the Trinity is not something that is merely virtually revealed in Scripture, but is formally revealed in Scripture in the identification of the unity of the Godhead, the divinity of the persons, the real distinction of the persons, the processions, and the relative names. Here, Paul is confusing the coordination of our thoughts with the proper theological conclusion. For me to coordinate the propositions &#8220;God is one&#8221; and &#8220;the Father is God&#8221; and &#8220;the Son is God&#8221; is not an instance of my proceeding under the light of virtual revelation, but of proceeding under the light of formal revelation, insofar as each judgement is formally revealed (any &#8220;formalization&#8221; concerns the process of definition, which, as I have noted above, is not included in my argument).</p><p>Three additional notes. First, he used the phrase &#8220;the fullest explanation of the Holy Trinity&#8221; and the phrase &#8220;the full Trinitarian formula.&#8221; In the latter case, he seems to be speaking merely of the creedal formula of the Trinity. In this sense, I would argue that the coordination of judgements in the creed simply concerns what is formally revealed in Scripture in equivalent terms, which is commonly stated by our theologians. In the former case, the full explanation of the Holy Trinity could mean its full scholastic development as one would find in the various scholastic works of the last millennium. In this case, I would obviously concede that, in some judgements, we follow the light of virtual revelation and have true theological conclusions. Yet I would simply deny what is assumed, i.e., that such are of faith. Otherwise, nearly every Catholic theologian would be a heretic (for, even among the Thomists, there are disagreements on theological conclusions).</p><p>Second, he did not seem to attend to the distinction between before and after the definition in Roman Catholic theology, something that I have treated in a number of places. The majority of Catholic theologians (as noted by Fr. Mar&#237;n-Sola) hold that what is virtually revealed can become of divine faith by the definition of the Church. Therefore, even if I were to affirm that the creedal formulation of the Trinity concerns judgements that are virtually revealed, it would still not follow as an argument against the argument I have given. For I would simply hold that such judgements were not of divine faith until after the definition of the Church.</p><p>Third (and I only note this because he made so much of my not proving my premises), Paul abandoned his own example within a minute of giving it. &#8220;In fact, because of how dicey the Trinity may be, let&#8217;s ignore that example and just go back to doctrine X in the abstract.&#8221; The one concrete instance offered of a doctrine that is derived by good and necessary consequence to which we give divine faith was abandoned as soon as it was given. I do not know what &#8220;doctrine X in the abstract&#8221; is, but it is probably resolved quite easily if the examples given can be any indication.</p><p><strong>Fourth Objection.</strong> &#8220;Someone who affirms a mere direct teaching of holy Scripture, something that&#8217;s very explicit, so, &#8216;he who teaches that Christ has not come in the flesh is antichrist&#8217; ... Christ came in the flesh; Christ became a man. That&#8217;s clear, directly explicit in holy Scripture. Now, even in that case, it is still also true to say that I believe this because I derived it from the word of God. And it is precisely because, even in that case of direct, simple apprehension of the data from Scripture, the rational process is still in play.&#8221;</p><p>And: &#8220;I submit that even in allegedly simple apprehensions of divine propositions ... even in the case of an allegedly simple apprehension of divine dogma, where you&#8217;re not reasoning from good and necessary consequence, you&#8217;re just saying &#8216;Scripture says this,&#8217; or &#8216;the Church, as the rule of faith, says this; I just immediately receive it,&#8217; I submit that in the sense in which Wagner himself says a human element comes into the motive of belief, if you grant his equivocal sense, it&#8217;s actually the same even for an allegedly simple apprehension of divine dogma.&#8221;</p><p>And, on Kevin&#8217;s clip: &#8220;The problem with some people like us is that we can think that syllogisms are like a law of the universe, like the code of the universe. Frankly, the issue is that syllogism and syllogistic reasoning is fundamentally descriptive of the rational process, not, as such, prescriptive. That&#8217;s very important, because that means you can actually break down many different things in the same syllogistic way from different angles. I submit that even in an alleged simple act of divine faith, you can actually break that down syllogistically, because of the theological priors.&#8221;</p><p><strong>Reply.</strong> There is not much to say here except that in these cases reason is acting as an instrument. There is no distinct motive except that of divine revelation. I am not arguing from the simple use of the intellect; therefore the critique does not follow. I have made this clear. But since Paul made this the backbone of his response to Kevin, let me explain it to you in a bit more detail, so that you are able to overcome these arguments with ease.</p><p>Dogma is revealed to us in words. This should be obvious. These words make up judgements. Judgements are an act of the second operation of the intellect. The judgement is formed from the joining or severing of two terms, which are acquired by simple apprehension. Simple apprehension produces the formal concept and terminates in the objective concept, i.e., the nature as known. The transmission of divine revelation, the articles of the faith, etc., actually supposes the pre-existence of abstracted concepts that are already present in your intellect. What divine revelation does is order these concepts into judgements, whether affirming or denying. Divine revelation, as it is transmitted to us who receive it by hearing, does not &#8220;infuse&#8221; new concepts into your intellect (I leave aside the case of the prophet himself, who may receive infused species; ST II-II q. 173 a. 2). So, when Scripture says that &#8220;Christ is a man,&#8221; it is joining together into a judgement two concepts: &#8220;Christ&#8221; and &#8220;man.&#8221; Now, if I were to reflect on this concept &#8220;man,&#8221; I see that the concept &#8220;man&#8221; is the same exact concept as &#8220;rational animal.&#8221; I am simply sharpening the concept that is possessed already in my intellect, which Scripture is ordering into judgements. Therefore, if I were to make the additional judgement that &#8220;Christ is a rational animal,&#8221; THE SAME CONCEPTS ARE USED; my intellect is just apprehending the concept in a weaker way in one instance and in a stronger way in another instance. While this may be expressed in terms of a syllogism, it is not a product of the third operation of the intellect. There is no additional motive of my assent to &#8220;Christ is a rational animal.&#8221; The motive of my assent is exactly the same in either case. The concepts are the exact same. The objective concept (which is the nature of the thing itself, differing from it only in its mode of being, i.e., intentional rather than real) is the same in either case; therefore it is the same in the conclusion, adding no additional motive of assent. Here reason acts merely as an instrument, and the tradition calls this &#8220;improper&#8221; or &#8220;explicative&#8221; discourse. Hugon lists these &#8220;immediate illations&#8221; (by equipollence, conversion, subalternation, &#8220;from one predicate to another, or from one subject to another, on account of the evident identity of each&#8221;) and rules: &#8220;Immediate consequence is not properly consequence or illation. For it belongs to the reason of illation that it proceed from the known to the unknown.&#8221; (<em>Logica minor</em> tr. III q. I a. II n. V)</p><p>Now, the same can appear when we identify a particular under an unconditioned universal. Let&#8217;s say we have the judgement &#8220;all men are under original sin.&#8221; There are two concepts present in this judgement, the simple concept of &#8220;man&#8221; and the complex concept of &#8220;under-original-sin.&#8221; When I look around me and perceive the exterior accidents of a man by my senses, this phantasm is formed in my mind and my intellect ultimately abstracts the concept, which is an immaterial thing. My intellect recognizes that what I am perceiving before me is identical with the concept of &#8220;man&#8221; in the judgements that I have about men, including the judgements of dogma that divine revelation orders. There is no additional motive of reason that is required for me to assent to &#8220;this man is under original sin&#8221; except the motive of divine revelation that ordered the judgement. Gotti says the same of &#8220;Christ died for me&#8221;: that discourse &#8220;is not truly illative but only explicative; just as this discourse, <em>Every man is rational; I am a man; therefore I am rational</em>, is not a truly illative discourse but only explicative, because the meaning of this proposition, <em>I am rational</em>, is contained in this, <em>every man is rational</em>.&#8221; (<em>Theologia scholastico-dogmatica</em> t. I q. 1 &#167; XXXII)</p><p>Contrast the proper conclusion. &#8220;Christ is a man&#8221; and &#8220;every man is risible&#8221; do not use the same concepts. &#8220;Risible&#8221; is nowhere in the comprehension of &#8220;man&#8221;; it is a property flowing from the essence and distinct from it (a proper accident, and so really distinct from the substance in Thomist metaphysics; but all the argument requires is that it be at least virtually distinct, Mar&#237;n-Sola&#8217;s second degree); and I get it from a <em>new</em> judgement, held on a <em>new</em> motive. That is why the tradition calls the one discourse explicative and the other illative, and why the first can be of faith and the second cannot.</p><p>So: &#8220;Christ came in the flesh&#8221; is explicit; &#8220;Christ is a man&#8221; is the same judgement in other words; &#8220;Christ is a rational animal&#8221; is the same judgement explicated. None of these is a theological conclusion. Paul&#8217;s &#8220;Christ came in the flesh&#8221; example is not pertinent to the case, as I have explained in a number of different videos and articles (even giving this exact example). Not once in the stream did Paul ever produce a single example of a proper theological conclusion drawn with a premise of natural reason that ought to be assented to by faith without the Church&#8217;s judgement. Further, he never demonstrated to us rigorously that the motive remains unmixed in the conclusion. He merely produced examples of explicative discourse and examples of the preambles of faith, and then called them all &#8220;syllogisms&#8221; without any of the precision that I include in my work, while (ironically) critiquing my lack of argumentation.</p><p>Which brings me to &#8220;syllogisms are descriptive, not prescriptive.&#8221; I find it a bit strange that he described Kevin&#8217;s qualification, &#8220;in scientific demonstration,&#8221; accurately, and then ignored it in his refutation. There is nothing magical about being able to construct a syllogism. As I have mentioned time and time again, the subsumed premise does not act as a motive in an explicative discourse or where there is an unconditioned universal and a particular. In either of these cases, the subsumed premise is not the formal motive of the conclusion. What is presented in these cases is not a scientific demonstration. A scientific demonstration is not the same as just writing something up in syllogistic form. There are many things that can be written up in syllogistic form (explicative discourse, the identification of a particular under a universal judgement, probable arguments, etc.) that are not instances of scientific demonstration. A scientific demonstration involves the exact process that I mentioned above, i.e., drawing forth a conclusion that is virtually contained in a certain premise by means of another premise. So when Paul says &#8220;you can break down many different things in the same syllogistic way from different angles,&#8221; he is right, and he has just conceded my point: the syllogistic form proves nothing about the motive. That is why I keep telling him to look at the act and not at the form.</p><p>The claim itself, that &#8220;even in an alleged simple act of divine faith, you can actually break that down syllogistically, because of the theological priors,&#8221; has been answered under the fourth argument, but let me repeat it briefly. You can write down the following syllogism as much as you want: &#8220;whatever God reveals is true; God revealed this; therefore this,&#8221; but that has nothing to do with whether this actually proceeds discursively. I demonstrated above in detail that faith is non-discursive. It is a basic mistake of both logic and theology to confuse these matters. Revelation is the light in which a man sees the thing believed, at once that by which and that which is believed. A denial of this makes absolutely no sense upon careful examination. It would result in an infinite regress wherein the entire chain of premises falls under syllogistic demonstration, leading to no first principle upon which the entire thing is based.</p><p><strong>Fifth Objection.</strong> &#8220;Now, let&#8217;s say an atheist comes along, and he reads the Scriptures, and he comes to the same doctrinal conclusion. &#8216;Oh yeah, this passage says this, this passage says that; that leads to this doctrinal conclusion.&#8217; Great. Now, will the atheist therefore come to believe that doctrine? No. He doesn&#8217;t ... Why? Because he doesn&#8217;t believe in the authority of God revealing ... That rational process, in other words, is not the motive of belief, or even a motive of belief, for him ... Conversely, the believer, me, I do have the motive of the authority of God revealing, and therefore I do come to affirm it.&#8221;</p><p>He repeats this three times, and calls it the thing that &#8220;shows&#8221; the distinction between motive and sub-motive.</p><p><strong>Reply.</strong> There is both a formal defect in this line of reasoning and a material defect.</p><p>Formally, the argument only works with a hidden premise. Paul&#8217;s inference is: the atheist has the rational process and does not believe; therefore the rational process is not a motive of belief. That follows only if a motive must be, by itself, <em>sufficient</em> for the assent, so that its presence guarantees belief and its failure to guarantee belief shows that it is no motive at all. But nobody claims that the natural premise is a sufficient motive; the claim is that it is a <em>partial</em> motive, concurring with the revealed premise in one compounded medium. Remove the hidden premise and the argument collapses: from &#8220;the atheist, who lacks faith in the antecedent, does not believe the consequent,&#8221; nothing whatever follows about <em>what</em> the believer&#8217;s assent to the consequent rests on.</p><p>Materially, then, Paul has confused a necessary condition with a sufficient condition. To assent to something on the basis of the inclusion of something in revelation is a necessary condition for divine faith; yet it is not a sufficient condition for divine faith in every instance. Therefore, while the absence of it excludes the atheist from having divine faith, this does not make its presence sufficient of itself in all cases for divine faith. This supposes what it ought to prove. The presence of the divine motive in one premise is not in dispute. What is in dispute is whether it is the <em>only</em> motive in the conclusion, and the atheist example says nothing whatever about that.</p><p>Further, we see that the test proves too much when applied to the theological opinion that proceeds by way of probable reasoning. Take the case of an atheist who reads St. Thomas&#8217; probable argument for some conclusion and then grants that it is a decent probable argument (denying the conclusion because he denies the premise of faith), while a Catholic follows the same argument and holds it as a theological opinion. By Paul&#8217;s example, the difference between them is &#8220;the authority of God revealing,&#8221; and therefore the Catholic holds the opinion by divine faith. It would necessarily follow from this that every probable theological opinion is of divine faith. Therefore, every theologian who has ever changed his mind on a disputed question has denied the faith and rejected Divine Revelation by that act, becoming a heretic. The test cannot distinguish faith from theology, or theology from opinion, because it only tests for the presence of <em>one</em> motive and ignores the other motive because it must gratuitously ignore the other motive in order to save the Protestant doctrine.</p><p>I would also like to note something about the proposed example. He states that &#8220;this Scripture says this, this Scripture says that, therefore this doctrine follows from that.&#8221; This is an instance of drawing a theological conclusion from two revealed premises, which, as I said in the state of the question, is not the case that presses him.</p><p>As an additional point, he bastardizes his own example. In the case of the atheist &#8220;concluding&#8221; a doctrine from Scripture, the atheist is not affirming directly that &#8220;x conclusion is the case&#8221;; he is affirming that &#8220;x conclusion follows from Scripture.&#8221; He is assenting to something, and has a motive for his assent; it is simply indirect rather than direct, i.e., he is affirming that Scripture says something, not affirming something that Scripture says. This is what infidel scholars do in their biblical commentaries. Now notice what that means for Paul. The atheist and Paul assent to exactly the same thing by exactly the same motive: that the consequent follows from the antecedent, by the evidence of the consequence. That assent is natural in both of them. Paul then adds a second assent, to the consequent itself. What is the motive of <em>that</em> assent? It cannot be God&#8217;s authority alone, for God&#8217;s authority reaches only the antecedent; what carries Paul from the antecedent to the consequent is the very consequence that he shares with the atheist, and that consequence is seen by natural light. So the assent to the consequent has two things in it, the believed antecedent and the seen consequence, and one of them is natural. Paul&#8217;s own example, properly analyzed, shows exactly the mixed motive he denies.</p><p><strong>Sixth Objection.</strong> &#8220;Our Roman apologist friends believe they have divine faith in the canon of Scripture because of the authentic decision of the magisterium ... So in one sense, they can say that they affirm the Gospel of Mark&#8217;s canonicity on the authority of God revealing. That is the sense in which I would say it. However, it&#8217;s also true that they believe that because they derived it from human testimony, their priest, historical documents of the Church, etc. ... But the instrumental motive, if you will, for their assent is the derivation of this fact from these historical, living testimonies, such as can be expressed in a syllogistic form.&#8221;</p><p>And the syllogism: &#8220;Premise one: &#8216;I ought to believe everything that is revealed by God.&#8217; Premise two: &#8216;That which is revealed by God for the Church, including me individually, is sufficiently attested to by certain marks and testimonies, that is, for example, the authentic testimony of the Church.&#8217; Premise three: &#8216;It has been demonstrated to me, through history and reliable living witnesses, that the canonicity of the Gospel of Mark is attested to by sufficient, certain marks and testimonies.&#8217; Conclusion: &#8216;I ought to believe in the canonicity of the Gospel of Mark,&#8217; and from that, the person goes to &#8216;I assent to it by divine faith.&#8217; Notice the multiple steps of non-revealed minor premises here.&#8221;</p><p><strong>Reply.</strong> First, the phrase &#8220;the instrumental motive,&#8221; as distinguished from the formal motive, is confused. An instrument, properly speaking, is not a condition: an instrumental cause positively concurs in the effect, under the motion of the principal cause. So if the natural premise is an &#8220;instrument&#8221; in the proper sense, it positively concurs in the assent, which is exactly what I say and what Paul denies. If, on the other hand, it does not positively concur, then it is a mere condition, and should not be called an instrument at all. Paul cannot have it both ways: either the natural premise contributes to the assent, and then it is part of its motive, or it does not, and then the conclusion was not drawn from it. This is distinct from the loose sense of &#8220;instrument&#8221; (my eyes, my ears) that has been explained above, where the word names a condition.</p><p>Second, this is not the sense in which I mean it, because you are specifically treating an objection to your doctrine on the basis of proper illation from a naturally knowable proposition, in which the motive of natural reason enters into the very process of reasoning itself. I do not claim (nor have I ever claimed) that I believe the canonicity of certain books of Scripture on the basis of any judgement that is naturally knowable. In fact, I am actually known for saying the exact opposite and using this as an argument against Protestantism.</p><p>To give an analogy: if I have a canon list in front of me, it is necessary that I use my eyes in order to read the page in front of me. Are my eyes the motive upon which I affirm the canon list? No. The motive is the divine authority that I believe the proposer has in such a case. My vision does not add any motive upon which reason rests, but is only a condition (which, as I have repeated, does not positively influence the effect, which is the proper office of a cause). How this is the case and not arbitrary, I have already explained above.</p><p>Third, look at the conclusion of his syllogism and think whether you have seen this before: &#8220;I <strong>ought</strong> to believe in the canonicity of the Gospel of Mark.&#8221; What is the judgement called where you <strong>ought</strong> to believe something? It isn&#8217;t the act of faith, which is the judgement terminating in the truth of the conclusion. It is the <em>judgement of credentity</em> (<em>iudicium credentitatis</em>), which is the practical judgement that this thing is to be believed, which follows on the judgement of credibility and precedes the act of faith. Then, take a look at his premises, which should be equally obvious from the above explanation: &#8220;What is revealed by God is sufficiently attested by certain marks and testimonies.&#8221; These are motives of credibility. &#8220;It has been demonstrated to me through history and reliable witnesses that the canonicity of Mark is so attested.&#8221; This is the judgement of credibility, which is formed by natural reason from these motives. In a spectacular turn of events, Paul has demonstrated to us that our understanding of the assent of faith and the antecedent judgements of the intellect are so intuitive that, when attempting to draw out the process of faith, he has listed them all. Then, he states &#8220;and from that, the person goes to &#8216;I assent to it by divine faith.&#8217;&#8221;</p><p>This is exactly correct. These are acts that precede the act of faith which are different than the assent as faith, as evidenced from the different object (&#8221;x is credible,&#8221; &#8220;x ought to be believed&#8221;) and a different motive (i.e., a natural motive). This is precisely Garrigou-Lagrange&#8217;s point, quoted above, that the act of faith is not the conclusion of the apologetic syllogism, which terminates rather in the judgement of credibility.</p><p>Yet, somehow, he goes on to treat the motives of these preparatory judgements as though they were the motive of the assent of faith itself. Well, he says this before immediately contradicting himself by arguing that the formal motive is the authority of God revealing. Oh well! We &#8220;Romanists&#8221; can simply hold that it is one thing to say that &#8220;this ought to be believed&#8221; or that &#8220;this is credible&#8221; and another to affirm something by the act of faith. This should be evident from the terms of the matter, wherein faith&#8217;s entire motive is the authority of God revealing. Paul has gone so far as to both make the assent of faith a syllogism AND to make the formal motive of the assent of faith a matter of natural inquiry. How are we to retain the supernaturality of faith? How am I to avoid the semi-rationalism of Hermes and G&#252;nther, condemned at Vatican I, with this novel doctrine? How do I avoid collapsing the natural and supernatural orders? I do not know. Yet, the one thing I do know is that the conclusion does not follow.</p><p>As to his comments on the canon of Scripture, the act whereby I affirm the canon is not a theological conclusion and it is not a mere dogmatic fact either (contrary to some moderns). It is <em>formally revealed in sacred Tradition</em>, as I have repeated on a number of occasions. Vatican I says that the Church holds the books as sacred and canonical &#8220;not because, having been composed by human industry alone, they were afterwards approved by her authority; nor merely because they contain revelation without error; but because, having been written under the inspiration of the Holy Ghost, they have God for their author, <em>and as such have been delivered to the Church herself</em>.&#8221; (DS 3006)</p><p>The Catholic&#8217;s assent to &#8220;Mark is inspired&#8221; is an assent to something God revealed, on the authority of God revealing, proposed by the Church. The Church&#8217;s proposition is not a premise from which I <em>infer</em> the canon; it is the <em>condition</em> under which the revelation reaches me, the application of the rule of faith. This is an instance (as I explained above) of applicative discourse, not of scientific discourse. The universal in an applicative discourse is nothing other than the particulars themselves. The subsumed proposition is nothing but a pure explication of the universal proposition, applying it to a determinate subject. It acts as condition, not as motive. This should be clear from what I have already said.</p><p><strong>Seventh Objection.</strong> &#8220;One of my favorite examples of this as well is the case of someone who comes to believe in the resurrection of Christ and comes to faith that way ... They go through all the arguments: the historicity of the Gospels, their authorship, their dating, questions on the reliability of witnesses ... And then, at the end of that whole process, they come to conclude: &#8216;Okay, Jesus rose from the dead. Now I&#8217;m going to assent in faith to that.&#8217; ... But that whole thing came about because of a long string of rational processes. That is key there.&#8221;</p><p>Then: &#8220;The Romanist may still say, &#8216;Well, actually, in that case you don&#8217;t really give divine faith to the resurrection, because it was demonstrated more rationally, not on the authority of God revealing.&#8217; But when you actually think about it, that just makes no sense. Because in the end, the assent of faith is not merely a virtue; it is actually a psychological thing ... that person then chooses to go from that rational demonstration to giving faith in Christ. And so, with that act of faith, it is actually on the authority of God, because these rational motives showed him that Jesus is the Christ ... You can distinguish the rational acceptance of the resurrection of Christ and the act of faith subsequent to that. But the important thing is that that act of faith ... still has the formal motive of the authority of God ... But the rational process is what got him there, fundamentally.&#8221;</p><p>Then, on my video&#8217;s treatment of the motives of credibility: &#8220;There is a sense in which, yes, that rational investigation of the motives of credibility caused the assent of faith. Again, emphasis on caused. It was an instrumental cause which God used to enlighten the reason of the person ... Just apply the same now to good and necessary consequence reasoning from the articles of faith ... It&#8217;s the same thing. It&#8217;s the same thing.&#8221;</p><p>And in the Q&amp;A: &#8220;I simply submit that the distinction between this process being prior to articles of faith, versus good and necessary consequence being posterior to articles of faith, that distinction is like, okay, so what? How does that still make one faith and the other not faith? So what if one&#8217;s posterior?&#8221;</p><p><strong>Reply.</strong> This objection, if taken in a strict sense (although he does not mean it in this sense), is rationalistic and destroys the notion of faith. Faith, as we agree, is, in the sense we use it here, an affirmation of something on the basis of God revealing. You do not assent to the resurrection of Christ, as an article of faith, on the basis of historiography. Even unbelievers can assent to the resurrection of Christ on the basis of historiography, and the guards at the tomb and the chief priests knew of it without believing (Mt 28:11&#8211;15). That reveals exactly what I am saying. The motive for my assent to matters of faith is not those antecedent or concomitant exercises of the senses or intellect that are required conditions for me to be able to make the assent of faith (e.g., the apprehension of the notions that are necessary for the assent as its terms, the senses that are required for the communication of judgements to us, the investigation of the signs that makes the assent reasonable, etc.). The motive of my assent is the testimony of God revealing.</p><p>But Paul, in the second passage, concedes all of this and then contradicts himself in the same breath. He rightly points out that we would respond that the historical demonstration does not itself constitute faith. Then he actually concedes exactly our point in substance: &#8220;that person then chooses to go from that rational demonstration to giving faith in Christ,&#8221; and &#8220;you can distinguish the rational acceptance of the resurrection of Christ and the act of faith subsequent to that.&#8221; How does he not see that he has just conceded the distinction he came to deny? He very clearly explains here that the resurrection of Christ, historically established, is a motive of credibility that induces the mind to make an act of faith by the judgement of credibility, and that the act of faith is a <em>distinct act</em> with <em>its own</em> formal motive. Yet, if this is the case, then the &#8220;long string of rational processes&#8221; is not the motive of the assent of faith; it is what precedes it.</p><p>He continues: &#8220;But the rational process is what got him there, <em>fundamentally</em>.&#8221; Does he not see the irony? What is fundamental is not formal. What is preparatory for a thing is not that thing. The rational process of inquiry is not formally the assent of faith, but fundamental to it as a preparation for it. That is the entire point that I labored so hard above to actually prove. And now apply it to the theological conclusion, and see the difference. In the case of the resurrection investigation, the reasoning terminates in a judgement (<em>this revelation is credible; it ought to be believed</em>) whose object is not the object of faith and which is not the medium through which the article is known; and then a new act, faith, reaches the article on God&#8217;s word. In the case of the theological conclusion, the reasoning terminates <em>in the very proposition assented to</em>; the natural premise is not &#8220;fundamental&#8221; to the conclusion as a preparation for it, but is part of the <em>cause</em> of the assent, and its motive enters the conclusion as virtually contained in it. In the first case there are two acts, and the second does not rest on the first as on its medium. In the second case there is one act, the assent to the conclusion, and it rests on the premises as on its medium, because that is what an assent to a conclusion <em>is</em>. This is completely different from the other rational processes that Paul has described.</p><p>That is also the answer to &#8220;so what if one&#8217;s posterior?&#8221; The difference between the preambles and the theological conclusion is not that the one comes before faith and the other after. It is that the preambles are not the <em>medium</em> of the article (they are the medium of a different judgement, about credibility), and the natural premise of a theological conclusion <em>is</em> the medium of the conclusion.</p><p>Recall the proposition condemned by Bl. Innocent XI, quoted above (DS 2119). If the &#8220;long string of rational processes&#8221; were the motive of the assent of faith, then the assent could not exceed the strength of that string. Yet, in Catholic theology, the assent of faith is stronger than the weight of reasons impelling towards the assent. Therefore, we must deploy the reasonable distinction of Scheeben between the motive <em>quoad exercitium</em> and the motive <em>quoad essentiam</em>, which occurs with frequency in our natural acts.</p><p>As to &#8220;the assent of faith is not merely a virtue; it is actually a psychological thing,&#8221; nobody said the act was not &#8220;psychological.&#8221; What we said is that the act has a formal motive, which specifies it, and that the motive is not any of the things that happen in the psyche before it. Paul seems to think that if he can show that <em>something happened in the mind</em> before the act, he has shown that the something is the act&#8217;s motive. That is the empiricism I mentioned above.</p><p><strong>Eighth Objection.</strong> Paul drew an objection from Turretin&#8217;s treatment of consequences (which I quoted in my video together with the similar statements of Cameron and Gillespie): &#8220;To apprehend the reason of a consequence is different from apprehending the consequent itself. Faith apprehends the consequent; reason, the consequence ... And it does not follow from this that faith, by which the consequent is believed, is founded upon reason, because reason is not an argument here on account of which I believe, but the instrument through which I believe. Now, the instrument does not introduce into the text what was not there before, but adduces by legitimate consequences what was concealed in it. Hence the theological conclusion results from the inferred mean; but the logical, from reason, or the instrument eliciting consequences. The consequence, as to its materiality, is founded upon the word; as to its formality, upon reason.&#8221; And again: &#8220;It belongs not to faith alone, but also to reason, to discern the reason of the consequence. Yet we say that it belongs properly to faith to believe the consequent. Nor does it follow from this that faith, because the consequent is believed, rests upon reason, since reason here is not an argument but an instrument.&#8221;</p><p><strong>Reply.</strong> I quoted these authors in my video to show that Protestant divines admit that some articles are known from Scripture only by consequence.</p><p>First, the distinction between &#8220;argument on account of which&#8221; and &#8220;instrument through which&#8221; is precisely the thing in dispute. Turretin asserts that reason, in a mixed syllogism, is an instrument and not an argument. Neither Paul, nor Turretin, nor Cameron actually proves that this is the case. I have already refuted this above. The natural premise is not an &#8220;instrument&#8221; of the inference; it is one of the two things the inference is <em>from</em> and from which it has its truth and motive. Mere instruments (in the sense we are using them here) would include those acts and faculties which do not positively and per se concur in the production of the conclusion, e.g., my eyes, ears, etc. To apply this to one of the premises in a demonstration is, as I demonstrated at length above, nonsense and would completely eviscerate the reality of proper reasoning.</p><p>Second, Turretin&#8217;s own distinction between the consequence and the consequent cuts against him. He says reason apprehends the consequence and faith the consequent. But <em>why</em> do I assent to the consequent? Because I have seen the consequence. The assent to the consequent, <em>as a consequent</em>, is caused by the seeing of the consequence together with the believing of the antecedent. That is what &#8220;consequent&#8221; means. Turretin cannot have faith &#8220;apprehend the consequent&#8221; unless faith has the consequence, and faith does not have the consequence; reason does, by his own admission. So the assent to the consequent has two things in it, and one of them is reason&#8217;s.</p><p>Third, oddly enough, Turretin basically just admits that we are correct if we only draw out the implications: &#8220;The consequence, as to its materiality, is founded upon the word; as to its formality, upon reason.&#8221; The conclusion has its motive from that which formally illuminates it, not the material element. The material element does not actually tell us why reason adheres to the judgement, only the formal element does that, i.e., the motive. Therefore, if the consequence rests formally upon reason, then our critique follows. The specification of the habit lies in the formal reason of the object. If not, then all those things which are materially of faith and held by reason would be held by faith (e.g., the Jew holding the truth of the resurrection).</p><p>Fourth, Cameron&#8217;s and Gillespie&#8217;s language (&#8221;a certain divine truth that ought to be believed&#8221;) is not necessarily of faith. Of course a necessary consequence from revealed premises is a certain truth and, therefore, &#8220;ought to be believed&#8221; in the sense that a rational man ought not to deny what evidently follows from what he believes. That is why Catholic authors state that the denier of an evident theological conclusion is <em>presumed</em> a heretic. But &#8220;ought to be believed&#8221; is not &#8220;is believed by divine faith,&#8221; any more than &#8220;I ought to believe the canonicity of Mark&#8221; in Paul&#8217;s syllogism was the act of faith in the canon.</p><p>Fifth, these passages presuppose a picture of faith that is discursive (which, as I have explained above, is absurd). &#8220;Faith apprehends the consequent; reason, the consequence&#8221; is only intelligible if faith is the kind of act that could apprehend a consequent <em>as</em> a consequent, i.e., if faith is itself a discursive, inferring act that merely happens to have God&#8217;s word among its premises.</p><p><strong>Ninth Objection.</strong> &#8220;Notice our Lord doesn&#8217;t point the Sadducees to an explicit passage on the resurrection and say, &#8216;You&#8217;re wrong.&#8217; ... He points to Moses, the books of Moses: &#8216;I am the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob.&#8217; Jesus then gives a rational conclusion from that: he is not the God of the dead, but the God of the living. Therefore there is the resurrection ... Does our Lord teach the resurrection of the dead as an article of faith here, or not? ... If you say no, then you&#8217;re creating an absurdity: that our Lord is somehow implicitly, without any clarification, assuming a very precise Thomistic account of epistemology on what constitutes the assent of faith, without the crowd realizing ... So I submit that this undercuts the attempted Thomistic account that articles of faith can only ever be through the express, explicit testimony of God ... So I think that could work as a one-shot argument, frankly.&#8221;</p><p><strong>Reply.</strong> Oh boy.</p><p>The teaching of the &#8220;Thomists&#8221; (which is not just the teaching of the Thomists, as the reader now knows) isn&#8217;t that implicit testimonies to articles of faith cannot be used to dispute with someone who denies an article of faith in order to induce him to its acceptance. That would be insane and would basically contradict the entire theological tradition. Su&#225;rez and Gotti both note that the councils themselves argue from consequences in their chapters before defining in their canons. Arguing to someone from what he already grants is what every apologist does, and what Our Lord does here.</p><p>First, the resurrection of the dead was explicitly present in the Old Testament (Daniel 12:2; Isaiah 26:19; Job 19:25&#8211;27; 2 Maccabees 7 and 12; Ezekiel 37), and the Jewish teachers who sat on the seat of Moses preached this mystery explicitly, as St. Luke records: &#8220;the Sadducees say that there is no resurrection, neither angel, nor spirit: but the Pharisees confess both.&#8221; (Acts 23:8) It was an article of faith. Therefore it is completely appropriate for Our Lord to appeal to implicit testimonies from Scriptures they accept in order to induce them to faith in this mystery. That is an argument <em>ex concessis</em>, and exactly the type of argument apologists use constantly against opponents. Paul says that if the Sadducees had a smaller canon &#8220;it makes the passage even more powerful.&#8221; Why? He is arguing against an adversary who denies the rule of faith and induces them both to the acceptance of this doctrine and the rule of faith by which they would be able to accept this doctrine by faith.</p><p>Strangely enough, Paul&#8217;s entire mode of argumentation seems to suppose that the Sadducees had faith and that Our Lord was attempting to elicit an act of faith from their previously held principles. What? They were faithless. They rejected the rule of faith and fell into innumerable heresies. They were opponents of the prophets and rejected the chair of Moses. What&#8217;s next, are we to argue that Korah had charity?</p><p>Second, I find Paul&#8217;s rhetorical question a bit disingenuous. &#8220;Our Lord is somehow implicitly, without any clarification, assuming a very precise Thomistic account of epistemology on what constitutes the assent of faith, without the crowd realizing.&#8221; It is rhetorically misleading to speak in this way. This reminds me of discussions with various Christological and Trinitarian heretics on the mysteries of the faith. &#8220;Oh, do you REALLY think Our Lord had partitive exegesis in mind when he spoke of his humanity?&#8221; This type of rhetoric may be exceedingly convincing to the masses, but it doesn&#8217;t actually mean anything. What Our Lord meant is what He said (e.g., &#8220;I thirst&#8221;). If someone comes around later and attempts to draw a conclusion from what Our Lord said, and we explain how this conclusion doesn&#8217;t follow from the statement, by synthesizing the entire testimony of Scripture, the use of theological reason, etc., you can&#8217;t turn around and say something like: &#8220;Oh, do you REALLY think Our Lord had ALL THAT in mind?&#8221; (a) Yes, I actually do, because I believe in orthodox Christology. (b) That is irrelevant to the matter at hand, because we are speaking about what the proper force of the language used is and what this signifies in reality. You are drawing a false conclusion from this. I am refuting this through other means. This isn&#8217;t that hard to understand. It amazes me that such a basic concept cannot be understood by opponents when they try this rhetorical fluff against us.</p><p>We can make this a bit absurd, if we wished, by Paul&#8217;s exegesis. Our Lord and the Apostles frequently appeal to natural reason or external signs in order to argue in favor of various matters of faith (e.g., the appeal to the five hundred witnesses). Now, are we to conclude from this that the formal motive of assent to matters of faith can be natural reason or external signs? That would obviously be absurd. They were clearly using such arguments to induce them to accept the testimony of God, as apologists always do.</p><p>That he calls this a &#8220;one-shot&#8221; argument is beyond me. Who is actually convinced by this?</p>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[The Absurdity of Sola Scriptura]]></title><description><![CDATA[A Scholastic Argument]]></description><link>https://thomism.com/p/the-absurdity-of-sola-scriptura</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://thomism.com/p/the-absurdity-of-sola-scriptura</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Christian B. Wagner]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 04 Sep 2026 00:39:26 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/e42c7819-1e91-4659-ad6a-48939c773d1c_1062x774.png" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3><span>Introduction</span></h3><p><span>In order to oppose the Protestant understanding of the rule of faith (</span><em><span>sola scriptura</span></em><span>), I have frequently employed arguments drawn from the nature of faith and of divine revelation. At times I have applied these to the canon of Scripture. The argument runs thus. In order for the canon of Scripture to be integrally known and believed by divine faith, the fact that these books are inspired must be revealed by God; for divine faith assents to nothing except on the authority of God revealing. Now, the fact that these particular books are inspired is not revealed in Scripture. Further, it is essential to Protestantism that only Scripture, and what is derived from Scripture, can properly induce the assent of divine faith. Therefore one of two things follows: either the canon is not known except by conjecture (as any supernatural fact must be, apart from revelation, since inspiration is internal and essentially supernatural); or it is known by faith, but on a revelation outside Scripture, which is to say by Tradition acting as a primary rule of faith.</span></p><p><span>Some of the less learned Protestants have answered this argument by denying the plain principles of revelation, faith and inspiration on which it rests, in ways contrary to Scripture, to right reason, and to their own theologians; and, what is graver than the absurdities they are driven to, several of them have embraced naturalism on the issue of inspiration.</span></p><div class="subscription-widget-wrap-editor" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://thomism.com/subscribe?&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Subscribe&quot;,&quot;language&quot;:&quot;en&quot;}" data-component-name="SubscribeWidgetToDOM"><div class="subscription-widget show-subscribe"><div class="preamble"><p class="cta-caption">To receive new posts in your inbox, consider becoming a free subscriber.</p></div><form class="subscription-widget-subscribe"><input type="email" class="email-input" name="email" placeholder="Type your email&#8230;" tabindex="-1"><input type="submit" class="button primary" value="Subscribe"><div class="fake-input-wrapper"><div class="fake-input"></div><div class="fake-button"></div></div></form></div></div><p><span>But some of the more learned have devised a reply drawn from our own theologians. It runs as follows. St. Paul testifies that &#8220;all Scripture is God-breathed&#8221; (2 Tim 3:16), a universal proposition in which the inspiration of each book of Scripture is included. Now, when a universal proposition is revealed, both the universal and the particulars included under it can be held by divine faith. Therefore the inspiration of each book can be held by divine faith, and held from Scripture alone.</span></p><p><span>The minor is confirmed by the common opinion of Catholic theologians who hold, e.g., that a man would be a heretic if he said that &#8220;I was not born in original sin&#8221; since it is of divine faith that &#8220;all men were born in original sin.&#8221;</span></p><p><span>Often, those making this reply confuse this principle with a different and genuinely disputed question: whether a theological conclusion properly so called (a truth deduced from a revealed premise and a naturally known premise by a real inference, e.g., &#8220;Christ is risible&#8221;) is of divine faith. On this point, there are three opinions. First, some theologians teach that a theological conclusion is of divine faith when it is sufficiently drawn by the one investigating the matter so as to be certain and evident. Second, others teach that a theological conclusion is not of faith before the definition of the Church, but can be of faith after the definition of the Church. Third, others teach that a theological conclusion can never be of faith, whether before or after the definition of the Church.</span></p><p><span>We can easily see where the conclusion enters. If this statement about the universal is confused with the first position about theological conclusions, then it would follow from what was said above about the universal that any Christian, if he is adequately certain of the theological conclusion &#8220;John is a book of the bible,&#8221; then he would be adhering to something implicitly contained in Scripture (therefore, saving the rule).</span></p><p><span>In the past I answered the Protestant reply by fighting on this second ground by showing, with the majority of our theologians, why the habit of theology is really distinct from the habit of faith and why a conclusion reached by real inference cannot rest on the authority of God alone. That was unnecessary. The Protestant&#8217;s syllogism does not concern a theological conclusion at all. It concerns a particular under a universal (the first question, not the second). To see why, one must attend to what a universal is.</span></p><h3><span>Extension, Comprehension, and the Universal</span></h3><p><span>Any nature as it is in the intellect (the quiddity apprehended abstractly, prescinding from this or that individual) stands in two relations. The first is to its </span><em><span>comprehension</span></em><span>: the notes that are contained in the nature and the properties that follow upon it. The comprehension I have of </span><em><span>man</span></em><span> is </span><em><span>animal</span></em><span> and </span><em><span>rational</span></em><span>; these are what I grasp when I grasp what man is. The second is to its </span><em><span>extension</span></em><span>: the subjects of which the nature is predicable. The extension of </span><em><span>animal</span></em><span> comprises its species (man, horse, etc.); the extension of </span><em><span>man</span></em><span>, which is a lowest species, comprises individuals (Peter, Paul, etc). The scholastics call the nature considered in its extension the </span><em><span>totum universale</span></em><span> or </span><em><span>totum logicum</span></em><span>, and the subjects under it its </span><em><span>partes subiectivae</span></em><span>; the nature considered in its comprehension, whose parts are the parts of its definition, which is called a </span><em><span>totum definibile</span></em><span> or </span><em><span>totum metaphysicum</span></em><span>.</span></p><p>We must consider nature abstracted in two relations, i.e., in its comprehension and in its extension. If we determine these precisely, we can easily dissolve the objection</p><p><strong><span>On Comprehension</span></strong><span>. What the nature comprehends it contains intrinsically and </span><em><span>in act</span></em><span>. The notes of the definition (</span><em><span>animal</span></em><span>, </span><em><span>rational</span></em><span>) are not something added to </span><em><span>man</span></em><span>; they are what </span><em><span>man</span></em><span> is, and the distinction between </span><em><span>man</span></em><span> and </span><em><span>rational animal</span></em><span> is only a distinction of reason, of the defined from its definition. For me to move from &#8220;man&#8221; to &#8220;rational animal&#8221; requires no proper discourse, but simply defining the term. All theologians agree that this is of faith and can be defined as such. The </span><em><span>properties</span></em><span> (e.g., risibility) stand somewhat differently: they are really distinct from the essence, as a proper accident from its subject, but they are contained in it </span><em><span>virtually </span></em><span>and </span><em><span>radically</span></em><span>, as the effect in its cause; and they are drawn out of it by real reasoning (i.e., proper discourse). Hence the scholastics say that the notes are contained in the nature </span><em><span>actu implicite</span></em><span> and the properties </span><em><span>virtualiter</span></em><span>. In this second case, we have a case of a proper theological conclusion that only proceeds under the light of virtual revelation. It is here that theologians dispute over whether a theological conclusion is of faith (the first position), can be of faith by definition of the Church (the second position), or can never be of faith (the third position).</span></p><p><span>There are thus two ways of passing from the nature to what it comprehends. When the passage is from the defined to its definition or to an essential part (from </span><em><span>man</span></em><span> to </span><em><span>rational animal</span></em><span>, from </span><em><span>Christ is man</span></em><span> to </span><em><span>Christ has a body and a soul</span></em><span>) the two terms differ only nominally, and the &#8220;reasoning&#8221; that joins them is not reasoning at all but the explanation of a term. Theologians variously call this improper or explicative discourse, improper reasoning, or the merely explicative conclusion. When the passage is from the nature to a property (from </span><em><span>Christ is man</span></em><span> to </span><em><span>Christ is risible</span></em><span>) the terms differ virtually, a new concept enters, and the inference is a real one so that the reasoning is called proper discourse, illation, or the truly illative conclusion.</span></p><p><span>This dispute right here has NOTHING to do with the objection that is given by the Protestants since the individuals that stand under a universal are not concerned with the comprehension of the universal. Therefore, we must judge differently on this matter.</span></p><p><strong><span>On Extension</span></strong><span>. The comprehension of a nature is intrinsic to it, so that to alter the comprehension is to alter the nature; the extension is extrinsic, so that if one of the individuals apt to receive the nature ceased to exist, the nature as universal would be untouched. The reason for this is that the individuals are not in the nature as abstracted as the notes are. They are not contained in it </span><em><span>in act</span></em><span>; they are contained in it </span><em><span>in potency</span></em><span>, as the subjective parts in a potential whole in an indeterminate and confused manner. The nature as universal is the nature as communicable, not as communicated, therefore it necessarily follows that those apt to receive it do not exist in the abstracted universal in act, but only potentially. To verify that a note is in the nature I analyze the nature. To verify that an individual is under the nature I must make a </span><em><span>second judgment</span></em><span>, contingent and existential, that </span><em><span>this</span></em><span> thing exists and </span><em><span>is</span></em><span> a man. The universal, of itself, does not supply that judgment, but only supposes it. Therefore, we call this judgement the &#8220;verification&#8221; since it is verifying something that is supposed in the universal.</span></p><h3>The Minor Premise in the Two Orders</h3><p><span>With this in mind, we can now compare the office of the minor premise in each of these two orders (the order of comprehension and the order of extension), which will resolve the question and dissolve the doubt of the Protestant. </span></p><p><span>In the order of comprehension there are two cases. Where the minor is merely explicative, we do not go beyond what the major formally, though implicitly, contains. The conclusion is the major itself under a more or less precise determination, and the assent to the more detailed is the same as the assent to the less detailed, exceeded and exceeding only in the order of clarity (i.e., nominally). From this difference, no new grounds upon which the mind rests is included, but only a different degree of explication. </span></p><p><span>Where the minor is truly illative, we go beyond what the major </span><em><span>formally</span></em><span> contains to what it contains only </span><em><span>virtually</span></em><span>. In this case, there there is a new ground which determines the assent. The natural premise becomes a partial cause of the conclusion  and the conclusion follows the weaker part (i.e., the natural premise, so that the assent is a mixed one, theological, not of faith. This is why many Thomists hold that, before the Church defines it, the theological conclusion cannot be assented to by divine faith however evident the inference; and why, after she defines it, it can.</span></p><p><span>In the order of extension there are also two cases, and here the theologians speak of the </span><em><span>unconditioned </span></em><span>(or absolute) and the </span><em><span>conditioned </span></em><span>(or hypothetical) universal. The universal is </span><em><span>unconditioned</span></em><span> when the identification of the suppositum as falling under its subject requires nothing beyond the explanation of terms (when to know that this thing is a man is, by the same knowledge and with the same certitude, to know that it is under &#8220;every man&#8221;). The universal is </span><em><span>conditioned</span></em><span> when its subject carries a restriction to the subject, e.g., &#8220;every infant validly baptized&#8221; includes &#8220;validly baptized&#8221; as a certain condition, &#8220;every man legitimately elected successor of St. Peter&#8221; includes &#8220;legitimately elected&#8221; as a condition, etc. In this case, the verification in the singular is not given by the mere identification of the suppositum, but only under some condition or hypothetical that must be verified outside the mere identification of the suppositum. To compare the two, when I say that &#8220;every man is born from Adam,&#8221; I am saying something about this man (since it is absolute), but when I say that &#8220;every host validly consecrated is Christ&#8221; I am NOT saying something about this host, but only about this host under some sort of condition or supposition (i.e., that it was validly consecrated).</span></p><p><span>Here we should note that it would be wrong to suppose that by &#8220;unconditioned&#8221; we meant that such was not conditioned in any sense of the term. This is to be denied since &#8220;every man is born from Adam&#8221; at least supposes the existence of such men in order to be verified. Rather, when we say that something is unconditioned/conditioned, we are asking whether the condition is something that is or is not really distinct from the very identification of the suppositum. Hence, in the case of &#8220;every man is born from Adam,&#8221; the very inclusion in the universal is really identical with the very identification of the man as man without any additional condition.</span></p><p><span>We have then four cases:</span></p><ol><li><p><span>improper illation (the defined to its definition);</span></p></li><li><p><span>proper illation (the essence to its property);</span></p></li><li><p><span>the unconditioned universal (the universal to a suppositum whose inclusion is given with its identification);</span></p></li><li><p><span>the conditioned universal (the universal to a suppositum whose inclusion depends on a restriction not so given).</span></p></li></ol><p><span>On these four cases rests four questions in theology.</span></p><p><strong><span>First Question. </span></strong><span>Whether what is reached by improper illation is of faith. All agree that it is so that someone denying &#8220;Christ is a rational animal&#8221; would, de facto, be a heretic if he grants the definition.</span></p><p><strong><span>Second Question</span></strong><span>. Whether what is reached by proper illation is or can be of faith. These are the three positions on the definability of theological conclusions explained above.</span></p><p><strong><span>Third Question.</span></strong><span> Whether what is contained under an unconditioned universal is of faith. All agree that it is, and that it is so </span><em><span>without</span></em><span> any definition. He who denies that Christ died for him or that he is descended from Adam is a heretic, even while this is only universally presented in scripture.</span></p><p><span>The reason for the difference between this case and the second case is the difference in the office of the minor. In the second case the minor is a true cause of the conclusion, and so something human enters into the formal motive of faith. The assent to the conclusion is partially resolved into both God&#8217;s authority and human reason. In the third case the minor is a mere condition which does not add a motive to the assent of the conclusion, but merely removes an obstacle. This is implied by the very notion of a condition and its distinction from the cause (which is to be devoid of positive influence in the effect).</span></p><p><span>This leaves us open to an interesting possibility. Since the minor premise in such a case does not add to the formal motive of the assent to the conclusion, but only verifies a certain condition, then it would follow that our assent to the conclusion would follow the certitude that we have of the verification itself. This can be understood by way of a hypothetical. Let&#8217;s say that God gave you infallible </span><em><span>natural </span></em><span>certitude of the fact that &#8220;all men are risible.&#8221; In this case, the conclusion drawn concerning Christ would still remain as a theological conclusion that would not be able to be assented to by faith since natural reason would still enter the assent of the conclusion as formal motive. On the other hand, let&#8217;s say that God gave you infallible </span><em><span>natural </span></em><span>certitude that &#8220;this eucharist is validly consecrated.&#8221; In this case, since the minor merely acts as a condition, one would be able to assent to the conclusion &#8220;this eucharist is Christ&#8221; with divine faith since nothing natural enters the formal motive of the assent to the conclusion in such a case. This is true even in the case of strict moral certitude, as many theologians indicate, as we will treat in the fourth question.</span></p><p><strong><span>Fourth Question. </span></strong><span>Whether what is contained under a </span><em><span>conditioned</span></em><span> universal can become of divine faith when the condition is verified (and by whom it can be verified). That it can, when the verification has strict moral certitude is commonly taught by theologians. For example, a baptizing priest has strict moral certitude of his intention to baptize, those watching the baptism do not have strict moral certitude of the priest&#8217;s intention to baptize since they have grounds for prudent fear of doubting that the priest did not have the correct intention. It is under this logic that we are able to understand dogmatic facts wherein the Church infallibly verifies the condition to be the case, hence allowing for the assent of faith to occur.</span></p><h3>The Refutation of the Objection</h3><p><span>Now we can see how ineptly the Protestant has argued from &#8220;all Scripture is God-breathed.&#8221;</span></p><p><span>It is plain, first, that his case has nothing to do with the </span><em><span>comprehension</span></em><span> of a nature. &#8220;This book is inspired&#8221; is not a note of, nor a property flowing from, the nature of a certain book; it is the predication of a nature as universal to an individual. This case therefore has NOTHING to do with the second question, the question of theological conclusions, on which he imagines the whole dispute to turn. It belongs to the order of </span><em><span>extension</span></em><span>: to individuals only potentially contained under the universal and extrinsic to it, reached only by a second judgment identifying the suppositum.</span></p><p><span>It is plain, second, that this case is not that of the </span><em><span>unconditioned</span></em><span> universal. It is not the case of anything falling under the nature of book (which would be absurd), but those books qualified in a certain sense, i.e., books as inspired by God. In this, we see that this entire question now revolves around the certitude we are able to have of the condition itself. My former arguments about the essentially supernatural and internal character of inspiration already resolved this question. The fact of inspiration is not something that can be known through natural or historical means unless the revelation of such a condition (which is outside of scripture) and proper certitude of such a fact excluding all prudent fear of doubt are supposed. The universal statement of St. Paul supplies neither of these. Therefore, it cannot be invoked in order to resolve the difficulty under which they perpetually labor.</span></p><p><span>From all this the Protestant syllogism is easily answered.</span></p><p><span>Major: St. Paul testifies that &#8220;all Scripture is God-breathed,&#8221; a universal proposition in which the inspiration of each book of Scripture is included.</span></p><p><span>Minor: When a universal proposition is revealed, both the universal and the particulars included under it can be held by divine faith.</span></p><p><span>Conclusion: Therefore the inspiration of each book of Scripture can be held by divine faith.</span></p><p><span>I distinguish the major. That the inspiration of each book is included in the universal </span><em><span>actually</span></em><span>, as a note in the comprehension of a nature, I deny; </span><em><span>potentially</span></em><span>, as a suppositum in the extension of a universal, I subdistinguish: as in an unconditioned universal, whose suppositum is identified by the mere explanation of terms, I deny; as in a conditioned universal, whose subject carries a restriction not verified by the identification of the suppositum, I concede.</span></p><p><span>I contradistinguish the minor. That the particulars can be held by divine faith if they are contained actually, as notes in a nature, I bypass (it is the second question, and irrelevant); if they are contained potentially, as supposita under a universal, I subdistinguish: if the universal is unconditioned and the suppositum&#8217;s inclusion is given with its identification, I concede; if the universal is conditioned, I subdistinguish again: if the condition is verified with a certitude excluding every prudent fear, I concede; if the condition is not so verified, I deny.</span></p><p><span>The root of the Protestant confusion is that he has collapsed two questions into one. It does not matter whether theological conclusions are of faith. Even were I to concede this in its most radical form, the case of a universal in its extension is untouched, because that case turns not on the strength of an inference but on the identification of a suppositum in a conditional universal, which it does not make for itself.</span></p><div class="subscription-widget-wrap-editor" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://thomism.com/subscribe?&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Subscribe&quot;,&quot;language&quot;:&quot;en&quot;}" data-component-name="SubscribeWidgetToDOM"><div class="subscription-widget show-subscribe"><div class="preamble"><p class="cta-caption">To receive new posts in your inbox, consider becoming a free subscriber.</p></div><form class="subscription-widget-subscribe"><input type="email" class="email-input" name="email" placeholder="Type your email&#8230;" tabindex="-1"><input type="submit" class="button primary" value="Subscribe"><div class="fake-input-wrapper"><div class="fake-input"></div><div class="fake-button"></div></div></form></div></div>]]></content:encoded></item></channel></rss>