From Xantes Mariales’ commentary on De Malo, Question 2, Article 8

Others err concerning whether the frequency of drunkenness aggravates drunkenness to infinity, and constitutes a mortal sin. If it does not, there stands in opposition St. Augustine in the sermon De Purgatorio, where he says: “to become drunk once is a venial sin; to become drunk frequently is a mortal sin.” If it does, there stands in opposition St. Thomas in the reply to the third objection, where he consistently teaches that if becoming drunk once is venial, then becoming drunk frequently will likewise be venial; because frequency is not a circumstance constituting the species. And from what has been said, only a circumstance constituting the species can aggravate to infinity, and render a sin from venial to mortal, or from no sin to a venial or mortal sin. Nor are there lacking those who think that St. Thomas is not consistent with himself, since here in the reply to the third objection he indicates that drunkenness, by its genus, is a venial sin, with St. Augustine, in the place cited above; and yet in Summa Theologiae II–II, q. 150, art. 2, he resolutely teaches the opposite, namely that drunkenness by its genus is a mortal sin. Nevertheless, there is no disagreement in either of these positions, which, so that it may appear from the first root, [will now be explained].

It must be noted, says St. Thomas (II–II, q. 150, art. 1), that drunkenness (ebrietas) can be taken in two ways. First, for the privation of the use of reason from the drinking of wine; and thus it is not a fault, but rather a penal defect following upon the fault of excessive drinking. Second, for the act of immoderately taking wine, by which a man can become drunk. When drunkenness is taken in the first sense, it can be either no sin, or a venial sin, or a mortal sin. For it will be no sin, says St. Thomas (art. 2), if someone drinks not knowing that the drink is immoderate and that the wine is capable of causing drunkenness; and thus he becomes drunk, as Noah did (Gen. 9). It will be a venial sin, if the one who drinks perceives that the drink is immoderate, yet is ignorant that the wine is capable of causing drunkenness. It is not a mortal sin unless it is plainly presumed and voluntary. Finally, it will be a mortal sin, if the one who drinks perceives that the drink is immoderate and that the wine is capable of causing drunkenness, and nevertheless, while indulging in its use, he prefers to incur drunkenness rather than to be deprived of such pleasure. And thus drunkenness is properly and per se so called, because it occurs from knowledge and deliberation of the will; and it receives the character of mortal sin, not from those things which happen accidentally and outside the intention, but from that which is intended per se.

The fundamental reason, says St. Thomas, why drunkenness, precisely insofar as it proceeds from the will, is a mortal sin, is this: because a man knowingly and willingly deprives himself of the use of reason, by which he exercises the virtues and turns away from sins; and at that moment to deprive oneself of so great a good is a habitually sinful act. But the virtues of acting are ordered to the avoidance of sins; nor would drunkenness be a mortal sin, unless its mortality were considered according to the evil disorder that is harmful, which through the act itself is introduced by the sin. According to that saying of St. Ambrose, we say that drunkenness must be avoided, through which very many vices are caused; for those things which while sober we avoid, through drunkenness we unknowingly admit. Therefore, according to this doctrine, drunkenness taken formally, as we have already explained, is by its genus evil and a mortal sin. But if it is taken materially, that is, for the drinking of wine willed by someone, it is not a sin, and can be only a venial sin. Consequently, since drunkenness taken absolutely contains both formal drunkenness and material drunkenness, it may thus be said that it is not determined to any one kind of sin; but without further determination it can be either good or evil, that is, a virtue or a vice, not evil by declaration. Just as number in itself is neither even nor odd, but can be either of the two, so also care must be taken lest one speak equivocally of drunkenness taken absolutely, which by its genus is neither good nor evil, as was said above, and formal drunkenness, which by its genus is a mortal sin.

With these things established regarding the point, when it is asked whether the frequency of drunkenness constitutes drunkenness a mortal sin, I say that it does not constitute it per se, but only per accidens, and not by the force of frequency precisely considered. Rather, this happens only because frequency produces an experiential certainty that the drink is immoderate and that the wine is capable of causing drunkenness; and once this certainty is present, the one becoming drunk, knowingly and willingly deprives himself of the use of reason, together with the other goods already mentioned; and this cannot occur without mortal sin, as was stated above. Moreover, frequency itself, precisely considered, since it is only the repetition of an act already specified, cannot constitute a new species; nor is it among the number of circumstances that aggravate to infinity, and which constitute a sin from venial to mortal. Therefore it is rightly said that frequency, by its own force precisely considered, cannot constitute drunkenness either from not-evil to evil, or from venial to mortal.

When St. Augustine says that to become drunk once is venial, but to become drunk often is mortal, he speaks of drunkenness according to what happens in most cases . For according to the common rule concerning moral matters, judgment must be made according to what happens in most cases. But in most cases it seems to occur that in the first instances of becoming drunk a person does not perceive either that the drink is immoderate or that the wine is capable of causing drunkenness; and because such ignorance is present, drunkenness can scarcely be entirely excused from sin, as happened in the case of Noah, that is, so that it may at least be excused from mortal sin. Therefore Blessed Augustine says that drunkenness not repeated many times is venial, but when repeated many times it is mortal, for the reasons already set forth. And thus both St. Augustine and St. Thomas are not in disagreement but are true, and in no way do they destroy one another’s teaching.

They differ only in this, that they speak of drunkenness considered in relation to the difficulty which surrounds the perfect doctrine of human doubts, namely whether drunkenness by its genus is a mortal sin; because a man knowingly and willingly deprives himself of the use of reason, rendering himself incapable of acting virtuously. According to this reasoning someone might object: why is it not the same with sleep? For sleep also deprives a man of reason and renders the one sleeping incapable of acting virtuously; therefore sleep would likewise be a mortal sin, just as drunkenness. It is answered that the case is not similar. For sleep and drunkenness differ in this, that sleep is natural and necessary for the repose of the soul, in which all its powers rest and are refreshed; and in natural things there is neither sin nor demerit. But drunkenness is voluntary and destructive, coming upon man and violently depriving him of the use of reason. Moreover, in sleep the use of reason is not entirely extinguished, but rather bound only accidentally; thus those sleeping sometimes perceive things in dreams, as in the case of Solomon and the Prophets, to whom revelations appeared in sleep which they received from God. Indeed, it is commonly said that a man in sleep is more apt to receive divine revelations. But when reason is bound by wine, it is bound per se and in a remarkable manner, so that the intellect remains fettered and unable to operate, whereas nothing similar occurs in sleep. Hence the argument drawn from sleep does not hold, as inferred from a lesser cause.

From these things someone objects: therefore, if such is the case, is it lawful medicinally to make a man drunk in order to provoke vomiting, or to cure some bodily affection? It is answered: if drunkenness is evil by its genus, it is not lawful; because evils are not to be done (especially spiritual evils) so that bodily goods may come about. Thus for the health of the body it is not lawful medicinally to commit fornication, even though fornication is evil by its genus. But I respond: although it is never lawful to blaspheme even for the sake of obtaining a good, because blasphemy is of itself a mortal sin, nevertheless drunkenness is not evil by its genus, and therefore to become drunk medicinally is permitted, as many hold. But whether drunkenness is evil by its genus is a great dispute among the Doctors. St. Thomas here determines nothing, but speaks only conditionally, as you have heard. For above he had resolutely established that formal drunkenness is by its genus a mortal sin; and at the end of the article, in the reply to the third objection, he says that it is lawful to become drunk in order to provoke vomiting. Yet in the end he concludes resolutely that it is not lawful, because what is evil by its genus can never be permitted to be done, especially since there are many other remedies for provoking vomiting, such as drinking warm water and similar things. Just as for calming nature from an excess of seed, for which some claim that there are other remedies which provoke fornication for the health of the body—yet to commit fornication is in no way permitted, according to all. These things have been said incidentally, for the fuller understanding of those matters which are written here at present.

From Commentary on De Malo, Question 7, Article 4

In the second part of the Article there are five arguments, in which the following questions are treated. The first is whether frequency, duration, and lingering (morosa) can make a venial sin into a mortal one. That this is so seems to follow, for St. Augustine teaches this in the sermon De Purgatorio: “if anger is held for a long time, and if drunkenness is frequent, they pass into the number of mortal sins.” Yet many hold that anger and drunkenness are venial sins by their genus. Therefore the Holy Father seems to intend that the circumstances of frequency and duration make a venial sin mortal. Likewise the Master of the Sentences (II, dist. 24) clearly teaches that delectatio morosa is a mortal sin. However, that this is not so seems to be suggested from the fact that no matter how lingering (morosa), prolonged, or frequent a movement of sensuality may be, if reason does not fully consent, it is never mortal. St. Thomas replies that anger and drunkenness are by their genus mortal sins, but they become venial either through a defect of deliberation or through the smallness of the matter. For anger implies a movement toward harming one’s neighbor; but to inflict harm upon one’s neighbor is by its genus mortal, since it is repugnant to charity with respect to the love of neighbor. Yet when the movement remains in the lower appetite and reason does not consent that grave harm be inflicted upon the neighbor, it is a venial sin because of the imperfection of the act, that is, because of the lack of full deliberation. But if anger is held for a long time, it cannot be that the deliberation of reason does not intervene, and thus anger becomes a mortal sin. In order, however, to determine when anger is said to be held for a long time, attention must not be paid to how long it lasts, since, as I said, it can last a long time without the consent of reason, and thus it would not be a mortal sin. Rather, attention must be paid to the negligence by which it could be resisted through reason and is not resisted. Then, I say, duration arising from negligence in resisting anger renders the anger a mortal sin, even if the anger itself does not last very long. Just as in another matter it is commonly said that whoever dies quickly has not lived long, in the same sense the Master says that delectatio morosa is a mortal sin. For he manifestly speaks of the moral delay arising from negligence in excluding it through reason, and not of mere delay in duration considered absolutely. This concerns delectatio morosa in an evil matter; for to delight in a good thing, it is certain, is no sin at all.

Similarly the same judgment applies concerning drunkenness. Drunkenness, insofar as it is in itself, does not turn reason away from God, although during drunkenness reason cannot be turned toward God. Nevertheless, since man is not bound always to turn his reason actually toward God, it follows that drunkenness can be excused so that it is not always a mortal sin. Yet when a man becomes drunk frequently, he seems not to care whether reason be turned toward God. In such a case drunkenness is a mortal sin, because it appears to contain a contempt of reason’s orientation toward God, on account of the immoderate delight in wine.

All these things are confirmed, and the expressions are included in I–II, q. 88, art. 5, rep. 1, where the Holy Doctor says that duration of itself is not a circumstance that draws an act into another species; likewise frequency or assiduity is not such, unless perhaps per accidens from something supervening. For a thing does not acquire a new species from the fact that it is multiplied or prolonged, unless perhaps in the act itself there is a prolongation or multiplication accompanied by something that changes the species, such as disobedience, contempt, or something of that kind. Therefore it must be said that anger, which is a movement of the soul toward harming one’s neighbor, if the harm toward which the movement of anger tends is of a kind that is by its genus mortal, such as homicide, then such anger will by its genus be a mortal sin. Yet it can become venial because of the imperfection of the act, for example if it is a sudden movement preceding the consent of reason. But if the anger is prolonged, it is rendered according to the nature of its mortal genus through the supervening consent of reason. If, however, the movement of anger tends toward something that is venial by its genus, as when someone becomes angry against another in that he wishes to say to him a slight word or a jest, or some lightly reproachful motion, then such anger will not be mortal, however long it may last, unless perhaps per accidens, as when grave scandal arises from it, or because of some other similar circumstance. And in the same way delectatio morosa is called a mortal sin when it concerns those things which by their genus are mortal sins. But in those matters in which such delectatio morosa does not concern mortal sin, it will be a venial sin because of the imperfection of the act, as was said concerning anger. Yet if the delight is prolonged or lingering (morosa), it is reduced to the nature of its object and becomes a mortal sin, on account of the supervening approval of reason toward the intended delectatio morosa.

Concerning drunkenness, finally St. Thomas concludes that it must be said that, according to its proper notion, it has the character of a mortal sin. For when a man casts aside reason and reduces himself to the manner of an animal, through that very reason by which he is ordered to God, he is thereby exposed to many sins, since the vices of life arise from the mere pleasure of wine, which is expressly contrary to virtue. Nevertheless it can become a venial sin, either because of ignorance or because of weakness (for example, if a man does not know the strength of the wine, or does not think by his own deliberation that he will become drunk, as happened in the case of Noah when he was made drunk). Then the drunkenness is not imputed as mortal, but is called merely an excess of drinking. But when intoxication is frequent, it cannot be excused through ignorance, since it appears that the will chooses rather drunkenness with its consequent harms than to abstain from superfluous wine. Therefore drunkenness then returns to its proper nature and falls under mortal sin. Concerning these matters read above distinctly in II–II, q. 150 throughout, but especially art. 2.

Here those things which were mentioned incidentally are sufficiently resolved; and note carefully two propositions proposed by St. Thomas. The first is found here: that drunkenness is not always a mortal sin. For although it deprives one of the use of reason and of the turning toward God, nevertheless since man is not always bound by precept to turn the act of his mind toward God, and since the precept concerning such conversion is affirmative, obliging always but not for every moment, therefore drunkenness is not always a mortal sin. The second proposition is found in I–II in the place cited above: frequent drunkenness cannot fail to be a mortal sin. For it cannot be excused by ignorance, either of the strength of the wine or of one’s own weakness; and thus the will seems rather to choose to endure drunkenness with its consequent harms than to abstain from superfluous wine. But the will ought to be prepared to expose itself to great goods, even with dangers of sin, yet for the avoidance of sins; whereas to expose oneself to those things which can occur during drunkenness merely for the sake of the pleasure taken in wine is against the order of reason, and plainly mortal, from which only ignorance, as was said above, could seem to excuse. According to this doctrine someone might ask how incautiously certain people deduce that a circumstance, remaining a circumstance, can make a venial sin into a mortal one, from the fact that a circumstance makes an act from good to evil, as when someone prays out of vain glory. But to make something from good into evil is something greater than making a venial sin into a mortal one. For good and evil are said to be genera, as is said in the Predicaments (that good and evil are genera of other things); whereas venial and mortal are different species within the same genus of evil or of sin. Therefore if a circumstance can render an act from good to evil (which is the greater), it will more easily render a venial sin mortal (which is the lesser). You are mistaken. St. Thomas responds here in the reply to the third objection, where those who reason in this way are answered: the circumstance which renders an act from good to evil is not taken as a merely accidental circumstance (as you suppose), but as an essential difference specifying the act, transferring it from one genus to another different genus, and constituting it within a determinate genus and species. For example vain glory, which a circumstance taken merely as an accidental circumstance cannot produce. And in the same way a circumstance taken merely as a circumstance cannot make a venial sin mortal, as has been proved. But if it is taken insofar as it introduces the mode of an essentially specifying difference, then it can make a venial sin mortal, as has been explained. Therefore the objection is actually in favor of, and not against, the decision that has been made.

But how the end is placed among the circumstances, and yet moral actions are chiefly specified by the end (how these two things can stand together has already been explained in the preceding questions). For the present it is sufficient to adduce what is touched upon here in the reply to the fourth objection, namely that human specification does not arise from a circumstance insofar as it is a circumstance, but insofar as it is the proper object of the act of the will. And with respect to this object it is commonly agreed that human acts receive their species. Since therefore an external act does not enter the genus of morals except insofar as it is willed, it thereby participates in specification from the end, which is the object of the will. And thus the statement of others (that the end is one of the circumstances not specifying the act) is not rendered false. For the first statement is made with respect to the external act considered in the genus of nature, which in that way receives its species from its proper object entirely independently of the will. But the other statement is made with respect to the external act insofar as it is willed, and in the genus of morals, in which case it receives its species not from the object alone but from the end to which it is ordered through the will. According to that principle: moral acts are qualified by the end (moralia ex fine qualificantur). Therefore there is no difficulty.

First Principle. It is an error to say that our knowledge of God by nature comes through the direct and immediate perception of God or of the eternal ideas. This is the error of the Ontologists.

Second Principle. In truth, the knowledge that we have of God by nature comes from an indirect and mediate perception of God. It is indirect insofar as the first object of our knowledge is not God, but some creature from which we come to know God (e.g., a friend of a friend is known indirectly insofar as your knowledge of him comes through the testimony of your friend). It is mediate insofar as such knowledge proceeds by the ordinary process of reasoning.

Third Principle. While it must certainly be held against the Ontologists that our natural knowledge of God is indirect and mediate, this is not to say that there are not different degrees of natural knowledge, some more sublime (insofar as they are less indirect and less mediate) and others less sublime (insofar as they are more indirect and more mediate).

As we consider different aspects of such knowledge, our natural knowledge of God can differ in its naturalness, intimacy/sublimity, and objective certainty.

First, in its naturalness. That which is natural is that which works suaviter, i.e., in a manner to which our faculties are accustomed. It is the “gravitational pull” of our faculties toward some act and toward some end. It is the intrinsic ordering of our faculties. This is the way in which our faculties work without the benefit or perfection of education, but according to those acts with which they are endowed by nature.

The “naturalness” of the act of knowing God by nature increases or decreases generally insofar as the act is more or less mediate. That act is completely intuitive which is not mediated by any process of reasoning. While this is never true of our natural knowledge of God, this does not mean that certain forms of natural knowledge cannot approach nearer to such intuitive knowledge insofar as they are mediated by a less extensive process of reasoning. As an example, we can compare our sight knowledge of someone with seeing them through a mirror, a photograph, and a painting. Obviously, it is only the direct sight of the person that is immediate; yet the media of a mirror, a photograph, and a painting differ in their proximity to direct sight, some being more and others less mediate.

The most natural act is that which operates in a spontaneous manner. The faculties are so intrinsically ordered to such an act that, without any process of reflection, they issue forth in such-and-such an act. Hence, when we smell cooking, our faculties are so accustomed to conclude that food is present that we spontaneously arrive at such a conclusion. When we hear a loud sound downstairs, we are accustomed to spontaneously conclude that there is danger, without a process of reflection. Our smell and hearing cannot immediately perceive such things (as they are beyond their proper objects), but the process is so natural that it goes completely unnoticed, and we often incorrectly identify the two acts as one, when in reality they are distinct.

It is in this way that there are acts of knowing God by nature that are more natural than others. For the sake of scientific rigor, theologians discuss different arguments and proofs for the existence of God; yet the primordial form of the knowledge of God in the hearts of men is that spontaneous, natural, and quasi-intuitive form, where the deduction is so slight and so natural that our intellects proceed from premise to conclusion without reflection. Thus, when we perceive the dependence, goodness, and beauty of created things, we do not perceive the Creator directly; yet the knowledge of Him issues forth in a manner that is natural, spontaneous, and unreflective.

The error of the Ontologists is that they considered such knowledge in an understandable, yet erroneous way. Just as we often identify two acts as one due to the natural way in which one proceeds from the other, so also did the Ontologists confuse the spontaneous emergence of the knowledge of God with knowledge that is completely immediate.

Second, in its intimacy and sublimity. As noted above, our natural knowledge of God is mediate and indirect. Its mediacy can be more or less natural depending on its spontaneity (this concerns the subjective medium of such knowledge). Yet we can also consider it from the perspective of its objective medium, insofar as it relies on an indirect object for our knowledge. God is not directly perceptible outside of the beatific vision. However, this does not mean that the object cannot differ in two respects: first, insofar as the object by which we know has a greater likeness to the thing known; second, insofar as the object by which we know has greater proximity to us. The first concerns the sublimity of the knowledge, and the second concerns its intimacy.

First, that knowledge of God which proceeds from more sublime objects will itself be more sublime. To contemplate a man in a painting is quite different from contemplating a man in a photograph—the photograph has a greater likeness to the man than the painting. Likewise, in our natural knowledge of God, those more sublime creations of His hand more luminously reflect God than those less sublime. Hence, it is one thing to contemplate Him in the eternal ideas of truth, goodness, and unity, and another to contemplate Him in creatures that involve greater degrees of dissimilitude. It is one thing to contemplate God in man as the image of God, and another to contemplate the vestiges of God in other creatures. The most sublime object (which comes to us only by divine revelation) is found in our knowledge of the affections of the Most Sacred Heart of Jesus, especially as expressed in the Psalter, communicating His prayers during the Passion.

Second, that knowledge of God which proceeds from a more intimate object will be more intimate. This is evident from experience. To know a person through the medium of the written word is quite different from knowing him through the spoken word, which is in turn different from personal presence. These degrees of knowledge differ accidentally insofar as there is a greater or lesser degree of proximity in the objective medium of the knowledge. The same is true with the knowledge of God. It is one thing to know God through the contingency of created things, and quite another to know Him intimately by taking as one’s starting point the effects of God sustaining, ruling, and guiding the soul. Both are mediate and indirect (insofar as they follow essentially identical processes, requiring us to draw a conclusion from an object that is not God), but it is evident that the latter is superior in certain respects.

The intimacy with which God is known through the “interior mirror” of the soul is called by certain Fathers and theologians “feeling.” This description combines both spontaneity and intimacy. To “feel” something implies the intimate presence of the object to the knower. We do not “feel” things that are distant and removed from us, but those that are close to us and operating upon us. Furthermore, when we “feel” something, the process is natural and spontaneous. The knowledge effected by such “feeling” is so immediate in experience that the procession from one act to the other goes largely unnoticed and is only later clarified through scientific reflection.

Third, in its certainty. Here we must distinguish between objective (or scientific) certainty and subjective (or personal) certainty. The more directly and naturally we perceive an object, the greater will be our adherence to it. Thus, it is one thing to perceive the heat of fire by touching it, and another to know it through the testimony of another. Those who have touched fire adhere to its heat with greater subjective certainty, because they have experienced the effect within themselves.

However, this differs from scientific or objective certainty. A chemist can explain with greater precision the causes of heat and combustion, thereby attaining a more objective certainty. While both forms result in adherence to the object, the former produces a more immediate adherence quoad nos, whereas the latter provides objectively certain reasoning that is more suitable for demonstration and disputation.

To give another analogy: facial recognition is less certain than DNA identification. Thus, if we wish to establish objectively the identity of a deceased person, DNA testing provides greater objective certainty. Yet facial recognition is more immediate and intimate; hence, the family of the deceased will adhere more firmly to that evidence than to DNA results.

These two forms of natural knowledge (one greater in intimacy, spontaneity, and subjective stability, and the other greater in objective clarity and scientific rigor) each have their proper place in Catholic theology and praxis (whether pastoral or apologetic). For this reason, the Fathers often spoke more of the former, while the Schoolmen more often spoke of the latter, although this distinction is not absolute.

Based on this text, we can more intricately consider the nature of the necessity of the sacraments which often is only treated in our polemics with the Feeneyites.

First, there is a distinction between the reception of a sacrament in re and in voto. To receive a sacrament in voto is not simply to “desire a sacrament.” Rather, it is an act of the will which intends to obey God motivated by charity, “those who love me will keep my commandments.” This is either explicit insofar as we understand the obligation and specifically intend to carry out such a command when the opportunity presents itself, or implicit insofar as someone does not explicitly intend to carry out what is commanded, but still has such a pious affection of the will as to carry out what is commanded when it is made known unto them (cf. Suprema haec sacrae).

Second, certain sacraments are necessary merely by necessity of precept and others by necessity of means. Necessity of precept refers to a necessary obligation imposed by the command of a superior, which can be excused by invincible ignorance. On the other hand, that which is necessary by a necessity of means not only consists of a necessary obligation imposed by command, but also established a means which is positively necessary in order to acquire a certain end. This is vital for understanding the doctrine. In this case, invincible ignorance excuses one from carrying out the command, but invincible ignorance does not supply the means to acquire the end. Hence, something positive which supplies the means must also be included. Hence, theologians will distinguish between those things which are necessary by a necessity of means per se and those things which are necessary by a necessity of means per accidens (n.b., among earlier scholastics, this language is sometimes different). In the case of that which is per se, it is itself intrinsically linked with the nature of the end so as to essentially imply the end by its presence and essentially remove the end by its absence. In the case of that which is per accidens, the link between the act and the end is positively established, only implying/excluding the end by the will of another.

This leads us to two conclusions that follow upon these definitions. First, for those things necessary by a necessity of means per se, there is NO SUBSTITUTION possible for the end sought (e.g., grace, the theological virtues, etc. for salvation). Hence, the absurdity of those pseudo-theologians who pretend that a mere desire for faith (fides virtualis) can supply for faith. Second, for those things necessary by a necessity of means per accidens, there can be substitution insofar as that which is provided for in the sacraments in order to achieve the end is supplied in some other manner. It is in this way that St. Thomas and traditional theologians describe the baptism in voto, not merely in some external or positive manner, but insofar as the baptism in voto brings about those very same means within us that baptism brings about within us for such and such an end. Hence, baptism saves by the infusion of grace. The same infusion of grace is implied by baptism in voto. Therefore, by strict logical sequence, it follows that just as the infusion of grace saved by baptism in re, so also will the infusion of grave save by the baptism in voto.

By this, we can see more clearly both the errors of the Feeneyite pseudo-theologians and the Quasi-universalist pseudo-theologians. They both error on the same point, but in opposite directions. They both see the command to baptize merely in terms of some sort of positive precept, i.e., that God commands that baptism be necessary for salvation. The only difference between the two abominable systems is that they see the imputability of the lack of carrying out this command differently. The Feeneyites hold that the command is arbitrary, always imputable as a sin leading to damnation. The Quasi-universalist also hold that the command is arbitrary, but allow for invincible ignorance. Neither side understands the question, since they are only viewing the question from the perspective of baptism as a command rather than viewing is from the perspective of baptism as a means, which is clearly brought forward by Catholic theologians. Hence, baptism does not become an arbitrary command, but is first and foremost a means to an end and its value is essential and intrinsic, rather than positivistic and extrinsic. Therefore, as traditional theology has always concluded, when that salvific effect that baptism works within us to the end of salvation is communicated to us in a different manner, the same effect of salvation follows. Hence, even if the Feeneyite wanted to deny that such ever is the case, such would only be a consideration de facto, rather than a consideration de iure. Doctrinally, the Feeneyite would still remain a defender of the baptism in voto. Hence, to illuminate the real differences between these two bastardized systems of theology and Catholic theology, the following questions are able to bring the truth to light.

First, to the Feeneyite, on the condition that some individual possesses sanctifying grace without baptism in re, is that person justified? If no, then from whence does baptism gain its salvific force? If from its communication of sanctifying grace, then there is contradiction. If from the mere carrying out of a command, then the system is positivistic and extrinsicist. If yes, then the Feeneyite de iure concedes baptism in voto, even if they do not concede it de facto.

Their foolish system can also be broken on related matters, such as membership in the Church, explicit faith in different articles, etc., by the same line of reasoning.

Second to the Quasi-universalists, on the (theoretical) condition that some individual without original or actual sin does carry out the command of baptism, yet (per impossibile) he does not possess sanctifying grace, is that person justified? If yes, then this is Pelagian. If no, then baptism does not justify in virtue of it being a command to carry out, rather it justifies in virtue of effecting something necessary for the end established. Hence, something beyond invincible ignorance is necessary. Rather, what is necessary is that what baptism justifies in virtue of is also communicated to us. Although, the Quasi-universalists ordinarily err on other issues along the same line, e.g., the necessity of explicit faith.

Third, we can distinguish between physical necessity and moral necessity. Although, it might be better to speak of the distinction between what is necessary in principle vs. what is necessary in practice. In the first case, we abstract from the concrete conditions of men and simply speak of what is abstractly necessary, possible, etc.. Hence, we may say that it is possible that a man come to know the entire moral law in principle since he has the faculties to investigate such things. On the other hand, when we speak about what is necessary, possible, etc., in practice, we are taking into account the reality of the situation at hand in all of its concrete circumstances. Hence, in this case, we say that it is impossible to know the entire moral law by the principles of unaided nature, without the help afforded by divine revelation, the interior helps of grace, and the external direction of the Church.

Hence, with these three distinctions in mind, we are able to speak more clearly about the necessity of the sacraments (especially baptism and penance) and how this relates to baptism in voto, perfect contrition, etc.

First Conclusion. To receive baptism or penance in voto is absolutely necessary in principle in the economy of salvation.

Second Conclusion. To receive baptism or penance in re is morally necessary in practice in the economy of salvation.

The first clearly follows from the discussion above. Both sacraments are necessary not merely by precept, but also by means. Hence, invincible ignorance does not supply the end, but only excuses from the command. For, they are positive means for bringing about what is necessary to achieve a certain end. Hence, it follows that there is no salvation without the reception of such sacraments in voto, the means needed to be supplied by God (which is, definitionally, to receive a sacrament in voto). Whether this is the case de facto or merely de iure matters little.

The second is exactly what is confirmed in the quote above from the Roman Catechism. Perfect contrition is something that is achieved by very few. What else is this to say than the fact that such can be acquired in principle by everyone, yet only in practice by a few? God has established the sacraments for a reason. He wishes that we “be saved and come to the knowledge of the truth.” So, while he supplies the means to the other in other ways (as is evident for those who are saved with only baptism/penance in voto), he has established these ways in re for our salvation as means to effect means necessary for various ends which can only be received with great difficulty. It is in this way that we refute the Quasi-modernists who wish to reduce the necessity of actual membership in the Church and the actual reception of the Sacraments into nothing.

Ven. Pius XII: “Even though by an unconscious desire and longing they have a certain relationship with the Mystical Body of the Redeemer, they still remain deprived of those many heavenly gifts and helps which can only be enjoyed in the Catholic Church.” (Mystici Corporis Christi).

600.- That evil angels, or demons, manifest themselves to men and speak with them in various ways is established by the whole course of history, both sacred and profane. [1]. Hence:

CONCLUSION: We can sometimes learn something true from demons and draw arguments from their statements.

Proof:

a) From Scripture. St. Thomas Aquinas (ST.II-II.Q172.A6) writes: “A gloss on Num. 22:14, says that Balaam was a diviner, for he sometimes foreknew the future by help of the demons and the magic art. Now he foretold many true things, for instance that which is to be found in Num. 24:17: A star shall rise out of Jacob, and a scepter shall spring up from Israel. Therefore even the prophets of the demons foretell the truth.”

b) Confirmation from Facts. For it is established that the demons themselves are sometimes compelled by the power of those who summon them in such a way that they unwillingly confess the truth. [2]

601. - с) From reason. “As the good is in relation to things, so is the true in relation to knowledge. Now in things it is impossible to find one that is wholly devoid of good. Wherefore it is also impossible for any knowledge to be wholly false, without some mixture of truth. Hence Bede says that no teaching is so false that it never mingles truth with falsehood. Hence the teaching of the demons, with which they instruct their prophets, contains some truths whereby it is rendered acceptable. For the intellect is led astray to falsehood by the semblance of truth, even as the will is seduced to evil by the semblance of goodness. Wherefore Chrysostom says: The devil is allowed sometimes to speak true things, in order that his unwonted truthfulness may gain credit for his lie.” (ST.II-II.Q172.A6) [3]

Wherefore demons, knowing certain things which of themselves surpass the human intellect, and learning them either by the power of their own nature or through the instruction of good spirits, can reveal these things to men, either with the purpose of deceiving them in other matters, or when commanded by God to confess the truth.

Nevertheless, in discerning these things the greatest discernment is required. [4]

602. - But once the manifestation of angels (namely, of good or of evil ones) has been presupposed and historically demonstrated, it is permissible for the theologian to argue not only from their words or signs, but also from their deeds, indeed even from the mere fact of their manifestation. For many things can thereby be gathered concerning the existence of angels, their nature, their power over men and material bodies, and their faculty of understanding and willing, etc.

All of which certainly serve very greatly those who study Pneumatology, as is evident.

DIFFICULTIES

603. Objection. Christ said of the devil: “He stood not in the truth, because truth is not in him. When he speaketh a lie, he speaketh of his own: for he is a liar.” (Jn. 8:44) Therefore, etc.

Response from St. Thomas: “Those things are called the demons’ own, which they have of themselves, namely lies and sins; while they have, not of themselves but of God, those things which belong to them by nature: and it is by virtue of their own nature that they sometimes foretell the truth, as stated above (ad 1). Moreover God makes use of them to make known the truth which is to be accomplished through them, by revealing Divine mysteries to them through the angels, as already stated (Gen ad lit. xii, 19; I, Q. 109, A. 4, ad 1).” (ST.II-II.Q172.A6.Rep3)

NOTES

[1]: Psellus: De Dæmonibus. Cf. Mirville, Les esprits; W. Scott, Hist. de la Démonologie; Gongenot Des Mousseaux, Mœurs des démons; Gaume, Traité du Saint Esprit, etc.; Goerres, Mystique. Demons manifest themselves in almost innumerable ways; on this subject see especially Collin de Plancy, Dictionnaire infernal. But above all others Méric, Le merveilleux et la Science is today to be recommended, for its excellent rules of criticism and its survey of the facts. Cf. the works of D. Constantin James, and of Fathers De Bonniot and Franco.

[2]: Cf. Gougenot Des Mousseaux, Mœurs et pratiques des Démons, cap. xxi, et alibi

[3]: See the responses to the objections. Cf. SCG3.C154

[4]: Cf. Schram, Theologia Mystica, etc.; Goerres, Mystic.

While this does not appear to reveal much at first glance, interestingly, some of the Fathers took this as a revelation of the number of angels which did not fall. Hence, the “one sinner” consists of the number of the elect, whereas the “ninety-nine” are those angels who never fell.

One of the greatest Patrologists in the history of the Church, Dionysius Petavius, gives a short explanation of this teaching in his Dogmata theologica: “Some of the ancients thought that the proportion between the number of men and Angels is as one to ninety-nine, because the parable of the man who had one hundred sheep seems to suggest this: one sheep was lost, and leaving the ninety-nine he went to seek it and carried it back upon his shoulders. That single sheep is commonly believed to signify human nature, while the ninety-nine represent the Angels.” (De Angelis, Lib. I, Cap. XIV, n. 9)

In the Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique, G. Bareille in the article titled Ange d’apres les Peres repeats this same idea: “The angels are very numerous; but how many are there? This is something that none of the Fathers has stated. Some of them, however, in order to give an approximate idea, took as the basis of their estimation the parable of the sheep. The ninety-nine sheep that remained faithful would represent the angels, while the stray sheep would represent mankind, so that the numerical proportion of angels to men would be ninety-nine to one.”

Cornelius a Lapide mentions this possible interpretation in his commentary on Matthew 18: “Many generally, by the ninety-nine sheep feeding upon the mountains understand the holy angels, who have the fruition of God in Heaven, who have never sinned. By the hundredth sheep which went astray, they understand the whole human race which sinned in Adam, and which, that He might redeem, and bring it back into the way of salvation, Christ as it were left the angels, and came down from Heaven, and was made man…Gather from hence how vast is the multitude of the angels, which as greatly exceeds the number of all the men who have been, or are, or ever will be, as ninety-nine exceeds one.”

In this article, I want to give a little bit of a “quote mine” of the different authors who mention this interpretation. Although, this is by no means exhaustive, it will give a good idea of the number of fathers who affirm this reading.

St. Hilary of Poitiers (d. 367): “But by the one sheep is to be understood one man, and under this one man is comprehended the whole human race. He that seeks man is Christ, and the ninety and nine are the host of the heavenly glory which He left.” (PL 9, 1020)

St. Cyril of Jerusalem (d. 386): “Behold, O man, before what multitudes you shall come to judgment. Every race of mankind will then be present. Reckon, therefore, how many are the Roman nation; reckon how many the barbarian tribes now living, and how many have died within the last hundred years; reckon how many nations have been buried during the last thousand years; reckon all from Adam to this day. Great indeed is the multitude; but yet it is little, for the Angels are many more. They are the ninety and nine sheep, but mankind is the single one.” (PG 33, 904)

St. Gregory of Nyssa (d. 394): “Since, then, this was the sum of our calamity, that humanity was exiled from the good Father, and was banished from the Divine oversight and care, for this cause He Who is the Shepherd of the whole rational creation, left in the heights of heaven His unsinning and supramundane flock, and, moved by love, went after the sheep which had gone astray, even our human nature. For human nature, which alone, according to the similitude in the parable, through vice roamed away from the hundred of rational beings, is, if it be compared with the whole, but an insignificant and infinitesimal part.” (Contra Eunom., lib. xii, cap. i)

St. Ambrose (d. 397): “Rich therefore is that Shepherd, of whose hundredth portion we all are, who has innumerable flocks of Angels, Archangels, Dominations, Powers, Thrones, and others, whom He left on the mountains; who, since they are rational, rightly rejoice in the redemption of men.” (PL 15, 1756)

St. Cyril of Alexandria (d. 444): “We may hence understand the extent of our Savior’s kingdom. For He says there are a hundred sheep, bringing to a perfect sum the number of rational creatures subject to Him. For the number hundred is perfect, being composed of ten decades. But out of these one has wandered, namely, the race of man which inhabits earth.” (CaLuke.C15.L1.13)

Pope St. Gregory the Great (d. 604): “For since a hundred is a perfect number, He Himself had a hundred sheep, seeing that He possessed the nature of the holy angels and men. Hence he adds, Having a hundred sheep.” (CaLuke.C15.L1.12)

Ibid., “One sheep then perished when man by sinning left the pastures of life. But in the wilderness the ninety and nine remained, because the number of the rational creatures, that is to say of Angels and men who were formed to see God, was lessened when man perished; and hence it follows, Does he not leave the ninety and nine in the wilderness, because in truth he left the companies of the Angels in heaven. But man then forsook heaven when he sinned. And that the whole body of the sheep might be perfectly made up again in heaven, the lost man was sought for on earth…” (CaLuke.C15.L1.15)

Smaragdus of Saint-Mihiel (d. 840): “The hundred sheep signify the totality of angels and men. But one went astray, that is, the human race sinned. He left the ninety-nine upon the mountains, that is, the nine orders of angels in heaven, and came to seek the one in the valley of tears. When it is found, there is greater joy over it than over the ninety-nine who had not gone astray.” (Commentaria in regulam Sancti Benedicti, cap. xxvii)

Theophylact (d. 1107): “The heavenly powers thus are called sheep, because every created nature as compared with God is as the beasts, but inasmuch as it is rational, they are called friends and neighbors.” (CaLuke.C15.L1.20)

St. Anselm (d. 1109): “The Lord found the sheep when He restored man, and over that sheep that is found there is more joy in heaven than over the ninety and nine, because there is a greater matter for thanksgiving to God in the restoration of man than in the creation of the Angels. Wonderfully are the Angels made, but more wonderfully man restored.” (Enarrationes, cf. CaMatt.C18.L3.BedeapAnselm)

Glossa Ordinaria, “‘More than over the ninety-nine,’ etc. If by the ninety-nine just who did not go astray and who have no need of repentance the angels are understood, it seems greater to justify the impious than to create and preserve the just; for although both are works of equal power, the former is of greater mercy and of greater joy.”

Ibid., “‘If there were a hundred.’ The Lord had a hundred sheep when the number of rational creatures (angels and men) remained complete, that is, in its perfection. But one went astray when man sinned.”

St. Thomas Aquinas (d. 1274): “The hundred signifies the universality of rational creatures. Ninety-nine is the same number as nine, only multiplied, for nine multiplied by ten makes ninety. This number, namely nine, falls short of ten in unity. Hence by these sheep he signifies all rational creatures…The sheep which went astray signifies the human race. And why…these ninety-nine signify angels who were left in the mountains, i.e., in the heavens…” (Matt.C18.L2.n1510-1511)

NOTE: There was also a citation from St. Augustine but I lost the reference. Oh well!

In his [Fr. Franz Hürth’s] annotations, by way of an appendix (in order to satisfy the requests of many), a few things are added concerning the weight and theological value of ALLOCUTIONS. For this purpose three things are considered, a) the matter of which they treat, b) the listeners to whom they are addressed, c) the person by whom they are delivered.

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One of these traditional penances concerns sexual relations between the married. Many of the Fathers witness to the common practice of abstinence from the marriage bed during penitential seasons. As an example, one must merely skim through the Lenten sermons of St. Augustine to see multiple references to this practice. This custom received widespread ecclesiastical sanction, as is evident from quite a few ecclesiastical monuments. There are quite a few, but here are a handful:

First, in his Letter to the Bulgarians, Pope St. Nicholas I instructs them that this is an essential part of the Lenten fast: “Indeed if, with the consent of the spouse, one perhaps spends time in prayer with a clean body at some other time as well, how much the more on this day — a day upon which we give the tithes of our flesh to God, we imitate the Lord Himself in abstinence, and we rightly cut from ourselves not only illicit things, but also from many things which are allowed — should we not also renounce every pleasure and apply ourselves to the chastity of our mind and body, in order that we may licitly spend time in prayer!” (ch. ix)

Second, this was included in the decretals of Gratian (Pars Secunda, Causa XXXIII, Quaest. IV) as a law of the universal Church (Fratres non solum debetis ab omni immunditia abstinere, sed etiam ab uxoribus propriis studiosissime contineatis. Nullus omnino uxori suae jejuniorum diebus conjungatur).

Third, in the Roman Catechism: “As every blessing is to be obtained from God by holy prayer, the faithful are also to be taught sometimes to abstain from the marriage debt, in order to devote themselves to prayer. Let the faithful understand that (this religious continence), according to the proper and holy injunction of our predecessors, is particularly to be observed for at least three days before Communion, and oftener during the solemn fast of Lent.” (n.b., this is repeated by Bl. Innocent XI in his Cum ad aures)

Fourth, in the traditional rite of matrimony, the Missal included an instruction for the priest to seriously admonish abstinence during penitential seasons (Moneat eos Sacerdos sermone gravi, ut sibi invicem servent fidem: orationis tempore, et præsertim jejuniorum ac solemnitatum, casti maneant).

NOTE: This is the reason for the traditional prohibition of marriages during the season of Lent. It is also interesting to note certain studies demonstrating a dramatic drop in births nine months after Lent in former ages.

There is a two-fold reason for this: a) to fight sin, and b) to aid prayer.

First, one of the purposes of penance is to abstain from licit pleasures in order to defend oneself against illicit pleasures (Pope St. Nicholas I, so that the person who recalls that he has committed illicit deeds may keep himself on these days even from licit things; Pope St. Gregory I, Often they that are in power, whereas they know not how to refrain lawful actions, slide into such as are unlawful and unquiet. For he alone is never brought down in things unlawful who is careful to restrain himself at times even from things lawful). The control of the soul over the passions of the body is strengthened when occasion is given to exercise this control. Hence, if one is able to abstain from food for 40 days, he will be strengthened against the vice of gluttony. In a similar way, if one is able to control lawful passions exercised in marriage, he will be strengthened against the vice of lust. This is even more necessary in an age in which the most abominable sexual sin is an almost universal experience, and even the sacred bed of marriage has been construed into an “anti-Christian hedonism.” (Ven. Pius XII)

Second, St. Paul witnesses that periods of abstinence from sexual relations are proper in those seasons of prayer so that “you may devote yourselves to prayer.” (1 Cor. 7:5) What is a more fitting time for such an exhortation to apply than the time of Lent, where one of the traditional triad is prayer (cf. St. Paul VI’s Paenitemini).

Yet, there is an even more important witness of the encouragement of this discipline: the liturgy. As is emphasized constantly by the authors who write on the liturgy, the will of Holy Mother Church for certain seasons is presented by the texts she chooses for the liturgy. One of the texts chosen for the Ash Wednesday liturgy is Joel 2:12–18. In this text, we see an interesting exhortation: “let the bridegroom go forth from his bed, and the bride out of her bride chamber.” (v. 16b)

As I will demonstrate in this article, the traditional exegesis of this passage explicitly teaches that this passage contains an exhortation to abstain from sexual relations during the season of Lent. Hence, due to the inclusion of this text in the liturgy, it can be rightly concluded that the traditional practice continues to be encouraged by the Church as an act of penance.

The notable French jurist, Robert Joseph Pothier, brings all these strands together (along with an impressive collection of references) in his Traité du contrat de mariage (n. 371), giving the judgment that “It is a very ancient discipline in the Church not to permit the celebration of marriages during certain seasons of the year dedicated to penance, especially during the holy season of Lent. This discipline, whose beginning is unknown and which probably goes back to apostolic times, is established by the canons of some of the most ancient councils…This prohibition of celebrating marriages during seasons dedicated to penance and prayer is very much in keeping with the spirit of the Church…By the same spirit she has always exhorted (and still exhorts today) married persons to abstain, by mutual consent, from the use of marriage during these holy seasons. For this reason the Church has chosen for the Epistle of the Mass of Ash Wednesday a passage from the prophet Joel which says: Egredietur sponsus de cubili suo, et sponsa de thalamo suo.”

This text and some of the other related proofs, along with a more extensive explanation, are brought forward by Fr. Thomas J. Gerrard in his work Marriage and Parenthood, chapter 7 on “Conjugal Restraint.”

Traditional Exegesis of Joel 2:16

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It is quite common, when one enters into the realm of the touchy topic of the marriage laws of the Old Covenant, that one will hear the interpretation that such laws were simply meant to regulate the marriage between those of the true religion and those of false religions, much like the precepts concerning “mixed marriages” that we see in the teaching and law of the Church. Yet, from a careful study of the relevant laws given by God to Bl. Moses, we see that the reality of the laws of the Old Covenant is much more complicated than this simplistic narrative.

This is seen especially in the case of the daughters of Zelophehad (Num. 27, 36). Initially, in Numbers 27, they come to Moses to put before him a difficult question. Their father had died for his own sin, i.e., “he was not among the company of those who gathered themselves together against the Lord in the company of Korah,” (Num. 27:3) which also seems to exclude him from death as one of those murmuring against God (Num. 11) or as one revolting at the time of the spies (Num. 14). While some commentators identify him with the man killed for gathering sticks on the Sabbath in Num. 15 (Hugh: qui interfectus fuit ex mandato Domini, quia colligebat ligna in Sabbato), this seems uncertain (Bl. Denys: non videtur certum…vir ille qui ligna collegit in sabbato, fuerat lapidatus, de quo omnibus patuit quod non fuit in seditione Core…fuit notabilis vir, de quo non apparet, quod personaliter ligna collegerit).

Yet, Zelophehad also died while only bearing daughters. Hence, what is to be done with his inheritance? The Lord extraordinarily permits these women to have possession in the land, “you shall give them possession of an inheritance among their father’s brethren and cause the inheritance of their father to pass to them.” (Num. 27:7) Then, he takes the occasion to give a judgement on inheritance laws for those dying without sons, delineating the various levels of next of kin. (v. 8–11)

Yet, this is not the last time we hear about the daughters of Zelophehad. Those of their tribe brought forward a valid complaint. If God allowed these women to have inheritance, what is to take place upon their marriage? Clearly, if these women were to marry those of different tribes, then the wealth and land that should enrich their tribe would be exported to other tribes, “if they are married to any of the sons of the other tribes of the people of Israel, then their inheritance will be taken from the inheritance of our fathers, and added to the inheritance of the tribe to which they belong; so it will be taken away from the lot of our inheritance.” (Num. 36:3)

In order to avoid this bad consequence, the solution is simple. First, it is obviously just (in accordance with the ruling of Numbers 27) that the daughters have the inheritance of their father. Second, it is also just that the inheritance of the father remains in his own tribe, “the tribe of the sons of Joseph is right.” (Num. 36:5) Hence, the obvious solution is that the daughters ought to be legally required to marry within their own tribe, “let them marry whom they think best; only they shall marry within the family of the tribe of their father.” (v. 6)

Yet, it is here that the difficulty begins to take shape, and there is some controversy within the Catholic tradition. What is the scope of this law? Does it apply only to those daughters who have inheritance (as the Hebrew text seems to indicate), or does it apply universally to all daughters in Israel (as the Latin Vulgate seems to indicate)? Further, how does this express principles of the natural law concerning marriage?

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Introduction

Vatican I tells us that “reason illustrated by faith, when it zealously, piously, and soberly seeks, attains with the help of God some understanding of the mysteries, and that a most profitable one, not only from the analogy of those things which it knows naturally, but also from the connection of the mysteries among themselves and with the last end of man; nevertheless, it is never capable of perceiving those mysteries in the way it does the truths which constitute its own proper object.”

Here, the very function of theology is set forth with great clarity, and its distinction from the assent of faith is placed in bold relief.

Through faith, we are able to grasp the mystery by means of the analogical notions that come to us through Divine Revelation. Here we possess a firm certainty and an irrevocable judgment concerning the existence of these mysteries. Theology, on the other hand, concerns the investigation of that which is grasped by faith, following those very analogical notions that come to us through Divine Revelation.

Here there are always two tendencies to be avoided: (1) a certain obscurantism that denies the dignity of Divine Revelation by tending to treat the analogical notions communicated to us as merely equivocal notions, and hence as incapable of any sort of comprehension or investigation; and (2) a certain rationalism that, far from dignifying Divine Revelation, pridefully exalts the capacity of human reason and lowers the dignity of the Divine Mysteries by tending to treat the analogical notions of Divine Revelation as purely univocal notions capable of a fully comprehensive understanding of the mystery.

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Introduction

One topic of particular interest to those studying the Trinity is what has come to be known as the Logical Problem of the Trinity (LPT). For many, the LPT presents one of the most serious intellectual difficulties with the Catholic faith. For others who profess to be Christians, it serves as a stumbling block—tempting them to adopt “the wisdom of the world” and reject the authoritative teachings of the Catholic Church concerning the Trinity. It is therefore natural that the LPT receives disproportionate attention compared to other theological topics. Yet this is a subject that demands the application of numerous principles from both logic and Trinitarian theology. As a result, it is often challenging to express the solution in a way that is at once succinct and simple—doing justice both to the problem’s intricacy and to the need for clarity for those less familiar with theological discourse.

Traditionally, post-Reformation scholastics included at the beginning of their theological manuals a section titled De Veritate Mysterii Sanctissimae Trinitatis, or something similar. In this tract, a number of themes are treated.

First, the Trinity is demonstrated from the loci theologici—that is, from Scripture and Tradition. Of particular interest to modern readers are the sections that argue for the Trinity from the Old Testament and examine the Trinitarian faith of the ante-Nicene Fathers.

Second, the question of the Trinity’s “knowability” by reason is addressed. Here we find debates over whether human reason can grasp the existence and possibility of the Trinity. (I explored this topic in greater depth here). Closely related is the treatment of the conceptual apparatus used to express the Trinity and the role such concepts play in mediating our knowledge of this mystery.

Third, having established that the Trinity is supra rationem (beyond reason), the theologians go on to show that it is not contra rationem (contrary to reason). This is the section in which dozens of objections are raised attempting to demonstrate the Trinity’s incoherence. Chief among these is the classic objection that “things equal to the same thing are equal to each other”—perhaps the most well-known formulation of the LPT.

The General Solution

In logic, there are three acts of the intellect: simple apprehension, judgment, and discursive reasoning. Each of these acts produces a distinct logical product. Simple apprehension yields a term—for example, “Socrates.” Judgment produces a proposition by combining two terms—e.g., “Socrates is a man.” Discursive reasoning produces a syllogism by combining two judgments and drawing a third—e.g., “Socrates is a man; all men are mortal; therefore, Socrates is mortal.”

A central concern of logic is determining which combinations of propositions form valid syllogisms. For instance, if I were to argue: “Some men are white; Tyrone is a man; therefore, Tyrone is white,” I would not be reasoning validly. This is because the premises do not guarantee the conclusion: the first premise allows for the possibility that some men are not white.

To formalize such considerations, classical logic categorizes propositions into four types:

• Universal Affirmative (A): “All men are rational.”

• Particular Affirmative (I): “Some men are white.”

• Universal Negative (E): “No man is a dog.”

• Particular Negative (O): “Some men are not white.”

These classifications—traditionally labeled A, I, E, and O—are foundational to determining valid syllogistic forms and play a crucial role in assessing whether an argument like the Logical Problem of the Trinity is formally coherent.

When we have a syllogism, we are dealing with three propositions—two premises and a conclusion—and each of these propositions typically falls under one of the four categorical types introduced above. (This classification, though widely used, is not without controversy; we will address this issue below.)

Consider the following example: “All men are rational; some animals are men; therefore, some animals are rational.” Here, the major premise (“All men are rational”) is a Universal Affirmative (A); the minor premise (“Some animals are men”) is a Particular Affirmative (I); and the conclusion (“Some animals are rational”) is also a Particular Affirmative (I). Accordingly, this syllogism is said to be in the AII mood, based on the traditional letter coding.

These classifications of propositions within a syllogism are called the moods of the syllogism.

In addition to the mood, syllogisms are also categorized by figure. The figure of a syllogism refers to the position of the middle term—the term that appears in both premises but not in the conclusion. There are four possible figures:

• Figure 1: The middle term is the subject of the major premise and the predicate of the minor premise.

• Figure 2: The middle term is the predicate in both premises.

• Figure 3: The middle term is the subject in both premises.

• Figure 4: The middle term is the predicate of the major premise and the subject of the minor premise.

Each figure allows for a specific set of valid moods, some of which are valid unconditionally and others only under certain conditions. Conversely, certain moods within each figure are invalid and do not yield logically necessary conclusions.

In order to determine which syllogistic moods are valid and which are invalid, we must appeal to what have traditionally been called the “supreme laws” of the syllogism. As Msgr. Henri Grenier explains:

The categorical syllogism depends on the principle of triple identity and the separating third. This principle may be stated thus: two things identical with a same third thing are identical with each other (principle of triple identity); two things, one of which is identical, the other not identical with a same third thing, are not identical with each other (principle of the separating third).

In a syllogism, two terms are compared with a third, and their identity is affirmed or denied according as both are united to a third, or as one is separated from it.

The principle of identity and the separating third is immediately evident and may be reduced to the principle of contradiction—the most fundamental of all principles: “A thing is or is not, or it is impossible that the same thing be and not be.”

However, the principle of triple identity and the separating third cannot, by itself, be directly applied in a syllogism, since the middle term to which the extremes are compared is a universal. It can only be applied through two other principles, which Aristotle designates as the dictum de omni and the dictum de nullo:

- Dictum de omni: Whatever is affirmed distributively or universally of a subject is affirmed of all its inferiors.

- Dictum de nullo: Whatever is denied distributively or universally of a subject is denied of all its inferiors.

Example: Whatever is affirmed or denied of “man” is affirmed or denied of all who fall under the concept “man”—e.g., Peter, Paul, etc. (Thomistic Philosophy, n. 70)

When we apply these rules—particularized into eight traditional logical laws—we derive the following valid moods for each syllogistic figure:

• Figure 1: AAA, EAE, AII, EIO

• Figure 2: EAE, AEE, EIO, AOO

• Figure 3: AAI, EAO, IAI, AII, OAO, EIO

• Figure 4: AAI, EAE, AII, AEO, IEO

All of this, of course, is elementary. Any introductory course in logic that covers categorical syllogisms will address these matters in detail. However, I believe that reviewing these fundamentals is essential for engaging with the question at hand. To evaluate the syllogisms often presented in support of the Logical Problem of the Trinity (LPT), we must understand the very principles by which the validity or invalidity of an argument is judged.

Thus, when we hear the common argument: “The Father is God; the Son is God; therefore, the Father is the Son,” a fundamental question must be asked: What is the distribution of the term “God”? For, the very validity of the syllogism depends essentially on the proper distribution of the middle term.

Theologically, we know that there is not, properly speaking, a distinction of universal and particular in God. Thus, strictly and properly speaking, the term God is not a species, and the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are not individuals within that species. The union of the divine persons is not merely specific but numerical.

Therefore, it would seem that the term God is perfectly distributed when predicated of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. In this sense, the dictum de omni applies: if something is affirmed of God, and God is predicated of the three persons, then that predicate would also apply to each of them. For example, if one were to say, “God is the Father,” and God were perfectly distributed, then the predicate “Father” would also apply to the Son and the Spirit—which is false.

Here, precisely, is where the proponent of the Logical Problem of the Trinity (LPT) errs. The LPT assumes that distribution occurs only when there is a proper universal term—such as man—communicated to numerically distinct individuals. In doing so, it mistakes what is essential to distribution for how we commonly experience distribution among creatures. But the fundamental reason for distribution lies not in the individuation of a nature under a species but in the communicability of a term to many supposita.

From this, we are led to a fruitful insight into how the rules governing syllogisms apply to Trinitarian theology. We believe that, due to the infinitude of the divine essence, it is truly communicable to more than one suppositum. As a result, the term God, while not a universal in the created sense, functions as a quasi-universal when employed in theological syllogisms.

As Gonet states in his Manuale Thomistarum: “Such a syllogism is defective due to the lack of perfect distribution of the term ‘God,’ which, although absolutely singular, nevertheless, on account of the real communicability of the divine nature to the three Persons, becomes quasi-universal (aequivalenter universalis).”

This syllogism suffers from the same fundamental defect as the argument: “Peter is a man; John is a man; therefore, Peter is John.”

In both cases, the argument fails due to an absence of perfect distribution, though the reasons differ. In the Trinitarian case, the failure stems from the real communicability of the divine nature, which—while numerically one—is able to subsist in three distinct supposita. In the human example, the failure arises from the communicability of a specific nature (e.g., man) to numerically distinct individuals. In both instances, however, the fallacy lies in the misapplication or misunderstanding of distribution. It is ONLY under this aspect that the comparison is made.

This is why Suárez stated that the proper application of the dictum de omni and dictum de nullo is a fundamental consideration in resolving the Logical Problem of the Trinity:

The figure of reasoning is based on the proper distribution of the middle term, which Aristotle signified by the principles dictum de omni and dictum de nullo. And this form, when correctly applied, also has a place in this mystery [i.e., the Trinity], provided we observe that the same individual reality—by reason of real communicability—is equivalent to a common nature (naturæ communi), that is, it is quasi-universal. Therefore, from this standpoint, distribution must be added in order for the form to be preserved. (De Deo Trino, Bk. 4, ch. 3, n. 9)

Suárez emphasizes that even in the case of the Trinity, where we are dealing with a numerically singular nature and not a proper species, logical form is preserved when distribution is understood in light of real communicability. The divine essence, while not a species, is truly communicable to three supposita; thus, the term God can function analogously to a universal in syllogistic reasoning—provided the logic is carefully applied.

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On Identity

From the perspective of distribution, we are better equipped to consider the notion of identity. It is precisely in light of the principles of distribution and communicability that questions concerning identity take on their proper logical and theological significance.

The scholastics distinguished between adequate and inadequate identity. Gonet defines the latter as follows: “A thing is said to be inadequately identified with something when it is not the same as everything with which that thing is identified, nor is that something with which it is identified merely the same as that thing” (nec identificans est idem cum solo identificato).

Here, “identity” is understood in relation to the relative extension of the subject and predicate. If the predicate is really communicated to the subject, this communication may either exclude further predication or allow for it.

For example, when we say, “All men are rational animals,” the extension of both terms is the same, and the communication is exclusive—there is no broader class of rational animals beyond men in this context. It is therefore equally true to say, “All rational animals are men.”

However, not all identity functions this way. When we say, “John is a man,” the predicate man is truly communicated to John, but not exclusively; it does not follow that “All men are John.” The communication is real, but not limiting. Thus, in such cases, reversing subject and predicate is logically invalid.

Now, based on the principles laid out above, are the divine persons adequately or inadequately identified with the divine essence? Clearly, due to the real communicability of the divine nature, each person is only inadequately identified with the divine essence.

As St. Robert Bellarmine explains,

To the second principle I say that that principle is not true universally, except when the two things are equal to a third thing adequately, as in mathematics, where, if two lines are equal to a third, universally they will be equal to each other, because there is found complete adequateness. However, if you say: man and horse are the same thing really with an animal; therefore they are the same between themselves—that is not valid, because man and animal are not the same really adequately; thus also the essence and paternity are not the same adequately, because the essence extends itself to more things. Nor is it true that that principle is the foundation of the whole human discourse, if no limitations are added, otherwise there would be so many figures in vain, and the modes of the syllogisms, whereby it is explained how two extremes are to be joined with the middle term, so that it can be concluded that they are also joined together...if the rational soul, because it is spiritual, naturally is in the many really distinct parts of a body, then this syllogism is not valid: Hands and feet are the same in place with the soul; therefore they are the same in place between themselve, how much greater is the fact that God, who is infinite Spirit, can be at the same time in several suppositums? (Controversy II, Ch. 18)

Further, Gonet explains,

The aforementioned philosophical axiom—on which the art of syllogistic reasoning rests—holds true only in those cases where [the major and minor] are the same with a third [i.e., the middle] adequately, not when they are the same only inadequately with a third. Now, the relations which constitute the divine Persons are not identified with the divine essence adequately, but only inadequately. A thing is said to be inadequately identified with something when it is not the same as everything with which that thing is identified, nor is that something with which it is identical merely the same as that thing (nec identificans est idem cum solo identificato). But each personal relation is so identified with the divine nature, that it is not identified with the other personal relations with which the essence is identified; and likewise, the nature is not so identified with one relation that it is not also identified with the others. Thus, for example, the distinct parts of the body are present to one third thing—namely, to the rational soul—without being present to each other: for the foot and the head are immediately and proximately united to the soul, but are distant from each other, because, evidently, they are not united to the soul adequately, but only inadequately—inasmuch as the soul informs not only those parts but also the other parts of the body and is united to them. Likewise, Christ is present in multiple hosts and altars, which nevertheless are not present to one another: because He is not present to those altars and hosts adequately, since He is present to many others as well. Similarly, the Divine Persons are identified with the essence, without being identified with one another—because they are not identified with [the Divine Essence] adequately, but only inadequately. (Manuale Thomistarum, Tractatus IV, Cap. 2)

But if the persons are only inadequately identified with the essence, why should the Logical Problem of the Trinity (LPT) even arise? How does this argument against the Trinity not result in a fundamental denial of syllogistic reasoning and especially the proper distribution of terms?

Conclusion

It is certainly possible to go further and discuss how the divine essence is really communicable to multiple supposita without multiplying the nature numerically, as happens with species in their individuals. However, that question lies beyond the scope of the present discussion (further, this discussion is more commonly brought up when discussing this issue). The immediate concern has been to demonstrate that, internally, there is no incoherence in the classical explanation of real identity (with the essence) and real distinction (of the persons).

A fuller treatment of the matter—one that may be undertaken in the future—would begin by examining the metaphysical nature of relatio, which is central to the scholastic understanding of divine distinction. But for now, the foregoing should suffice to address the objection posed by the LPT.

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I came across one of these earlier and went down a bit of a rabbit hole on a very important motif among Catholic authors: rain as doctrine and clouds as preachers. This may not sound very important at first, but the moral applications made by Catholic authors are crucial for understanding the role of the laity when there is a “crisis of doctrine” among the teachers in the Church (obviously, quite an important situation to consider).

I’ll begin with St. Thomas, who opens with an interesting note in his Commentary on Romans. In the preface to the Epistle, one of the important points made by St. Paul concerns his desire to go to Rome to see the Christians of the city in order to “impart some spiritual gift.” He emphasizes this so strongly that he even states an oath before God, confirming the desires he frequently pours out in prayer.

St. Thomas here addresses an important question: Why wasn’t St. Paul able to go to the Romans? Obviously, he could approach the matter on a purely natural level, but instead he seeks to view it from the perspective of Divine Providence. Why would God hold back a good teacher, one with spiritual gifts to impart in abundance?

[St. Paul] touches on the obstacle preventing him from having fulfilled that intention, saying, and have been hindered hitherto either by the devil, who endeavors to prevent the preaching from which man’s salvation results: the north wind drives away rain (Prov 25:23), i.e., the doctrines of the preachers; or perhaps by God, according to whose nod the journeys and words of preachers are arranged: the clouds, i.e., preachers, scatter his lightning. They turn round and round by his guidance to accomplish all that he commands them(Job 37:11ff.).

But the Apostle wants them to know both these things for their own benefit, so that seeing his affection, they might receive his words with more reverence, and recognizing their own conduct as the obstacle hitherto preventing his visit, they might amend their lives. So the words of Isaiah express a punishment for sin: I will command the clouds to rain no rain upon it (Isa 5:6). (Rom.C1.L5.n91)

I want to hone in on that last point. St. Thomas shows that God, from time to time, restricts a Christian teacher from reaching a particular group of people. What could be the reason for withholding such a good gift?

St. Thomas explains that the combination of Paul’s expressed desire to come and the clear implication that God had not yet willed it to happen was meant to prick the consciences of the Romans and lead them to recognize something. It was not God’s fault, nor St. Paul’s fault, that he was unable to go to Rome to see the Christians. It was the fault of the Romans themselves. How was it their fault? It was a “punishment for sin” arising from “their own conduct.”

Focusing more specifically on the verse from Isaiah, it was quite common to interpret this as an act of judgment by God—namely, His refusal to send preachers (Hugh of St. Cher: Predicatoribus, qui terram Ecclesiae pluunt doctrinis, coruscant miraculis, tonant minis), something especially evident in the case of the Jews, as a punishment for their rejection of Christ and the Apostles (Gloss: Hoc post ascensionem Domini, quando nec prophetas habuerunt et apostolos repulerunt).

This is connected with the withholding of the “latter rain” in Jeremiah 3:2–3, where the prophet declares: “You would sit by the roads waiting for them like a thief in the desert; you have defiled the land with your fornications and your iniquities. Therefore, the drops of the rains were held back, and the latter rain was not given.”

This “rain” is interpreted by the authors as referring to the blessing of the Word of God given to the people (Gloss: ablata est scilicet omnium rerum benedictio, ut paterentur siccitatem sermonis Dei). Since the people had fallen into sin, God shut the mouths of preachers—a pattern that occurs throughout the history of the Church (Hugh of St. Cher: propter peccata populi saepe fit, ut Dominus claudat ora praedicatorum).

Turning to the verse from Job, we see that just as it is by the “command” of God that He judges a people by not sending them good preachers (i.e., “the clouds to rain no rain upon it”), so too it is by the gift of God that He raises up preachers to rain heavenly doctrine upon them (i.e., “by his guidance to accomplish all that he commands them”).

Yet, we hear more about this “rain of doctrine” in the prophetic books. After exhortations to return to the Lord by penance and moral reformation, Joel promises that

O children of Sion, rejoice, and be joyful in the Lord your God: because he hath given you a teacher of justice, and he will make the early and the latter rain to come down to you as in the beginning. (Joel 2:23)

Hosea speaks of the beneficial effects of such great chastisements of God, stating that the effect of these humiliations will be the return to God,

In their affliction they will rise early to me: Come, and let us return to the Lord: For he hath taken us, and he will heal us: he will strike, and he will cure us. He will revive us after two days: on the third day he will raise us up, and we shall live in his sight. We shall know, and we shall follow on, that we may know the Lord. His going forth is prepared as the morning light, and he will come to us as the early and the latter rain to the earth. (Hos. 6:1-3)

Zechariah exhorts us to pray for this latter rain, promising an abundance of rain which will come from this,

Ask ye of the Lord rain in the latter season, and the Lord will make snows, and will give them showers of rain, to every one grass in the field. (Zec. 10:1)

I could go on, as this theme is quite frequent in the prophetic books, as those who are familiar with them know quite well. In light of the prophetic books, read through the tradition of the Church, we are able to derive a few conclusions that guide us in living through a drought of the Word of God.

First Principle. The drought of the Word of God is a judgment for sin. God has clearly revealed, in passage after passage, that He withholds these great gifts from His people as a punishment for sin. It is not arbitrary. It is not “unfair.” It is our sin that brings this about.

Second Principle. God has promised to take away this punishment. In prophecy after prophecy, even in their harshest criticisms of the people and of the hierarchy, the prophets do not lose hope.

It is quite common in traditionalist circles to violate these first two principles.

First, many treat the crisis as though it were merely passive. They explain the material forces that have contributed to the drought without seeing things from the perspective of Divine Providence. They cry that the Assyrians have invaded, yet fail to see them as the “rod of my anger” (Is. 10:5).

Second, the crisis causes many to “blackpill.” It leads them into despair, convincing them that such a situation cannot and will not improve. It produces a message completely devoid of hope. The faithful are driven to despair, never hearing the promises of restoration that God has given to us if we turn back to Him. Many traditionalists see themselves as imitators of the prophets in calling out evil within the Church. Rightly so. Yet they do not always carry forward the full message of the prophets, which includes the hope of restoration.

Third Principle. God is the giver of the gift of the “rain of the Word.” The clouds give rain at the command of God. It is God who sends preachers, and it is to Him alone that we must have recourse during a drought of the Word.

Fourth Principle. God has attached the means of restoration to the judgment and to the penance of the people.

First, judgments are not given by God arbitrarily. There is some error, some sin He is rooting out. Hosea tells us that those suffering the pain of the drought will be driven to return to the Lord. Is this not what ought to happen in our current crisis? Did not God permit it as a means to restore His people, to restore His priests “whose lips guard knowledge”? In the history of the Church, it is often at the impetus of such judgments that great reforms occur. Why should we view our present crisis from any other perspective?

Second, the means of restoration are tied to the penance of the people. There is no secret method for resolving the crisis. God has judged us as unfaithful and is punishing us for our own good. How are we to overcome this? The prophets have already told us, and they have attached the promise of restoration to certain objective means: prayer and penance. “He hath taken us, and he will heal us: he will strike, and he will cure us.”

The means of Church politics and propagandizing (which God has used throughout the history of the Church) are effective only when God chooses to bring about His purposes through them. Otherwise, they fail. So how do they succeed? Through prayer and penance. That is the simple answer. Yet how much time is spent on propagandizing to resolve the crisis, compared to the time devoted to those spiritual exercises that God, through the mouth of His prophets, has promised will bring about its resolution?

There is a harmful assumption that many people have whenever a controversial issue like this is addressed: namely, that this is simply a “manualist” position, guided by the authors of third scholasticism in the period between the Vatican Councils.

While it is certainly true that a true and proper development occurred during this time, the motivations for these developments were not a departure from the past. First, these authors were guided by the rapid expansion of the use of the papal Magisterium, which went beyond the old _Bullarium_ form and developed into a papal Magisterium largely concerned with a proliferation of encyclicals and allocutions touching on nearly every issue imaginable. Second, these authors were guided by the rapid expansion of historical scholarship and new access to primary sources that had not been available under second scholasticism in the post-reformation period.

Some of these authors attempted to provide “new solutions to old problems” (many of which were later excluded by the Magisterium of the Church in the aforementioned encyclicals and allocutions). But on issues of central importance, it is clear that these authors simply repeated the teaching of the “old authors,” using the new tools at their disposal to provide a more secure foundation, both magisterially and scientifically.

Here, I want to provide the “classical” authors who comment on this issue (St. Robert Bellarmine and John of St. Thomas) in order to give you the foundational treatments that these later authors follow.

St. Robert Bellarmine

Source: De Romano Pontifice, lib. 4, c. 5 (From the Fr. Baker Translation)

The third proposition can be this: Not only can the Sovereign Pontiff not err in decrees of faith, but also he cannot err in precepts of morals, which are prescribed for the whole Church, and which are concerned with things necessary for salvation, or with things which are per se good or evil.

We are saying, first of all, that the Pontiff cannot err in those precepts which are prescribed for the whole Church, because as we said above, concerning precepts and particular judgments, it is not absurd that the Pontiff may err.

We add, secondly, which are concerned with things necessary for salvation, or with things which are per se good or evil, because it is not erroneous to say that the Pontiff in other laws can err, that is, by establishing a superfluous law, or one that is less discrete, etc.

Now we will explain the whole matter with some examples. It cannot happen that the Pontiff would err by prescribing some vice, like usury, or forbidding some virtue, like restitution, because these things are per se good or evil; and it cannot happen that he would err by prescribing something against salvation, like circumcision, or observing the Sabbath, or by forbidding something necessary for salvation, like Baptism or the Eucharist. But that he would command something which is neither good nor bad essentially, nor contrary to salvation but which is useless, or that he should prescribe it under a very severe penalty–it is not absurd to say that this could happen, although it is not the role of subjects to pass judgment on these matters, but simply to obey.

Now the proposition is proved, and first of all, that the Pope cannot err in precepts of morals necessary for salvation, because then the whole Church would be seriously injured, and she would err in necessary matters, which is contrary to the promise of the Lord in John 16:13: When the Spirit of truth comes, he will guide you into all the truth. This is to be understood (at the very least) to be about the truth necessary for salvation.

Secondly, because then God would be failing his Church in necessary matters, since he commanded her to follow the Pontiff, and he permits the Pontiff to err in necessary matters. But certainly if God is not lacking in any way concerning necessary matters, how much less regarding his Church?

Now it is proved that the Pontiff cannot err in morals that are per se good or evil. For then the Church could not truly be said to be holy, as it is called in the Apostles’ Creed. For, she is said to be holy especially because of the holy profession, as we have shown elsewhere, because indeed she proclaims a holy law and profession, which teaches nothing false, and prescribes nothing evil.

Secondly, because then necessarily she would also err concerning the faith. For, the Catholic faith teaches that every virtue is good, every vice is evil. But if the Pope erred by prescribing vices, or forbidding virtues, that is, by prescribing some work, which would really be evil, but not manifestly evil, or by forbidding a work of virtue, but not manifestly a work of virtue, the Church would be bound to believe that vices are good and virtues are evil, unless it wanted to sin against conscience. For in doubtful matters the Church is bound to accept the judgment of the Sovereign Pontiff, and do what he prescribes, and not to do what he forbids. And lest by chance she should act against conscience, she is bound to believe as good what he prescribes, and evil what he forbids.

John of St. Thomas

Source: Tractatus de Auctoritate Summi Pontificis, disp. 3, art. 3 (From Osvaldo R. on Academia)

WHETHER, IN PROMULGATING LAWS FOR THE UNIVERSAL CHURCH AND IN APPROVING RELIGIOUS ORDERS, THE POPE CAN ERR?

I. In this matter the common opinion of the theologians is that the Pope cannot err in the laws which he proposes to the universal Church and which are ordered to the common good. St. Antoninus, Part III, title 12, chapter 8, §2, teaches this as something of faith, and Cano, book 5 of De Locis, chapter 5, says that it is very close to faith. To these agree Fr. Bañez in the earlier commentaries on question 10, doubt 6; Molina, book 2 De Justitia, disputation 325; Bellarmine, book 4 De Romano Pontifice, chapter 5; Suarez, in his work De Fide, disputation 5, section 8, number 7; Torres, disputation 16, doubt 2, who especially attacks Cajetan on this point.

In order that this doctrine be more clearly understood, there are two opinions in this matter. The first is that of Cajetan, volume 2 of the Opuscula, treatise 6, chapter 2, where, treating of the contract of the Monte di Pietà and whether it is usurious, he holds that the determination of moral questions-such as whether this contract is usurious or not belongs incidentally and not simply to the Pope’s judgment, namely because to the Pope is promised all truth that is necessary for salvation, but not every naturally knowable or moral truth; if what is necessary is not necessarily known for some reason, or if it is not grasped by all, then it will pertain to the judgment of the Church. Hence he says that just as, in matters of faith, the authority of the Supreme Pontiff outweighs all reasoning, so above him in knowable matters reason, strengthened by the natural light, has precedence.

This is Cajetan’s opinion-not that which Torres, in the place to be cited, attributes to him, namely, that he said that the definition of Leo X in the Lateran Council, by which he defined the Monte di Pietà as not usurious, was not a definition of faith. Cajetan does not say this in that treatise, nor could he say it, since he wrote that treatise long before Leo X and the Lateran Council.

II. Magister Soto agrees with Cajetan in book 6 De Justitia, question 1, article 6, where he says that Leo X did not approve all the conditions of that contract of the Monte di Pietà, but only insofar as they were not contrary to the sacred canons; and he adds the same doctrine of Cajetan, that although the Pope has supreme authority for making laws, moral questions that are naturally knowable and that are not deduced from Sacred Scripture–such as whether such contracts are usurious or not–do not seem to pertain to the Pope. Soto adds, however, at the end of that article that it is not expedient that all usurious contracts be defined as matters of faith, if they are such, because they depend solely on philosophy, and the Holy Spirit intends only to expound Sacred Scripture to the Church and to sanction necessary laws. For this reason Soto seems to admit that in necessary laws the Church is infallibly guided by the Holy Spirit, just as Cajetan holds that the Holy Spirit teaches her all truths necessary to salvation. Thus, they do not seem to be opposed to the common opinion, nor should Torres have been so surprised by their doctrine.

III. Therefore the second and common opinion of theologians is that which we recounted at the beginning of this doubt. In order that its foundation be considered, it must be noted–what Fr. Suarez in the place cited and Fr. Bañez also remark–that it is not an inconvenience that the Pope can err in some circumstances of the laws that he establishes, for example, by multiplying precepts, or imposing excessive rigor or penalties; but he cannot err in the very substance and morality of the law, by sanctioning something contrary to honesty of morals or to natural or divine law.

Thus, in the laws proposed by the Church we can distinguish either their morality, as it were, on the side of their object, or their application to persons here and now, or their circumstances–for example, their rigor or penalties, and so on. These last two belong rather to prudence, to the application and direction of the law, than to its substance.

IV. We therefore say that in what pertains to the substance and morality of the law which the Pope proposes in common as a rule of morals to be followed, it would be heresy to assert that the Church can err, so that she would permit or command something pernicious or contrary to good morals or to natural or divine law. The foundation is that it belongs to the authority of the Pope to feed the sheep of Christ, who are fed not only with the doctrine of faith but also with the rules of morals; therefore, just as he cannot err in feeding the sheep as regards faith, so neither can he err in feeding them as regards rules of morals.

Hence the Lord said in Matthew 23: “The scribes and the Pharisees sit in the chair of Moses; therefore all things whatsoever they shall say to you, observe and do.” But to observe and do pertains to morals; therefore, if all those things are to be observed, it is necessary that they not be pernicious and contrary to law and good morals. Likewise, it is of faith that the Church is holy; therefore it must be that she does not err in rules of morals. For if she admitted something dishonest and evil as a rule, she would not be holy. If, however, the Church cannot err in rules of morals, neither can her universal head err in this respect, insofar as he is head; for the universal authority of the Church is in the head, and the Church must follow his doctrine.

Finally, rectitude of morals is no less necessary for salvation than certitude of faith; therefore, just as the Pope, by his supreme authority, cannot err in handing on certitude of faith, neither can he err in handing on moral rectitude. Just as, if in moral doctrine about the sacraments, such as the prohibition of giving Communion to the laity under both species, he erred, this would be a pernicious error; because if the religion of the sacraments, which depends on their cult, is destroyed, faith itself is destroyed.

V. Nevertheless, as to prudential application to individual persons or in judgments or about the circumstances of laws, there is no inconvenience that the Pope may err, because these depend in common on the fallible testimony of men, as St. Thomas teaches in Quodlibet 9, the last article. And it is clear from Scripture that the steward placed over the Church can be an unfaithful one, as is gathered from the parable in Matthew 24: “But if that evil servant shall say in his heart, ‘My lord is delayed, and shall begin to strike his fellow servants,” etc.; and in 1 Corinthians 4: “Let a man so account of us as of the ministers of Christ and stewards of the mysteries of God. Here now it is required among the stewards that a man be found faithful.” It is therefore not repugnant that in exercising his stewardship the Pope be unfaithful and imprudent; but stewardship pertains to application.

Finally, this is gathered from chapter Si Quando, De Rescriptis, where the Pope says: “Either reverently fulfill our mandate, or, through your letters, put forward a reasonable cause why you cannot fulfill it; for we will patiently endure if you do not do what has been suggested to us by a wicked insinuation.” From this text is founded the doctrine that it is lawful for subjects to petition the Pope not to receive certain laws issued by him, and thus it is presupposed that in these matters he can err imprudently on account of bad application, arising from ignorance or malice.

And in chapter A Nobis, number 2, De Sententia Excommunicationis, it is said that the judgment of the Church is sometimes led by opinion, which often deceives and is deceived. It is therefore clear that in imposing penalties or applying laws or in forensic judgments and in matters that depend on information or the truth of a fact, the Church can be deceived and therefore that the laws of the Pope are often derogated from or revoked by himself or by another Pope. In those laws, however, which are proposed to the whole Church–as those promulgated in a General Council or those incorporated into the body of canon law–a prudential error is more difficult to admit, because of the general approbation they have; and therefore they cannot be derogated from unless special mention is made of them, as is clearly gathered from chapter Ex Parte, De Capellis Monachorum, and chapter Finale, De Poenitentiis et Remissionibus, in the Sext; and this is the common opinion of the doctors whom Sanchez cites, book 1 De Matrimonio, disputation 26, number 7.

VI. From what has been said I infer that the Pope cannot err in the approbation of some religious order; and one who said the contrary would at least be considered rash and scandalous and proximate to error. For St. Thomas, in Opusculum 19, chapter 4, immediately before the solution of the arguments, says: “In canon law, Question 25, question 1, it is said that it is not lawful for anyone without peril to his state to presume to change the divine constitutions or the decrees of the Apostolic See. Therefore, since through the Apostolic See certain religious orders have been instituted, anyone who endeavors to condemn such a religious order clearly renders himself damnable.” So far St. Thomas.

What exactly St. Thomas understands by “damnable” he does not explain, but he seems to be speaking of a doctrine that is damnable, and thus at least proximate to error. Recent authors follow St. Thomas in the place cited above, and Azorius, volume 2, book 5, chapter 7, where he notes the temerity and erroneousness of the opposite against Magister Cano, book 5 De Locis, chapter 5, who very boldly asserts that some orders have been approved by the Church not only uselessly but even harmfully. But this is rightly subject to censure.

The foundation is taken from what has been said: for, in approving some religious order, the Church proposes it to all the faithful as a rule and way of perfection, in such a way that it is free to anyone to follow it, not only as something pertaining to the common precepts but as pertaining to the counsels and to perfection. Therefore, if the Pope erred in such approbation by proposing something harmful and useless as a true and legitimate rule of religious perfection, the Church would be deceived in a matter of great importance; because something would be proposed to all the faithful as a rule of holiness, whereas there would be no holiness in it. For any faithful can enter a religion that has been approved, as a certain way of perfection.

But it would be a great inconvenience that something be proposed as an exemplar of holiness and as a rule of perfection to the whole Church and to anyone who wishes to enter it, in which perfection is not found, but rather something harmful; just as it would be an inconvenience that someone be proposed as a saint who is not a saint, since he is proposed as an exemplar to be imitated by the whole Church. In the same way a religious order is proposed as a rule to be followed by all, and whoever enters it professes perfection. It would therefore be a great inconvenience that something of this kind be proposed which is in fact harmful and does not tend to perfection. And this conclusion is to be understood, like the one set forth above concerning the approbation of religions, as to their substance–not only as regards the three substantial vows, but also as regards the goodness and morality of the rule itself and of the statutes approved for it as conducive to perfection–whatever may be the case about the circumstances of religious orders or their multiplicity, which are not in themselves connected with the substance and goodness of an approved religion.

SOLUTIONS TO THE ARGUMENTS

VII. You will object, against the conclusion set forth above, with the argument of Cajetan and Soto: that only what is deduced from Sacred Scripture or apostolic traditions–that is, from the written or handed-down word of God–pertains to the infallible judgment of the Pope; for what is not contained in these sources, at least implicitly and in itself, cannot be defined explicitly and for us. But moral laws, as regards their goodness and morality, are not deduced from Scripture or apostolic tradition but from physical and moral reason and from the nature of such things; and such laws are promulgated by the Pope according to occasions and times. Therefore, the definition concerning such laws–that they are good and that no error can be mixed into them–does not make it a matter of faith that there can be no error in them.

VIII. And the argument is confirmed because, in this reasoning, we said that canonization of saints is not of faith, no matter how much the Pope defines it, because it is not a definable matter nor deducible from Scripture or from the tradition of the saints as regards this particular person who is declared a saint. Therefore, likewise, it will not be certain and of faith that a particular law–or any other law, which has been promulgated by the Pope–contains no error.

IX. The answer is that it is true that the Pope cannot define anything as of faith unless it is contained in Scripture or tradition; for the Pope cannot establish a new faith, nor are new revelations made to him; he can only explain those things that are contained in the faith and propose those things as of faith for us. For this reason there is a sure rule that those things which are not deduced from Scripture or apostolic tradition cannot be defined as of faith; and this is, as it were, a certain sign for knowing whether something is defined as matter of faith or not–namely, whether it is defined as deduced from Scripture or tradition.

Nevertheless, Magister Cano, book 5 of De Locis, chapter 5, §Nonne igitur, adds other signs for recognizing what in the definitions of councils is to be taken as matter of faith, such as if those who say the opposite are judged heretics, or if it is commanded that what is defined is to be received under anathema, or if it is expressly said to be to be accepted as dogma of faith by Catholics, or if the opposite is judged to be contrary to the Gospel or apostolic tradition.

X. This being supposed, in the present case we say that the Pope, in moral matters, can proceed in two ways. In one way, only by commanding some law and proposing it to the Church as a rule. In another way, by declaring in particular some moral matter, for example, that such a contract is evil or good and that such matter is a sin or not.

When the Pope proceeds in the first way, he does not define as of faith, nor does he define in that law a determinate matter as true; but only this is of faith, that the morality of such a precept or rule is not evil; and this is of faith in virtue of that universal principle: that whatever is set forth ex cathedra must be observed and done, and because the sanctity of the Church cannot fail and consequently neither can moral rectitude, which depends on law. Thus, in the same way, it is of faith that “every man is mortal” and that “this man is mortal.”

In the same way, it is of faith that every moral law of the Pope is good and that the morality of this particular law is good, although the matter that is commanded is not defined as true in particular as something to be believed. For truth is one thing, morality another; the latter is certainly not evil, whereas nothing is defined about the truth of the matter.

When, however, the Pope proceeds in the second way, then he defines concerning the truth of that morality, namely by determining that this is a sin or not, that this is a simoniacal or usurious contract, and so on. Although this depends in large part on natural principles of law, it does not depend on them precisely insofar as they are natural, but also insofar as they are handed down in the Decalogue, in Scripture, and in those things that are said in Scripture about usury or simony. For from those principles, according to the understanding of the Church and of the saints, it is deduced how this or that is usurious or simoniacal, sinful or right; and thus we deny that it is deduced from purely philosophical principles, but rather from those contained in Sacred Scripture.

For Sacred Scripture contains principles of morality, both in the Decalogue and in the Law and in the doctrine of the Gospel, where many moral precepts are taught; and from conformity with those principles it is deduced that something is of good or evil morality.

XI. To the confirmation it is answered that the matter of canonization of saints is not sanctity or moral rectitude absolutely and in itself, but as applied to this person, who is determined and judged to be holy because of the good works which he is proven to have done; and although concerning sanctity or moral rectitude in general it is possible to give certitude of not erring as something of faith, nevertheless concerning rectitude in particular and as applied to this person there cannot be such certitude; it suffices that it pertain indirectly and in a reduced way to faith, as we explained in the preceding article. The reason is that the rectitude of a moral law is rectitude in general, since law only determines it in universal; such rectitude and sanctity in general can be immediately deduced from Scripture, and error in that matter would be contrary to the sanctity of the Church herself, which depends on the law she follows. The application, however, of such rectitude to this or that person in particular can neither be deduced immediately and of itself from Scripture nor does it pertain in this way to the sanctity of the Church as a whole, but is, as it were, an example left to the Church for imitation.

XII. Second it is objected that various popes seem to have erred in handing on some laws contrary to good morals or to divine law. For in chapter Cum Essent, De Testamentis, Pope Alexander III says that it is foreign to divine law and to the institutions of the holy Fathers and the custom of the Church that wills should not be valid unless they are made before seven witnesses; and yet this is established as a custom among many Catholic nations. Likewise, in chapter Licet, De Sponsa Duorum, the same Alexander III determines that after a woman has been married to someone by legitimate consent she cannot marry another; and if she does and carnal intercourse follows, she must be separated: “Although,” he says, “our predecessors judged otherwise.” Therefore his predecessors erred in this.

Moreover, it is clear that the second marriage cannot stand while the first husband lives. Likewise, Pope Stephen VI invalidated all the acts of Pope Formosus, his predecessor, and commanded those ordained by him to be ordained again–which is to have an opinion contrary to the sacrament of orders.

XIII. Lastly, in chapter Per Venerabilem, who the legitimate children are, the Pope teaches that the law of Deuteronomy is not abrogated, which is false; and in chapter Laudabilem, De Conversione Infidelium, it is said that Pope Coelestine III determined that by the heresy of one spouse the marriage is dissolved. And in the Extravagant Exiit, De Verborum Significatione, Pope Nicholas IV defines that perfect poverty, which Christ followed, does not admit ownership of goods either in common or in particular. The contrary of this is taught by Pope John XXII in the Extravagant Ad Conditorem and the Extravagant Quia Quorundam, and he defines it to be heretical to say that Christ taught such poverty. Therefore one of these popes erred, and consequently our conclusion remains overturned both in fact and from our own experience.

XIV. The answer is that in the texts cited nothing is taught as law that is contrary to good morals. For in chapter Cum Essent, De Testamentis, nothing contrary to moral goodness is taught: it is indeed foreign to divine law that seven witnesses be required for a will as something necessary–not because it is contrary to it, but because it is not from it nor very conformable to it, although it is not contrary; and therefore the Pope reproves that custom of seven witnesses. Nor is it repugnant that a custom once reproved later revive and prevail among some nation.

Some canonists, however, say that in that text the Pope is speaking only of wills in pious causes or with regard to those who are temporally subject to the Roman Church, not of all the faithful. But they still must explain how the Pope says that this is foreign to divine law.

In chapter Licet, De Sponsa Duorum, the Pope does not explain how his predecessors judged otherwise–whether because they so judged according to their private opinion and explanation as private persons, or whether they judged in this way as issuing sentence ex cathedra; likewise, whether they judged differently in the substance itself of the matter in question or in some accidental matter, for example, in the mode of making the separation of the second marriage or compelling the woman to return to the first. Therefore we can say that those predecessors either thought differently only according to private judgment and not according to law, or thought differently only in some accidental matter.

XV. As to the act of Stephen against Pope Formosus, it is answered that Stephen did not err in handing on any law, but only in fact, because from hatred of Formosus he wanted to ordain again those ordained by him, as he said, simoniacally, or because he thought that they had not been rightly ordained as to the substance of the sacrament, or because, in hatred of Formosus or of his simony, he did this; and if he did wrong, he nevertheless did not hand on any law or definition about this. Thus it was only a personal sin. The invalidation of all the acts of Formosus was also a defect in fact, not in a law promulgated by him.

To what is said in chapter Per Venerabilem, the answer is that the Pope does not say that the ancient law is absolutely not abrogated, but that Deuteronomy, because it is the first law, must be observed–that is, fulfilled–in the New Testament, especially in those things which are there figured, as he shows by the passage of chapter 17 which he cites: he clearly speaks, as to the letter, of that testimony of Deuteronomy 17: “If you see a difficult and ambiguous judgment, go up to the place which the Lord your God will choose,” etc.; and he says that this is also to be understood of the Apostolic See. Therefore Deuteronomy is not observed in the New Testament by the force of that law, as if it now remained, but because many things decreed there are moral laws or figures of things that are to be fulfilled in the New Testament. It is clear, however, from the doctrine of St. Thomas, First Part of the Second Part, question 104, article 3, that only those precepts of that law which were figurative and ceremonial fail in the New Testament; the moral and judicial precepts, and those things which were signified by those figures, could not fail. What, therefore, is decreed in Deuteronomy must be observed in the New Testament, as it were, by fulfillment or imitation, not by the force and obligation of the law, when the Lord says: “I have not come to destroy the law but to fulfill it.”

XVI. As to what is alleged from chapter Laudabilem–that the marriage is dissolved by the heresy of one spouse–this is not found in that text, although it is said that this was once contained in the ancient decretals and that Castro says he saw it in book 1 De Haeresibus, chapter 4. Perhaps, however, because that text was not Pope Coelestine’s, or was not received as a pronouncement ex cathedra, but only as his private judgment, it was removed from the decretals.

Finally, as to what is alleged from Pope John XXII, the answer is taken from the doctrine of Turrecremata, book 2 De Ecclesia, chapter 112, and Bellarmine, book De Romano Pontifice, chapter 14, where the statements of those popes are reconciled. They explain that in what Pope Nicholas IV thought, namely that the poverty which possesses nothing in common or in particular is more perfect and meritorious, he defined nothing; he only explained his own opinion. John XXII did not directly impugn this, but only renounced the right that the Roman Pontiff was said to have to possess all the goods of the Friars Minor.

As to what is said about the poverty of Christ, Nicholas and John do not disagree. Nicholas says that Christ sometimes followed that poverty in which nothing is possessed in common or in particular, and sometimes admitted ownership in common, because “Judas carried the money bag.” John XXII asserts that it is heretical to say that Christ never had anything of his own; and this is very true and not contrary to the earlier assertion.

XVII. Lastly, it is objected that the excessive number of religious orders induces great confusion in the Church of God, as is said expressly in chapter Finale, De Religiosis Domibus, and the same is found in chapter Primo of the same title in the Sext. Therefore many religious orders are approved uselessly and harmfully; otherwise, their multiplication would not cause great confusion. Likewise, the rules of many orders have been approved which afterwards have been rejected by the Apostolic See itself, as the order of the Fraticelli, approved by Pope Coelestine V, was revoked by a privilege of Pope Boniface VIII in the Extravagant Sancta Romana, De Religiosis Domibus; and the order of the Humiliati was suppressed by Pope Pius V in a particular bull; the order of the Templars by Pope Clement V, and similarly others have been condemned. Therefore, in approving the rules of such orders it is not certain that the Pope cannot err; otherwise they would not have been abrogated without reason.

Introduction

Lately, I have been getting quite a few questions about the nature of the infallibility of the disciplinary (and liturgical) decrees of the Church. Many of surprised to learn that it is Catholic doctrine that the Church not only can teach the “primary object” of Revelation infallibly, but also can and does present certain “secondary objects” of Revelation with infallibly, usually enumerated by the theologians as “theological conclusions,” “dogmatic facts,” “disciplinary decrees,” “the constitutions of religious orders,” and “the canonization of saints.”

While many are aware of the endless quarreling between individuals over the infallibility of canonizations (cf., my video here), the other areas in which the Church claims infallibility are largely unexplored in our circles. Notoriously, these other objects of infallibility are quite unknown outside of those with a unique interest in ecclesiology. For example, I distinctly remember many conversations with Protestant and Catholic students of theology who are genuinely shocked when I tell them about the infallibility of dogmatic facts.

The recent questions (and quarrels) about the secondary objects of infallibility concern the infallibility of disciplinary decrees, which is quite easily misunderstood. I do not wish to “jump in the fray” of such debates. Perhaps it is far better to write something that can be of use beyond the limited circumstances of these debates. Beyond this, in imitation of our devout fathers in the faith, during this holy season of Lent, we ought to rightly observe “God’s truce,” keeping a serenity incompatible with public disputation. Absent a more explicit and concrete treatment of the issue and the refutation of specific arguments of those who oppose the Church, I trust that sanctified reason saturated by prayers for the Divine Light will guide you in applying these principles.

Question I. What is a Secondary Object of Infallibility?

Answer. A secondary object of infallibility refers to those objects presented by the Church that are not infallible for their own sake (primarily and directly), but for the sake of something else (secondarily and indirectly). These are the so-called “second paragraph” truths of the professio fidei. In the 1983 Code, there were originally no corresponding canons that related truths of this nature. Yet, this lacuna was resolved by St. John Paul II in his Apostolic Constitution Ad tuendam fidem, which expanded CIC 750 and 1371 (with corresponding changes to the Eastern Code of Canon Law). The CDF explained in more detail the issue in the Doctrinal Commentary on the Concluding Formula of the Professio fidei that accompanied the changes.

Generally, the relevant magisterial texts will refer to those “historically or logically” connected with the deposit of faith. Hence, these objects are not, in themselves, necessary as the primary objects are, but are necessary due to their connection with something else. Hence, for example, the primacy of the Roman Pontiff is something that is a primary object of infallibility. As a matter of faith, it can be said to be necessary to adhere to for its own sake. Yet, what good would be adherence to the primacy of the Roman Pontiff if we did not know who the Roman Pontiff is? Hence, the personal identity of the Roman Pontiff is not necessary for its own sake (directly and primarily), but for the sake of upholding something that is a matter of faith (i.e., the primacy of the Roman Pontiff).

These must be general facts necessary for upholding some primary object. Hence, whether this eucharist is valid or that pastor has legally acquired jurisdiction are not general facts necessary for upholding some primary object. Thus, these are quite obviously fallible. On the other hand, due to the universal necessity of adhering to the Roman Pontiff (or some Ecuemnical Council), there is a strict and universal necessity in that identity in order to uphold the primary object. It suffices for me to have general moral certitude of things like the validity of the sacraments I am receiving, but infallibility is required for the identity of the Roman Pontiff. Hence, while both are “secondary objects” insofar as it bears some relation to the deposit of faith, only the one consists of secondary objects of infallibility insofar as it is general rather than particular. (For more about this, cf. Fr. Francisco Marin-Sola’s Homogeneous Evolution of Catholic Dogma, Ch. V, Sec. 3).

Hence, we can make a three-fold distinction, primary objects, secondary objects, and non-objects. The first can always be judged by the Church in an infallible manner. The second can always be judged by the Church (e.g., the Church can investigate and judge whether this priest has been validly ordained), but only infallibly when it has some general bearing (e.g., the Church can infallibly judge whether such and such a sacramental form in this priest’s ordination is valid). The third does not fall within the scope of the Church’s judgement. Hence, Ven. Pius XII teaches that such an object “that neither directly nor indirectly touches faith or morals…the Church leaves to the free discussion of experts.” (Humani generis, n. 30)

Salaverri distinguishes secondary objects into three kinds: “A. Speculative truths logically connected either consequently [i.e., theological conclusions] or in a presupposed way with the revealed truths [i.e., preambles of faith]; B. Dogmatic facts whether simply such [e.g., the Council of Trent] or especially doctrinal [e.g., the heresy of Jasenius’ propositions]; C. Dispositive decrees about discipline in general, and in particular on the canonization of Saints and on the approbation of religious Orders, which are said to be connected with revealed truths in a purposeful way, because they help very much to obtain the end of revelation which is the sanctification of souls.” (Sacrae Theologiae Summa, De Ecclesia, n. 700)

Here, we treat those of the third category. These dispositive decrees are either general dispositive decrees (e.g., the Breviary, the Code of Canon Law, etc.), the canonization of saints, or the approbation of Religious Orders. It is important to note the reason or foundation for this infallibility since this will restrict the scope of the infallibility by the principle that the necessity of the end restricts the necessity of the means. Since the end of such dispositive decrees is “the sanctification of souls,” the restriction of the means will follow suit, as I will explain below. This is quite distinct from the infallibility that we consider in speculative truths or dogmatic facts, which has the truth of the matter as its object.

Question II. What is a Disciplinary Decree?

Answer. A disciplinary decree is a precept that is given by the Church intended to direct the life of the faithful. These can either be universal or particular depending on either the authority who promulgates such a decree or those persons for whom the decree is intended. Further, such decrees can either be positive, as issuing a command, or negative, as giving a certain permission.

First, a decree can be positive and universal. Such are commands issued for the universal Church that directs the faithful in general to order their lives in such a way. An example of such a universal positive decree is the canonizations of saints for the universal Church. Further examples would the editio typica of the various different liturgical books of the Church and the Code of Canon Law.

NOTE: It is important to note here a distinction that will come up later. As to the universality, we are also adding a certain supremacy. It is not enough for an authority that is universal to issue some decree (e.g., a Roman Congregation), but also that the authority be supreme both in agent (the Roman Pontiff or Ecumenical Council) and in a supreme mode (as a command with the relevant promises and penalties). In many cases, certain acts are understood as universal due to one or another factor, yet not in its full sense.

Second, a decree can be positive and particular. Such are commands issued either by the universal Church intended only for a particular part of the faithful or by a certain particular authority in the Church for his part of the Church. An example of the former is the old form of canonizations by the Pope for particular areas of the Church (e.g., the canonization of St. Simon of Trent for the diocese of Trent, Bl. Charlemagne for the diocese of Aachen, etc.) and of the latter is the current practice of the declaration of a servant of God by the Bishop of a diocese or a penitential day approved by an episcopal conference or ordinary. As to liturgical books, an example of the former would be translations of the official liturgical books promulgated by the universal Church, which are approved by Rome, yet only intended for a particular portion of the faithful. An example of the latter would be a certain devotional work written by a Bishop or Episcopal conference for use in ecclesiastical functions.

Third, a decree can be negative and universal. Such commands are not, properly speaking, commands, but only give permission for a certain practice to exist in the universal Church. Properly speaking, this is the nature of beatifications which allow for the veneration of such a saint in the universal Church without commanding the act of veneration (which formally constitutes canonization, according to Pope Benedict XIV, cf. Pesch, Praelectiones Dogmaticae, Tom. I, Pt. II, n. 547). Here, it seems to me one could place the various liturgical practices officially permitted for the universal Church which are not commanded by the Church (e.g., communion on the hand, altar girls, Fiducia supplicans, etc.). It is important to remember that the official permission given for these acts are to be distinguished from any tacit permission or toleration that may arise.

It seems like there is a strong connection as to the second and third categories of decrees. This is evidenced, for example, by Benedict XIV’s comment that the “old form” of particular canonizations (referring to St. Simon of Trent) is equivalent juridically to a beatification (as, consequently, permitting such for the universal Church under the proper conditions).

Fourth, a decree can be negative and particular. These are permissions either given by the Holy See for a particular area of the Church or by a particular authority for his area of competence. Examples of these would include the various different fasting indults given by either the universal authority or by particular authorities.

The material division of such decrees are given by Salaverri: “Disciplinary decrees in general are: either a) juridical, which are ordained to determine, enforce and vindicate the rights and offices of the faithful; or b) liturgical, which are prescribed to order divine worship and the administration of holy things; or c) magisterial, which are disposed to promote ecclesiastical instruction and to moderate the preaching of evangelical doctrine.” (ibid., n. 704)

Most theologians only give a material distinction between juridical and liturgical decrees (cf., the many theologians below).

Question III. How are these Protected by the Holy Spirit?

Answer. Infallibility refers to a certain incapability to err. Now, when we usually use the term, we are referring particularly to the inability to to err in the truth of something. When we say “the hypostatic union is an infallible dogma,” we mean that it is a truth of faith that is infallibly true. Do we mean the same thing when speaking about the infallibility of disciplinary decrees? Not exactly. We are referring to its inability to err for its particular end. As we saw above, the end of a disciplinary decree is the sanctification of souls. Hence, the infallibility of disciplinary decrees is particularly an ability to provide those means that objectively lack what is ordinarily necessary for the sanctification of souls and to avoid those mean that objectively contradict those means necessary for the sanctification of souls.

NOTE: Admittedly, most theologians simply reiterate the latter kind of infallibility (of a negative sort) and only mention the former kind of infallibility (of a positive kind) in passing.

To better understand this teaching, it is helpful to give a three-fold distinction between infallibility as to the end, objective infallibility as to safety, and subjective infallibility as to safety.

When we refer to “safety” we are speaking of something positive rather than something simply negative. For something to be “unsafe” is to provide harmful means to some end. If I do not give the proper directions to the grocery store, I am simply lacking the means to the end, I am providing a simple negation. If I give directions to the store that goes over a mountain pass that could easily kill the passenger, I am adding something positive that is incompatible with the end.

Hence, when we specifically speak of the infallibility of disciplinary decrees, we are referring to the infallibility of the end, i.e., that such disciplinary decrees provide those means necessary for the end of ordinary sanctity and, consequently, lack those means objectively contrary to the end. It is important to remember that there are disciplinary decrees that specify the end further, e.g., the approval of religious orders goes beyond ordinarity sanctity, approving that their rules are also apt for perfection, “the way of living according to a certain Rule is commended as apt to acquire perfection according to the evangelical counsels.” (Salaverri, ibid., n. 706) On the other hand, when we speak of infallible safety, we neither affirm nor deny that such means are there, but at least exclude those means which work against the end intended by the decree. The former includes the latter, but not vice versa.

Further, we can distinguish between that safety which is objective and that safety which is subjective. For something to be objectively safe is for that thing to be free from dangers positively excluding the end, abstracted from considerations of conscience. For something to be subjectively safe is for that thing to be free from those dangers positively excluding the end when considered in union with the rules of conscience.

Here, we must be especially careful to consider this question in accordance with the objective laws of conscience in mind and with that which is clear and certain from the teaching of the Church.

First Conclusion. It is certain that the infallibility as to the end must be affirmed for positive and universal disciplinary decrees.

This first conclusion is the primary object of this article. When the theologians speak of the “infallibility of disciplinary decrees,” they do not refer to any disciplinary decree whatsoever, nor any disciplinary decree that comes from the Holy See, nor any positive disciplinary decree that comes from the Holy See whatsoever. Rather, the theologians refer specifically to those disciplinary decrees that are both positive and universal, such as the editio typica of the liturgical books promulgated and approved for the use of the entire Church.

Further, they do not mean any infallibility whatsoever, but only the infallibility as to the end intended, i.e., that the means sufficient for the end will be present in such liturgical books.

Further, the establishment of such decrees are formally an act of the power of ruling, although it supposes the power of teaching insofar as the disciplinary decrees are commands to do certain acts that touch faith or morals. Hence, following this, Salaverri teaches that these decrees must both be licit (neither conta legem, nor praeter legem, but positively iuxta legem, i.e., in St. Thomas’ classification, neither against the law of a higher power, nor outside the scope of their power, but within their power) and free from errors against faith or morals: “a) the Church has the power to prescribe all of them, b) that the observation of the universal precepts of the Church is in harmony with the doctrine of faith and morals and suitable for obtaining the end of the Church.” (ibid., n. 703)

Lastly, as pointed out by Schultes and Dorsch, we speak of the law substantially, rather than modally. Hence, Schultes lists the accommodation of the law to circumstances, the proportion of penalties, the application of the law, and the execution of the law as modal properties (cf., below). Dorsch also lists the factual presuppositions in making the law (e.g., whether there needs to be a reform of such and such a law, whether such crimes are actually occuring, etc.)

The theologians commonly prove this thesis with two arguments, a priori from theological principles and a posteriori that the Church has actually claimed such a prerogative for herself.

First Argument. “The end of the infallible Magisterium demands those things that are necessary in order to obtain the end for the life of the faithful in the Church without error. But in order to obtain the end for the life of the faithful in the Church without error, infallibility concerning the disciplinary decrees purposefully connected with the truths of revelation is necessary. Therefore, the end of the infallible Magisterium demands infallibility concerning the disciplinary decrees in general, which are purposefully connected with revealed truths.” (ibid., n. 722)

Second Argument. The magisterium has claimed such infallibility in a number of different cases.

Generally, Pius VI in Auctorum fidei, condemning the errors of the Synod of Pistoia, writes the following: “The prescription of the synod…includes and submits to a prescribed examination even the discipline established and approved by the Church, as if the Church which is ruled by the Spirit of God could have established discipline which is not only useless and burdensome for Christian liberty to endure, but which is even dangerous and harmful and leading to superstition and materialism,—false, rash, scandalous, dangerous, offensive to pious ears, injurious to the Church and to the Spirit of God by whom it is guided, at least erroneous.” (D 2678)

Particularly, we have the condemnation of the Greeks against inclusion of the Filioque in the Creed (D 691), the condemnations of the Hussites (D 1200, 1258) and Protestants (D 1728-1732) against communion in one kind, and the various different decrees of Trent on the rites and ceremonies of the mass (D 1613, 1645, 1657, 1745, 1746, 1757).

Although, this can be easily demonstrated unto the age of the Fathers by simply pointing to the numerous cases (Infant Baptism, Purgatory, etc.) where the universal discipline of the Church was used to demonstrate the truth of a matter of faith.

Objection. Were there not errors in the Roman Breviary?

Reply. With Benedict XVI (De servorum Dei beatificatione et beatorum canonizatione, lib. IV, part II, cap. XIII, nn. 7–8) and Benedict XIII (Dissertatio de Reliquiis S. Bartholomaei, art. VII), I reply by distinguishing, errors of fact, conceded, errors of faith or morals, denied.

Although, from this, it is not to be concluded that the Roman Breviary lacks all authority in such matters. As Benedict XIII relates, “the Roman Breviary is indeed of the greatest authority in those things which of themselves pertain to ecclesiastical worship; yet it is of lesser authority in private facts or deeds which are reported incidentally in the lives of the saints, so that no efficacious argument can be drawn from them, especially where more ancient monuments are opposed. For the Church itself, which uses them, does not judge whatever is inserted in its Breviaries to be of unshaken and infallible truth, since many times it has changed and corrected them for various times and occasions.” (ibid.)

For supposed errors concerning the application of Extreme Unction and the “rigorism” of the penitential system, cf. Straub, De Ecclesia Christi, vol. 2, th. 25, cor. 1-2

Second Conclusion. It is certain that subjective infallibility of safety must be affirmed for all positive disciplinary decrees, whether universal or particular, in accordance with the laws of conscience.

In order to properly understand this conclusion, it is important to remember the laws of conscience. It is safe to follow authority when one does not have a perception of the objective discordance between the precept of the authority and the precept of some higher authority. Disciplinary laws must follow these laws as well, at least providing for subjective safety when there is no discordance pressing the conscience.

Such is confirmed by the common opinion of moralists and formulated in two principles.

First, we ought to obey all those commands “in which no species of sin can be judged to be present.” (St. Ignatius of Loyola, Constitutions)

NOTE: It is important to remember that one is not obligated to obey in those indifferent matters (praeter legem) where the power of the prelate does not extend, even while obedience is the safer option. St. Thomas teaches this in many places, “the subject is neither bound to obey nor bound not to obey,” (Sent.II.D44.Q2.A2) “a subject is not bound to obey his superior if the latter command him to do something wherein he is not subject to him.” (ST.II-II.Q104.A5)

Second, that even when obedience to such commands (i.e., those commands where we do not judge sin to be present since “we must obey God rather than men” Acts 5:29 and “the dictate of conscience binds more than the precept of a prelate” Sent.II.D39.Q3.A3.Rep3) involves sins in the objective order, obedience frees us from incurring sin in the subjective order. Hence the principle of Bl. Denys that “in dubiis, an sit contra Præceptum Dei, standum est præcepto prælati; quia, etsi contra Deum, attamen propter obedientise bonum non peccat subditus.” (In 2 Sent., d. 39, q. 3)

As Bl. Denys the Carthusian (ibid.) and St. Alphonsus Liguori (Theologia Moralis, bk. I, tr. I, ch. I, n. 12-13) extensively prove, this is the common teaching of the saints and theologians.

Objection. It seems odd to refer to such a principle as in any way “infallible” since in the thesis and explanation it is clearly admitted that there is a possibility of error.

Reply. It is conceded that such language is less proper. It can only be said to be infallible sub conditione, i.e., if sin is not perceived by the conscience of the one acting. Yet, despite how unclear the language may be, it is the terminology commonly used, thus it is used by accommodation.

Third Conclusion. It seems that it could only be probable that objective infallibility of safety could be affirmed for universal negative disciplinary decrees, yet it seems more likely that such is absent.

Here, it is very easy to confuse the objective infallibility of safety claimed for doctrinal judgements by certain theologians with an objective infallibility of safety for negative disciplinary decrees. Yet, there is a lack of parity between the two.

Negative disciplinary decrees can be motivated by two reasons. First, certain negative disciplinary decrees tolerate errors. Second, other negative disciplinary decrees are meant to also give a quasi-positive judgement that there is a freedom from error.

As to the former, it is obviously impossible to claim any sort of objective infallibility of safety since the very object of the disciplinary decree is to tolerate an error so that greater evils do not arise (as, e.g., a Catholic state may tolerate a certain false religion due to the evils which may arise from the removal of the religion).

As to the latter, it is possible to claim some charism that frees the Church from erring in her quasi-positive judgement that declares such disciplines free from errors against faith or morals. Yet, it seems more appropriate to treat whether or not such a charism exists when treating the doctrinal judgements of the Church since such judgements seem formally doctrinal.

Fourth Conclusion. It is certain that objective infallibility of safety is absent from particular negative disciplinary decrees.

If what is said in the third conclusion is kept in mind, then the fourth conclusion follows clearly and obviously. While it is possible (and some say probable) that there is some sort of charism defending the quasi-positive non-supreme judgements of a universal nature, such a charism has never been claimed for particular decrees and can with certainty be judged as absent.

This should be clear from a number of different examples, e.g., the almost infinite number of books given a nihil obstat or imprimatur, many of which contradict each other in the doctrine taught, both of which obviously could not be true. Or, the number of different local disciplines eventually condemned by the Church. Etc.

Scholium. On the Prudence of Universal and Positive Disciplinary Decrees

In order to avoid confusion, it is necessary to add a caveat that many students of ecclesiology may miss at first, although this will be mentioned at length in the quotes below.

While it is true that the doctrinal judgement connected with certain disciplinary decrees is infallible, it is not true that the prudential judgement connected with disciplinary decrees is infallible. The former considers the substance of the law and the latter considers the modal properties of the law. As an example from recent Papal news, if Alejandro Labaka is canonized, it would obviously be an abominable act, giving scandal to the faithful by his shameless behavior, yet as a doctrinal judgement, declaring that such and such a man is in heaven, it would be correct. As Salaverri states in relation to religious orders, “the concern is with a doctrinal judgment, whereby it is decreed: that such a way of living, looked at in itself, is suitable for acquiring evangelical perfection, and that this judgment cannot be wrong. It is not a question of a prudential judgment, concerning the opportunity or convenience, because of the extrinsic circumstances of admitting or permitting some Religious Order…” (ibid., n. 728)

Note that this is proportional with the end of each judgement, so that you do not misunderstand this quote. The end is the “cause of causes” and determines the substance of the precept. The canonization declares infallibly that such a saint is in heaven, and then worthy of our veneration (although, there are various secondary objects, which ought to be treated in another place). The approval of religious orders declares infallibly that such a rule is apt to acquire evangelical perfection. Disciplinary decrees in general are lawful acts that order the faithful to the profession of the true faith and the exercise of charity. The nature of the freedom from error is proportional to the primary end to which the act is ordered, while it may fail in certain secondary ends, such as its extrinsic suitability.

Excursus. Various Treatments by Theologians

Here, it is helpful to bring together the various different definitions given by theologians so that we can illuminate principles by authority. While I have followed Salaverri closely as a reference text widely known and easily accessible, other sources have not been lacking in my study of the issue.

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Introduction to the rules by which one is able to know which sins are mortal and which are venial

“Do not any unjust thing in judgment, in rule, in weight, or in measure” (Lev. 19:35). Vices frequently put on the appearance of virtues, and things which are deadly are regarded as wholesome. For the most cunning enemy, those whom he cannot deceive through evident evils, he attempts to ensnare and overcome through apparent goods. This assault and this work belong to the noonday demon, as Bernard says, who (as the Apostle testifies) “transformeth himself into an angel of light” (2 Cor. 11:14; cf. Ps. 90:6). Therefore it is necessary, both for confessors and for penitents, and especially for preachers of the word of God, that they be able to discern which sins are mortal, in what way, and for what reason, according to certain and solid rules. For this reason, concerning this matter, I shall now introduce certain orderly rules, as judicial laws, insofar as the Lord shall grant it.

FIRST RULE: Whatever is contrary to the natural law is, according to its genus (*ex suo genere*), a mortal sin; although at times, on account of the smallness of the act or the prevention or surprise of reason, it may be venial, as also happens in other sins which are mortal according to its genus (*ex suo genere*).

The natural law is that which right and well-disposed purely natural reason dictates to all. This law, as regards its affirmative precepts, is expressed in Matthew, where the Savior says: “All things therefore whatsoever you would that men should do to you, do you also to them” (Matt. 7:12). But as regards the negative precepts, it is found in Tobias, where it is read: “See thou never do to another what thou wouldst hate to have done to thee by another” (Tob. 4:16). Nevertheless, this negative prohibition is sufficiently understood within that affirmative precept uttered by Christ. Hence, as has been stated above (art. 3, 8, 18, 19), Thomas and other doctors affirm that a sin is mortal if it is against the law, whether it be against the written law or the natural law. And in Book 2, Distinction 42, Durandus writes that every sin is against the natural law, or the inspired law, or one derived from them. Finally, according to the holy Doctors, the written law and even the evangelical law presuppose and are founded upon the natural law, and add certain things to it; therefore the natural law binds under mortal sin. Moreover, the natural law is a certain expression and image and resplendence of the eternal and uncreated law; therefore the Most High Lawgiver requires it to be fulfilled by all. For this reason He impressed and, as it were, inscribed it upon the reason of all, and did not merely set it forth in books, as Isidore teaches (cf. Rom. 2:15). **Furthermore**, commenting on that passage of Isaiah: “They have transgressed the laws, they have changed the ordinance, they have broken the everlasting covenant” (Isa. 24:5), Jerome understands by ordinance the natural law implanted in the hearts of all, for the transgression of which the Lord declares that He will condemn the reprobate. Therefore, to act against the natural law is a mortal sin; and a sin is so much the more unjust and more deadly the more it is opposed to the natural law.

But if it be objected that, according to Ambrose, sin is a transgression of the divine law, and that the natural law is distinguished from the divine law, it must be answered that the natural and divine laws, although they are formally distinct, nevertheless materially coincide; because the natural law can also be called divine, insofar as it is expressed in Sacred Scripture and proceeds immediately from the eternal law (cf. Rom. 7:12).

SECOND RULE: Whatever is opposed to justice and is done against the precepts of the Decalogue is, by its very genus (*ex suo genere*), mortal.

For the Prophet says to the Lord: “Thou hast despised all them that fall off from thy judgments; for their thought is unjust” (Ps. 118:118). And again: “Neither shall the unjust remain before thy eyes” (Ps. 5:6). Likewise: “Cursed are they who decline from thy commandments” (Ps. 118:21). This is evident from the explanation of St. Bonaventure, introduced in the nineteenth article. Hence also in Book 2, Distinction 35, he asserts that a sin exists whether it be against the law of nature, against the written law, or against the evangelical law. The same is evident from the fact that the precepts of the Decalogue are of natural law, or of the natural dictate of reason, according to all doctors, although the observance of the Sabbath, as regards the determination of time, was not of the natural law. Hence, according to Estius, the Decalogue was a certain renovation of the natural and unwritten law. Moreover, the precepts of the Decalogue concern acts of justice. Therefore in Jeremiah it is said: “Cursed be he that doth the work of God deceitfully” (Jer. 48:10). Or, as another translation has it, “negligently,” which comes to the same thing. For he performs the work of God deceitfully who does it without due diligence and thus withholds just honor from the Creator. And this is to do the work of God negligently, which is directly against justice and against the natural and divine law, because both natural reason and Sacred Scripture dictate that service must be rendered reverently and diligently to God Most High, the Prince of immense majesty.

THIRD RULE: Whatever is contrary to the evangelical and divine law is a mortal sin.

For in the evangelical law not only are the precepts of the Decalogue contained, but many others are added to them by Christ, who did not come to destroy the law, but to fulfill and perfect it, as is clear in Matthew (Matt. 5:17), where the precepts added by Christ are described, and likewise in Luke, where many things are found which, according to one interpretation, are counsels, but according to another are precepts, as is evident concerning reconciliation to be made, the avoidance of oaths, and the love of enemies (Matt. 5:23–24, 34; 5:44; Luke 6:27), also concerning giving to everyone that asks, lending, and similar matters (Matt. 5:42; Luke 6:30). But others are absolute precepts, although some of them are not expressed in the form of a command, as that saying: “Whosoever shall say to his brother, Thou fool, shall be in danger of hell fire” (Matt. 5:22). Moreover, that these bind under mortal sin is evident from the fact that Christ, at the end of these teachings, said: “Every one that heareth these my words and doth them not, shall be like a foolish man that built his house upon the sand” (Matt. 7:26). This is also clear from what He again declares in Matthew: “Not every one that saith to me, Lord, Lord, shall enter into the kingdom of heaven, but he that doth the will of my Father who is in heaven,” that is, His precepts (Matt. 7:21). Hence He speaks again: “If thou wilt enter into life, keep the commandments” (Matt. 19:17).

The divine law is divided into the evangelical law and the Mosaic law. Now in the law of Moses three kinds of precepts are contained, namely moral, judicial, and ceremonial. The moral precepts were those contained in the Decalogue, either explicitly or implicitly and directly; but the ceremonial precepts were, as it were, certain determinations of the moral precepts regarding rite and the manner of divine worship, that is, concerning the manner of observing justice in relation to God; while the judicial precepts were determinations of the moral precepts regarding the manner of observing justice among men, as Alexander of Hales in his Summa, Thomas likewise in the Prima Secundae (q. xcix, a. 4), and William of Paris in the book On Faith and Laws explain. Moreover, those ceremonial precepts were figures of the mysteries of Christ; therefore, once the Gospel of God was promulgated, they were forbidden. Likewise, those judicial precepts cease in the evangelical law, although some of them may be renewed and instituted in the New Testament by a prelate or a ruler, as Thomas asserts in the Prima Secundae (q. civ, a. 3). Therefore the saying of Blessed Ambrose, “Sin is the transgression of the divine law and disobedience to the heavenly commandments,” is not to be understood of the ceremonial and judicial precepts of the Old Testament.

FOURTH RULE: Whatever is contrary to the precepts of the Church is mortal.

This is proved from what the Son of God asserts in Matthew: “And if he will not hear the church, let him be to thee as the heathen and the publican” (Matt. 18:17). Now by the name of the Church a universal synod may be understood, concerning which Augustine speaks in the book Against Faustus: “Such is the authority of the Church that I would not believe the Gospel unless the authority of the Church moved me.” The name of the Church can also signify any Supreme Pontiff or Apostolic Lord, to whom every one of the faithful is bound to obey in all things more than any inferior or even his own prelate, as Raymond teaches in his Summa, and Thomas and Bonaventure in the Second Book of Sentences (Distinction 44). Chrysostom also, commenting on Matthew, and Durandus, who was of the Order of St. Francis, and Thomas in the Secunda Secundae, understand by “the Church” in the aforesaid words an ecclesiastical prelate (q. xxxiii, a. 8, ad 4). Therefore one must obey the general decrees of councils, and likewise the canons of the Supreme Pontiffs, as divine precepts, which, alas, is very poorly observed, because sins are committed everywhere against ecclesiastical liberty and against the privileges of religious, nor does the clergy any longer care for the decrees and canons regulating and concerning their own state.

FIFTH RULE: Whoever does not obey his superior who has legitimate jurisdiction over him, in matters that concern that superior’s authority, jurisdiction, or preeminence, sins mortally.

This is clear from what has already been said. For he acts or omits to act against what justice requires, and against the words of Christ, who said: “He that heareth you, heareth me; and he that despiseth you, despiseth me” (Luke 10:16). And Peter of Tarentaise [Bl. Innocent V] testifies to this near the end of the second book of the Sentences. Hence prompt obedience is owed to secular princes, judges, parents, and one’s own superiors, since the Apostle says to the Romans: “He that resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of God; And they that resist, purchase to themselves damnation” (Rom. 13:2). And elsewhere: “Servants, be obedient to your carnal masters, Not serving to the eye, as pleasing men” (Eph. 6:5–6; Col. 3:22). Indeed, the prince of the Apostles commands in his first canonical epistle: “Servants, be subject to your masters in all fear, Not only to the good and gentle, but also to the froward” (1 Pet. 2:18).

SIXTH RULE: Whatever is contrary to the charity of God or of one’s neighbor is mortal.

This has already been shown at length above (art. xviii), and the divine Apostle teaches it most clearly in the First Epistle to the Corinthians, to such an extent that he says: “And if I should deliver my body to be burned, and have not charity, it profiteth me nothing” (1 Cor. 13:3). From this Alexander of Hales on the Third Book of Sentences, and William of Auxerre in his Summa conclude that if someone, from unformed faith and servile fear, were to endure death for the faith, he would nonetheless be damned. For charity is the life of the soul, nor can anything be accepted or pleasing to God without it. Therefore the Apostle John affirms many things concerning this in his first epistle, saying: “Whosoever hateth his brother is a murderer” (1 John 3:15). And not only is whatever is contrary to charity mortal, but also whatever directly opposes any virtue that falls under a precept, because this too is contrary to the precept itself and overturns what justice requires and the order of charity.

THE SEVENTH RULE: Whoever exposes himself to moral danger sins mortally.

This is evident from the authority of St. Augustine, who asserts this. And the meaning is this: whoever doubts, when doing or omitting something, whether it is mortal, such that he does not have a more probable judgment for one side than for the other, but stands, as it were, in equilibrium, or even judges it more probably to be mortal, and yet does or omits such a thing, sins mortally, even if the act itself is in fact venial. For such a person behaves foolishly and sins against true wisdom and prudence. For the Savior commands: “Be ye therefore wise as serpents” (Matt. 10:16). And Paul says: “Become not unwise” (Eph. 5:17). Hence Ss. Thomas, Bonaventure, and others unanimously say on the Fourth Book of Sentences (Distinction XVII) that one who doubts whether any sin is mortal is bound to confess it, otherwise he would sin mortally, even if the sin were not in fact mortal, because he would be committing himself to the danger or risk of spiritual death. Hence accidental homicide is not excused when a person ought probably to have judged that homicide or something similar could result from his action. Indeed, according to St. Bonaventure on the Fourth Book, distinction seventeen, a man is bound to confess venial sins committed deliberately, lest he expose himself to danger; because many who think they are sinning venially, in fact sin mortally.

EIGHTH RULE: Whoever does not avoid a probable and proximate occasion of mortal sin, sins mortally.

This is clear from what has already been said. For such a person exposes himself to danger, especially if he has at times experienced that from such an occasion he has fallen mortally. And thus they sin mortally who, without necessity, approach persons and places where they probably know that they will fall, and who do not avoid embraces, touches, and kisses, from which, by their own experience, they know that they have sinned, or have been so gravely aroused or polluted. Concerning such occasions of sin, Hugh of St. Victor says: He cannot avoid sin who does not avoid the occasions of sin.

NINTH RULE: Not only does one sin mortally who performs a work forbidden by a precept, but also one who, with deliberation, consents to a forbidden pleasure.

This is clear from what was said in the nineteenth article. Moreover, as Thomas of Argentina says in his Compendium, morose delectation is a mortal sin. Nor is a delight called morose unless it arises from the consent of reason.

On this matter St. Thomas writes more fully in the Prima Secundae, question seventy-four, article eight, saying: Some have held that consent to a forbidden delight is only a venial sin. Others have said that it is a mortal sin; and this position is the truer one. Nevertheless, the two opinions can be reconciled in some way. For someone can, for example, take delight either in the thought of fornication insofar as that thought has the character of an object, insofar as the will or reason reflects upon its own act, or in the act of fornication that is thought about. Now a thought of fornication is not of itself always mortal, but sometimes venial, as when it clings uselessly to the mind apart from a precept. Indeed, at times it is free from all sin, as when someone thinks about it in order to argue against it or to discuss it. Moreover, the same judgment applies to such a thought and to the delectation that follows it; therefore consent to such a delight is not a mortal sin. But consent to a delight that follows a thought about the act of fornication is a mortal sin. For this delight does not occur unless a person’s affection is conformed to the act about which he is thinking, since no one takes delight except in something that is in harmony with his affection. Finally, what Augustine asserts in book twelve of *On the Trinity* accords with this: “Because of sins of thought, even without the will to carry them out, but with the will to take delight in them, the whole man will be condemned. For to consent to such a delight is nothing other than to consent that one’s affection be inclined toward the act which such delight follows.” It is also said in the *Summa Pisana*, drawing on the words of Thomas (ST, Prima Secundae, Q. LXXIV, Art. 6, ad 3): “A delight is called morose not because of length of time, but because deliberating reason lingers over it, and does not repel it, but willingly embraces the thought from which it is caused; such thoughts must be repelled as soon as they touch the mind.”

TENTH RULE: Not only does one sin mortally who carries out a forbidden act, but also he who firmly intends to do it.

For such a will is reckoned as the deed itself, since in it there is a complete turning away from God. Hence the Judge of all consciences says: “Whosoever shall look on a woman to lust after her, hath already committed adultery with her in his heart” (Matt. 5:28). Therefore Jerome says in his Epistles: “A thought is sinful once it has given consent to the suggestion.”

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Cardinal Ottaviani wrote up a pretty cool profession of faith for the Council Fathers at Vatican II in the preparatory sessions. It combines a number of different sources (Nicene Creed, Trent, Vatican I, Pascendi, etc.). I like it so I decided to translate it here for all of your reference.

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I. I with firm believe and profess all and each of the things contained in the Symbol of faith which the Holy Roman Church uses, namely: Credo in unum Deum… [1]

II. I also firmly receive all and each of the things which have declarated by the inerrant Church, whether defined by a solemn judgement, or asserted by the ordinary and universal magisterium: especially those things which are opposed to the errors of this time. [2]

III. First, I profess a personal God, the principle and end of all things, can be known with certainty (and therefore demonstrated) by the natural light of reason, through the things that have been made, as a cause is known through its effects; and that this same, as supreme Lord, must be acknowledged not only by individual human beings, but also by civil society. [3]

IV. I also believe without hesitation that Jesus Christ is one and the same, He whom we profess by faith to be true God, and whose life on earth the Gospels bear witness to; and I acknowledge Him as the Mediator, who by the sacrifice of the Cross made satisfaction to divine justice for the sins of the whole human race. [4]

V. I attest that the Immaculate and ever-Virgin Mary, the Mother of God and Mother of mankind, is to be honored in a singular way by the Church; and I declare that by her genuine veneration the worship of God and of Jesus Christ is not diminished, but rather increased. [5]

VI. I accept by faith the one Church of Jesus Christ, the ark of salvation: namely, that Church which He Himself founded and acquired with His blood, and which He entrusted to be shepherded by Saint Peter, the Prince of the Apostles, and his successors, the Roman Pontiffs. To them I promise and swear true obedience, and to whose supreme magisterium (also in the explanation of the natural law) I sincerely submit myself. Moreover, I acknowledge that the bishops, in communion with and under the authority of the Roman Pontiff, are the successors of the Apostles. [6]

VII. I believe that there are seven Sacraments of the New Law, truly and properly so called, instituted by Jesus Christ, through which the grace that they signify is conferred; and that there is no salvation except through Baptism, the gateway of the Church, received either in reality or at least by desire (sive re sive voto). [7]

VIII. I profess that the Sacrifice of the Mass is effected by the priest alone, duly ordained, insofar as he acts in the person of Christ the High Priest, and that the divine Victim is immolated; and that the same Victim is offered to God the Father by the faithful together with the priest and through the priest. [8]

IX. Furthermore, I adore the Sacrament of the Most Holy Eucharist, confected in the unbloody Sacrifice, and I believe that in it are contained truly, really, and substantially the Body and Blood, together with the soul and divinity, of Our Lord Jesus Christ; likewise, I believe that by the words of consecration there takes place a conversion of the whole substance of the bread into the Body, and of the whole substance of the wine into the Blood of the Lord (this conversion the Catholic Church most fittingly calls Transubstantiation). Moreover, I also profess that under either species the whole and entire Christ is present, and that the Sacrament is truly received. [9]

X. I also accept the Sacramentals as received by the Church. I acknowledge indulgences for the living and the dead; likewise, I hold that the invocation of the Saints, as well as the veneration of their relics and images, are salutary for the Christian people. [10]

XI. I sincerely accept by faith original sin (by which all human beings sinned in our first parent Adam) as a sin in the proper sense of the word, transmitted by generation and proper to each individual. [11]

XII. I acknowledge the external arguments of revelation (above all miracles and prophecies) as most certain signs by which the Christian religion, divinely originated, is conclusively demonstrated; and I likewise maintain that these remain even today suited to human understanding. I also hold that the Church herself, considered in herself, by reason of her catholic unity, outstanding holiness, and inexhaustible fruitfulness in every good, by her marvelous propagation and her invincible stability, is a perpetual motive of credibility and an irrefutable testimony of her divine mission. [12]

XIII. I sincerely receive the doctrine of the faith handed down from the Apostles through the orthodox Fathers, transmitted to us in the same sense and with the same meaning. Therefore, although the understanding of revealed truth grows in the Church, I reject as heretical the notion of an evolution of dogmas that would pass, in the course of time, into a meaning different from that which the Church once taught. [13]

XIV. I hold that the deposit of faith (that is, the word of God, both written and handed down) was completed with the Apostles. I firmly maintain that Sacred Scripture, immune from every error, must be interpreted under the guidance of the Magisterium of the Church, according to the norm of Tradition and in accordance with the analogy of faith. [14]

XV. I profess that faith is not a blind religious feeling or merely an effect of the soul, but a true assent of the intellect to a truth received from without through hearing; namely, that we believe to be true what has been revealed and attested by a personal God, on account of the authority of God Himself, who is supremely truthful. In believing, we render full obedience of intellect and will, under the inspiration and assistance of God’s grace. [15]

XVI. Likewise, I profess without hesitation all the other things defined and declared by the Ecumenical Councils (especially by the most sacred Synod of Trent and by the Ecumenical Council Vatican I) above all concerning the primacy of jurisdiction and the infallible magisterium of the Roman Pontiff; just as I condemn and reject those things which in the same Councils and in the Encyclical Letters, namely Pascendi and Humani generis, have been condemned and rejected. [16]

XVII. This true Catholic faith (outside of which no one can be saved) I freely profess at present and sincerely hold; and I shall take care, God helping me, that it be preserved whole and inviolate by me and by those subject to me, with the greatest constancy, until my last breath of life. Thus I, the same N., before God and Jesus Christ, who will judge me unto eternal life or eternal punishment, promise, vow, and swear. [17]

NOTES

[1]: Taken from the Tidentine profession of faith, D994. The Symbol is the Niceno-Constantinopolitan, D86

[2]: cf., Vatican I’s de fide cath., D1792, where the two-fold magisterium [is mentioned], and the beginning of the Anti-Modernist Oath, D2145

[3]: cf., the Anti-Modernist Oath, D2145; see also D1650, against Bonetty; D1672, against Frohschammer; D1785 and 1806: Vatican Council I and Humani generis (D2320), where the certain demonstration of the existence of a personal God is treated. The following was added: ‘and that the same, as supreme Lord, must be acknowledged not only by individual human beings,’ in order to posit a general principle against laicism (cf. Pius XI: Ubi arcano, D2190; Quas primas, D2197

[4]: On the distinction between the historical Christ and the Christ of faith, cf. Pius X, Pascendi, D2076; see also the Anti-Modernist Oath D2145: “through the true and historical Christ.” On the distorted notion of Christ’s satisfaction, cf. Humani generis D2318

[5]: This is directed against those who say that devotion to the Blessed Virgin Mary is peripheral. The expression “ever-Virgin” is used on account of recent errors concerning the virginity of the Mother of God.

[6]: This is directed against those Catholics who say that the Roman Church must at last renounce her claim to be the one true Church of Christ. There is an allusion to Acts 20:28, in order to signify, under a single mode, both the mystical and the juridical aspect of the Church. The words “I promise and swear obedience” are taken from the Tridentine formula (D999). The words concerning the explanation of natural law were added because of the many pontifical decisions in moral and social matters.

[7]: This is an abbreviated Tridentine formula (D996). On Baptism and the desire for Baptism, see the Council of Trent (D796). The necessity of Baptism for salvation is affirmed on account of new theories widely disseminated concerning the salvation of infants who die without Baptism.

[8]: This paragraph is set forth against those who attempt to deny the essential difference between the hierarchical priesthood and the universal priesthood. See Pius XII, Mediator Dei (D2300), where the participation of the faithful in the priesthood of Christ is treated.

[9]: Cf. the Tridentine formula (D997) and Humani generis (D2318). As to the word “I adore,” cf. the hymn “Adoremus in aeternum Sanctissimum Sacramentum” and the hymn “Tantum ergo Sacramentum veneremur cernui.” Cernui, that is, worshipping with head bowed.

[10]: An abbreviated Tridentine formula (D998).

[11]: Cf. the Tridentine profession (D996) and the Council of Trent (D790), with Humani generis (D2328).

[12]: Cf. the Anti-Modernist Oath (D2145) in comparison with Humani generis (D2305). On the Church as a motive of credibility, cf. Vatican Council I (D1794). There are today those who, constantly emphasizing the culpability and sins of the Church, completely obscure this criterion.

[13]: Cf. the Anti-Modernist Oath (D2145), in comparison with Humani generis (D2309 ff.).

[14]: We follow the Decree Lamentabili (D2021): “Revelation…was not completed with the Apostles.” On the interpretation of Sacred Scripture with due regard for the Magisterium, Tradition, and the analogy of faith, cf. Humani generis (D2315).

[15]: See the Anti-Modernist Oath (D2145). The formula has been completed from Vatican Council I (D1789): “We are bound to render full obedience of intellect and will to God who reveals.”

[16]: Cf. the Tridentine formula augmented in the year 1877, concerning which augmentation see D1000 with note 1. We have added Pascendi, the Anti-Modernist Oath (D2146), and Humani generis.

[17]: Cf. the final words of the Tridentine Profession (D1000). In this place we have introduced the last things of man, concerning which today one is scarcely permitted even to speak in Ignatian spiritual exercises, as being regarded as antiquated and displeasing to the contemporary religious sensibility.

As the story goes, after around a decade of very public back and forths, the Vatican stepped in and told Murray to stop writing on the issue publicly. Concomitant with this was a very public speech given by Cardinal Ottaviani titled Chiesa e Stato: alcuni problemi presenti alla luce del magistero di Pio XII (english here). This lecture was given before many officials and caused an international crisis, prompting the international press to run stories on the very “anti-modern” treatment of the question from Cardinal Ottaviani.

Now, in this speech, beside denouncing Stalinist Russia and praising Francoist Spain, Cardinal Ottaviani doesn’t really “call out” anyone by name. Yet, the same cannot be said for a new work that came out the next year in 1954, a new edition of his very popular Compendium iuris publici ecclesiastici, which now included a section against the “new liberals.” This caused some buzz in the theological world, especially in the United States.

The first of the “book notes” of the American Ecclesiastical Review that year read

One of the more important publications last year was that of the fourth enlarged and revised edition of Cardinal Ottaviani’s Compendium iuris publici ecclesiastici. Msgr. Giuseppe Di Meglio assisted the Cardinal in the preparation of this edition. Of special interest to Catholic scholars who followed the controversy carried on some months ago on some points of Catholic doctrine about the interrelations of Church and state is the brief section on this new edition on the errors of contemporary Catholic liberalism (pp. 296-99). This new edition of the Compendium gives a masterly résumé and an effective refutation of mistaken teachings which were sometimes taken rather seriously a short time ago. This new edition, a work of viii + 496 pages, is published by the Polyglot Vatican Press.

Almost painful to read how hopeful this review is. Also, Msgr. Di Meglio is better known for other reasons now (anti-semitism), so good luck trying to find out about his life amidst the dozens of articles kvetching about him.

Anyways, in this “expanded section” from Cardinal Ottaviani, there are actually names named and theses listed out in greater detail, so I thought it would be fun to translate it for your enjoyment.

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Recently, I was translating through Billuart’s Summa Summae (already posted on Patreon, here, will be posted on my Complete Course in Thomistic Theology soon) and thought it would be helpful to give a few helpful notes from this work.

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In the fourth question of the first article, Billuart treats the question “what is signified in divinis [by] this name ‘Person’?’”

Now, you would think that he would jump on this question and answer “relation!” But, his answer is quite different from what you would expect according to the ordinary Orthodox polemic. He answers that “person…in divinis signifies relation, not as it is formally and explicity a relation (or, in its respect to the terminus), BUT AS IT SUBSISTS SUBSTANTIALLY.” Shocking, right? From this, he draws the obvious conclusion that, due to this, the name “person” is not a relative, but an absolute name: “the name ‘person’ is said of God (de divinis) NOT AS A RELATIVE NAME, but an absolute name, because it signifies relation, not as it is formally relation (or, by a relative mode), but by a subsistent mode.”

Very interesting! So, it is quite more complicated of a teaching than many would initially realize.

In the second article, he treats this question at a greater length, refuting any opposing position and vindicating the true position. Yet, the most interesting part is the beginning where the notae are listed which explain the thesis that will be stated in the dico.

The first note is relatively straightforward and we all remember it from our first readings of Trintiarian theology. Relation imports a two-fold concept, in and ad. For something to be “in” another is common to all accidents. Ad is what is unique to relation insofar as relation indicates an order to another, i.e., some terminus.

In divinis, the in is different from the in that is present among created things. For, unlike created accidents, the in of a Divine relation does not import inherence, but subsistence. Created accidents inhere in some other subject (or, at least is apt to do so), in divinis relations simply subsist, they do not “inhere in” the Divine Essence as an accident inheres in a subject. Hence why the Divine Relations are really identical to the Divine Essence rather than forming some sort of composition with the Divine Essence.

Now, here is the tricky part. Most people remember the ad of the relations, but they will often think about it too much in a “completionist” sense, only thinking of the reference to the terminus rather than also that which is presupposed to such a reference. In the concept of ad, we are able to distinguish two rationes. First, the ratio of relative entity in se as affecting the subject as that by which (ut quo). This is known as the relation in actu signato or the formae afficientis subiectum. Second, the ratio of the exercise itself, and as actually referring to the terminus as that which (ut quod). This is the relation in actu exercito or sub conceptu formae exercitae referentis. While these are temporally simultanoues, there is a certain logical priority and posteriority going on there. The former is that by which the subject is ordered to the terminus whereas the latter is the actual ordering to the terminus. Clearly, the former is logically prior to the latter.

From this perspective, it is easy to see how absurd many of the critiques of this scholastic doctrine end up being. Lossky writes “The relationships, instead of being characteristics of the hypostases, are identified with them…” How can this not be absurd under a fair understanding of the doctrine? We do not believe that the relations constitute the persons as actually referring to the terminus (i.e., in actu exercito) since this very referentiality would assume the person as already constituted (Billuart, sic enim supponit personam, et sequitur ad generationem). This is the same reason why active or passive origin cannot formally constitute the persons as persons. Rather, we affirm that relation constitutes the person in actu signato, i.e., insofar as it is some subsistent form, logically presupposed to the exercise of the relation, which is something that is absolute, as stated above.

Decided to do some digging and I came across some other figures. Really looking forward to collecting and reading these authors treatment on select topics since their treatments are, 1. More traditionally orthodox (i.e., not weird slop syntheses done by certain E-Orthodox), 2. Easier to evaluate, and 3. Systematic.

I thought it would be fun to post a few of their treatments on Divine Simplicity to show just how different their view of the matter is from many of the E-Orthodox. Interestingly, there is a mix of praise of and agreement with the Latin Scholastic tradition and condemnation of the same tradition from different authors (although, it seems that some of those authors who condemned did not understand clearly what they were condemning).

I would like to thank @blessedmikko and @stpetermogila from Twitter for their help in some leads on these figures, along with providing some helpful links to translations they have done.

I am not going to pay wall this because much of the research is due to their help and, well, that would be really weird. But, I do appreciate a subscribe from anyone who finds this helpful.

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A helpful list is given in the New Catholic Encyclopedia

Russian theologians at this time excelled in theological manuals, and many of these were translated into Greek and used by the Greek Faculties. Popular Russian compendia that had great use in Greece included that of Antony Amphiteatrov, rector of the Academy of Kiev, Dogmatic Theology of the Eastern Catholic Church (Kiev 1848), and that of Macarius Bulgakov, Introduction to Orthodox Theology (St. Petersburg 1847). It was not long, however, before the Greek theologians were producing their own compendia. Nicolaus Damalas, Zikos Rhosis, Crestos Andrutsos, K. J. Dyovuniotis, D. S. Balanos, I. Mesoloras, Nectarios Kephalas, and Nicolaus Ambrazis all made useful compendia for use in Greek-speaking seminaries.

From a (non-sympathetic) Orthodox source,

The Church’s systematic preoccupation with the faith appears during the patristic period for the first time, especially with Origen (his work “On Principles”), and in a strictly organized way with Saint John the Damascene (Exposition of the Orthodox Faith). Ever since that time, this subject has continued to develop in the West during Medieval times (Thomas Aquinatus, SUMMA) and during the post-Reform period, with the blossoming of Confessional Theology, in which Orthodoxy (wrongly) participated (Mogila Confession, Cyril Lucareus, Dositheos etc). In later times (after Eugene Vulgaris), this phenomenon blossomed in the 19th century (Athanasios Parios “Epitome” 1806. Moschopoulos “Epitome of dogmatic and ethical theology”, 1851. Especially among the Russians, we note the Metropolitan Anthony, Makarios of Moscow – both widely acknowledged). In the 20th century, Z. Rossis is in the lead in Greece, with Ch. Androutsos as the central person; I. Karmiris and P. Trembelas follow, basically correcting Androutsos but still maintaining the same method and division. This branch was successfully cultivated in the Theological School of Chalki, by the Metropolitan of Myra, Chrysostom Constantinides. A new boost to Dogmatics was given by John Romanides, with his persistence that the character of the dogma entails the experience of it, and also his search for the patristic roots of the dogmas, as opposed to Western Theology. (https://www.oodegr.com/english/dogmatiki1/A1.htm)

Some Greeks have been listed here and Russians here, some in Western Languages here. There are other helpful articles on this website as well collecting links.

If anyone has links to digitized versions of these manuals, I would be very happy to have them. Thank you!

So, let’s get into a few cool examples.

Christos Androutsos, Dogmatics of the Eastern Church,

§ 12. The Attributes of God in General

It was said above that God is inaccessible to the human intellect, and that we are unable to render His incomprehensible concept by means of a definition. Nevertheless, whether by drawing conclusions from general revelation or by being instructed through supernatural Revelation, we ascribe to Him various attributes, calling Him just, holy, all-wise, and so forth. These attributes of God we call attributes (attributa), in contrast both to the properties of the three Persons (proprietates) and to the predicates by which God is characterized as the subject of various acts—such as Creator, Judge, and the like (praedicata).

There therefore arises the question: what is the nature of these attributes, and what is their relation both to the divine essence and to one another? First, as regards the nature of the attributes, one must decisively reject that crude view according to which the divine attributes are real distinctions within the essence of God, as though that essence were composed of parts or of locally separated domains. This view is clearly a consequence of accepting God as comprehensible; for if the essence of God were accessible to our knowledge, then naturally the attributes of God—within which is contained everything we know about God—would have to be assumed as existing in God as such. On this ground also stood Eunomius, who, while professing that God is wholly inaccessible to us, consistently admitted only one attribute, the unbegotten, as constituting the essence of God.

But the admission of many attributes in God corrupts the elementary and at the same time fundamental concept of God as a simple and absolute being, by dividing the divine essence and transforming God into a finite, composite, and imperfect being. On the other hand, the view that the divine attributes are merely fabrications of our intellect, revealing nothing of the divine essence and amounting to synonymous expressions—as was held by the philosophers of the Middle Ages known as “Nominalists” (Nominalismus)—is likewise unscriptural and untenable in every respect. Scripture and the Fathers, when they ascribe attributes to God—simplicity, infinity, love, and so forth—nowhere indicate that they accept these merely metaphorically or as synonymous and meaningless names.

If the divine names were only subjective conceptions of the divine essence, and if the appellations of God as holy and just did not signify that God is in reality just and holy, but only that we perceive Him as such, then the very notion of Revelation is immediately destroyed, religious feeling is nullified, and faith is deprived of all truth. The religious longing to form some conception of God cannot rest in the general and lifeless notion of God as absolute and infinite, but is directed toward God as a Father full of moral perfections.

Those who regard the divine attributes as mere representations raise objections to the opposing view, advancing the following arguments. The acceptance, they say, of real attributes in God (a) risks introducing something secondary and non-essential into the divine essence; (b) abolishes the unity and simplicity of the divine essence by transforming God into the bearer of a multiplicity of attributes; and (c) undermines the absoluteness of God by subjecting God to the attribute that we ascribe to Him. Thus, when we call God, for example, just, we are said to be accepting justice as a really higher idea in which God participates, just as human beings do.

But these arguments are neither reasonable nor acceptable. The attributes of God do not, in the first place, introduce anything secondary or non-essential into the divine essence, because they are not accidental or non-essential predicates, but—as we shall see—expressions of the essence of God that are, as a whole, identical with the divine essence. That the attributes of God do not transform the divine essence into something composite and multiform is also evident. The divine attributes are not distinctions within the divine essence itself, but express the relations of the simple essence of God to the multiplicity of finite beings and to their condition.

Equally unfounded is the third argument, for when we ascribe justice to God we do not understand Him as a participant in justice; rather, accepting justice as being fulfilled in God in reality, we ascribe it to Him not synthetically but analytically, as justice being fully realized in God in every respect.

The true theory of the divine attributes lies midway between the realist and the nominalist theories: it accepts the divine attributes neither as objective distinctions within the divine essence nor as mere names, but as subjective representations of the real relations of the infinite God to the finite world. Certainly, the divine essence—since it is not revealed in the world in a necessary way, as in Pantheism, and since it remains inaccessible to our intellect—cannot be expressed by any set or multitude of attributes. Hence all the divine attributes, least of all each by itself manifesting the divine essence, do not provide us with full and perfect knowledge of God, nor are they objective predicates of the essence of God considered in itself.

Yet the divine essence, albeit imperfectly, makes itself manifest in its works, which it has created. And just as from works of art we draw conclusions about the artist, so also from created things we are able, analogically and by reasoning, to infer the various relations and references of the divine essence to the world. The human mind, unable to grasp the divine essence at once in its inner unity, derives what pertains to it from its relations to finite beings—various in number and in condition. In these relations of God to the manifold world, the essence of God appears either in similarities and contrasts, or as a power producing manifold operations.

The expressions by which we denote such relations of God to the world—namely, the divine attributes—thus constitute the forms or the inadequate concepts (_inadaequat_) in which, or through which, the real essence of God imperfectly impinges upon our intellect. Thus the divine essence, conceived in contrast to the temporal limitation of beings, is the eternity of God; while omnipotence presents that same essence in contrast to the limited power of finite beings.

Although in this sense the character of the divine attributes is subjective, this subjectivity must not be understood as an arbitrary and unsubstantial construction of our mind, but as faithfully rendering the real relations and references of God to the world. Just as a ray of sunlight, according to the common image, though essentially one, nevertheless—depending on the differing nature of the objects upon which it falls—illuminates, warms, softens, and hardens, so also the one simple essence appears to our intellect under different relations and references.

This truth was set forth by Basil the Great and other Fathers, and was later repeated by those around Thomas Aquinas through the well-known formulas of Scholastic theology. The attributes ascribed to God, Basil observed—refuting Eunomius, who understood the attributes as expressions of the same thing—despite their subjective form, are “a confession of what truly belongs to God.” The things said to exist _according to conception_ (_kat’ epinoian_) are divided, on the one hand, into empty images of imagination or arbitrary representations, such as centaurs, and, on the other hand, into representations of things formed by right reason, such as the divine attributes. The former are false and unreal, whereas the latter, even though they do not exist in things in the same way as in our knowledge, nevertheless correspond to something real in what exists.

In this way also do those holy Fathers agree who call the essence of God incomprehensible and ineffable, while describing our concepts of God as “being about God.” Those around Thomas Aquinas, distinguishing the merely subjective representation (_distinctio rationis ratiocinantis_) from the representation grounded in the relations of God (_distinctio rationis ratiocinatae_), accept the divine attributes in the latter sense, as expressions of real relations in God. Not very differently speak those around Duns Scotus, who accept the divine attributes as distinctions not real but formal (_formaliter_), that is, existing in God according to form.

Accordingly, the divine attributes are the subjective forms of the real relations of the simple being, God; and their relation both to the whole divine essence and to one another may be summarized as follows. Considered objectively, these attributes, as being the essence of God itself under different aspects and relations, cannot naturally be distinguished from one another, nor can there be any question of whether they are akin to or exclude one another. Rather, their relation both to one another and to the divine essence is—according to the observation of Scheeben—like that of a colorless diamond to the colors of other precious stones: just as the colorless diamond contains within itself the colors of all other precious stones and can in fact be represented by each of them, so also the divine attributes, although not separated in God, nevertheless possess a specific power and significance corresponding to their reflection in the world.

Theophan Prokopovich’s *Christiana Orthodoxa Theologia*, pg. 136ff

§ 92. In this question, simple means that which is not composite and does not consist of parts. Now, the more various the kinds of parts, the more various is the kind of composition—and likewise the simplicity opposed to it must be distinguished.

For some parts are substantial, such as matter and form, from which a substance is composed; and if either is lacking, the thing neither is nor is called a thing of the sort it ought to be in its genus. Thus in man the parts are body and soul; remove either and there is no man. The composition of such parts may be called substantial, and the simplicity opposed to it is likewise substantial simplicity, that is, being without substantial parts.

Again, there are what are called integral or integrating parts (as the schools stammer), which supply the integrity of a thing, and if even one of them is removed, the thing does not cease to be a thing, but it ceases to be whole. Such in man are an eye, a hand, feet, and so on. If the eye is torn out or a hand cut off, a man does not cease to be a man; but he ceases to be whole—he no longer has everything which, in his constitution, he ought to have. The composition of such parts, and the simplicity opposed to it, may likewise be called integral: integral composition is that which consists of such parts; integral simplicity is that which lacks such parts.

Further, parts are called either homogeneous or heterogeneous. Homogeneous parts are of the same kind and nature as the whole, as in water individual drops are water, and have smaller parts in turn that are likewise homogeneous. Heterogeneous parts are not of the same nature or kind as the whole, as the body of a man is not a man; likewise the individual integrating parts—foot, hand, eye—cannot be called “man.” The composition of such parts can also be called homogeneous or heterogeneous. But the simplicity opposed to them cannot be expressed by these names, but only by some circumlocution; for example, a simplicity lacking both homogeneous and heterogeneous parts.

There are also, though less properly, so-called accidental parts, namely the accidents themselves that inhere in a substance: in bodies, color, light, hardness, softness, taste, smell, etc. In a spirit too there are certain passions and actions (which can not inappropriately be placed here), such as joy, sadness, contemplation, recollection, and the like. The composition that regards such parts is called accidental; but the simplicity opposed to it is not well called “accidental simplicity,” but rather “simplicity free from every accident,” or by some other name.

Finally, metaphysicians also posit essential parts, which are understood to constitute an essence, such as genus and difference; and one may even imagine “integral parts” of an essence, such as properties, which are not really distinct but are the same thing, though they are distinguished by our reason. Yet these are not parts properly so called, since they are not really distinct from one another; and therefore they do not belong to the present question.

Here, rather, we treat of the simplicity that excludes real and proper parts: substantial and integral, homogeneous and heterogeneous, and finally accidental.

Nor can potency and act be called parts (as some would have it). For if a thing is considered in potency, that is, in its being able to be, then it is not; and if it is considered in act, that is, as existing, then its non-being is not, nor can existence and non-existence be parts of the thing, but only of its coming-to-be (as they say, in fieri). But the potency of a thing, which is opposed not to non-existence but to action, pertains to the fourth genus mentioned above, namely accidental composition.

Nor does “supposit” or “subsistence of a nature” have a place here: it is nothing other than the thing itself not united to another, and therefore is not a part. A special consideration of the divine supposits will come later, and will be touched upon below in an objection.

§ 93. We therefore say that God is so simple as to exclude all the real parts enumerated above—contrary to what the ancient Anthropomorphites thought, who attributed to God a head, eyes, hands, feet, in short the whole stature of a man. Hence they were called Anthropomorphites, that is, “introducers of human form.” Likewise contrary to what certain recent “theologasters” sprung up in Macedonia have mistakenly imagined: for they maintained that there are in God certain actions or energies and certain other uncreated accidents, distinct from God Himself and co-eternal with Him—whose nonsense and madness we shall explode in the next chapter.

Here, however, we shall first demonstrate our assertion; then we shall dissolve the difficulties raised against it; and then we shall inquire into the use of the doctrine—all briefly....

§ 96. Here, then, note these axioms.

First: God is purest act; that is, whatever He does, He does it not with something adhering to Him, but through Himself and by Himself.

Second: all God’s attributes are not habits, nor are they acts of God, but God Himself in His entirety; hence they are rightly predicated of God even in the abstract, thus: God is wisdom, omnipotence, etc.

Third: whatever is in God is not, nor ever was, in Him as potency—that is, it is not such that it could at some time have been, and yet was not; nor such that it exists indeed, yet could not exist; nor even such that it exists indeed and cannot not exist, and yet at least by our thinking is understood as though it were something potential: since whatever is in God is God Himself—the whole substance and essence of God....

§ 98. Objection 2) Whatever consists of a subject and attributes is not most simple. But God is so: for we have said that in God there are attributes—wisdom, omnipotence, etc. Reply. The major must be limited by this distinction: “what consists of a subject and attributes,” properly speaking, is granted; but improperly—i.e., that which has attributes distinguished from itself only by reason—is not therefore not most simple: this is denied. God’s wisdom can be distinguished from God by our concept; but in reality God Himself, whole and entire, is that.

Antony Amphiteatrov’s *Dogmatic Theology*:

God is a most simple and most pure Being. The simplicity or purity of the divine essence consists.

a) in the fact that there is in God no material composition whatsoever — that He is a completely incorporeal being and not subject to the senses....

b) The simplicity of the divine essence consists not only in the absence of material composition, but also in the absence of intellectual composition. In God there is no genus and species, no accidental properties, no real division of attributes. We distinguish different attributes in Him only because of the weakness of our intellect; in Himself He is perfect unity and identity — the most pure and most simple Spirit.

“The Godhead is simple and uncompounded,” says Saint John of Damascus. “If we call uncreatedness, beginninglessness, incorporeality, immortality, eternity, goodness, creative power, and the like essential properties of God, then the Godhead would be composed of many parts — which would be extreme impiety. All these must be understood of the whole Godhead identically, simply, indivisibly, and conjointly.” (§21. Simplicity)

Eugentius Voulgaris, Compendium of Theology,

Simplicity is the negation of composition; and simple is that which is superior to composition. Composition is twofold: actual and conceptual or according to thought. Actual composition is an aggregate of parts really divided, such as in man, of soul and body. Conceptual composition is a conjunction of things divided according to thought, such as from genus and difference, the metaphysical parts. Actual composition is either from essential parts really divided, such as from soul and body; or from integral parts wholly restoring the composite, such as the members of an animal. To these some add a third, from essence and hypostasis; and a fourth, from subject and accident. Conceptual and logical division, opposed to conceptual composition, the Scholastics wish to be twofold: one with basis and reason, such as is contemplated in the simplest being, becoming many and different through superabundance of power, such as in the human soul, one, into physical, sensitive, and rational; the other logical and without reason, which I would more properly call irrational, according to which one might divide the Apostle into Simon, Peter, and Cephas, or a garment into its remnant.

Men, theologizing, have been led into many absurd opinions, following their own conceptions more than the Scriptures and the divinely inspired Fathers in divisions and distinctions concerning God. Some unreasonably did not hesitate to divide the simplest essence actually into many. Others, fearing composition greatly and thinking to avoid it even where there was no fear, made the attributes themselves continuous with the essence, almost showing it devoid of properties. And indeed the Scholastics have fallen into so many verbal disputes: tropic, specific, logical, actual, and of these some greater, some lesser; some actual from the nature of the thing, others from the nature of the thing but not actual, which they invented, so that to enumerate all accurately would be troublesome and superfluous, let alone to set forth and record clearly. Concerning these, the learned Coressius discusses extensively in his handbook on the procession of the Holy Spirit (chapters 13 and 14)... For us it will suffice, having selected and refuted the opinions holding more notable absurdities concerning divisions in God, to choose and establish the more pious one.

Actually, therefore, and from many essences an aggregative composition was impiously attributed to God by all the pagans, among whom stars, earth, cattle, reptiles, and almost all creatures were honored as gods. Similar were afflicted among the Jews the Sadducees, who, like Epicurus, thought there is no spirit at all unmixed with matter, nor such a God (Acts 23). But also from the flock of Christians around the fourth century many wild beasts arose in the Church, vomiting bitter poison against the simplest nature and circumscribing the formless nature with human form, who were also called Anthropomorphites from the heresy. No less impious is the thorn introduced in recent times by Spinoza, according to which the matter of the universe is posited instead of God, to which belong magnitude and thought; but all things from which this universe is composed, whether bodies or spirits, are modes and dispositions of this immeasurable and eternal essence, subject to various alterations, changes, motions, passions, and wretched affections, with which this universe is carried along and confused, the same alone acting and suffering. To set forth these is as if to refute them.

But Aetius and Eunomius in the fourth century held the opposite absurdity, admitting no division at all between the divine essence and its attributes; and no less calling the Son God than unbegotten, because they said unbegottenness is in no way divided from being God. For supposing, according to the orthodox confession, that the Son is not unbegotten, from this they impiously inferred that He is not God, conspiring with Arius. From the same impious indivisibility they boasted to bear a comprehensive concept of God; for if the attributes are in no way divided from the divine essence according to them, nor interchangeably, nor these from one another, then one who understands unbegottenness, as they strongly asserted, will accurately understand God Himself. Children of Latins follow this opinion, and among them the Nominalists, who divide the divine essence from its attributes only by name. But to speak the truth, those starting from the school of Thomas seem to hold opinions not far different from the nonsense of Eunomius, strongly asserting that everything in God is the essence of God; and distinguishing the properties of the essence and from one another only by our conceptions.

First, therefore, it must be determined that there is no actual composition in God from many essences, such as in man from soul and body, nor from parts granting wholeness, such as from so many members; nor physical from matter and form; nor from subject and accident. For God is most simple, and unmixed with any matter, outside passion, beyond alteration. But to the aforementioned compositions matter attends, and alteration and passion follow, as is clear to those who have in any way fixed their mind upon it. And the divine Scriptures proclaim Him spirit (John chapter 4): “God is spirit, and those who worship Him must worship in spirit and truth”. Greatly differs, as Irenaeus says (book 6, chapter 16), “the Father of all from human passions and dispositions; He is simple and uncompounded, wholly spirit and wholly reason”. And Origen (On First Principles, book 1, chapter 1): Therefore one must not suppose God to be body or in body, but an intellectual nature, simple, admitting no addition at all in itself, so as to be everywhere a monad, and, if I may say so, wholly intellect. “What will you suppose the divine to be?” Gregory of Nazianzus (Oration 34): “Body? And how infinite, unbounded, formless, intangible, invisible? Or are these also bodies? Oh the audacity; for this is not the nature of bodies. Or body, but not these of grossness, so that the divine has nothing more than we? For how is it venerable if circumscribed? Or how will it escape being composed of elements and again dissolved into them and altogether destroyed? For composition is beginning of conflict, conflict of separation, separation of dissolution, dissolution altogether alien to God and the first nature. Therefore no separation, lest dissolution; no conflict, lest separation; no composition, lest conflict. Therefore neither body, lest composition.” Reason also allies against composition in God; for if the first nature were composed of parts really distinct, there would be some cause higher and prior assembling the parts into one, and the first nature would not be first, which is contradictory.

Second, these parts must be posited finite, and nothing infinite will subsist from finite parts; or from infinites; therefore it will not be infinite from infinites, and consequently falls from the infinity into which it is posited. Nor say that at least from subject and accidents, if no composition at all aggregated from parts belongs to God; for nothing in God is accidental. For the accidental belongs contingently; what belongs contingently can be and not be; what is such, present or absent, brings change. But God is immutable. Therefore all properties in God are necessary and essential. Hence the perfections of creatures, being by participation in them, are predicated by comparison, not by abstraction; for there is intellect, will, wisdom, life in man, but man is living and not life, wise and not wisdom, having intellect but least of all intellect, and will but in no way will. But concerning God the divine attributes are predicated even in abstraction, as essential and not accidental, and from Himself and not by participation. For which reason (Prov. chapter 8) “I, wisdom, says, have dwelt in counsel, and knowledge and understanding”; and (Dan. 9) Christ is called eternal righteousness; and (John 14) “I am, He says, the way and the truth and the life”. As also the holy Augustine (On the Trinity, book 5, chapters 8 and 10): To be God, he says, is to be great; for He is His own greatness; the same be said concerning His goodness, eternity, and the rest of His attributes. But from this those around Thomas wrongly understood to identify and unite the divine attributes, both relative and absolute, with the essence of God, and to depart little or nothing from the babbling of Eunomius and Aetius. For they too do not wish the being of relations, such as fatherhood, sonship, and the characteristics of hypostases, such as unbegottenness, begottenness, and the like, to be other than the essence. For in divine things, they say, there is only one being, and the being of relation is not divided really from the being of essence, but only by reason and conception. Of which opinion the leaders are Bonaventure, Aegidius, Richard, Henry, Hervaeus, Peter Aureolus, William Ockham, and others of the Scholastic order.

But a cloud of Fathers and Theologians stands against them (Basil, book 2 against Eunomius): “What is not ridiculous if someone determines that the power of begetting and foreknowledge and every activity is essence? For it is necessary, as in polyonymous things, to have the same meaning for all names, as when we call the same man Simon, Peter, and Cephas.” Similar are those of Gregory of Nyssa (book 12) against the same Eunomius, and of Augustine (On the Trinity, book 8, chapter 4): For it is one thing, he said, to be God, and another to be father; and though fatherhood and essence are one, yet it is not lawful to say that the father is wise by fatherhood... From which it is clear that he considered fatherhood and essence not to be two essences; yet fatherhood to be something other than divinity, and other than wisdom... And Gregory the Theologian in the first oration on the Son distinguishes generation from the generator, and will from the willer, as motion from the mover. And John Damascene in his work on the energies of our Lord (book 3, chapter 16): “Know, he says, that activity is one thing, the active another, the effect another, and the agent another.” Whence the Great Basil in his works against Eunomius: If, he said, we place all divine names into the divine essence, we will show God not only composite but composed of dissimilar parts, because something different is signified by each name. On which also Justin (question 129) posits coexistence between essence and property; but coexistence indicates at least two things coexisting; therefore properties in God are other than the essence and than one another. From this also the Great Basil in his letter to his brother calls properties in the plural, and characteristics, and contemplated, and shining upon; and hypostasis the individuating. As also the Theologian by synecdoche from one the whole. And the sixth synod (act 6) defining hypostasis to be essence with properties, and thus recognizing properties other than essence.

Of the same opinion among the Scholastics are Durandus, Francis Mayron, James, Viterbo, Urban Nicholas, Marsilius, John Basil, John Wigos, and above all John Scotus.

And the otherness of properties from essence and from one another is shown by various arguments not subsisting by bare conception alone, thus: First: Essence is in the Son, but fatherhood is not; therefore this is not identified with that, for it is impossible for the same to be and not be.

Second: The Father and the Son are the same in essence and not the same in properties; therefore properties in God differ from essence.

Third: Properties are many; essence is one; if therefore properties were identified with essence and essence with properties, these would be many and not many, and that one and not one.

Fourth: Things receptive of different definitions are other in nature; for definition is unfolding of nature. But divine attributes are defined differently; for compassion is defined one way, justice another, and they are productive of contrary effects. For one pities, the other disciplines; therefore divine attributes are different in nature; therefore they cannot be the same in nature. And the Thomist cannot say that things differing in nature differ by reason and conception; for the actual definition unfolds the nature of the defined according to first conception, not second.

Wherefore, to summarize briefly the whole with George Coressius in his handbook on procession (chapter 16): Since difference is threefold, verbal, logical, and actual, between divine properties and essence, verbal is to be rejected like crow-scaring; for these do not differ as remnant and garment. No less logical, which is taken not from otherness of natures of the differing things but from conception. And actual difference reeks of impiety, introducing different subjects and different essences. How therefore shall we name the division between properties and essence, and these from one another? Scotus called it specific otherness, and we would name it ontic. For every positive perfection is being, and for this reason perfections in God differing from essence and from one another not only by bare reason, as shown, but ontically, are multiplied and divided....

...You will say on behalf of the Thomists: Only the essence and nature of God is hymned and worshiped as uncreated, but the attributes are also uncreated and worshipful; therefore attributes are essence. I reply: Only essence and nature with its attributes: I concede; without these: I deny. One therefore is God, abounding in infinite perfections and glorified with them, not because these are altogether identified with His essence, but because they are perfections befittingly belonging to the supreme nature in a divine manner, and ontically coexisting and differing, as set forth.

They object: If relation differs from essence, either essentially or personally. But if the first, there will be two essences or many; if the second, as many persons as attributes; great absurdity follows either way; therefore... I reply: Neither essentially is relation or attributes distinguished from essence; for they are not other essences besides the essence, as our reasoning maintains; nor personally; for not each divine attribute and property is one person, but ontically; for being is essence, being is relation, being is goodness, and the rest. For they are not non-beings but attributes, as the name indicates, other than essence and coexisting with it.

Objection: If attributes are ontically other than essence, either they will be essences or accidents; for every being is either essence or accident. But we say these are beings, essential and divinely befitting perfections. Let the followers of Gennadians tell us whether the rational, posited as constitutive difference in man, is essence or accident, and similarly the risible and receptive of intellect and knowledge, accompanying the essence. If therefore these in man, being other than human essence, differ neither as essences from it nor as accidents, how in God, if we say the belonging perfections differ, do they fabricate for us essences or accidents?

One might inquire whether composition from genus and difference is admitted in God. To which it is easy to reply that this is not granted, nor definition; for God, as Clement of Alexandria says (Stromata, book 5) and Cyril of Alexandria (dialogue 2 on the Trinity), is neither genus, nor difference, nor species, nor individual.

The divine, therefore, is simple and beyond composition aggregated from many essences, and from matter and form, and from integral parts, and from subject and accidents, and from genus and difference, as least of all belonging to Him who is infinite and most perfect. Yet it has that from essence and hypostasis, and again from essence and attributes: either coexistence, which harming nothing of His simplicity most exalts and establishes the treasures of His infinite perfections.

(Book 1, Chapter 6, Concerning the simplicity of God)

If you want Bulgakov, it is found here in Théologie dogmatique orthodoxe, vol. 1, pgs. 178ff

It has caused much discussion online from both the pro- and anti-SSPX lines. I have mixed feelings about the SSPX in general, and some of the questions surrounding their canonical state go beyond my personal competence, but I thought it would be helpful to highlight a few appropriate reflections.

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First, if you do not sympathize with the good Archbishop, then there is something wrong with you.

An eye-opening experience of mine was reading Archbishop Lefebvre’s Open Letter to Confused Catholics. I believe that many contemporary “traditional Catholics” have this notion that things get worse as time goes on. Things on the ground in 1970 must be better than 1990, and 1990 must be better than 2010, etc., but this is nowhere near the case. Not even close.

Reading Lefebvre actually gave me a well-needed white pill when I was a new Catholic. The problems I saw on the ground were nowhere NEAR the problems that were on the ground in the immediate post-conciliar period. Things have gotten better (much better!) on the ground. That is undeniable (unless one is quite concerned with the last bit of drama from Rome).

Further, I think Lefebvre, as someone who did live in a different world and in a “different” Church than we do, saw the situation as apocalyptic. Again, quite different from those of us who are already “used to” the problems existing. We can discuss whether this was a rational thought or not (in hindsight, it is easy to judge), but I do not think many of us can even imagine the weight of the age. It was liable to strain all and break some.

If and when I speak of Lefebvre’s decision negatively, it is not with any less admiration for his person than is due. He was a holy priest and apostolic bishop in an impossible situation. I cannot but admire Lefebvre, even while I firmly believe that every Catholic should admit that his decision was the wrong one.

While this may be controversial, I do not think Lefebvre in his final days would have failed to sympathize with those who would ultimately disagree with his decision. The decision that he made was one that was made after a long period of reflection, wherein both options were weighed in great detail. This is not the behavior of a man who would not sympathize with those who take the opposite opinion.

Second, it is never permissible to act contrary to the will of the Pope by performing consecrations.

Now for the other part. I believe that it is undeniable that it is never permissible to act contrary to the will of the Pope by performing consecrations.

In order to understand this, we need to make two distinctions. First, between that law which is merely positive and that law which is divine. Second, between what is beside an express intention and that which is simply contrary to an express intention.

Certain laws of the Church are established on the mere basis of the will of the legislator. The obligation of these laws can be formally dispensed and can even be ignored in the face of certain degrees of necessity. The obligation of other laws cannot be dispensed because they are not based on the will of the legislator, but on divine or natural law. As an easy example, it is a precept of ecclesiastical law to go to Mass on Sundays, whereas it is a precept of divine law to worship God. If one were to be in a state of necessity, one could forego the precept to go to Mass on a Sunday, e.g., if one were morally certain that it would cause one to fall into grave sin. Yet, if the conditions required one to fulfill the precept to worship God, then this could NEVER be dispensed or otherwise foregone without sin (whether the guilt for such a sin is incurred in the internal forum—God is the judge, de internis non iudicat Ecclesia).

Second, it is one thing to act beside the express will of the Roman Pontiff (which, as I note, is not really “beside” per se, only non-express) and another thing to act contrary to the express will of the Roman Pontiff. This distinction should be understood easily enough. It has not always been required by law to seek an explicit mandate in order to consecrate a bishop (a formal process was only developed over time in order to better regulate the establishment of the hierarchy, although tacitly—or, rather, implicitly—it can hardly be held that the permission of the Roman Pontiff to the process was absent). In those cases, such a consecration would not be according to the will of the Roman Pontiff, but simply beside the will of the Roman Pontiff. As another example, if it were simply impossible to seek his mandate and there were some pressing need in order to supply a bishop, then the same would be in effect (although, as noted above, strictly speaking, this is only improperly said to be outside his will). Yet, it is another thing altogether when such a mandate is sought and it is expressly denied.

This is set out clearly by Ven. Pius XII in the encyclical Ad apostolorum principis, written to the Church in China. The Church in China during that time was suffering persecution at the hands of the Communist government. Ven. Pius XII was quick to refute claims that Catholics were in any way bad citizens of the nation, but, to the contrary, were first in loyalty to and love for the nation.

Yet, there were certain errors that had affected some within the Chinese Church, rebuked earlier in his encyclical Ad sinarum gentem. Due to the continual presence of a “missionary hierarchy” in the nation, some complained that there ought instead to be a native hierarchy. Ven. Pius XII, while stating that it would, of course, be ideal to have such a hierarchy, held that it was simply not practical to have a hierarchy free from missionaries from other nations. Further—and this is the important part—it would be contrary to divine right to seek such a hierarchy in an autonomous manner.

Part of this so-called autonomy was that they sought to elect their bishops and have them consecrated. There is nothing, of course, wrong with certain dioceses electing their bishops as a process sanctioned by the law of the Church (as had been done in certain parts of the Church in the past, even in Rome herself! cf. n. 38). Yet, such elections were not conceded by Rome (due to the obvious imprudence that would be involved in the matter, since it was based on socialistic notions of right and governance, cf. n. 43).

While this situation seems quite distinct in its material circumstances from the consecrations done by Lefebvre, it has an affinity to the situation insofar as Ven. Pius XII takes the opportunity to treat the question ex professo of consecrations done against the express will of the Roman Pontiff for a number of paragraphs.

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As noted by Fr. D’Angona, the letter does not condemn this as a mere violation of positive law, but, inasmuch as it is simply contrary to the will of the Roman Pontiff, as contrary to divine law itself. The relevant comment is in paragraph 37, which describes such consecrations as “contrary to all right and law” (cf. n. 48 as well). The phrase contra ius fasque in context (cf. St. Pius X’s Iamdudum, n. 7; Leo XIII’s Humanum Genus, n. 6, etc., as well) can hardly be interpreted as not indicating such a contrariety.

EDIT: Here is more about the second point.