Yet, in Catholic Theology, when we refer to someone as a “laxist” or a “rigorist,” we do not at all mean to impugn their character, or make a judgement about their own diligence in conforming to the moral law. Rather, the terms are meant to indicate how moral judgements are formed. These are known as “moral systems.” “Laxism” and “rigorism” are not meant to indicate an excess of defect in moral effort, they are meant to indicate a speculative error about when and how we can act without sin.

When we are certain about a moral prohibition or command, it is obvious that we are obligated to either omit the act (in the case of a prohibition) or perform the act (in the case of a command). This is quite obvious. Yet, it is also obvious that there are times in which we are not sure about the moral character of an act. In this case, we have a “doubting conscience.” When such a “doubting conscience” occurs about moral prohibition/command, what are we supposed to do?

In the last five centuries, theologians have had much to say about how a doubting conscience can be healed, forming systems such as compensationism, laxism, probabilism, equi-probabilism, probabiliorism, tutorism, etc. Yet, there is a “new laxism” (which can be called “hyperlaxism”) that is quite popular among Catholics today, which attempts to jump the ship altogether by simply denying that such a conscience needs healing. Under their system (if it can be called such), the “doubting conscience” stands for them as an infallible guide, alongside the teaching authority of the Church.

For the new laxists, a conscience can only be rendered practically certain by the teaching authority of the Church. If there is a certain command or prohibition of the Church, then the conscience binds. Otherwise, the conscience is doubtful. With this error in place, they deny the (universally held) premise that it is unlawful to follow a doubting conscience (cf., McHugh and Callan, Moral Theology, n. 640f).

In this way, they surpass the errors of the old laxists. Previously, all moral theologians were in agreement, laxist, rigorist, and everyone in between, that a doubting conscience could not be followed. Hence, there was common ground between all parties involved. Yet, the “new laxism” goes a step further than any of the old laxists, refusing to even grant this ground.

Paradoxically, this new laxism has a darker side that brings it to the side of rigorism. On the one hand, the new laxists follow a doubting conscience. Yet, on the other hand, they believe that a doubting conscience can only be healed by the most rigoristic standards. Many of the new laxists demand that they be shown an infallible determination of the Church in order to render the conscience certain. The conscience cannot be made certain by evident reason, the plain sense of scripture, the authority of the saints, the consensus of moral theologians, or even the non-infallible judgements of the Church. While some will concede one or other of these means (e.g., many will allow for the authority of a pastor), this is only an inconsistency in following to its logical conclusion what is preached by the New Laxists.

The effects of this new laxism are monstrous on the spiritual life. Simultaneously, it begets a conscience that is scrupulous and a conscience that is tepid. The conscience becomes scrupulous insofar as the new laxism advocates for obedience to a doubting conscience. The man becomes tepid insofar as the new laxism casts the obligations of conscience onto few aspects of his life. Beside all this, the man becomes rigid insofar as he imagines the conscience only bound by the strictest laws of rigor. Hence, on the one hand, he cannot imagine that another has been bound in conscience where he has not, unless that man is a rigorist and an extremist, or at least a scrupulant. Yet, on the other hand, anyone who dissents from him is viewed as immoral and lax.

Read more

Obviously, as is the nature of such videos, there was pushback. That is to be expected. Unfortunately, much detail is lost in the medium of a video, which would otherwise clarify controverted points. Hence, in this article, I hope to highlight a few points that might be less clear on the issue of sexual ethics and the unmarried. Two notes before I begin.

First, I will be using McHugh and Callan’s Moral Theology for most of the citations where I can. It is quite accessible to English readers, allowing for everyone to helpfully reference the sections quoted.

Second, most of my treatment of this question will seem quite “abstract.” This is by design. It is quite dangerous for anyone to, by rigorism, bind the conscience where it is not bound by God. The moralists refer to this act as paving the road to hell due to the principle that an erroneous conscience binds and he who acts against conscience sins.

Certain questions related to this topic require moral estimation, i.e., an understanding of one’s own dispositions and the circumstances in which one finds himself. Hence, to speak in particulars or absolutes can give the wrong idea. Although, this is not to say that such is necessarily inappropriate as designating a general rule to which exception applies or as assuming the bad dispositions it prohibits. Even Sacred Scripture itself speaks in this way, Turn away thine eye from a shapely woman. (Sir. 9:8)

As a last note, remember that it is important to heed the warning of many moralists. To think about such matters can itself be an occasion of sin. Hence, it is important to consider whether your reading of this article has a just cause, or is done merely for curiosity.

Definitions

First, there is a distinction between internal and external acts. Internal acts are those concerned with the faculties of the soul. More particularly, we are concerned here with venereal pleasure. External acts are those concerned with the acts of the body.

Second, there is a distinction as to the external acts between the principal act and secondary acts. The principal act (also called ‘consummated’) concerns those acts ordered per se to generation (intercourse) or the organs of generation. The secondary acts (also called ‘non-consummated’) concern those acts ordered per accidens to generation, i.e., those “secondary or non-consummated external acts (e.g., looks, conversations, touches, embraces, kisses), which are related to the principal act as being an enticement to it, its preparation, or its external sign and accompaniment.” (McHugh and Callan, n. 2486)

The secondary acts are called per se indifferent, since they can either be performed for good or for evil, depending on the end and circumstances of the act. (Ibid., n. 2513)

Third, as to the internal acts, we must distinguish between venereal and natural pleasure. Venereal pleasure concerns the enjoyment that accompanies or prepares for generation. This is often described as the “stirring of spirits serving generation.” Natural pleasure simply concerns the connatural good of the sense involved, “the higher sensible pleasures, on the other hand, are produced by a sensible object, not on account of any relation to venereal or gustatory delight, but on account of a perfection in the object that makes it suitable to the sense (e.g., the enjoyment derived from beautiful scenery, classical music, fragrant roses, or downy or velvety cloth).” (Ibid., n. 2461).

Fourth, danger of sin is either proximate or remote, depending on the individual and circumstances involved. Proximate danger of sin involves “moral certainty that in given circumstances sin will be committed, either because the generality of mankind falls in such cases (absolute danger), or because in them a particular individual has always fallen (relative danger).” (Ibid., n. 258) Remote danger of sin is present where there is a lesser likelihood that sin will be committed, “and does not exclude a serious and well-founded probability or expectation to the contrary.” (Ibid.) There is a mere possibility of sin where there is “the conceivability but unlikelihood that it will result from a certain set of circumstances.”

To expose oneself to danger of sin can either be lawful or unlawful. It is lawful “if this can be done according to the laws of prudence, for otherwise absurdities would follow.” (ibid., n. 261) As the moralists frequently repeat, if we were bound to avoid all danger of sin, then we would have to leave the world. It is unlawful if one imprudently exposes oneself to danger of sin without just cause. Here, it is important to invoke the principle of a proportionately grave justification, which requires moral discernment. If one exposes himself to danger of sin with a proportionately grave cause, then it may be prudent, otherwise it is imprudent.

In the case of an unlawful exposure, it is a mortal sin when one “rashly exposes himself to the proximate danger of grave sin, or to what he foresees will become proximate danger.” (ibid., n. 260) It is a venial sin when one “rashly exposes himself to the remote danger of grave sin or to the proximate danger of venial sin.”

Obviously, in the case of an exposure to the mere possibility of sin, there is no sin. (ibid., n. 262)

In the case of a lawful exposure, the following rules are ordinarily given by the moralists: “(a) that the one who exposes himself to the danger of sin be sure that his motive is good (viz., that he firmly intends to avoid the sin to which he may be tempted and to accomplish only the good he desires); (b) that the action he performs and which involves the danger is necessary, and bears a correspondence in importance to the gravity of the sin and the proximity of the risk; (c) that means be employed (e.g., prayer, pious thoughts, spiritual reading, and the use of the Sacraments), which will so reduce the danger that one has confident assurance that the danger will be encountered safely.” (ibid., n. 261)

Theses

One will be hard pressed to deny any of the aforementioned definitions. They are common among Moralists and invoked from time to time by the Church in her teaching. It is only necessary to apply these principles to the question at hand.

NOTE: While it is possible to draw up theses for the married as well in light of the clear distinctions given above, this goes beyond the scope of this article. Hence, I will restrict my comments to the unmarried.

Since, as we went over above, these secondary acts are per se indifferent, we cannot determine whether they are good or evil except by recourse to good or evil circumstances. Here, we will consider two: the intention of the act and the danger of the act.

Thesis I. For the unmarried, to perform secondary external acts with the intention of venereal pleasure, or to consent to such pleasure is a mortal sin.

This is established by the authority of Pope Alexander VII. He condemned the thesis that “it is a probable opinion which states that a kiss is only venial when performed for the sake of the carnal and sensible delight which arises from the kiss, if danger of further consent and pollution is excluded.” (D1140)

First, it is condemned that such a position is a probable opinion. Hence, Catholics must hold such a position to be manifestly uncertain as a condemned thesis.

Second, it is condemned that such an act is venial. Hence, it is not sufficient to hold that such an act is light matter. Rather, one must hold that such an act constitutes grave matter (as theologians commonly hold for all violations of the 6th/9th commandment, ex toto genere suo).

The sense of the thesis is that such non-consummated acts cannot be done for the sake of venereal pleasure without mortal sin, as Viva makes clear in his commentary on this passage. While some commentators attempt to read this in a material way (i.e., x type of kiss is condemned), the foundation for the condemnation is the sinfulness of consenting to illicit pleasure.

α) It matters little what kind of act is being done (words, looks, kisses, touches, etc.) for the scope of the condemnation, as long as the act is being done in view of the venereal pleasure that will be derived from the act.

β) It matters little whether the pleasure consented to is intentional (i.e., I kiss in order that I enjoy illicit pleasure) or incidental (i.e., I kiss without such an intention, yet consent when it arises). While the condemnation only explicitly concerns the former, the line of reasoning about consent to venereal pleasure with equal force applies to the latter.

It is important to recall that this condemnation is restricted in scope. It does not judge on whether such acts can be done outside of the cases when one consents to or intends venereal pleasure. Hence, it is necessary to go beyond what is determined here, applying the other rules laid out above.

Scholium. On Natural Pleasures

A further question may arise here. It has been determined that intention of or consent to venereal pleasure is unlawful for the unmarried when performing such acts, but is it lawful to have the intention of or consent to natural pleasures? On this topic, moral theologians are divided and its determination is quite complex. Hence, I will simply note that there is controversy and move on from here.

Thesis II. For the unmarried, to perform secondary external acts in such a way as to expose oneself to danger of sin without just cause is unlawful.

For the understanding of this thesis, note that “danger of sin” here is not simply “danger of intercourse.” Rather, “danger of sin” is meant to (primarily) indicate the consent to venereal pleasure which may arise.

To give an example from the video I responded to (on the issue of ‘French Kissing’), proximate danger of sin which is absolute involves “moral certainty that in given circumstances sin will be committed…because the generality of mankind falls in such cases.” The generality of mankind consents to venereal pleasure when they perform such an activity. Hence, it is a mortal sin from the danger involved.

To illustrate this point further, let’s take the example of an unmarried couple being left alone in private for a short space of time. For most, this involves a remote occasion of sin, although for others (relatively speaking) the danger becomes proximate due to past sexual sins. In the former case (if there is no just and proportionate cause) it will be light, in the latter case it will be grave.

Lastly, let’s take the example of a simple conversation. In this case, there is only a mere possibility of sin, involving neither a proximate or remote danger of sin. Hence, it is not sinful and there is no unique justification required for the act.

Thesis III. For the unmarried, to perform secondary external acts which expose to danger of sin with just and proportionate cause is lawful, if sufficient precautions against sin are taken.

For those who have a more cursory understanding of the topic, this may come as a surprise. Yet, please note three things in particular.

First, the reason for exposure must be proportionate to the severity of the sin and the proximity of the danger. Hence, the danger in viewing a nude member of the opposite sex is obviously more proximate than simply making physical contact with another person on a decent part of their body. Therefore, the former is only excused in extreme circumstances (e.g., a doctor) while the latter is excused in less severe circumstances (e.g., handshake).

Second, the cause for exposure must be just. St. Alphonsus teaches (n. 417-418) that these acts can be done for a number of different sufficient reasons, including as a matter of duty, national custom, increased goodwill, etc., yet can be done for non-sufficient reasons as well, e.g., vanity, curiosity, etc. This is also considered by St. Thomas as well, “it is possible to do such things without lustful pleasure, either as being the custom of one’s country, or on account of some obligation or reasonable cause.” (ST.II-II.Q154.A4)

On the basis of the presence of the first and second, such acts are referred to as “necessary occasions of sin.” It is important to note that “necessary” is being taken in terms of “moral necessity,” which involves the avoidance of sufficiently grave harm or the acquiring of a sufficiently weighty good. Hence, e.g., bad co-workers can be referred to as a “necessary occasion of sin” for a man insofar as leaving his job will involve grave harm.

Third, sufficient precautions must be taken. Even if one has just and proportionate cause, it can still be possible to fall into sin. For an alcoholic to have just and proportionate cause to walk past the bar does not exclude the fact that he may fall into sin in the process. Hence, we are required to take sufficient precautions to avoid incitements to sin which may arise. The precautions are sufficient when one is morally certain that they will “so reduce the danger that one has confident assurance that the danger will be encountered safely.”

Scholium. On Necessary Occasions and Possibility of Sin

From this, the reader will conclude that there are two instances in which such acts will be appropriate. First, as (morally) necessary occasions of sin. Second, those acts which pose a mere possibility of sin, without involving either (relative) remote or proximate occasions of sin.

It is a reasonable question to ask whether the first category or the second category ought to be invoked in the majority of morally legitimate cases of secondary external acts. Some (more modern) authors seem to ordinarily justify these acts on the basis of the first category, arguing that the goods sought in such acts make them morally necessary as a preparation for marriage. Other (older) authors seem to almost entirely restrict the morally legitimate cases to the second category, arguing that such moral necessity is rare insofar as most of these acts can be substituted by other efficacious means.

Practically, these positions will look quite similar. Those who invoke the first category focus on the good intention of the act in external secondary acts. Those who invoke the second category focus on the relative freedom from danger necessary to act in such a way. It matters little which route one takes in considering the moral legitimacy of such acts, as long as those who invoke the first category are sure to also emphasize the obligation to “so reduce the danger that one has confident assurance that the danger will be encountered safely.”

State of the Question. We can distinguish between three concepts: validity, liceity, and fruitfulness:

α) To have a valid reception of the sacrament means that the bare fact of the confection of the sacrament occurs. In order for a valid sacrament, there simply must be the proper matter, form, minister, and intent.

β) To have a licit reception of the sacrament means that the laws surrounding the proper administration of the sacrament are followed in confecting the sacrament. This concept does not absolutely coincide with the concept of validity. A sacrament can be valid and not licit. Hence, e.g., in the Latin Church it is illicit to give the eucharist to infants, yet the validity of the sacrament is not touched.

γ) To have a fruitful reception of the sacrament means that the gracious effects of the sacrament are truly communicated to the recipient. This abstracts from the licit reception of the sacrament, but not from the valid reception of the sacrament. In certain cases, it is possible for someone to fruitfully receive the sacrament without following the external laws from the Church (e.g., an individual commits a mortal sin, yet doesn’t know of the positive precept of the Church to go to confession before the reception of the sacrament, hence they make an act of perfect contrition and receive the sacrament with devotion). Yet, in the strict sense, the fruitful reception of the sacrament is dependent upon the validity of the sacrament since the fruitful reception indicates precisely the fruitful effects communicated by the sacrament. Although, in a broad sense, we can even speak of the “fruitful effects” of an invalid sacrament that is putatively valid. In this case, it would be equivalent to an act of spiritual communion.

In this case, we are not concerned with the validity of the practice of frequent communion. In the case of the Eucharist, repetition provides no impediment to validity. Further, we are not speaking about the liceity of frequent communion, which is directly relevant to canonical and historical studies. Rather, we seek to concern ourselves with the fruitfulness of the frequent reception of the sacrament, so as to give the general principles/rules of theologians.

Objection. It seems that it is impossible to separate the liceity of the practice from its fruitfulness. For, the liceity of the practice concerns a universal law of the Church that is generally applicable to the faithful. Now, such universal laws of the Church that are generally applicable fall under the disciplinary infallibility of the Church. Hence, it is not possible that such a practice be anything but fruitful.

Response. I distinguish the major premise: generally applicable to the faithful unconditionally, denied, generally applicable to the faithful conditionally, i.e., with those proper dispositions explicitly and implicitly contained or tacitly assumed by the law, conceded. Further, I distinguish the minor premise, infallible as to the objective conformity with faith or morals and taken substantially, conceded, taken modally, denied.

This distinctions are explained in more detail in my article On the Infallibility of the Disciplinary Laws of the Church. NOTE: I am not at all commenting on the modal properties of the law concretely taken, but only abstract separability and distinction between the two in principle.

Lastly, fruitfulness can be taken in two ways. First, we can speak absolutely of the communication of the gifts of grace in the reception of the sacrament taken individually, i.e., “what are the dispositions sufficient for the communication of grace in this sacrament.” Second, we can speak relatively of the communication of greater gifts of grace taken collectively, i.e., “what is the most efficacious habitual practice for the communication of the greatest degree of grace in these sacraments.”

To illustrate this quantitatively (which only has a remote likeness to the communication of grace): let’s say that there was a man who had two options in relation to two masses. First, he could receive fruitfully at both masses with moderate preparation. Second, he could increase his fervor at the second mass by not receiving at the first mass so much so that his dispositions allow for an even greater reception of graces than both masses with moderate preparation taken together. In both cases, his reception of the sacrament would be fruitful in an absolute sense. Yet, relatively speaking, in the second case his reception would be more fruitful.

Hence, when speaking absolutely, the only disposition required for a fruitful reception of the sacrament is to be in a state of grace. Yet, relatively speaking, for a more fruitful reception of the sacrament, we treat other dispositions.

First Conclusion. For the fruitful reception of the sacrament, only the state of grace is required.

On the first point, theologians are divided. Cajetan, Peter de Soto, and Contenson teach that the state of grace does not suffice for the fruitful reception of the sacrament, but actual devotion is necessary. Although, more common is the opinion of others (Suarez, Vasquez, Lugo, John of St. Thomas, the Salmanticenses, Gonet, Billuart, St. Alphonsus, etc.) that the state of grace suffices.

As St. Thomas teaches in ST.III.Q79.A8:

Venial sins do not utterly hinder the effect of this sacrament, but merely in part. For…the effect of this sacrament is not only the obtaining of habitual grace or charity, but also a certain actual refreshment of spiritual sweetness: which is indeed hindered if anyone approach to this sacrament with mind distracted through venial sins; but the increase of habitual grace or of charity is not taken away.

In this section, St. Thomas is speaking of venial sin in the very act of communing. Hence, a fortiori for other ill-dispositions. Such is the argument given by St. Alphonsus in his defense of frequent communion.

The other dispositions (e.g., actual devotion) is necessary for an actual refreshment by the sacrament (i.e., the increase of the actual fervor of charity), but to be free from mortal sin, even while venially sinning, suffices that there be an increase of habitual grace and charity. The former is a more fruitful effect, while the latter is a merely fruitful effect.

It is in this way that other texts from St. Thomas are easily resolved (although, certain theologians argue for a change in his position), distinguishing between the habitual and actual effects of this sacrament:

Every perfection to be acquired is impeded by the removal of its proper disposition. But just as material dispositions are ordered to the perfection of form, so acts are ordered to the perfection of the end. And therefore since this sacrament perfects by uniting to the end, as was said above, in order for it to have its own effect fully in the one who receives it, there must be actual devotion present. And since sometimes actual devotion can be impeded without mortal sin, since various distractions impede it, and venial sins destroy the act of the virtues, this sacrament’s effect can be impeded without mortal sin so that someone does not receive the increase of grace; but neither would he have become guilty of mortal sin, but perhaps guilty of venial sin, by the fact that he approaches the sacrament without proper preparation. (Sent.IV.D12.Q2.A1.qa3)

This seems to follow from the teaching of the Council of Trent that the sacraments confer grace “on those who do not place an obstacle thereto,” (Sess. 7, can. 6) as theologians commonly argue.

In the language of theologians, for the habitual effects of the sacraments to take place, a mere negative and habitual disposition is required (i.e., freedom from mortal sin and presence of sanctifying grace). Yet, for the actual increase of the charity, a positive and actual disposition is required (i.e., actual devotion).

With all of this in mind, we can move on to the practical advice that is given by St. Thomas, which is generally represented in approved spiritual authors and by the Church.

Second Conclusion. For the more fruitful effect of the sacrament, the rule is to be followed that is laid down by St. Alphonsus, “there is no one to whom monthly communion may not be recommended: there are but few to whom weekly communion should be forbidden; and very few to whom daily communion ought to be allowed.”

NOTE. All spiritual writers and the ecclesiastical decrees on the matter teach that the permission of more frequent communion than the norm should be reserved to a spiritual director who is able to objectively discern whether you are properly disposed for more frequent communion. As St. Alphonsus says, “to regulate the frequency of your communions belongs not to you, but to your director.” The documents of the Church don’t merely counsel everyone in a state of grace to receive as frequently as possible without distinction (although, per se, this state suffices for the effect of the sacrament). Sacra Tridentina counsels the use of confessors to discern the prudence of the practice in individual cases: “That the practice of frequent and daily Communion may be carried out with greater prudence and more fruitful merit, the confessor’s advice should be asked.” Bl. Innocent XI’s decree is especially clear: “frequent communion should be left to the decision of confessors, who ought to prescribe what they judge to be most profitable to their penitents, from the purity of their conscience, and from the fruit which they receive from frequent communion.”

So that one does not become confused on this matter, it is necessary to again refer to the difference between the fruitful and more fruitful reception of the Sacrament.

As St. Alphonsus teaches, in the case of one who is free from mortal sin with some devotion for the sacrament, it is obviously sufficient for a fruitful reception of the sacrament. Yet, when St. Alphonsus gives his advice for confessors on whether they should allow communion more than once a week, he is giving advice for what is the more fruitful practice. St. Alphonsus simply states that “it appears to me that…it may be very reasonably asserted that, according to the common opinion of spiritual fathers, and according to the present practice of the church, all who are not conscious of mortal sin should be allowed to receive the holy Eucharist.” He uses this premise as an a fortiori argument to demonstrate that weekly communion is allowed for those free from mortal sin. Hence, while it is per se permitted (and fruitful) to receive at any time when free from mortal sin, it is the more fruitful practice to permit such habitually only to those who are disposed properly (as not to have the opposite effect in the long run).

Now, it is important to point out (in line with Sacra Tridentina) that there is no divine precept prohibiting a fruitful reception of the sacrament. Now, as a matter of ecclesiastical precept, Sacra Tridentina has forbidden confessors to forbid such reception to those who are free from mortal sin and approaching with the right intentions. Hence, the Spiritual Director is only in a position to counsel on this matter, rather than to command obedience. In the Motu Proprio, the distinction is made between what is expedient (i.e., to be “free from venial sins, at least from such as are fully deliberate, and from any affection thereto”) and what is sufficient (i.e., to be “free from mortal sin”).

Hence, the principles that will be drawn from Ss. Thomas and Alphonsus are counsels, not matters of precept, but any prudent and upright Catholic desiring perfection should pay attention to what is said. This is evident from a number of different reasons that become clear when carefully reading the treatment of the matter from traditional authors (especially in their recitation of various exceptions and extraordinary circumstances that could not apply if they were intending to recount strict precepts).

First, the general norm of the reception of Holy Communion, as evidenced by a multitude of Fathers, Theologians, and Spiritual Authors, is to receive once a week. This is against certain more rigorous authors who follow St. Francis de Sales.

In An Apologetic Reply, on the Subject of Frequent Communion, to D. Cyprian Aristasio, St. Alphonsus deals with a particular objection to his doctrine distinguishing between frequent (i.e., more than once a week) and weekly communion. According to St. Alphonsus (with most theologians and spiritual writers), we ought to distinguish between the detachment from deliberate sin sufficient for weekly communion and the detachment from sin sufficient for more frequent communion. In the former case, it suffices that there be a firm purpose to be free from mortal sin. In the second case, there must be a firm purpose to be free from venial sins as well. Yet, through a confusing text attributed to St. Augustine, some spiritual authors (including St. Francis de Sales) collapsed the two cases and demanded the same freedom from attachment to deliberate sin in those communing weekly as those communing more frequently. Yet, throughout this reply, St. Alphonsus corrects the record and shows that everyone in a state of grace ought to commune, outside of those extraordinary cases when a penitent should be forbidden communion for a just cause.

Second, as to a more frequent reception of communion, St. Thomas and St. Alphonsus provide mutually beneficial treatments of the matter.

NOTE: On the issue of frequent communion, St. Alphonsus’ doctrine received particular approbation by the Church. It is noted in the Acts of St. Alphonsus’ Beatification that such a work was done at the request and with the express approval of Pope Clement XIII:

Returning to Rome, Alphonsus was embraced most affectionately by the Supreme Pontiff and honored with a three-hour audience. When, among the most weighty matters of the Church on which he was consulted by the Pontiff, he mentioned that the Book he had recently published on the utility of frequent Communion had been attacked, the Pontiff was inflamed with zeal, and showing that this most holy practice is very useful to souls, and confirming it by his own experience, commanded him to refute the adversary: as he shortly afterward did in Rome, and offered the published reply to the Pontiff himself. (Positio super Introductione Causae, Rome 1796, Informatio, n. 71)

Read more

Read more

Well, when my daughter was born this summer, I never resumed my translating. Hence, the tract remained partially translated, covering: (a) the truth of the Trinity, (b) the knowability of the Trinity, and (c) on the Divine Processions. While I did end up finishing Charles-Rene Billuart’s treatment in his Summa Summae for my Complete Course in Thomistic Theology, Gonet’s treatment is FAR superior in every way possible. Perhaps I will finish it in the future, but here is what I have so far (unedited). Apologies on the excess parentheses. I just include as much as possible before editing.

INTRODUCTION

This mystery is not undeservedly called by [St. Gregory] Nazianzus “the most sacred enigma,” whose perfect understanding must be deferred until the clear vision of God. Hence, it is not without purpose that in the Gospel it is said that someone came by night to his friend and asked: “Friend, lend me three loaves” [cf. Lk. 11:5], which is nothing other than the knowledge (cognitionem) of the Trinity, which is the true food of the soul, as [St.] Augustine teaches, in Sermon 29 de Verbis Domini. Truly, he comes by night because the investigation of the three Persons in Unity is obscure and shadowed, so long as we are in this mortal life, and belongs more truly to the Blessed than to those still journeying here below. This perhaps was also indicated under a mystery in Genesis 18, when it is said that Abraham was at the door of the tabernacle, when he saw three and adored one, just as when the soul then begins to behold the unity of nature in the Trinity of Persons, when, placed at the final moment, it departs from the tabernacle of the body. Wherefore Augustine fittingly says, Book 7 of De Trinitate: “The Trinity is to be held by faith, until He shines forth in our hearts, who says through the Prophet: ‘Unless you believe, you shall not understand’ [Isa. 7:9].” Therefore, in the thorough investigation (pervestigando) of this mystery, the anchor of faith must be held firmly, whence, before we engage the scholastic difficulties and dispute with the scholastics concerning the processions, relations, and the Divine Persons and their properties, so that the faith and truth of so great a mystery may be more firmly established in our hearts and the principal errors of heretics against it may be shattered at the threshold of this Treatise, we have judged that certain points concerning its truth and cognoscibility ought to be set forth, by way of preamble to the scholastic difficulties.

To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber.

CHAPTER 1. ON THE TRUTH OF THE MYSTERY OF THE MOST HOLY TRINITY

The faith of this mystery consists principally in this: that we firmly believe and profess one God subsisting in three Persons; whence, in order that the truth of this may be established, there must first be proved the real distinction and plurality of the Persons, against Sabellius; and then their consubstantiality, against the Arians and Macedonians.

§ I. There is in God a real distinction of Persons.

This truth is, in the first place, insinuated three times in the first chapter of Genesis. First, when it is said: “In the beginning God created heaven and earth” (Gen. 1:1); for in Hebrew, it is rendered “Elohim created,” that is, “the Gods” or “the Judges.” By the word “created” (which is in the singular number) the unity of the Divine nature is designated, and by the word “Elohim” (which is in the plural number), the plurality of the Divine Persons is designated. Second, by the following words: “Be light made. And light was made. And God saw the light that it was good” (Gen. 1:3–4). For, as St. Thomas notes in ST.I.Q74.A3.Rep3, the Person of the Father is insinuated in God saying “Let there be light;” the Person of the Son, in the word by which it is said; and the Person of the Holy Spirit, in the complacency whereby “God saw the light that it was good.” Third, when it is said later in the same chapter: “Let us make man to our image and likeness... And God created man to his own image and likeness” (Gen. 1:26–27). For that alternation between plural and singular number is no obscure signification of the mystery of the Trinity. This is confirmed even by what the Jews respond, namely that God spoke with Himself and, stirring Himself to action, said: “Let Us,” etc. Thus, [St.] Basil, in the Ninth Homily on the Hexaëmeron said that “their words contain a manifest absurdity. Where is the smith, the carpenter, the shoemaker, who, without help and alone before the instruments of his trade, would say to himself; let us make the sword, let us put together the plough, let us make the boot? Does he not perform the work of his craft in silence? Strange folly, to say that any one has seated himself to command himself, to watch over himself, to constrain himself, to hurry himself, with the tones of a master!”

The same truth is proven by the words of the Prophet in Psalm 32: “By the word of the Lord the heavens were established: and all the power of them by the spirit of his mouth.” For by the name “Lord” is understood the Father, whose is the Word, and who operates through the Word, the first Person of the most holy Trinity. The Word, by whom all things were made, is the Son, the second Person. Finally, the third is the Spirit of the mouth of God, to whom, in a singular manner, the perfection of divine works is attributed. Hence [St.] Jerome remarks: “The majesty of the Trinity is most clearly declared in these words: Lord, Word, Spirit of the Lord.” And [St. Gregory of] Nyssa, in Oratio Catechetica, Chapter 4: “By these words, the mystery of truth is established, which dictates that the Word is to be spoken of according to essence, and the Spirit according to hypostasis.” The same mystery is expressed in Psalm 66, where it is said: “May God have mercy on us, and bless us: may he cause the light of his countenance to shine upon us…May God bless us: and all the ends of the earth fear him.” [cf. Ps. 66:2, 8]. Concerning which [St.] Jerome also says: “May God the Father bless us; Our God, the Son—for He is indeed our God. And Isaiah says: ‘And thou shalt call his name Emmanuel,’ that is, God with us [Is. 7:14]. Our God bless us: God the Holy Ghost. See the mystery of the Trinity contained within a single verse.” But lest, in naming God, one should suppose that three Gods were being spoken of, he immediately added, thereby insinuating unity, “And let all the ends of the earth fear him.”

Finally, Isaias 6: “Holy, Holy, Holy, the Lord God of hosts” the Seraphim cry out, one to another. In this, the Trinity of Persons is designated by the thrice-repeated name “Holy”; and the unity in essence is signified by the singular form of the words “the Lord God of hosts”. Hence, St. Ambrose speaks splendidly in Book 2 of de Fide ad Gratianum: “What means this threefold utterance of the same name ‘Holy?’ If thrice repeated, why is it but one act of praise? If one act of praise, why a threefold repetition? Why the threefold repetition, unless that the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are one in holiness? The seraph spoke the name, not once, lest he should exclude the Son; not twice, lest he should pass by the Holy Spirit; not four times, lest he should conjoin created beings [in the praise of the Creator]. Furthermore, to show that the Godhead of the Trinity is One, he, after the threefold ‘Holy,’ added in the singular number ‘the Lord God of Sabaoth.’”

The same truth is clearly declared in the New Testament, especially in Matthew 28: “Baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost” (Matth. 28:19). And in First John 5: “And there are three who give testimony in heaven: the Father, the Word, and the Holy Ghost” (I Ioan. 5:7).

Nor is the subterfuge of Sabellius of any value, who says that those things in Scripture which signify a distinction of Persons ought not to be referred to a diversity of the persons themselves in se, but rather to a difference of offices or actions of the same Persons, as though the same Person, insofar as unbegotten and the principle of creation, is called the Father; insofar as incarnate, is called the Son; and insofar as sanctifying the creature, is called the Holy Ghost, this, as it were, by a kind of extension or diffusion of the same person into various effects. This evasion, I say, does not hold: first, because Scripture in various places admits a true Paternity and Sonship in God, as is evident from that passage in First John 5:20: “That we may be in his true Son”; but where there is true Paternity and Sonship, there must be a distinct Suppositum or Person, since these are relatively opposed. Hence the excellent saying of Tertullian in Contra Praxean, Chapter 10: “In order that I may be a husband, I must have a wife—not be my own wife. So too, in order that I may be a Father, I must have a Son; I am not my own Son.” Further, because Scripture places generation and procession within the Divinity as prior to all created things, and prior to both the Incarnation and the sanctification of creatures: for the Son is said to be begotten before the day star [cf. Ps. 109:3], and Divine Wisdom to have proceeded from the mouth of the Most High before all creatures [cf. Eccli. 24:5], and theWord to have been in the beginning with God, and that through him all things were made [cf. Ioan. 1:1,3].Therefore, within God Himself there is a true and real distinction of Persons, and not merely a difference in connotation or in relation to ad extra effects, or to the Incarnation. Thus, Pope [St.] Leo the Great speaks excellently in Epistle 93 [15]: “the Catholic faith acknowledges the Trinity of the Godhead to be of one essence (ὁμοούσιον) in such a way that it believes the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost indivisible without confusion, eternal without time, equal without difference: because it is not the same person but the same essence which fills the Unity in Trinity.”

The same truth can be proposed by a threefold congruency. First, it is necessary that in God there be found perfect friendship, since this is a simple perfection, unmixed with any imperfection. But friendship cannot be preserved without a real distinction between the one loving and the one loved, since it implies mutual love and equality, as the Philosopher teaches in the Book 5 of Ethics, Chapter 3. Hence Gregory says in Homily 17 in Evangelia that charity cannot exist with fewer than two; therefore, there is in God a real distinction of Persons.

Second, the supreme good must communicate itself in the highest mode. But without a real distinction of Persons, the supreme communication of God cannot be preserved, since a real distinction is required between the one who communicates and the one to whom the communication is made. Therefore, a real distinction of persons must be admitted in God. Hence [St.] Cyril in Book 2 of the Thesaurus wrote that “there cannot be perfect Deity, unless it have a Son, and bring forth from itself its own fruit.”

Third, God is most perfectly felicitous; and since there is no perfect joy nor true felicity without societas, there must exist in Him a true and perfect societas. But if the real distinction of Persons is removed, there can be no perfect societas in God, since creatures are dissimilar to God and have not existed from eternity. As St. Thomas argues, “although the angels and the souls of the saints are always with God, nevertheless, if plurality of persons did not exist in God, He would be alone or solitary. For solitude is not removed by association with anything that is extraneous in nature; thus anyone is said to be alone in a garden, though many plants and animals are with him in the garden. Likewise, God would be alone or solitary, though angels and men were with Him, supposing that several persons were not within Him.” (ST.I.Q31.A3.Rep1) Therefore, a plurality of persons in God is to be admitted.

The arguments of the Sabellians were drawn from those places in Scripture where God is said to be “alone.” For example, Deuteronomy 32: “See ye that I alone am, and there is no other God besides me” (Deut. 32:39). But to this it is easily answered: that the term “alone” removes from God only the plurality of gods, not the plurality of Persons, who subsist in one and indivisible essence. Hence the excellent statement of Bernard in Book 5 of De Consideratione: “Nor do we forsake this profession of the Unity by our upholding of the doctrine of the three Persons, since, when we speak of the Trinity, we do not mean a multiplicity of gods any more than in speaking of unity we imply loneliness. Wherefore, when I speak of One I am not disturbed by the consideration of number, which does not multiply the essence, nor change it, nor divide it. Again, when I speak of three things, if I view them as one, whatever the three things may be, I am not proved wrong. Nor, if I speak of the three Persons of the Godhead, am I obliged to confound the Persons, or reduce the three to the One.”

§ II. The Consubstantiality of the Divine Persons Shown by Scripture

Concerning the First Person [of the Trinity], no one has ever doubted that He is truly God; for, as Augustine says Book 2 of De Trinitate: “The Father is God, as even all heretics concede.” Therefore, what remains is only the proof of the divinity of the Son against the Arians, and of the Holy Ghost against the Macedonians; and once these are proven, the consubstantiality of the Divine Persons will be maintained.

First Conclusion. The second Person of the Trinity is of the same substance and nature as the Father.

First Proof. This is proven first from that passage in John 10, where Christ, speaking of Himself, says: “I and the Father are one” (John 10:30). That He is speaking of unity of essence is clear from the immediately preceding words: “My Father, who hath given them to me, is greater than all” (John 10:29); for nothing surpasses all things except perfect divinity. Hence Augustine, in Sermon 56 De Verbis Domini, says: “Let the Arians hear that He said ‘one’; let the Sabellians hear that He said ‘we are’; and let neither group, by denying either equality or distinction, be found vain.” Certain interpreters of Scripture rightly observe that Christ, in saying “I and the Father are one,” named Himself before the Father, a construction which might appear to exhibit a kind of discourtesy, were it not that He said this to overturn that heresy which He foresaw would arise in the Church: namely, that which claimed the Father was prior to the Son in time, dignity, and power.

Second Proof. This is proven secondly from those places in Sacred Scripture in which Christ is called “true God” (1 John 5:20), “great God” (Titus 2:13), and “God over all” (Romans 9:5). For these passages clearly declare that He is God not by participation, adoption, or imitation, but by His own nature, and therefore equal to the Father and consubstantial with Him. Hence the Apostle says in Philippians 2:6: “Who being in the form of God, thought it not robbery to be equal with God.” And in Psalm. 109:1, in order to signify the same equality of the Son with the Father, the Son is said to sit at the right hand of the Father: “The Lord said to my Lord: Sit thou at my right hand,” as [St.] Augustine noted in that very place. [St. John] Chrysologus also acutely observed in Sermon 58 that just as in that Psalm the Father says to the Son: “Sit thou at my right hand,” so too the Father is said to sit at the right hand of the Son: “The Lord at thy right hand” (Ps. 109:5), in order to denote that between the Father and the Son there is an equal degree of honor. He stated, “thus the Son of God sits at the right hand, in such a way that the Father does not sit at the left: for the divine confession is unique and singular, wherein the heavenly power admits nothing left-handed.”

Third Proof. The conclusion is proven thirdly from that passage in John 1: “In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God” (John 1:1). For, as Ambrose excellently says in Book 1 of De Fide Trinitatis: “In this short passage our fisherman has barred the way of all heresy. For that which was ‘in the beginning’ is not comprehended in time, is not preceded by any beginning. Let Arius, therefore, hold his peace. Moreover, that which was ‘with God’ is not confounded and mingled with Him, but is distinguished by the perfection unblemished which it has as the Word abiding with God; and so let Sabellius keep silence. And ‘the Word was God.’ This Word, therefore, consists not in uttered speech, but in the designation of celestial excellence, so that Photinus’ teaching is refuted. Furthermore, by the fact that in the beginning He was with God is proven the indivisible unity of eternal Godhead in Father and Son, to the shame and confusion of Eunomius. Lastly, seeing that all things are said to have been made by Him, He is plainly shown to be author of the Old and of the New Testament alike; so that the Manichæan can find no ground for his assaults. Thus has the good fisherman caught them all in one net, to make them powerless to deceive, albeit unprofitable fish to take.”

The arguments of the Arians were of no real weight, for they argued in this way: The Father is said to be greater than the Son, John 14: “The Father is greater than I” (John 14:28); and in First Corinthians 15, the Son is said to be subject to the Father (cf. I Cor. 15:28); and in Philippians 2, He is said to be obedient to Him (cf. Phil. 2:8); and in Mark 13, Christ says that He does not know the day of judgment (cf. Marc. 13:32); and in John 5, that He can do nothing of Himself (cf. John 5:19). But these statements, they say, are incompatible with the equality and consubstantiality of the Son with the Father. Therefore, they conclude, the Son is not equal to the Father, nor consubstantial with Him.

Truly, if this argument proved anything, it would prove that the Son is not supreme over all creatures, as the Arians claimed, since in Hebrews 2:9, Christ is said to be lower than the angels. Just as, therefore, from this it does not follow that Christ is inferior to the angels, except only according to the ratio of human nature: so also, from the fact that the Father is said to be greater than the Son, and the Son to be subject and obedient to Him, one can only infer that the Son is not equal to the Father according to His humanity, but not that He is not equal to Him according to His Divinity. As for what is added concerning the day of judgment, it must be said that Christ is said not to know it as the Legate of the Eternal Father and Teacher of the Nations, that is, with respect to its public disclosure, but rather as something kept “under seal” and not to be revealed to others. In this way of speaking, we often use the phrase when, having been asked about things we have received in secret, we respond that we do not know them. Hence Hilary in Book 10 of De Trinitate says: “This profession of not knowing is not a weakness of ignorance, but a dispensation of silence.” To the passage in John 5, St. Thomas responds “the words, ‘the Son cannot of Himself do anything,’ do not withdraw from the Son any power possessed by the Father, since it is immediately added, ‘Whatsoever things the Father doth, the Son doth in like manner;’ but their meaning is to show that the Son derives His power from the Father, of Whom He receives His nature.” (ST.I.Q42.A6.Rep1) In one word, it is signified that Christ has power through generation, not as an ungenerated Person, like the Father.

Second Conclusion. The Holy Ghost is true God, and therefore consubstantial with the Father and the Son.

First, He is said to create the world and to fill it: “Thou shalt send forth thy spirit, and they shall be created.” (Ps. 103:30) “For the spirit of the Lord hath filled the whole world.” (Sap. 1:7) Second, He is said to establish the heavens and to adorn them: “By the word of the Lord the heavens were established; and all the power of them by the spirit of his mouth.” (Ps. 32:6) “His spirit hath adorned the heavens.” (Job 26:13) Third, He is said to search the deep things of God: “The Spirit searcheth all things, yea, the deep things of God.” (1 Cor. 2:10) Fourth, He is said to have a temple, which belongs to God alone: “Know you not that your members are the temple of the Holy Ghost?” (1 Cor. 6:19) Fifth, He is said to speak through the mouths of the Prophets and the Saints: “For prophecy came not by the will of man at any time: but the holy men of God spoke, inspired by the Holy Ghost.” (2 Pet. 1:21) Sixth, He is said to be the beatitude of the angels: “The Holy Ghost being sent down from heaven, on whom the angels desire to look.” (1 Pet. 1:12) Finally, in the Acts of the Apostles, the Holy Ghost is plainly called God. For Peter said to Ananias: “Why hath Satan tempted thy heart, that thou shouldest lie to the Holy Ghost?... Thou hast not lied to men, but to God” (Act. 5:3–4).

Against the divinity of the Holy Ghost, Macedonius principally opposed two arguments: First, that which is founded on Romans 8:26: “The Spirit asketh for us.” But if He were God, He would not ask, but would give. Second, that which is founded on John 16:13: “What things soever he shall hear, he shall speak, and the things that are to come, he shall shew you.” But he who must hear and be instructed in order to speak to others is not God, for God has no need of instruction. Therefore, the Holy Ghost is not God.

To the first objection, the response is given from Augustine, Epistola 121, that Paul asserts the Holy Ghost “maketh intercession for us” because He teaches us to ask; whence he immediately adds in the same place: “The Spirit also helpeth our infirmity” (Rom. 8:26). Or it may also be said, with St. Thomas, on this very passage of the Apostle, that the Holy Ghost is said to intercede, that is, He makes us intercede; just as it is said in Genesis 22:12, “Now I know that thou fearest God,” that is, I have caused it to be known.

To the second objection it must be answered, with Basil in Book 1 of Contra Eunomium, that the Holy Ghost is said to hear from the Father and the Son the things which He speaks, not by way of instruction or discipline, as from an inferior to a superior, but through the communication of the divine essence and scientia, which He has received from the Father and the Son through His eternal procession.

CHAPTER 2. ON THE COGNIZABILITY OF THE MYSTERY OF THE TRINITY

First Conclusion. The mystery of the Trinity is not able to be known (posse cognosci) by the light of natural reason.

Proof from Scripture and the Fathers. It is said in Matthew 11:27, “No one knoweth the Son, but the Father: neither doth any one know the Father, but the Son, and he to whom it shall please the Son to reveal him.” Hence Pope [St.] Hormisdas, in his Epistola ad Iustinum Imperatorem, writes: “The secret of the Trinity could not be investigated by the nature of any visible or invisible creature.” By which words he clearly declares that no human or angelic intellect can, by natural light alone, ascend to the cognition (cognitionem) of this mystery, indeed not even to suspect it. As a type of this reality, in Ezechiel 10 the throne of the Most Holy Trinity is said to be set above the heads of the four living creatures; for (as some interpreters of Scripture note) the sublimity of this mysterium transcends the fourfold grades of created knowledge: namely, sensitive, typified by the ox; imaginative, typified by the lion; rational, typified by the man; and angelic, typified by the eagle. Wherefore, the Prophet adds in the same place: “When there was a voice from above the firmament, that was over their heads, they stood and let down their wings” (Ezech. 1:25). And St. Gregory explains that when we reflect on angels, the voice is still said to come from the firmament, not above the firmament; but when the mind considers the power of the divine nature and its other attributes (and the same must be said concerning the plurality of Persons), “the voice is from above the firmament,” because it apprehends that reality which transcends even the understanding of angels by its incomprehensibility.

Proof from St. Thomas. The second proof is from the reasoning of St. Thomas in ST.I.Q32.A1. God cannot be known by us naturally except through creatures; for we know nothing about Him a priori or per causam, but only a posteriori, and through effects produced by Him. But from created effects we cannot arrive at knowledge of so great a mystery: therefore, this mystery cannot be known by us through natural light. The major is evident. The minor is proven from the fact that created effects do not proceed per se from God as Three, but insofar as He is One; because they proceed from Him per se by reason of omnipotence, in the mode of proximate power, and by reason of divinity, as the radical principle. Hence, just as effects produced by an artisan, for example, a painted panel by a painter, do indeed manifest his skill and craftsmanship, since they proceed from and depend upon that per se; yet they do not manifest his color, shape, stature, garments, and the like, which do not per se contribute to the production of the work, but are only present per accidens and concomitantly in the artisan as he acts according to art: so too, although from the inspection of creatures and the skillfully ordered structure of this world we may come to know the infinite wisdom, power, and divinity of that supreme Artisan, yet from them we cannot arrive at knowledge of the Trinity.

First Objection. In created things there shines forth many vestiges of the Trinity, from which we may come to a knowledge (cognitionem) of this mystery. Hence, some of the ancient philosophers had some knowledge (notitiam) of it. For Trismegistus said: “The Monad begot the Monad, and reflected its own ardor into itself”; in which words there clearly seems to be expressed the generation of the Word and the procession of the Holy Spirit. Augustine also reports in Book 7 of the Confessionum that he had read in the books of the Platonists many things pertaining to knowledge (notitiam) of the Most Holy Trinity: for example, that which John writes concerning the eternal generation of the Word: “In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God” (John 1:1).

Response. I respond that although certain vestiges of the Trinity may indeed shine forth in created things, nevertheless, apart from divine revelation, human reason is not able to attain any knowledge (notitiam) of it, nor even the slightest suspicion. For, as St. Thomas teaches in Sent.I.D33.Q1.A1.Rep2, all similitudes which can be drawn from creatures to explain this Mystery bear more dissimilitude than similitude; therefore, they lead the intellect away from the truth of this Mystery more than they lead it into the truth. Thus Dionysius, in Chapter 13 of De Divinis Nominibus, writes: “No number, nor unity, nor productiveness, nor any other existing thing, or thing known to any existing thing, brings forth the hiddenness, above every expression and every mind, of the Super-Deity Which is above all superessentially.” Therefore, if any of the ancient philosophers had some knowledge of it, they drew that knowledge either from Sacred Scripture and the books of the Prophets, or from the verses of the Sibyls, or even from the revelation of demons, who, at the first instant of their creation, possessed the faith and revelation of this Mysterium. That they at times spoke of it to men is indicated by the response of Serapis, who, when asked by Thulis, the king who reigned in Egypt, who was more blessed than he, is said to have replied (as Suida reports, and as cited by Ludovicus Vives in Book 10 of De Civitate Dei): “In the beginning is God, then the Word, and the Spirit. These three are added: these three are coeternal, and tending to one.”

Second Objection. By natural light it is known that the highest perfection is to generate one like oneself; therefore, by the same natural light it will be manifest that generation, and consequently the production of the Word, is found in God. Likewise, it is evident by natural reason that the good is self-diffusive, and therefore that infinite good, such as God is, can diffuse and communicate itself infinitely. Hence, since only the communication of the divine nature ad intra is infinite simpliciter, it can be demonstrated by natural reason that God communicates His nature ad intra to another suppositum; and consequently, that there are multiple Persons in God.

Response. I deny the antecedent. For natural reason dictates that generation cannot occur without a division of nature and substance, into the one generated and the one generating, and consequently not without imperfection. Therefore, that generation is a simply simple perfection, and that it involves no imperfection in its concept, this we do not know with certainty except through divine revelation, by which we are taught that in God there is a Son begotten of the Father before all ages, and that He is of the same substance and nature with Him. As to what is further added, namely, that by natural light it is known that infinite good ought to communicate itself infinitely, it must be said: by natural reason it is known that infinite good can be communicated infinitely, with respect to the mode of communication, namely by producing things from nothing, which requires infinite power; but not with respect to the thing communicated, namely the divine nature itself. For although God ad intra can communicate it, yet this power which He has of communicating Himself ad intra cannot be apprehended by our own powers, because the very cognition of these principles does not suffice for us, consulting only natural reason.

Second Conclusion. While the Mystery of the Trinity is above [natural reason], it is not contrary to natural reason.

Proof. As St. Thomas argues in SCG1.C7, although the truth of the Christian faith exceeds the capacity of human reason, nevertheless, those things which natural reason has introduced (indita habet) cannot be contrary to the truth of faith. For those things that are naturally implanted (sunt insita) in reason are known to be most true; and likewise, that which is held by faith, since it is divinely confirmed, it is impious to believe to be false. Therefore, since only the false is contrary to the true, it is impossible that the truth of the Mysteries of the Faith should be contrary to principles known naturally: therefore, although the Mystery of the Trinity is above reason, it is nevertheless not contrary to natural reason.

Objection. This Mystery conflicts with that well-known principle, known by natural light, which is the very foundation of all syllogistic art: “things which are identical with a third are identical with one another” (quae sunt eadem uni tertio, sunt eadem inter se). For the Divine Persons are really identical with the essence, and yet are really distinguished from one another: therefore, the Mystery of the Trinity is not only above [natural reason], but also contrary to natural reason.

Some [i.e., Suarez and Vazquez], in order to extricate themselves easily from this difficulty, respond that the aforesaid axiom holds only in created things, not however in God, in whom, on account of His infinitude, the same numerically one nature can subsist in three Persons really distinct from one another. Hence [St.] Cyril of Alexandria, Book 11 in Ioannem, says: “If there were nothing at all to separate or create a distinction between us and God, we might then apply the analogy of our own case to the things which concern God; but if we find the interval betwixt us to be something we cannot fathom, why do men set up the attributes of our own nature as a rule and standard for God, conceiving of that Nature Which is not bound by any law in the light of our own weaknesses, and so suffer themselves to be guilty of doing a thing which is most irrational and absurd?” But this response is merely an evasion, and a closing-off of the proposed difficulty, not a solution. For that principle, as was stated in the objection, is the chief and almost sole foundation of the entire syllogistic art: for it infers from the identity of the extremorum [i.e., the major and minor terms] with a third term [i.e., the middle] in the [major and minor] premises an identity with each other in the conclusion. But the syllogistic art applies no less in the case of God than in creatures: therefore, the truth of the aforesaid principle also remains. Therefore, the solution is to be rejected.

First Reply. I respond with St. Thomas (ST.I.Q28.A3.Rep1) that the philosophical axiom is universally true when the extrema are identified with a third [both] in re et ratione; but not so when they are identified realitier [i.e., in re] with the third, yet distinguished from it in ratio [and] implying an opposition of relation, for by reason of such an opposition the extrema can be identified realiter with a certain middle, and nevertheless differ realiter from each other. And thus it occurs in the present matter: although the divine relations and Persons are identified realiter with the essence, yet because they are distinguished from it virtualiter, and by a reasoning which involves a relative opposition among themselves, they are distinguished realiter from one another, even though they are the same as the essence. This can be illustrated by two examples. The first is given by St. Thomas in the cited place: although action and passion are only distinguished modaliter from motion [i.e., by a minor real distinction], yet they differ realiter from each other by a major real distinction (distinctione reali maiori), on account of the opposition they bear to one another. And if motion were of such perfection and amplitude that it could identify realiter both action and passion with only a distinction of reason (distinctione rationis), nevertheless action and passion, by reason of the opposition they bear, would still be distinguished realiter from one another. The second is taken from the properties of being [i.e., the transcendentals]. If, per impossibile, the three properties of being (i.e., one, true, and good) while preserving perfect identity with the ratio of being in which they are transcendently included, were to possess among themselves a relative opposition, then by reason of that opposition they would be distinguished realiter from one another, even though they would differ only rationally from the ratio of being.

Nor are the two objections (instantiae) valid which can be made against this solution. [First Instance:] Wisdom and goodness in God are distinguished from the essence by reason, just as Paternity and Filiation are; and yet they do not differ from each other realiter. [Second Instance:] Likewise, it is correctly inferred that Peter is an animal, from the fact that he is the same (idem) as man, from which, nevertheless, Peter-ness and animality are distinguished by reason. Therefore, even if the extrema [i.e., major and minor] differ from the third [i.e., middle] by reason, it is rightly inferred that they are identified realiter with one another, because they are identified realiter with the third. But, I say, these objections (instantiae) do not hold. To the first [instance], St. Thomas responds in Sent.I.D2.Q1.A5.Rep4: “Although wisdom does differ from the other attributes according to its account (secundum rationem), still it is not opposed to any other attribute. For wisdom is compatible with goodness, life, and the other attributes in the same subject. And therefore it does not have the character of distinguishing (rationem distinguendi) supposits of the divine nature, which opposite relations do have. But just as divine wisdom really makes the effect of wisdom on account of the truth of its account (propter veritatem rationis), which remains in God, so too a relation makes a true distinction on account of the true account of relation (propter relationis veram rationem), which is preserved in God.”

By these words he first makes known (insinuat) the difference that exists between goodness and wisdom on the one hand, and on the other hand between Paternity and Filiation, which consists in the fact that, although [wisdom and goodness] differ from the essence according to reason, just as Paternity and Filiation do, nevertheless, relative opposition is not included in their formal ratio (ratione formali), as the relations [of Paternity and Filiaton] do, and, therefore, [wisdom and goodness] do not differ realiter from each other, as Paternity and Filiation do.

Next, he indicates the fundamental reason (rationem fundamentalem) why the divine relations, despite their real identity (reali identitate) with the essence, are distinguished realiter from one another: namely, it is proper to an infinite rei to identify res with itself while preserving their formal rationes (rationibus formalibus), just as the formal ratio (ratio formalis) of wisdom, which is to know things (res) through their highest causes, is most perfectly preserved in God, notwithstanding its real identity with the essence, so too the formal ratio of relation must be perfectly preserved in Him, notwithstanding the real identity of that relation with the divine nature. But the proper ratio (propria ratio) and essence of relation is to be opposed to its correlate, and to be distinguished realiter from it. Therefore, although the divine relations and persons are identified realiter with the essence, nevertheless they are distinguished realiter from one another, by reason of the relative opposition which they possess. From this, the response to the second objection (instantiam) is clear. Peter-ness and animality are not distinguished from man by a reason (ratione) that imports relative opposition, as Paternity and Filiation in the divine are distinguished from the essentia. Thus, while it is rightly inferred that Peter is an animal, from the fact that Peter-ness and animality are identified reality with man, on the other hand, it does not rightly follow that the Father and the Son are identified realiter with one another, from the fact that Paternity and Filiation are the same realiter with the essence and differ only rationally.

Second Reply. The aforementioned philosophical axiom, on which the art of syllogistic reasoning rests, holds true only in those cases where [the major and minor] are the same with a third [i.e., the middle] adequately, not when they are the same only inadequately with a third. Now, the relations which constitute the divine Persons are not identified with the divine essence adequately, but only inadequately. A thing is said to be inadequately identified with something when it is not the same as everything with which that thing is identified, nor is that something with which it is identical merely the same as that thing (nec identificans est idem cum solo identificato). But each personal relation is so identified with the divine nature, that it is not identified with the other personal relations with which the essence is identified; and likewise, the nature is not so identified with one relation that it is not also identified with the others. Thus, for example, the distinct parts of the body are present to one third thing, namely, to the rational soul, without being present to each other: for the foot and the head are immediately and proximately united to the soul, but are distant from each other, because, evidently, they are not united to the soul adequately, but only inadequately, inasmuch as the soul informs not only those parts but also the other parts of the body and is united to them. Likewise, Christ is present in multiple hosts and altars, which nevertheless are not present to one another: because He is not present to those altars and hosts adequately, since He is present to many others as well. Similarly, the Divine Persons are identified with the essence, without being identified with one another, because they are not identified with [the Divine Essence] adequately, but only inadequately.

From what has been said, you will understand the reason why this syllogism is not valid: “This God is the Father; this God is the Son; therefore, the Son is the Father,” not per se from the fact that the form of the expository syllogism (syllogismi expositivi) fails in this mystery, but from the fact that such a syllogism is defective due to the lack of perfect distribution of the term “God,” which, although it is absolutely singular, nevertheless, on account of the real communicability of the divine nature to the three Persons, the [term ‘God’ becomes] quasi-universal (aequivalenter universalis). Hence, for it to be perfectly distributed in the premises, the syllogism should be formed as follows: “Whatever is God is the Father; whatever is God is the Son; therefore, the Father is the Son” and then both the Major and the Minor [premises] would be false, since the Holy Spirit is God, and yet is neither the Father nor the Son.

CHAPTER III. ON THE DIVINE PROCESSIONS

​​The processions of God ad intra are the foundations of the divine relations, by which the Persons are constituted. Hence, before we treat of the the divine relations and Persons, we must first treat of the divine processions.

§ I. Whether, and how many, processions there are in God?

First Conclusion. Ad intra processions are really in God.

First Proof. This is evident from Sacred Scripture. For Christ says in John 8:42, “I proceeded forth and came from God”, and in John 15:26, “The Spirit of truth, who proceedeth from the Father.” Likewise, in Scripture, the First Person is often called the Father, and the Second the Son. But it pertains to the very ratio of a Father to generate, and of a Son to be generated: therefore, in God there is a real procession, by which the Father generates, and the Son is generated.

Second Proof. Reason also confirms this. First, because the Divine Persons are distinguished solely by relative opposition, as is stated in the Council of Florence; but the relative opposition of the Divine Persons is founded upon the origin of one from another. Secondly, because, as St. Thomas argues in ST.I.Q27.A1, whoever understands, from the very fact that he understands, produces a word; hence, since God is intelligent, indeed, in the highest degree (gradu) of intellectuality, He must produce a Verbum in His cognition: not, indeed, in order to understand (for this is already posited as possessed through essential cognition), but because He understands, and in order that, out of the infinite intellectual fecundity, He may communicate His knowledge (notitiam) to another, that is, to the Word itself, and speak Him.

But in order that the force of this congruence may be better perceived, and that an objection (instantia) commonly raised to the contrary may be resolved, it must be noted that when St. Thomas says that whoever understands, from the very fact that he understands, produces a word, this is not to be understood of just any act of intellection (for, the production of a word does not belong to the ratio of intellection as such, as is evidence in the beatific vision, in which the blessed produce no word [cf., ST.I.Q12.A9]), but rather of that connatural intellection by which every intellectual creature understands itself. Therefore, the force of this congruity lies in this: since intellectual creatures, even the most perfect, produce a word in every act of connatural intellection, it is fitting that God, who is in the supreme degree (gradu) of intellectual natures, by His connatural cognition, which is His own self-cognition, likewise produces a Word, not from need (indigentia), but from fecundity.

First Objection. It is repugnant for a being that is a se to proceed from another (ab alio); but each Divine Person is a being a se, therefore, one cannot proceed from another (ab alia).

Reply. I distinguish the major: that it is repugnant to a being a se to proceed from another (ab alio), if it be by procession from another as a cause, I concede the major; but if it be from a principle of origin, with all dependence and causality excluded, I deny the major. Hence, when it is said that each Divine Person is a se, or has being a se, this is true if the phrase “a se”, or “to have being a se,” excludes an extraneous principle (principium extraneum), i.e., of another nature; but it is false if it excludes a real principle of the same nature: for in this way, only the Father is a se, since He alone is unbegotten and unproduced.

Second Objection. A procession cannot be understood without a dependence of the one proceeding on the one producing (procedentis a producente); since to proceed from another (ab alio) is to be unable to be (non posse esse) without that other. But a Person in God is not able to depend on another (ab alia): therefore, neither can one proceed from another.

Reply. I deny the major; and to the proof of the major, it does not suffice, for true dependence of one upon another, that the one cannot exist without the other. For one relative cannot exist without the other, and yet it does not depend upon it, since relative things (relativa) are simultaneous by nature. But, in addition, it is required that the one cannot exist without the other by reason of subordination (ratione subordinationis), which necessarily requires a diversity in nature. Therefore, although in God the Person proceeding cannot exist without the Person producing, nevertheless He does not depend on the producer; because the essence of both is the same, differing only in the mode of possessing it (modo habendi): for the Person producing possesses it a se, while the [Person] proceeding possesses it from another (ab alio).

Third Objection. Between the Divine Persons there cannot be priority and posteriority, since they are coeternal; but procession necessarily involves an order of prior and posterior between the producing Person and the produced Person; therefore, there cannot be procession between the Divine Persons.

Reply. Although among the Divine Persons there cannot be a priority of duration, there can be a priority of origin, which suffices for the procession of one from another. For the light of the sun emits brightness from itself (ex se), and yet the sun is not prior in time to its brightness, but only prior in origin or in nature. Hence, the Divine Word is called the splendor of the Father, because He proceeds from the Father as light from the sun, and is coeternal with Him.

Second Conclusion. There are only two processions in God, one per intellectum, by which the Word is begotten; the other per voluntatem, by which Love is spirated.

Proof. Procession in God is not according to a transient action (actionem transeuntem), but [according to an] immanent (immenentem) [action]. But in God, who is the most perfect intellectual agent, it is only possible for two immanent operations to be found there, namely, intellection and volition, which are distinct virtualiter. Therefore, it is only possible for there to be two divine procession, one per intellectum, the other per voluntatem.

Objection. This argument only proves that in God it is only possible to posit a procession per intellectum and [a procession] per voluntatem, but not that there cannot be in the in the Divine intellect many cognitions, from which multiple words may arise, or multiple volitions, from which multiple loves may be spirated.

Reply. If there were multiple processions in the Divine intellect, from which multiple words may arise, are they going to be diverse specifically or only numerically (specie vel numero tantum diversae)? Not [specifically], since the Divine intellection and speech is one by a specific unity. Not [numerically], since a numerical distinction only arises either from matter or from a subject; but the divine processions and their termini lack matter and subject since they are per se subsistentes. Further, because numerical distinction only arises from limitation; hence, the divine nature, because it is not limited, is not able to be multiplied numerically. But the divine processions, and their termini are not limited entities, therefore, they are not able to be multiplied or distinguished merely by number.

Further, since the Divine Word is infinite and comprehensive, and the adequate terminus of the divine cognition, and since through it the eternal Father knows the [Divine] essence, attributes, [and] relations, [along with] all possible creatures, there cannot be but one [Word]. As St. Thomas admirably explains in Ioan.C1.L1.n27: “Our word is imperfect, but the divine Word is most perfect. Since we cannot express all our conceptions in one word, we must form many imperfect words through which we separately express all that is in our knowledge. But it is not that way with God. For since he understands both himself and everything else through his essence, by one act, the single divine Word is expressive of all that is in God, not only of the persons but also of creatures; otherwise it would be imperfect.”

Confirmation. Among the Angels, the more some excel in dignity, the fewer species and words they use to express their own concepts; therefore, since God attains the highest summit of intellectuality, with one most perfect Word He manifests all the secrets of His infinite wisdom. Hence the Prophet says: “God hath spoken once, these two things have I heard” (Ps. 61:12). For God speaks once, because He has uttered and continually utters one Word from eternity; but the Prophet hears two things, because in this one Word the Father has declared all things.

§ II. What is the principium quo proximum of the Divine Processions?

Durandus holds that the divine nature is not only the radical, but also the proximate and immediate principium [quo] of the divine processions, on account of its fecundity, which belongs to it by reason of its infinitude. Others teach that [the] principium [quo] is solely the absolute perfection; others, solely relation.

First Conclusion. The divine nature, as pre-understood (praeintellectam) by the intellect and will, is not the principium quo proximum et immediatum of the divine processions, but rather the intellect and will of God.

First Proof. This is seen from the fact that Scripture, the Councils, and the Most Holy Fathers commonly call the second person of the Most Holy Trinity the Word and begotten Wisdom; whereas they call the third Charity and Love; but these names pertain to intellect and will. Therefore, the intellect and will are the immediate principium [quo] of the divine processions. Nor is the objection valid which Durandus raises, namely, that those expressions are metaphorical: first, because Cyril, in Thesaurus, book 4, chapter 5, says, “God chose the name Word, because it is the most proper.” Hence, St. Thomas in ST.I.Q34.A1.Rep1 calls Origen the source of the Arians for saying that the Son of God is not properly the Word, but only metaphorically. Further, because if it were permitted to interpret those places of Scripture in which the second person is called the Word in a metaphorical sense, then even those in which He is called Son could be twisted into a metaphorical sense. And thus, an occasion would be given to heretics to evade all the testimonies of Scripture through tropical and metaphorical senses.

Second Proof. One must philosophize about divine things by way of analogy and similitude to created things, excluding imperfections. But in created things, to understand and to will do not proceed immediately from nature, pre-understood in its powers and faculties, but rather from intellect and will; therefore, [so also] in God. Nor is one able to say that the difference between God and creatures is that creatures, due to the finitude and potentiality of their nature, require proximate principles in order to act; whereas God, on the other hand, due to the infinitude and most perfect actuality of the Divine Nature, does not require the concurrence of proximate principles in order to act. One is not able to say this because, while the concurrence of proximate principles distinct realiter from nature is repugnant to the infinitude and purity of the divine nature, nevertheless, the concurrence of proximate principles which are only distinct virtualiter from the divine nature, and identified realiter with it, is not repugnant. Now, intellect and will in God differ only virtualiter from the divine nature; therefore, it is not prejudicial to the infinitude and purity of the divine nature that the divine processions are from intellect and will as from a proximate and immediate principle (principio proximo et immediato), and from the divine nature only radicaliter and mediate.

Third Proof. This can further be proven from the absurdities (inconvenienti) that follow from Durandus’ opinion (sententia). For, if the divine nature, as pre-understood to the intellect and will of God, is the immediate principle of the divine processions, one is not able to assign a reason for why there are only two processions in God, why one ought to proceed from the other, why the Word only proceeds from one person, and why the Holy Spirit proceeds from two [persons]. Finally, there would be no reason why one procession should be generation and not the other, since both persons proceed from the same nature and in the same mode [on this supposition]: all of which is utterly repugnant to the truth of the mystery of the Trinity.

Objection. Durandus responds that just as it is permitted for properties to emanate immediately from nature, nevertheless one emanates prior to another, and one, through the mediation of the other, results from nature; so likewise, even if the divine processions arise immediately from the fecundity of the divine nature, nevertheless a sufficient reason can be assigned for their order, why one supposes the other, and why, through the mediation of the one, it is fitting that it pertain to God.

Reply. But this solution is not sufficient (non valet). First, because properties [differ from operations insofar as] they do not require that they flow forth from principle principles through a medium, as operations do; whence, although in order to assign an order of emanation among properties, it is not necessary to recur to prior proximate principles, on the other hand, it is necessary in order to assign an order of prior and posterior among operations. Secondly, because even though a finite nature can be the root (radix) of finite perfections, one of which is prior to another, because it is its cause, just as rationality is the root (radix) of the capacity to admire and to laugh (admirativi et risibilis), nevertheless, if a nature is infinite, no reason can be given for why [its fecundity] is not exhausted (exhauriatur) by one procession, but well through two [processions]. Therefore, from the divine nature strictly taken (praecise sumpta), which is infinite, a diversity of processions cannot arise; rather, one must recur to the proximate principles, namely intellect and will.

Second Conclusion. The intellect and will of God are not the principium quo proximum et immediatum of the generation of the Word and production of the Holy Spirit, except insofar as they are modified by the relations of paternity and active spiration, which such relations connote.

Proof. The fundamental reason for the conclusion is as follows. If the principium quo proximum et immediatum of the generation of the Word and the production of the Holy Spirit were to consists in the intellect and the will adequately considered, or in any absolute perfection [whatsoever], determined or connoted by no relation, then, since all the absolute perfections of the entire Trinity are common, it would follow that the power to generate and spirate would be found in all the Persons of the Most Holy Trinity, and, therefore, it would immediately follow (subindeque) that the Son would be able to generate another Son and the Holy Spirit would be able to spirate or produce another Holy Spirit. Whence, since in God all that is possible [actually] exists, the Son would de facto generate another distinct Son, and the Holy Spirit would spirate another Holy Spirit, and thus there would be in God more persons than three, which is repugnant to the Catholic faith and utterly destroys the mystery of the Trinity.

What is said of the intellect and will of God, must also be said of the divine nature for the same reason (proportione servata). For it is not the first and radical principle of the divine processions, except insofar as modified by the relations; otherwise, as it is in the Son, it would have the ratio of the radical power to generate; and insofar as it is in the Holy Spirit, [it would have] the ratio of the radical power or principle to spirate. Just as, therefore, in created things we see that the same form, insofar as it is in diverse subjects, and is modified in them in diverse modes, produces different effect, e.g., heat generates flesh in animals, not in fire, and in women produces milk, and not in men; and grace in us, since we are persons outside [of God] (persona extranea), constitutes adopted sons, [whereas] in Christ, who is a Divine person, it does not, so also, proportionally, must the same be understood in the present case. For the Divine essence, insofar as it is in the Father, and is modified by the relation of Paternity, has the ratio of the radical power of generation, and the first and remote principium quo of divine generation; but the same essence, insofar as it is in the Father and Son, and as modified by the relation of [active] spiration, has the ratio of the radical power of spiration, and is the first and remote principium quo of the production of the Holy Spirit. Whence, St. Thomas proposes this objection in QDePot.Q2.A1.Obj13, “if, in God, the Father begets, he must do so in respect of his nature. But the nature is the same in the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. For the same reason, then, both the Son and the Holy Spirit will beget.” He responds to this argument, saying “although he same nature is in Father and Son, it is in each by a different mode of existing, that is, with a different relation. Consequently, it does not follow that whatever befits the Father through his own nature befits the Son.”

Third Conclusion. The principium quo, whether proximate or remote, of the divine processions is not merely the relation alone.

Reason. The reason is that the principium quo of the generative or productive action is that in which (in quo) the one generated or produced is assimilated to the generator or produced, since the intention of the agent is that the one produced be assimilated to himself in the principium quo by which he acts. But, in God, the person produced is assimilated to the person producing in that which is absolute, not that which is relative. Therefore, it is not the relation, but in an absolute perfection connoting relation (perfectio absoluta connotans relationem) that the principium quo of the divine processions [is to be found].

Confirmation. If Paternity, e.g., were the generative power in the eternal Father, and the principium [quo] of divine generation, then either it would be such under the express concept of the Paternity, as it is an exercised relation (relatio exercita); or under the formal ratio of the hypostasis, an would have the ratio of subsistence and personality. But neither can be said, therefore, the principium quo of divine generation is not able to consist in the relation alone. The first part of the minor premise is clear because Paternity, under the express concept of the exercised relation, is founded upong generation, and according to the mode of our conception presupposes it, and consequently also presupposes a generative power in the Father, i.e., the principium quo of generation. As to the second part [of the minor premise], it is proven from the fact that the principium quo of any production must be active, at least as it is quo; yet a relation, insofar as it has the ratio of personality, or the form of hypostasis, is not active, even as quo, but is the pure terminus of nature, constituting it under the ratio of person. Hence, although under this ratio there is a necessary conditio for action, or rather, an intrinsic mode completing the power of acting, it is not, however, the principium quo of generation or spiration. Whence [St.] Anselm, in Monologian, chapter 2, when speaking of the Holy Spirit, says “the Father and the Son emit so great a good not from their relations, which are many, but from the essence itself, which is one.” Further, [St.] Dionysius in De Divinis Nominibus says that “the Father is fontal Deity, but the Lord Jesus and the Spirit are, if one may so speak, God-planted shoots, and as it were Flowers and superessential Lights of the God-bearing Deity.”

First Objection against the First Conclusion. [St.] Hilary in De Synodis says that “to all creatures the will of God imparted His substance, but to the Son, nature gave it.” Further, [St.] Augustine in Book 15 of De Trinitate, Ch. 20, says that “The Word through whom all things were made is the Son of God by nature.” Therefore, from the Holy Fathers, it would seem that the procession of the Word in the divine order is immediately from nature, and not from intellect.

Response. I deny the consequence, for those Holy Father only intend to teach against the Arians that the Word does not proceed from the free will of God, as creatures as produced, but that its production is natural and necessary. Hence, they take the term “natura” in the sense of that which is opposed to that which is free (libero). Or, if they mean that the procession of the Son is from the nature of God as from a principle, they speak of the radical and remote influence, through the medium of the intellect as proximate power.

Second Objection against the First Conclusion. We ought to philosophize about divine things by analogy and similitude with created things. But the generative power does not pertain to creatures by reason of intellect. Therefore, neither [does it so pertain in the case of] God.

Response. We ought to philosophize about God by analogy and similitude with the created things [that are] more perfect, such as those which are spiritual and intellectual. The generative power does pertain to these by reason of intellect. For, the production of the created word is a certain intellectual generation because, as is commonly said, “from the object and power, knowledge (notitia) is born (paritur), and “partus” signifies generation.

Objection against the Second Conclusion. If the principium quo of the Divine Processions does not consist adequately in absolute perfections, but, rather, in absolute perfections (i.e., intellect or will) as connoting the relations of Paternity and active spiration by which they are modified, then it would follow that the generative power is not in the Son since there is not the relation of Paternity in him. But, this cannot be said, therefore neither [can the condition be said]. The logical sequence (sequela) of the major [i.e., the conditional affirmation] is evident. The minor [i.e., that the conditional cannot be said] seems to be established from the fact that the generative power is a kind of perfection. [Thus,] if it were not in the Son, then he would not be equal to the Father in perfection, which is repugnant to the equality of the Divine Persons.

Response. A full response to this difficulty will be given below, when we treat of the equality of the Divine Persons. To briefly reply for now, although the generative power is not in the Son, it does not follow that there is in Him the defect of any perfection that is in the Father; because to be able to generate (posse generare) and to be able to be generated (posse generari) are two offices/functions (munia) which are differ in relation and do not differ in perfection among Divine Persons. For the same absolute perfection, connoting the Paternity, gives the ability to generate (posse generare), and connoting the Filiation, gives the ability to be generated (posse generari).

Objection against the Third Conclusion. The principium quo of generation is that by which (a quo) the Father is denominated as “able to generate” (potens generare). But, the Father is denominated as having an ability toward generation (potens ad generandum) by the relation of Paternity. Therefore, [relation] is the principium quo of Divine generation. The major is clear. The minor is proven in that the proper denomination (denominatio propria) arises not from a common form, but from the unique (propria) [form]. But, the denomination of “able to generate” (potentis generare) is most unique (proprissima) to the Father. Therefore, it does not arise from the essence, which is common, but from the Paternity, which is unique (propria) to him. Whence Athanasius, in Dialogo Primo de Trinitate, says that the Pater generates (gignit) by hypostasis, and creates by command.

Response. I concede the major. I deny the minor. To the proof [of the minor], I distinguish the major, a proper denomination (denominatio propria) ought not to follow from a common form, taken in its undifferentiated commonality (communitate relicta), I concede the major; as appropriated, I deny the major. I concede the minor and deny the consequence.

Therefore, this argument only proves that the denomination of “able to generate” (potentis generare) does not befit the Divine nature taken in an absolute sense (absolute sumpta), but as modified by the relation of paternity, which we explained in the second conclusion. Hence, when [St.] Athanasius says that the Father generates by hypostasis, this is not to be understood of the principium quo proximum or [principium quo] remotum of generation, but only taken as the completion of the principium quo, whether proximate or remote, connoting the relation of Paternity, by which it is modified and completed. From what has been said, it follows that the terminus quo of the divine processions is something other than that which is absolute in re, connoting relation. This is clear for the same reason which we showed for the principium quo, for in the terminus quo ([i.e.,] formal [terminus]), the terminus of the production must agree with the one producing; but in the relations such agreement does not occur, whereas [such agreement] is found in the absolute. Therefore, the absolute, connoting relation, is the formal terminus of the Divine Processions.

§ III. Why is one of the divine processions generation, but not the other?

It is a truth of the faith (de fide) that, besides the procession of the Word, which is a true generation , as is clearly gathered from various places in Scripture, there is another procession, that of love, or of the Holy Spirit. For, as St. Thomas explains in ST.I.Q37.A1, “just as when a thing is understood by anyone, there results in the one who understands a conception of the object understood, which conception we call word; so when anyone loves an object, a certain impression results, so to speak, of the thing loved in the affection of the lover; by reason of which the object loved is said to be in the lover; as also the thing understood is in the one who understands” Therefore, just as it is inferred probabiliter that there is in God a production of the Word from the fact that God understands, as we showed above, so likewise it can be concluded probabiliter that there is another procession in God by way of love, from the fact that God loves.

Valentia, who finds this reasoning unsatisfactory, says that, although the beloved ought to be present within the lover by inclination, nevertheless, some terminus does not need to be produced by the created will, which is a “pondus” [weight, gravity, etc.] and inclination toward the beloved; for the presence of the object is sufficiently brought about through the act of love, which is the actual inclination.

But, on the contrary, just as the object of intellection is not formally present to the intellect by the very act of intellection, but through another terminus produced by it, which is its express image and similitude, so also is the object of love not formally present to the lover by the act of love, but by another terminus produced by it, which has the ratio of an impulse or “weight” (ponderis) including it toward the beloved. Just as [St.] Augustine says in Confessionum, bk. 13, ch. 9: “Amor meus pondus meum; amore feror quocumque feror” (“My love is my weight; by love I am carried wherever I am carried”).

With this presupposed, we inquire into the reason why the ratio of “generation” pertains to the one procession [of the Word] and not to the other procession [of Love] when the definition of the generation of living things is the “origin of a living being from a living being, in similitude of nature” seems to apply no less to the procession of the Holy Spirit than the production of the Word. This difficulty appeared so great to the Holy Fathers that [St.] Ambrose, in De Fide ad Gratianum, chapter 3, says: “To know the distinction (discretionem) of generation is impossible for me;” and [St.] Augustine, in Contra Maximinum, book 3, chapter 14, exclaims in wonder: “To distinguish between that generation and this procession, I do not know, I am not able, I am not sufficient.”

However, the Scholastic theologians have devised reasons to explain this aenigma. Only two modes of speaking will be treated here, which seem more probable (probabiliores), passing over the others for the sake of brevity. The first teaches that the production of the Word is generation, but not the procession of the Holy Spirit, because [the Word] receives, in virtue of his generation, a “second nature, and the power to produce another Divine suppositum, whereas [the Holy Spirit] because he produces nothing within God. But this opinion (sententia) displeases many and is rejected. First, because the similitude required in the begotten person to have the ratio of generation is not in [that which is] relative, but in [that which is] absolute. But the similitude in the fecundity to produce another supposit is not in the absolute taken as such (absoluto praecise), but in the absolute together with (adjuncta) a relation in obliquo and de connotato, as was said in the preceding sections. Therefore, this is not necessary for the ratio of generation.

Second, even if the Son were not productive of the Holy Spirit, he would still be the Son, and, accordingly, his production would still be true generation. Therefore, the ratio of generation does not pertain to the production of the Son precisely from the fact that he receives a fecund nature and the power to produce the Holy Spirit. The consequence is clear. The antecedent is proven. The Son of God, according to [St.] Augustine, De Trinitate, [Book 7], ch. 2: “He is the Son by which He is the Word, and He is the Word by which He is the Son.” But if the Son did not produce the Holy Spirit, he would proceed in the same mode by intellection, as he now proceeds, and thus he would be Word since a word is nothing other than the intrinsic terminus of intellection. Therefore, he would be the Son, even if he did not produce the Holy Spirit. As a confirmation, if, per impossibile, the power to spirate was taken from the Father, he would nevertheless remain Father by the power of generation. Therefore, the Son would also remain Son even if He does not produce the Holy Spirit. The consequence is clear because it is repugnant for the Father to be without the Son; therefore, if the power to spirate were removed from the Father, He would remain Father, and the Son would remain [the Son] as well, even if He did not produce the Holy Spirit.

Third, for true generation it suffices that nature, under the concept (sub conceptu) of nature, be communicated to the produced terminus; but, the true concept of nature in its full rigor is preserved, even without the power to produce another suppositum: therefore, the true ratio of generation is also [preserved]. The major is evident from the definition of the generation of living things. The minor is shown. It is not of the ratio of nature that it has its principle in another (in alio), or in an order to another (ad allium), but it is sufficient that it be a principium of motion in that in which it is, as is evident in the nature of the heavens and Angels, in which the most ratio of nature is found, yet without productive power, even radically, of another supposit. Therefore, the concept of nature is found in its total rigor even where there is no productive power for another, namely, by the fact that it is the root (radix) of other operations, whether immanent or transient. I add that, if the power to produce another suppose were part of the quidditative concept of nature, the Holy Spirit would not be of the same nature with the Father and Son, since in him there is not the power to produce another Divine Person, as there is in the Father and Son. Further, the Son would not be of the same adequate nature as the Father, since the Divine Nature, as it is in the Father, is both generative and spirative, whereas, as it is in the Son, it is only spirative.

The second mode of explanation proposes that the production of the Word is generation, but not the production of the Holy Spirit, because although the Divine Nature is communicated to both, nevertheless the Son proceeds according to the mode of Image, whereas the Holy Spirit does not, since He stands in the mode of an impulse of one loving toward the beloved thing. But this opinion (sententia) too does not seem to reach the mark of truth. For the ratio of image is something consequent upon passive generation, and it is posterior. Therefore, one cannot prove a priori that the procession of the Word is generation, and that the procession of the Holy Spirit is not, merely because the Word is the image of the Father and the Holy Spirit is not. The consequence is clear. The antecedent is proved because among men (in humanis), the son is first generated from the Father, inasmuch as he is produced similar in nature to him, before he is said to be the father’s image, which follows from the former. Further, because in Divine things (in divinis), we first understand the Person of the Son as generated, before we understand the relation of image. For as [St.] Augustine says in Book 7 of De Trinitate, cap. 2: “In that He is born, He is understood to be Word, and Image, and Son.” As St. Thomas teaches in ST.I.Q40.A4, “origin, in the passive sense, simply precedes the personal properties of the person proceeding.” Further, he adds in the same place in the reply to the third objection, “Nativity…in the order of intelligence, precedes filiation.” For, origins are conceived by us as the foundations (fundamenta) of the relations. Therefore, we first conceive the Person of the Son to be generated because the Divine Nature is communicated to Him in virtue of His procession before we conceive in him the relation of Image. Hence, we can only gather a posteriori and not a priori that the Divine Word is begotten and Son, and not the Holy Spirit, because the ratio of Image applied to the one and not the other, just as it is rightly inferred that a horse is not a rational animal because it is not risible. But here we are inquiring into the a priori reason why the production of the Word is generation, and not the procession of the Holy Spirit, which is what remains to be explained.

Conclusion. The proximate and immediate reason why the procession of the Word is generation, and not the procession of the Holy Spirit, is because the Word proceeds in the similitude of nature (similitudinem naturae) by virtue of its procession, rather than the Spirit. The first and radical reason is to be sought in the fact that the Word proceeds by way of intellection (fit per intellectum) whereas the Spirit proceeds by way of volition (per voluntatem). The first part is proven in that actions which terminate at the same terminate are diversified by diverse modes of proceeding and tending towards the [terminus], as Philosophers commonly teach and illustrate with diverse examples. Therefore, the production of the Word and procession of the Holy Spirit are distinguished on account of their diverse modes of tending to the terminus; and one has the ratio of generation, but not the other, because the one tends in the similitude of nature formally (formaliter) and by virtue of itself, but not the other, even though the Divine Nature is communicated by both.

This reasoning is confirmed and further illustrated by the example used by St. Thomas in SCG4.C13 where he says that if a man could produce another man in two ways, namely, by generation, or from his own flesh, by a power granted to him by God, he who was begotten by generation would be called son, not the other, even though both would be similar in substance, solely on account of the different mode of proceeding. For this same reason, Abel is called the son of Adam, but not Eve who was formed from his side; because, although human nature was communicated to both, it was not in the same manner: to Abel by a generative and assimilative act, but not so to Eve. Similarly, therefore, although the Holy Spirit receives the Divine Nature from the Father and the Son, because he does not receive it in virtue of or from the mode of His procession, as the Word does, his production does not have the ratio of generation, as does the procession of the Word.

From this, we are able to easily prove the second part of the conclusion. For, the reason why the Word proceeds in similitude of nature in virtue of its procession, rather than the Holy Spirit, is because the one proceeds by intellection (per intellectum), and the other proceeds by volition (per voluntatem). Therefore, the first and radical reason why the procession of the Word is generation, and the procession of the Holy Spirit is not, is that the former is through intellection (per intellectum), whereas the latter is through volition (per voluntatem). The consequence is clear. The antecedent is proven by the reason given by St. Thomas in ST.I.Q27.A4: “The procession of love in God ought not to be called generation. In evidence whereof we must consider that the intellect and the will differ in this respect, that the intellect is made actual by the object understood residing according to its own likeness in the intellect; whereas the will is made actual, not by any similitude of the object willed within it, but by its having a certain inclination to the thing willed. Thus the procession of the intellect is by way of similitude, and is called generation, because every generator begets its own like; whereas the procession of the will is not by way of similitude, but rather by way of impulse and movement towards an object. So what proceeds in God by way of love, does not proceed as begotten, or as son, but proceeds rather as spirit; which name expresses a certain vital movement and impulse, accordingly as anyone is described as moved or impelled by love to perform an action.”

By these words, he clearly declares that the Divine Word has that which [causes it to] (habere quod) proceed in the similitude of nature by virtue of its procession, but not the Holy Spirit, because the Word proceeds by intellection, and the Holy Spirit [proceeds] by volition. For the Intellect, as it abstracts from created and uncreated, is assimilative, because intellection takes place by the assimilative of the power with the object, as is taught [by Aristotle] in De Anima; and thus, in its most perfect analogate, namely, the Divine intellect, there is an assimilation of most perfect similitude, which is identity in nature. But, on the other hand, the will is not an assimilative power, because the unique (proprius) mode of the operation of the will is not by assimilation to the object loved, but by inclination and propensity toward it. Therefore, no matter how much the perfection of will increases, it will not produce a similar terminus as its principle or object from its proper ratio (propria ratione), but rather will have the most perfect impulse toward it.

Objection. The intellect only seeks to be assimilated to the object in intelligible and intentional esse, not, however, in natural and entitative esse; but, it pertains to the ratio of being begotten and Son to be assimilated to the producer in nature and entitative esse: therefore, it is not rightly inferred that the Divine Word is begotten and Son, from the fact that he proceeds by way of intellection (per intellectum).

Response. Created intellects, because they are imperfect and produce [their] word from indigence, are only able to assimilate the terminus with the object in intentional and intelligible esse. Yet, the Divine Intellect, because it is most perfect, and does not produce its Word from indigence but from infinite fecundity, it is not only able to assimilative [the terminus with the object] in intelligible esse, but truly in natural and entitative esse. This is especially the case because in God intelligible and natural esse are identified [with each other] without any virtual distinction, since the divine nature is constituted by its most perfect and actual [act of] intellection, as we showed above in Tract I, Chapter 3.

Objection. Just as it is proper (proprium) for an intellect to produce a similitude as the terminus of its intellection, so also is it proper for the will to produce, as the terminus of its love, the union of the lover with the thing (re) loved. Hence, St. Thomas (ST.I-II.Q28.A1.Rep3) teaches that three types of union belong to the ratio of love: one from which it (a qua) it proceeds, which is the union of similitude, which is the cause of love; another in which it consists, which is a kind of impetus and impulse toward the thing (rem) loved; and, lastly, another which effects or desires, i.e., the real union which the lover seeks to have with the thing loved (amata). Therefore, just as the most perfect intellect produces a most perfect similitude, so also does the most perfect will produce a most perfect union. Now, just as a most perfect intellectual similitude implies an identity in nature under the concept of nature, so also does a most perfect union. Therefore, it is not rightly inferred that the Divine Word rather than the Holy Spirit is begotten and Son from the fact that He proceeds by way of intellection (per intellectum) rather than by way of volition (per voluntatem).

Response. Although [it is true that] the more perfect the love, the more perfect the union ought to be, such always remain within the line of love, not outside of it. But, identity in nature is outside of the line of the will and love, yet it is not outside of the line of the intellect and the intellectual similitude because will in God, since it is an inclination of the Divine Nature, is consequent upon it, whereas intellect in God, since it is that which is first conceived in God and is the root (radix) of Divine operations, or of the attributes pertaining to operation, does not suppose nor is it consequent upon the Divine Nature, but constitutes it. Hence, although in God the most perfect intellectual similitude implies an identity in nature under the concept in nature, the same is not implied from the most perfect union of love; for this only implies the most perfect inclination of the Divine Nature, which is constituted by intellection.

§ IV. Another objection is resolved.

Objection. The Holy Spirit has the Divine Nature in virtue of its procession and origin; therefore, His procession is no less [said to be] generation than the production of the Word. The consequent is clear from what was said above.

First proof of the antecedent. The Holy Spirit has the Divine Nature from His procession and origin, since he does not have such from Himself (a se), but from the Father and Son, from which He proceeds. Therefore, He has such in virtue of His procession and origin.

Second proof of the antecedent. The Holy Spirit, in virtue of His procession, is communicated the Divine existence (existentia), since production terminates in esse; but, the Divine existence (existentia) is not even virtually distinguished from the [Divine] nature: therefore, in virtue of His procession, the Holy Spirit is communicated to the Holy Spirit.

Third proof of the antecedent. The Father and Son, in producing the Holy Spirit, intend to produce something of the same (simile) nature, and not only in [certain] attributes. Therefore, the Holy Spirit, in virtue of His origin, has the Divine Nature. The consequent is clear. The antecedent is proven: every agent intends to produce something similar (simile) to itself, not only in the proximate principle by which it acts (in principio proximo agendi), but especially in the radical [principle], e.g., fire does not only intend to produce something similar (simile) in heat, but also in its substantial form [i.e., fire], and the parents (pater) do not only intend to assimilate their child in the generative power, but especially in [human] nature. But, the Divine essence is the radical principle (principium radicale) of the production of the Holy Spirit, just as the will is the formal and proximate principle. Therefore, the Father and Son, in producing the Holy Spirit, intend to produce something of the same (simile) nature, and not only in [certain] attributes.

Fourth proof of the antecedent. The Holy Spirit, in virtue of its procession, proceeds as God; therefore, in virtue of His procession, He receives the Divine Nature. The consequent is clear. The antecedent is proven: the Holy Spirit, in virtue of His procession, proceeds as He is, but He is formally God; therefore, in virtue of His procession, He proceeds as God.

Fifth proof of the antecedent. The Holy Spirit proceeds formally as a Divine Person; therefore, as one having the Divine Nature. The consequent is clear. The antecedent is proven: the Holy Spirit, in virtue of his procession, possesses relative subsistence, by which Divine Persons are constituted; therefore, He proceeds formally as a Divine Person.

Response. I deny the antecedent. To the first proof, I concede the antecedent and deny the consequence. Not everything that belongs to the terminus produced by procession is communicated in virtue of (ex vi) the procession, but only that which is the ratio formalis for terminating the procession. Therefore, since the divine nature is not the ratio formalis for terminating the procession of the Holy Spirit, but is something that is identified with the ratione formali for terminating, namely, with the ratione of love or impulse, which is what formally terminates. From this, it follows that the Holy Spirit has the divine nature from his procession and origin, but not in virtue of (ex vi) his procession and origin.

To the second proof, the divine existence is communicated to the Holy Spirit as a general condition which is required for every production, but not as the formal terminus of his procession, which is love or impulse.

To the third proof, I deny the antecedent. To its proof, the major is only true when the agent acts in virtue of a power proximately destined to communicate nature; but when it acts in virtue of another power, it intends a supreme similitude of itself in the proximate principle. Hence, since in divine things the intellect is the power which is per se primo destined for the communication of nature rather than the will, the Father and Son, in producing the Holy Spirit by volition (per voluntatem), do not intend a similitude in nature formally in virtue of (ex vi) such a production, while the Father, by intellection (per intellectum), produces the Son in such a manner.

To the fourth proof, I deny the antecedent. For, the Holy Spirit in virtue of (ex vi) his procession does not proceed formally as God, but as the love of God. To the proof of the antecedent, I distinguish the major, the Holy Spirit in virtue of (ex vi) his procession proceeds as he is (ut est) under every formality which he is (formalitate qua est), I deny the major; under some [formality], I concede the major. Conceding the minor, I deny the consequence. This solution is able to be illustrated by two examples. The first is in the case of a man who is generated and a man who is created to whom the same exact predicates apply with respect to esse, yet which terminate according to diverse formalities, the one generated and the other created, the latter under the common ratio (sub ratione communi) of created being, and the former under some more particular ratio (sub aliqua ratione peculari) of being. The second is the case of the existence of the body of Christ the Lord in the Sacrament by transubstantiation. For, although in the Body of Christ there is the rational soul which vivifies and animates, nonetheless it does not terminates in transubstantiation formally under the ratio (sub ratione) of vivifying or animate, but only under the ratio (sub ratione) of body.

To the fifth proof, I deny the antecedent. To the proof, the Holy Spirit posses in virtue (vi) of his procession relative subsistence by which (per quam) he is constituted as a person, but not formally as that which constitutes him as a person, because the person is constituted by relative subsistence as modifying the nature. For, the Holy Spirit does not have this formally in virtue of his procession as modifying the nature, but precisely as modifying the love or impulse toward the beloved object. Hence, the Holy Spirit does indeed formally proceed as subsistent in love, but as truly subsistent in the divine nature, only materially and identically, on account of the identity of the divine nature with the divine love.

Definition: Concelebration concerns the consecration of the eucharist by multiple priests. This topic was traditionally treated in commentaries on the thirteenth distinction of the Fourth Book of Sentences by the Medievals, and by later scholastics in their commentaries on Tertia Pars, q. 82, a. 2 and in other works such as moral theology manuals and works on sacramentology by the later scholastics.

A similar question concerns the simultaneous application of baptism (cf., ST.III.Q67.A6). As for the other sacraments, the question is more obscure (except, of course, on the sacrament of matrimony). Confirmation, Penance, Ordination (NOTE: Consecration is done in solidum), Extreme Unction, and the Eucharist seem to follow the same line of reasoning as each are sacerdotal sacraments (although, obviously, the question of its fittingness would be distinct).

Division: This topic can be treated as to its possibility/validity, existence, fittingness, and nature of concelebration. Further, there can also be questions concerning its liceity, yet such is a question of canon law rather than a strictly theological question.

The fourth question poses particular difficulties, as can be seen from the quite lengthy treatments of the topic by the scholastics: “How thorny (or, as Francisco Suárez says, slippery) this very question is, you will discover if you compare the rather lengthy disputation of Suárez with the other, far more lengthy, of Gabriel Vásquez, which overturns the former.” (Maurice de la Taille)

Generally, theologians commonly answer that the practice of concelebration is possible/valid, truly exists, and is fitting (although certain individuals dissent partially with respect to the second and third as to the mass of the ordination of priests). As to the fourth, there are three positions on the matter, which will be treated in their own place.

Practice: Concelebration has always been practiced in both the east and the west, although in different ways depending on time and place. In the east, the custom is more frequent. This has never been rejected by Rome (cf., Benedict XIV, Demandatam, n. 9, and Allatae, n. 38).

In the west, the practice was previously more common in the ancient Church. Later, it was reserved for the Mass of the Ordination of priests and Consecration of a bishop, as reflected in the 1917 Code and the Pontificale Romanum. Today, the practice of Concelebration is not as strictly limited.

The practice is mentioned by Pope Innocent III: “At times many priests concelebrate...Moreover, the cardinal presbyters are accustomed to stand around the Roman Pontiff and to celebrate together with him…in that [the Apostles] concelebrated, they show that they then learned from the Lord the rite of this sacrifice” (M.L. 217, 874).

This same practice as to the rite of newly ordained priests is mentioned by St. Thomas with the same connection made to the concelebration of Our Lord and the Apostles (ST.III.Q82.A2, Sent.IV.D13.Q1.A2.qa2).

Difficulties: The disagreement concerns how the danger of a) repeating the words of consecration over previously consecrated matter, b) offering no sacrifice, and c) not completing the sacrifice through communion under both species is not avoided.

Since it is morally impossible that all pronounce the words at the same instant, it follows that, a) the later priests repeat the words over previously consecrated matter, b) the same priest may not consecrate both species and complete the sacrifice, and b) that no one, consecrating both species, receives Communion under both, in the case where the bishop is preceded by some newly ordained priest in one or the other consecration.

Hence, some (Richard of Middleton, Cajetan) remove these difficulties by denying that the newly ordained actually concelebrate, but only materially pronounce the words of consecration. Others (Durandus, Biel) say that they truly concelebrate, but that this custom is dangerous and should be abolished.

Possibility/Validity: The first conclusion is that concelebration is both possible and valid. This is proven from the fact that it is the custom of the Church, which cannot permit error in such a matter. Further, in concelebration, nothing essential is lacking in the matter, form, minister, or intention of the sacrament.

As to the objection that such is not possible due to the multiplication of ministers, it is not repugnant that multiple instrumental causes concur with the principal cause for a single effect. Now, the priests consecrating the eucharist are an instrumental cause of the priesthood of Christ acting in persona Christi. Therefore, etc. (cf., ST.III.Q82.A2.Rep2)

For validity, a few points must be recalled. First, as to the matter, there must be determinate rather than indeterminate matter (e.g., it would be invalid for two priests to attempt to consecrate “a part of the host,” but valid for two priests to consecrate each side of a host). Second, as to the form, the entire form must be pronounced by the priests, not one part for each.

Existence: The second conclusion is that concelebration actually exists in the Church, particularly in the mass for the ordination of Priests. There is no controversy surrounding the mass for the consecration of Bishops.

The previous controversy was based on various ambiguities in the ancient liturgical texts. There is no ambiguity in the current texts.

Fittingness: The third conclusion is that concelebration is licit and fitting. It is licit in virtue of the law of the Church, which regulates what is lawful as to the celebration of the sacraments. It is fitting insofar as it is a longstanding custom of the Church, which cannot fail habitually in prudence.

St. Thomas demonstrates the fittingness on two grounds, a) it is an imitation of the institution of the Lord’s Supper, and b) it follows from the nature of the Eucharist as the sacrament of ecclesiastical unity.

Nature: On the nature of concelebration, there are multiple opinions, which follow from the difficulties listed above of the moral impossibility of stating the form at the same moment. There is no difficulty with explaining how multiple instruments concur to a single effect, but there is a difficulty insofar as the consecration is effected as soon as the final word is spoken.

Pope Innocent III and St. Thomas respond to this objection in the same way, i.e., insofar as the concelebrants all refer their intention to the same instant, even while they may differ in the time in which they speak the words.

Pope Innocent III: “But when at times many priests concelebrate, if perchance not all pronounce the words of consecration at the same time, it is asked whether only he effects [the sacrament] who first pronounces? What then do the others do, do they repeat the sacrament? Could it therefore happen that he who celebrates principally does not effect it, while he who celebrates secondarily does effect it, and thus the pious intention of the celebrant is frustrated? It can indeed be said, and probably answered, that whether the priests pronounce earlier or later, their intention ought to be referred to the instant of the bishop’s utterance, with whom they concelebrate as the principal celebrant, and then all consecrate and effect [the sacrament] together. Although some agree that he who pronounces first consecrates; nor is the intention of the others frustrated, because that is accomplished which is intended.” (De sacro altaris mysterio, IV, 25)

St. Thomas: “As Innocent says, all those celebrating should direct their intention to that instant when the bishop utters the words; and in this way the bishop’s intention is not spoiled, nor does anyone do something that is already done.” (Sent.IV.D13.Q1.A2.qa2.Rep2, cf. ST.III.Q82.A2)

All theologians admit that the priests have the intention to consecrate at the same instant, yet there is disagreement on how this instant is actually determined.

Read more

α) First, we can abstract from the soul’s termination in a specifically sensible good and refer generally to the pleasure of possessing the good, whether the object or act be sensitive or not. This sense does not concern us here.

β) Second, ‘concupiscence’ can be taken either in a habitual sense or an actual sense. In a habitual sense, it refers to a certain disordered inclination of the soul towards sensible goods. Such habitual concupiscence is communicated from Adam to all his descendents and is the material part of original sin (whether proper or improper). Actual concupiscence refers to the disordered motions of the soul towards some sensible good from the sensible part of the soul. For the clarification of this:

γ) Third, actual concupiscence can be divided into first motions and second motions depending on their relation to the will. First motions are those motions of concupiscence that are antecedent to the will. Second motions are those motions of concupiscence that have their principle in the command of the will. The first are generally called “involuntary motions” and the second are called “voluntary motions.”

δ) Fourth, the first motions are distinguished into “first-first motions” (motus primo primi) and “second-first motions” (motus secundo-primi). This distinction is based on a simple fact. Certain motions are outside the scope of the will and hence are absolutely involuntary, e.g., motions of hunger, thirst, etc., due to having its origin in a natural principle. On the other hand, other motions do come under the indirect influence of the will and hence are voluntary in a sense, i.e., insofar as the will can control the sensible appetites so as to prevent these motions. I explain this in more detail here.

In De Malo, St. Thomas distinguishes between motions simply coming from the disposition of the body and motions coming from the exercise of the sense powers. In the first case, it is obvious that such “biological” motions are in no way voluntary, but are far removed from the powers of reason. Yet, in the second case, reason can exercise some influence over the motions that arise from their exercise. Hence, it enters the moral order (i.e., those acts in relation to the will):

Since sense perceptions affect sense appetites, and yet sense appetites are powers belonging to bodily organs, the movements of sense appetites can arise in two ways: in one way from the disposition of the body; in the second way from sense perception. And the disposition of the body is not subject to the command of reason, but every sense perception is subject to the command of reason. For reason can forbid the exercise of any power of sense perception, especially in the absence of something perceptible by touch, which sometimes cannot be removed. Therefore, since sin belongs to sense appetites insofar as they can obey reason, the first movements of sense appetites, which arise from the disposition of the body, are not sin, and some call these movements primo primum. And the second movements, which sense perceptions arouse, are sin. For reason cannot in any way avoid the first movements, and reason can avoid some but not all second movements, since reason, turning its attention from one thing, encounters another, from which an illicit movement can arise. (QDeMalo.Q7.A6.Rep8)

This is explained in more detail in St. Thomas’ Commentary on the Sentences where he distinguishes between natural and sensitive appetites:

A natural appetite, such as that for food, is one engendered not by the imagination, but by the very disposition of natural qualities by which natural powers carry out their actions. But this motion is not subject or obedient to reason in anything. Hence neither can there be sin in it, and so here it is not discussed. However, the sensitive appetite is that which follows from prior imagination or sensation. And this is called the ‘motion of sensuality.’ (Sent.II.D24.Q3.A1, cf. Rep2, QIV.Q11.A1)

Hence, sometimes authors distinguish between “the first motions of sensuality” and “natural motions,” the former of which are “always venial sins” and the later “without sin.” St. Thomas connects the two sets of terminology, which might be confusing:

All the first motions ascribed to sensuality, as the words of Augustine assert, are a sin. But the preceding motions, which we have called ‘natural’ above, which do not follow the imagination, but only the action of natural qualities, lack the ratio of sin, insofar as we can take as true the statement of those who say that motus primo primi are not a sin, but that motus secundo primi are a sin. In this case by primo primos motus we understand natural motions, and by secundo primos motus we understand motions of sensuality, in which sin can exist as in a subject. (Sent.II.D24.Q3.A2)

This becomes important in Christology in articulating the “blameless passions” present in the humanity of Christ. Further, this is important in Mariology as to the question of whether and how the fomes remain in the Blessed Virgin (cf., ST.III.Q27.A3, ST.III.Q27.A4.Rep1, Sent.III.D3.Q1.A2.qa1, Sent.III.D3.Ex, CT.BookI.C224-225, Jerem.C1.L3, as I explain in an old article here).

Second motions are called “directly voluntary.” Second-first motions are called “indirectly voluntary.” First-first motions are called “involuntary.”

It is important to note that the second-first motion in no way requires that there be consent on the part of the will, whether express or tacit. Rather, what is required is that the will in principle can act upon the faculty so as to resist the inordinate motion and omits the obligation:

In is not said to be in sensuality on account of reason’s interpretative consent. For when the motion of sensuality precedes reason’s judgment, there is neither an interpreted consent nor an expressed consent; but from the fact that sensuality can be subject to reason, its own act, even if it precedes reason, has the notion of sin. (QDeVer.Q25.A5.Rep5)

Hence, as we shall see, we ought to call such motions sins of omission (cf., Sent.II.D24.Q3.A2.Rep2 and other places below).

First Thesis. Inordinate second motions of concupiscence are sinful.

The reason for this is clear and quite easy to understand. A second motion of concupiscence is a motion of concupiscence that is brought about through the commanding power of the will. In this way, the lower faculties act as the instruments of reason and participate in the character of the act of the will. Hence, if the command of the will is inordinate, then the motion participates in this disorder as a voluntary act, taking upon itself the character of sinfulness found in the act of the will. For more, cf. ST.I-II.Q74.A4, QDeMalo.Q7.A6, etc.

Second Thesis. Inordinate second-first motions of concupiscence are sinful.

The reason for this is less clear and requires more explanation. Here, the distinction between second-first motions and first-first motions is important. After the fall, we are subject to the habitual disorder of concupiscence. This disorder of sensuality continues to remain in act even after regeneration and continually maintains habitual dispositions that provide the internal occasion for sinful acts, like any other vice of the moral order. Now, if such motions were completely and simply involuntary, clearly they would lack the notion of sin. Yet, such is not the case. Natural motions and motions of sensuality are distinguished insofar as the will has no control over the former motions, but there is a certain control over the latter and hence a corresponding obligation:

An act of the natural appetite is not subject to the command of reason, just as neither an act of the other potencies of the vegetative soul, and for this reason, fault cannot consist in an act of such an appetite, just as there is not fault in man’s hunger or thirst…But an act of the sensitive appetite is subject to the command of reason because reason coming before it can command it or even impede it, and thus such a motion can already have the character of fault. (QIV.Q11.A1)

The wills of the regenerate are able to prevent these inordinate motions by grace, although even the unregenerate have the physcial potency (strictly speaking) to prevent individual motions. Hence, we are able to individually prevent each inordinate motion and have an obligation to prevent such inordinate motions (‘thou shalt not covet’). Therefore, even while such motions are not motions that proceed from the command of the will, they are still somewhat voluntary insofar as there is an ability and obligation to prevent these motions of concupiscence flowing from the habitual disorder of the fomes: “movements of sense appetites are venial sins because the will can prevent them.” (QDeMalo.Q7.A6.Rep2) In this way, they are sins of omission. This process is described by the Angelic Doctor in a number of different places (ST.II-II.Q158.A2.Rep3, QDeMalo.Q7.A6.Rep8, Sent.II.D24.Q3.A2.Rep4, QIV.Q11.A1.RepSC2, etc.):

This corruption of the fomes does not hinder man from using his rational will to check individual inordinate movements, if he be presentient to them, for instance by turning his thoughts to other things. Yet while he is turning his thoughts to something else, an inordinate movement may arise about this also: thus when a man, in order to avoid the movements of concupiscence, turns his thoughts away from carnal pleasures, to the considerations of science, sometimes an unpremeditated movement of vainglory will arise. Consequently, a man cannot avoid all such movements, on account of the aforesaid corruption: but it is enough, for the conditions of a voluntary sin, that he be able to avoid each single one. (ST.I-II.Q74.A3.Rep2)

It is important to remember, as pointed out in the controversy over the fomes peccati in the Blessed Virgin mentioned above, that these motions must be inordinate (i.e., contra legem). For these motions to be praeter legem is not sufficient to be sinful.

Third Thesis. Inordinate second motions of concupiscence are either mortal or venial sins, inordinate second-first motions are only venial sins.

From the first thesis, it is clear that second motions of concupiscence simply participate in the full character of the act of the will. Hence, they will be either be virtuous or vicious insofar as the will commanding them is virtuous or vicious. It is for this reason that we can speak of acts of sensuality that are mortal sins (I say to you that every one who looks at a woman lustfully has already committed adultery with her in his heart). For more detail, cf. ST.I-II.Q74.A4.Rep1, QDeMalo.Q7.A6, QDeVer.Q25.A5.Rep1-2, Rep11-12, etc.

On the other hand, second-first motions are something imperfect in the genus of morals insofar as it does not involve the full advertance of reason. It is for this reason that they are (at most) venial sins:

Man does not do perfectly himself what he does without the deliberation of reason, since the principal part of man does nothing therein: wherefore such is not perfectly a human act; and consequently it cannot be a perfect act of virtue or of sin, but is something imperfect of that kind. Therefore such movement of the sensuality as forestalls the reason, is a venial sin, which is something imperfect in the genus of sin. (ST.I-II.Q74.A3.Rep3)

St. Thomas argues similarly in QDeVer.Q25.A5 and other places.

This is clear when we consider what a mortal sin is in the proper sense. A mortal sin turns the creature away from God as its last end. Now, the sense faculties consider only sensible objects in the termination of its own proper motion (cf. Sent.II.D24.Q3.A2.Rep3). Hence, whereas reason can terminate in God deliberately as the last end, the sense faculties can only be subordinated to such an end by the order of reason (which only occurs by second motions of concupiscence, unless we consider second-first motions as consented to in certain cases). Hence, the sense faculties can only participate in the character of merit or mortal sin by the ordering of reason, whether in acting toward the end or in abolishing the end. Yet, sense faculties can order toward the created object that is sensed. Now, this has the character of venial sin and in no way excludes ordination to the last end per se. Hence, even those motions of concupiscence that precede reason can have the character of venial sin. It is in this way that St. Thomas argues in De Malo:

Mortal sin consists of turning away from the ultimate end ordained by reason, and sense appetites cannot reach so far…And when reason commands movements of sense appetites, as is evidently the case regarding one who wills to lust for something mortally sinful, such movements are mortal sins, but we attribute them to reason commanding them, not to the sense appetites. (QDeMalo.Q7.A6)

This is also something that applies for infidels as well (QIV.Q11.A2, Rom.C8.L1.n597f, etc.).

Fourth Thesis. Inordinate second-first motions are ‘venial’ as to its genus, yet can be described as ‘mortal’ under a different aspect, i.e., insofar as it is punished by eternal condemnation in the reprobate.

I already explained this in detail here.

Fifth Thesis. When we resists the first motions of concupiscence by grace, there is merit.

Not only is reason related to motions of concupiscence as commanding (second motions) or as permitting (second-first motions), but it can also resist such motions by the power of grace:

When an illicit movement belongs to a sense appetite, reason can be related to it in three ways. Reason can be related to the illicit movement of a sense appetite in one way as resisting the movement, and then there is the merit of reward and no sin. And reason is sometimes related to the illicit movement as commanding it. For example, when one deliberately arouses the movement, there will be mortal sin if the illicit object belongs to the genus of mortal sin. And reason is sometimes related to the illicit movement as neither prohibiting it nor commanding, but consenting to it, and then there is venial sin. (QDeMalo.Q7.A6.Rep6)

Hence, the difference between merit and venial sin is found in whether the motion has been resisted or has not been resisted, as has been described so often above:

It has incomplete dominion in those acts which do not proceed by the command of reason, though the will could have impeded them, so that in this way, they are subject to the will in a certain way, as regards the acts’ being impeded or not being impeded. (Sent.II.D24.Q3.A2)

Yet, as was covered above, we cannot resist all of these motions. Hence, we constantly must seek forgiveness of our sins and beg for help to have the graces to resist such sins.

Sixth Thesis. The first-second motions are damnable in the infidels due to their annexation with the guilt due to original sin, yet are not mortal sins.

Here, it is helpful to apply the distinctions that were necessary in the fourth thesis. It is one thing for something to bring about some effect in virtue of its own power and quite another thing to simply participate in some effect due to an annexation with it (e.g., human acts merit supernatural beatitude due to their annexation with the motion of the Holy Spirit, ST.I-II.Q114.A3). Venial sins in the reprobate do not, by their own power, bring about eternal punishment, yet they are said to be punished with eternal punishment in the reprobate. In a similar way, first-second motions of concupiscence are not said to bring about eternal punishment by their own proper power, but they are punished with eternal punishment due to its union with the guilt of original sin in the reprobate. It is in this way that St. Thomas interprets the Augustinian formula that concupiscence is dissolved in its guilt, but continues in its act for the regenerate. St. Thomas writes,

If this passage refers to first movements experienced by those not in Christ Jesus, such stirrings are damnable according to the condemnation due to original sin, which still remains in them and from which those in Christ Jesus have been freed. But this does not mean that a new condemnation is added on account of such stirrings. (Rom.C8.L1.n599.3)

It is important to note that this damnability is not a damnability as to actual mortal sin, but a damnability as to original sin. It receives the damnability of its habit rather than a new damnability on account of the motion:

An act proceeding from such a habit does not have a new reason for condemnation added to the reason for condemning the habit. Accordingly, the first motions in unbelievers, inasmuch as they proceed from original sin, do not receive the condemnation due to mortal sin but only to original sin. (Rom.C8.L1.n599.4)

Further, this condemnation/damnability is not considered as united to itself and to its own act (otherwise, how would the just have first-second motions that are not damnable?), but as to the fact that its principle is in original sin with the attached guilt annexed to it:

In another way, we are able to consider [first motions of concupiscence] according to their principle, which is original sin; and in this mode they are not able to have more of the ratio of sin than original sin has, because an effect, as such, cannot be greater than its cause. However, original sin in the infidel remains both secundum culpam and secundum poenam; in the faithful, however, it remains secundum poenam, but is taken away as to culpam…For this reason, these motions of sensuality in the faithful are indeed venial sins insofar as they are personal acts; but insofar as they arise from original [sin], they do not pertain to damnationem culpabilem, but only to a certain poenalitatem. In the infidel, however, insofar as they are personal acts, they are likewise venial sins; but insofar as they are derived from original sin, they have something of damnationis culpabilis, not according to the ratio of an actual mortal sin, but according to the ratio of the damnation which belongs to original sin. (QDeMalo.Q7.A8)

It is for this reason that Thomists hold that second-first motions in the infidel are punished with both eternal punishment of loss (insofar as it proceeds from original sin) and eternal punishment of sense (insofar as it is an actual sin that is not remitted before death). An example of this can be found in Mariales’ commentary on De Malo.

It is in this way that we clearly understand the statements of the Holy Fathers that concupiscence is damnable in the unregenerate, but not damnable in the regenerate. For, in the regenerate, the damnable guilt due to concupiscence in not present insofar as the guilt due to original sin is not annexed to it. Yet, in the unregenerate, the damnable due to concupiscence is present insofar as the guilt due to original sin is present as annexed to it.

As Mariales states in his commentary on QDeMalo.Q7.A8,

Although they assert that infidels are damned on account of the movements of sensuality [i.e., second-first motions] (even those not consented to), nevertheless they do not say that damnation comes to them on account of the movements of sensuality taken precisely in themselves…Rather, they intend that it comes on account of those movements insofar as they are rooted in original sin (not remitted by Baptism). That is to say, the Fathers hold that unbelievers are damned on account of the original guilt (culpa) annexed to them [second-first motions]. (cf., QIV.Q11.A2.Rep1)

How this avoids the doctrine of Baius is explained well by Fr. Pedro Lumbreras, O.P. (the author of the 24 Thomistic Theses) in De Sensualitatis Peccato, Commentarium in Iam IIae, q. 74, aa. 3 et 4 and by Scheeben in the Book 4 of his Handbook, along commonly with Thomists on ST.I-II.Q89.A5. This is also explained by moralists, e.g., McHugh and Callan, Moral Theology, n. 129.

Lumbreras explains the difference as Baius’ proposition rejecting the fifth proposition,

These propositions, however, were condemned, and our thesis appears close to them. But to one who considers carefully, there is no affinity between our proposition and the Baian propositions. For Baius speaks of desires or movements of concupiscence which man suffers unwillingly. We, however, speak of desires or movements of concupiscence which man, though able to restrain them, nevertheless does not restrain, and therefore does not suffer unwillingly.

Read more

His treatment relevant to this question is four chapters long: the Divine will in general, on the object of the Divine will, on the freedom of God in general, and on the constitutive principle of the freedom of the divine act.

Read more

Read more

Here, it is relevant to note a distinction that is often invoked by the Popes when explaining their own power in this sphere. Political acts are those actions that are exercised by the authorities of a political society to order that society. These acts can be of three kinds.

1. First, there are those political acts that are purely “matters of technique” that have bearing on the purely pragmatic aspects of political society (e.g., whether it is more prudent for x society to have senators that serve 5 year terms or 6 year terms) and depend on the knowledge of concrete circumstances.

2. Second, there are political acts that concern a judgment of matters of political principle. This could be called a “theoretical” judgement about the nature of political society (e.g., whether a political society has social obligations to religion) and depend on the knowledge of the natural law and divine revelation.

3. Third, there are certain “mixed” political acts that concern aspects both of the first category (matters of technique) and of the second category (matters of political principle), which are the application of matters of principle in concrete circumstances (e.g., whether X war is a just war or not). In the example given, in order to understand whether x war is a just war or not, it is required BOTH to have a knowledge of the doctrine of just war (second category) and the concrete circumstances of the war (first category) in order to verify that the principles are fulfilled in the concrete reality.

The ordinary way in which the Roman Pontiff teaches concerning political matters is by treating those second category issues, although it is obvious that he cannot effectively carry out his duty of head of the Church and teacher of all Christians unless he occasionally ventures into the third category (how would he effectively preach the Gospel to men without speaking to issues relevant to his hearers?).

This leads to quite a problem that has permeated the relationship between the Roman Pontiffs and the temporal sphere. Since there is a “mixed” competence to those third category decisions (which have to be made for the integrity of his office), then it follows that there is no unique charism protecting the Roman Pontiff from certain aspects of his speech when judging on these matters (i.e., the concrete circumstances), but only certain other aspects (i.e., the principles of political prudence).

Hence, in the history of the Church, there is an ebb and flow of Pontifical interventions, some of which are among the greatest triumphs of the Chair of St. Peter (e.g., the timely and prophetic voice of Leo XIII) and others have been not so triumphal and have cast a shadow on the dignity and authority of the Chair. This arises more from the particular genius and natural gifts of the particular man than it does from some lack on the part of the graces of the Office.

I am of the firm persuasion that we are in the midst of quite a streak of historical “misses” on a handful of different topics where the very advice or judgement given is not only a simply bad decision, but also militates against the very principles preached by those same pontiffs when they abstract from speaking on concrete circumstances and restrict their discourse closer to the realm of principles. Hence, it is quite a gift when we hear from a Pope a more abstracted type discussion laying out a handful of principles to follow. These short comments can often be more helpful than the lengthy and bloated interventions on these matters.

Recently, we had one of these quite helpful moments in relation to Immigration from Pope Leo XIV. He was asked last week by a reporter the following question: “We have just set foot on a continent where many people desire—dream of—traveling to Europe. Your next trip will be to Spain, where the issue of migration will occupy an important place, especially in the Canary Islands. Your Holiness knows that the topic of migration in Spain produces great debate and polarization. Even among Catholics themselves there is no clear agreement in their position. What could you say to Spaniards, and in particular to Catholics, regarding immigration?”

The framing of the question is obviously bait. The lady who asked the question clearly was fishing for a response that would allow the Roman Pontiff to weight in on a particular political dispute in Spain. If the Holy Father were to give a direct judgment on the matter, this would be a great political capital for whichever said he would support. Yet, rather than doing this, His Holiness did the smart thing and began to discourse on a few relevant considerations that have been frequently repeated by the Popes for the last century or so.

First principle. The eschatological obsession with emigration is not the answer, integral development is the answer.

He begins his answer by stating: “The issue of immigration is very complex and affects many countries…for that reason, my response begins with a question: what is the North of the world doing to help the South of the world, or those countries where young people today do not find a future and, because of this, live with the dream of wanting to go North? Everyone wants to go North, but often the North does not have answers for how to offer them opportunities…What are we doing in the richer countries to change the situation in the poorer countries? Why can we not try—both through state aid and through investments by large wealthy companies, by multinationals—to change the situation in countries like those we have visited on this trip? Africa is considered by many people as a place to go to extract minerals, to take its wealth for the enrichment of others in other countries. Perhaps at the global level we should work more to promote greater justice, equality, and the development of these African countries, so that they do not have the need to emigrate to other countries, to Spain, etc.”

There are two points here that are relevant. First, the eschatological frenzy of the global south for emigration is disordered. Despite the frequent comments from the Roman Pontiffs pontificating (no pun intended) on the theoretical benefits of immigration after it is “too late,” it still stands that the greater option is to remain in one’s place of origin and to serve their nation and people by refusing to emigrate. This was repeated a number of times by Pope Francis and has already been stated multiple times by Pope Leo (a recent example can be found in his address to university students on 17 April 2026).

Therefore, he draws the conclusion (the second point) that we ought to solve the “root problems” of emigration before we even discuss the problem of immigration since the former depends on the latter. To solve the problem of emigration, we should eliminate those occasions which motivate the choice to emigrate, e.g., war, economic hardship, etc.

This solution is, of course, the best of both worlds. Where there is a realistic move towards development, not only is it permissible to “turn back” those attempting to immigrate into one’s nation, it becomes an act of justice, not only for your own nation, but also for the nation from which the individual is attempting to emigrate. How is this not supposed to be concluded from the words of the Roman Pontiffs? If it is helpful to x nation that their emigrants remain in the nation rather than leaving for the north, then wouldn’t it necessarily follow that it would be a just act towards that nation for the nation to which they intend to immigrate to turn them back? How else is there supposed to be an integral development of the nation if there is constant emigration, especially of those who leave for university and never come back? This is, of course, quite different in those nations where there are legitimate claims to refugee status, where there is an obligation for host nations to temporarily protect and house individuals with an ultimate goal of repatriation in a way that will do justice to the host nation.

One of the best critiques of the current stance of many in the hierarchy is that they too hastily judge individuals to belong to the second category rather than the first category. Yet, as stated, this is a difference on a matter of fact rather than of moral doctrine.

Second principle. There ought to be a concern for the nation to which immigration comes, whose regulation justly falls to the civil authorities.

Not only is there a concern for justice toward the nation from which migrants emigrate, there is a concern for justice toward the nation to which migrants immigrate. Leo treats this by saying “Personally, I believe that a State has the right to establish rules at its borders. I am not saying that everyone should enter without order, sometimes creating in the places they go situations even more unjust than those they left behind.”

Leo’s second principle is that the State is the relevant authority for controlling the flow of immigration (as he will treat later in the answer, this “control” may even take the form of a complete ban on immigration into the nation). In fact, he acknowledges that these immigrants may cause an even greater affront to justice in the nation to which they are immigrating than was created in the nation from which they are emigrating.

This is why there is a dual principle of justice and a dual principle of injustice. Towards the nation from which they emigrate, there is an act of justice in remaining so that they may serve their nation, and there is an act of injustice when they leave without just cause. The best way to solve this is by integral development. Towards the nation to which they immigrate, there is an act of justice in establishing immigration laws and an act of injustice in violating the rights of those in the host nation. The best way to solve this is by an ordered system of immigration and strong control of borders.

Third principle. No matter what, we ought to be humane towards other people.

This third point is interesting because it is so often misconstrued. Leo stated, “the other point I would like to address is that, in any case, they are human beings, and we must treat human beings in a humane way—not treat them, as often happens, worse than animals. There is a great challenge: a country may say that it cannot receive more people, but when they arrive, they are human beings and deserve the respect that belongs to every human person by reason of their dignity.”

Obviously, the last caveat is the most important. The statements “we should treat people with dignity” and “we should write and enforce immigration laws” are clearly distinct statements and can exist with harmony: “a country may say that it cannot receive more people, but when they arrive, they are human beings and deserve the respect that belongs to every human person by reason of their dignity.”

If one is careful to read the implicit and explicit critiques of the American situation, it is usually this third principle that is invoked. Many in the hierarchy accuse the administration of treating people inhumanely. It is obvious that any Catholic should be against inhumane treatment of anybody (if such was occurring, which is a different question). There is never a critique of the fact that that should be the writing and enforcement of strong immigration laws by the state. In fact, when asked about the USCCB’s support for “open borders” on November 25th, 2025, the bewildered Pope made the same point: states have the right and duty to enforce immigration laws, but we should make sure we do it without treating others inhumanely. In fact, one of the most prevalent critiques by the Church of the US immigration system is its failure to effectively enforce a universal standard across administrations.

I’ve spoken on this topic in other places in more detail, but here I wanted to deal specifically with a point of interpretation concerning various statements of St. Thomas. Often, those of a more “traditionalist” persuasion will quote texts from St. Thomas and other scholastics like the following: “Nor is it possible for one who has a false opinion of God, to know Him in any way at all, because the object of his opinion is not God.” (ST.II-II.Q10.A3)

The reason for this conclusion is taken from the dogma of Divine Simplicity: “There cannot be false knowledge of simple things: because they are either perfectly known inasmuch as their quiddity is known; or they are not known at all, if one cannot attain to a knowledge of them. Therefore, since God is absolutely simple, there cannot be false knowledge of him in the sense that something might be known about him and something remain unknown, but only in the sense that knowledge of him is not attained.” (Ioan.C4.L2)

How do we “get around” such clear testimony from St. Thomas? Luckily for us, explanations of the proper sense of these texts have existed for centuries.

Read more

One of my greatest joys has been the study of the Divine Scriptures. From my youth, Providence placed me in those conditions necessary to understand and enjoy the Sacred Page. Not that I properly understood these texts while in a heretical communion, but rather that, like the Jews, I labored to grasp the letter of Scripture without truly becoming acquainted with its spirit. Yet, as the body must be formed in order to receive the soul, so too must the letter be grasped in order to enter into the spirit. Hence, as deformed and inaccurate as my understanding of the Sacred Page was, it nevertheless served as a preparation for my future studies.

It was only by the mercy of God, without any merits of my own, that He so graciously drew my mind and heart to the Catholic Faith. Yet, at first, it was more my heart than my mind. I was beset by many obscurities and temptations to doubt, yet my will remained firmly fixed, eliciting that faith without which it is impossible to please God.

By the grace of God, these swelling affections that once waged war against my soul have been healed through study and prayer. Through the opposition of heretics, I was driven to have recourse to God for His aid in understanding the truth. Ever adhering to the doctrine of St. Thomas Aquinas, I came to understand the Divine Scriptures (especially the doctrine of St. Paul, whose writings I have continually read from the time in which I could read). Indeed, by the guiding hand of St. Thomas, I found within myself the principle attributed to Pope John XXII confirmed: that one may gain more in a year with his writings than in a lifetime with those of any other author.

In my own mind, I have experienced the darkness and obscurity of heresy, which led me to vainly oppose the Catholic Faith. I have felt the residual wounds which such heresy continues to inflict upon the soul even after conversion. Yet I have also experienced the gradual freedom from these effects, which comes through firm adherence to the Catholic Faith and the study of the Doctors of the Church.

As converts from heretical depravity, we follow the way of St. Paul. Initially, we are freed from our errors by the illumination of Christ; yet this very illumination can blind us for many days. It is only through prayer and fasting that the scales fall from our eyes, enabling us to see the truth clearly.

One of these matters that continues to blind opponents of the Catholic Faith is the interpretation of Epistle to the Hebrews, especially the tenth chapter: “by a single offering he has perfected for all time those who are sanctified.”

Many Protestants gloss this passage as somehow contrary to the practices and doctrines of the Catholic religion—especially on two points. First, whether this can be said to be true in light of the Catholic teaching on the Eucharistic Sacrifice and the Priesthood. Second, whether this can be said to be true in light of the Catholic teaching on penance and redemptive suffering.

In this article, I intend to explain briefly the entire Epistle and bring the major themes to bear on the proper interpretation of this passage for the edification of Catholics and the salvation of those in the darkness of heresy.

Sacred Heart of Jesus, have mercy upon us.

NOTE

Before we begin, I would like to remind you that Scholastic Answers is completely reader/viewer funded.

In order to keep doing what I do, I need a steady stream of those willing to give recurring donations.

One of the best ways of doing this (and getting the benefit of more/full articles!) is by signing up for the premium version of my Substack by clicking this button:

Subscribe now

Thank you for your generosity in advance!

PROPER CONTEXT

While it is quite common to simply appeal to Hebrews 10 in isolation, this is bad practice. The argument that culminates in Hebrews 10 starts at the very beginning of St. Paul’s epistle. Hence, it is first important to reference the line of reasoning in order to apply these frequently repeated themes to the exegesis of the text itself. It is in this way, rather than merely through some sort of minute investigation of grammar and syntax that we are able to come to a full and certain understanding of the text, as the great medieval exegetes were apt to do in their division of text.

In any discourse, we can distinguish the subject and the purpose of the discourse. The former concerns the matter discussed in the intellectual line, the latter concerns the reason for discussing in the moral line. In Hebrews, the subject is the superiority of the New Covenant established by Christ over the Old Covenant, the prupose is the exhortation of the hearers to fidelity to the New Covenant. Hence, the various arguments, illustrations, and exhortations will coalesce on these points. This will become evident from our overview.

In the first and second chapters of the Epistle, St. Paul argues for the superiority of the New over the old as to the messengers of the covenant. The Old Covenant was “declared by angels” (2:2) and delivered “by the prophets” (1:1). Yet, the New Covenant was “spoken to us by a Son.” (1:2)

He extensively proves this superiority of the Son over Angels by various authorities of the OT itself in the first chapter.

The purpose of this declaration (which will be a frequent theme) is to show the superiority of the salvation in Jesus Christ. The conclusion is drawn at the beginning of the second chapter by an a fortiori argument: “if the message declared by angels was valid and every transgression or disobedience received a just retribution, how shall we escape if we neglect such a great salvation?” (2:2-3)

The line of reasoning runs thus, Jesus Christ is the legate of the NT and Angels are the legates of the OT, now the transgressions of the OT were harshly punishment, therefore how much more the transgression of the NT (which transgress against a more noble legate, as was demonstrated in the first chapter).

The practical consequence of this is that we ought to be even more careful to adhere to the demands of the NT than the Jews were of the OT.

From the very beginning of the Epistle, the subject and purpose are clearly evident.

An interesting point to note is that adherence to this message as a matter of principle comes by the message’s confirmation with signs and miracles as motives of credibility, along with the authoritative legates of Christ: “It was declared at first by the Lord, and it was attested to us by those who heard him, while God also bore witness by signs and wonders and various miracles and by gifts of the Holy Spirit distributed according to his own will.” (2:3-4)

Yet, it is quite easy at this point to formulate an objection, especially for a Jew to whom this Epistle is addressed. If Christ is truly superior to Angels, why did he become man and suffering? Wouldn’t this be contrary to his superiority?

St. Paul both directly answers the objection and provides the reason for the incarnation.

First, he answers the objection by stating that the incarnation did not make Christ inferior since the world to come is to be subjected under men in the world to come by the gifts of glory (2:5-8).

Second, he explains the reason for the incarnation, which makes its fittingness evident. This second point illuminates very much what is to come in the epistle.

It was specifically by his suffering and death that Christ (in His humanity) became higher than the angels: “his lessening is not in relation to the nature of his divinity nor absolutely according to his human nature, but in the sense that he suffered according to it.” (Heb.C2.L3.n122.5)

This suffering and death in His Sacred Humanity was most fitting, as St. Paul explains, due to the unity necessary for the purpose of the Incarnation. Christ was to suffer in order to redeem men. This redemption, i.e., their perfect salvation, came through one who was like them insofar as both the redeemed and the redeemer shared flesh.

These two principles will be repeated throughout the Epistle, 1. The unity of the redeemer with the redeemed, and 2. The perfect salvation by this redemption. These two principles are as keys for understanding the entire Epistle, as we shall see later.

These two principles of unity and perfection become the two-fold foundation for the glorious effects of the redemption. He becomes like us so that he may be both “merciful” and “faithful.” (2:17) This makes it so that he may have the two effects of his redemption, i.e., “to make expiation for the sins of the people” (2:17) and “to help those who are tempted.” (2:18)

This is explained in detail by Catholic theology in our articulation of the two-fold effect of sin (stain and obligation to punishment) along with the two-fold effect of the redemption to heal each defect (the descending mediation of grace and the ascending mediation of propitiation). Christ in his perfect sacrifice propitiates God so that he is merciful towards the debts of punishment that we owe and he merits for us the graces to both heal the stain and overcome temptation. This is the perfect redemption preached by the Catholic faith from Scripture.

In chapter 3, we gather two more principles that have already been alluded to in the first two chapters when he turns to Christ’s comparison with Moses.

First, we ought to look to the perfection of redemption and the merciful gaze of our redeemer with a spirit of hope, “we are his house if we hold fast our confidence and pride in our hope.” (v. 6)

Second, we ought to consider the greatness of our redemption in its two-fold aspect so as to fear the lack of the requisite conditions to enter into the rest hoped for by the disobedience of sin, “to whom did he say that they should never enter his rest, but to those who were disobedient? So we see that they were unable to enter because of unbelief.” (v. 18-19)

Here we have four golden principles that arise time and time again throughout the epistle,

1. Christ is a merciful redeemer who has become like unto us and can help free us from all the effects of sin,

2. Christ is a perfect redeemer whose powerful redemption can perfect us from all the effects of sin

3. Therefore, we ought to hope in his redemption

4. And be careful to avoid disobedience, which cuts us off from his redemption

These are fruitful principles which contain the entirety of the Catholic doctrine on the matter. Christ is the objective principle of our redemption in both its ascending and descending aspects. We ought to enter into this redemption by faith. This redemption consists of the remission of sin, the “perfecting” of those being perfect, i.e., in the forgiveness of our faults and the cleansing of our souls. We ought to fear contradicting this redemption by mortal sin, which is unbelief and disobedience, and will be eternally punished.

The remainder of the epistle goes into more detail with some of these principles invoked from the very beginning.

In chapter 4:1-13, the conditions of the NT are emphasized. The sabbath rest was a symbol of the future rest to come. Yet, this rest was not given unto those who were disobedient to God. Therefore, we ought to heed the warning already stated to “strive to enter that rest, that no one fall by the same sort of disobedience.” (4:11)

In chapter 4:14-5:10, the priesthood of Christ in ultimately bringing about this sabbath rest is explained. For, an objection can easily arise on this point. “Are you not asking too much, St. Paul? If our fathers could not bear the yolk of obedience, how much less can we? Isn’t it inevitable that our weakness lead to disobedience and ultimately to damnation, losing such a great hope and reward?”

As a good pastor, St. Paul mixes the warnings with exhortations of hope founded upon Jesus Christ. If we remember from above, Jesus Christ is BOTH a perfect mediator and one who has become like unto us, “we have not a high priest who is unable to sympathize with our weaknesses, but one who in every respect has been tempted as we are, yet without sinning.” (4:15) Therefore, it inevitably follows that we ought to confidently seek his help in helps against temptations to disobedience AND mercy for our many sins, “Let us then with confidence draw near to the throne of grace, that we may receive mercy and find grace to help in time of need.” (4:16)

We are to “draw near” to Christ in order to benefit from the fruits of his high priesthood. It is only by this drawing near that we are flooded by mercy for our failings and grace to overcome these very temptations to disobedience.

He then goes on, in the second part of this section, to derive this from the nature of his priesthood performed on earth. For, Christ as a priest was able to merit for us the benefits of salvation by his person and work. He interceded for us by his prayers and supplications constantly in order to merit for us those gifts of mercy and grace. By this work of his priesthood, he become “the source of eternal salvation to all who obey him.” (5:9)

At this point, the main points of this epistle are clear to readers. Christ by his objective redemption of the world in his suffering merited the gifts of grace for us. He is the only perfect source and mediator of our salvation. Hence, we ought not to disobey Him, but to obey him by belief in Him, drawing near to him due to the fear of retribution and hope in his promises.

It is this fear of retribution and hope in his promises that becomes the theme of the sixth chapter of the Epistle.

From verses 1-8, he explains again under a different image what he had previously emphasized, i.e., that disobedience to the NT by apostasy leads to eternal damnation.

Yet, in verses 9-20, he gives them a message of hope in their reliance on the mediation of Jesus Christ. St. Paul states that he has confidence in their salvation amidst the possibility of damnation due to the justice of God is paying back their merits, “God is not so unjust as to overlook your work and the love which you showed for his sake in serving the saints, as you still do.” (v. 10) The purpose of the warnings is so that they continue in the same spirit unto the end. For, if they violate this spirit, they are placed in danger of hellfire.

Yet, as he goes on to highlight in the second part (v. 13-20), we retain confidence in this situation (like Abraham) insofar as our redemption is based on the promises of God toward us.

In the seventh chapter, he takes this as an opportunity to highlight the objective redemption itself by explaining the superiority of the priesthood of Christ. He first proves the superiority of the priesthood of Christ (i.e., the priesthood of Melchizedek) over the priesthood of the Levites in v. 1-10.

Then he explains the import of this superiority in a lengthy section lasting from 7:11-10:39, of which 10:19-39 is a repetition of the frequently invoked pastoral applications of both fear and hope.

The import is explained in terms of the priesthood (ch. 7), the mediation (ch. 8), the sanctuary (ch. 9), and the sacrifice (ch. 10).

As I have mentioned above, the themes of this section are already present in the earlier sections of this epistle and are simply re-emphasized and explained in more detail under distinct images. Hence, chapter 10 becomes completely unintelligible without the themes exegeted from the previous sections and reemphasized in the earlier parts of this section as well.

He begins chapter 7 by demonstrating the superiority of the priesthood of Melchizedek (which Christ has) over the priesthood of the Levites.

The superiority of such priesthood in its elimination of sin is given in the passage. For, he states first that perfection was not attainable in the priesthood of Levi, “if perfection had been attainable through the Levitical priesthood...what further need would there have been for another priest to arise according to the order of Melchizedek, rather than one named according to the order of Aaron?” (v. 11-12) With this same principle, he proves the existence of a new law over the old law since law is proportioned to priesthood.

The hope of this perfection by a new law through a new priest is the very purpose of invoking this history, “On the one hand, a former commandment is set aside because of its weakness and uselessness (for the law made nothing perfect); on the other hand, a better hope is introduced, through which we draw near to God.” (v. 18-19)

The purpose of invoking this distinction is the same as the glories lauded for the priesthood of Christ above. By the old law, we were not able to draw near to God since it did not perfect, but by the new law we are able to draw near to God and this drawing near to God is a “better hope.” This superiority of Christ is found in that He is able to “save those who draw near to God through him, since he always lives to make intercession for them.” (v. 25)

This consequence is explained and amplified in the following chapters, but its sense is already clear from what has come before in the Epistle. Christ is able to bring about the forgiveness of sin and able to give us those heavenly blessings of obedience to God.

In chapter 8, this is amplified. He is enacting a covenant with “better promises.” (v. 6) These “better promises” do not merely consist of the benefits of eternal life, but the fact that “I will put my laws into their minds, and write them on their hearts, and I will be their God, and they shall be my people. And they shall not teach every one his fellow or every one his brother, saying, ‘Know the Lord,’ for all shall know me, from the least of them to the greatest. For I will be merciful toward their iniquities, and I will remember their sins no more.” (v. 10-12)

These elements were already explained above. Christ is giving a better hope insofar as he is able to internally teach, internally sanctify, and provide forgiveness before God.

This contrast becomes stark in chapter 9 with a comparison between the benefits hoped for in each covenant. In the old covenant, there were external benefits, but it “cannot perfect the conscience of the worshiper, but deal only with...regulations for the body imposed until the time of reformation.” (v. 9-10)

This “perfecting of the conscience” is brought about by Christ insofar as he secured an “eternal redemption” by a redemption which was “by his own blood.” (v. 12) This “eternal redemption” ought to be interpreted both in light of what came before and what came after. Before, this “eternal redemption” which is the “perfecting of the conscience” is described in terms of something internal, i.e., the writing of the law on the heart. This is found in the effects of sanctifying grace, which both teaches us by faith and causes obedience within us by charity.

This “eternal redemption” is described after as purifying of “your conscience from dead works to serve the living God.” (v. 14) The conscience is purified by the work of Christ so that we may serve God. This is found in both the forgiveness of sins and in the grace which renovates man, as explained above. This is evident from the intention of this purification, which is “so that we may serve the living God.” The means are proportioned to the intention. Now, the means that bring about service to God is primarily the writing of the law of God on our hearts, which is by grace. Further, this cleansing of conscience also occurs with the consciousness that we are forgiven or at least can approach God for forgiveness.

Another effect of this redemption is that “those who are called may receive the promised eternal inheritance, since a death has occurred which redeems them from the transgressions under the first covenant.” (v. 15) The hope of eternal life is the end, yet this is concretely stated to occur through a certain means, i.e., “a death has occurred which redeems them from the transgressions.” First, there is the death which is the meritorious cause of our justification. Second, there is the redemption from transgressions, which purifies our conscience. Eternal life is said to occur initially through the death, yet through the very means of the effects of such death within us. This is the reversal of the “disobedience” warned throughout the entirety of the Epistle up to this point.

This entire work is summarized in v. 26, wherein the work of Christ is said to “put away sin by the sacrifice of himself” insofar as this involves the shedding of blood.

Up to this point, we have explained and investigated the key themes of Hebrews in relation to what will be explained clearly in chapter 10.

1. Christ’s suffering and death is the foundation of his priesthood, the objective means whereby he merits eternal life.

2. The effects of this suffering and death are found in the purification of conscience, which involves the merciful forgiveness of sins and the redemption of the inner man by the writing of the law on our hearts, along with the helps given to us in order to avoid mortal sin.

3. This great redemption is brought about within us by faith, whereby we draw near to God.

4. In light of these great truths, we ought to fear disobedience which cuts us off from this great redemption while also hoping in Christ, who is gentle and understanding of our weakness, and has promised to us BOTH sufficient helps and the rewards of eternal life.

THE EXEGESIS OF HEBREWS 10

In Hebrews 10, all these great truths are synthesized in light of the passion of Christ with the highest sublimity.

First, the reason for the imperfection of the law is given, “since the law has but a shadow of the good things to come instead of the true form of these realities, it can never, by the same sacrifices which are continually offered year after year, make perfect those who draw near.” (v. 1)

The law is imperfect due to its function. The law was a shadow of something to come in the future, i.e., the work of Christ. Hence, it was not able to “make perfect those who draw near.”

a) The sense of “make perfect” is already clear from what has been said above. To “make perfect” refers both to the forgiveness of transgressions and the transformation of the interior of man so that he is able to avoid sin.

b) The sense of “draw near” is also clear. To “draw near” in this epistle constantly refers to drawing near by some sort of reliance on something else for aid. When it comes to the law, the reliance on the law is uncertain. Yet, when it comes to Christ, we are able to have hope in drawing near since he is able to give to us what we need, i.e., to be “made perfect” by mercy and grace.

Second, a confirmation of this is brought forward, “Otherwise, would they not have ceased to be offered? If the worshipers had once been cleansed, they would no longer have any consciousness of sin.” (v. 2, n.b., continues to v. 4)

We have seen above that the “consciousness of sin” does not merely refer to a subjective psychological state, but a true a well founded reflex judgement whereby we are able to confidently judge (cf. ST.I-II.Q112.A5) that we are freed and cleansed from sin insofar as the law of God is written on our hearts and we are no longer under obligations to punishment insofar as we are forgiven of our sins.

While these benefits come with Christ, as we shall see, they do not come with the law.

Third, this is also demonstrated by the desire of Christ to become a sacrifice to God rather than to simply offer the sacrifices of the Levitical priesthood.

It is in light of this that we come to the most important section in the epistle for what we are considering (v. 9-18):

He abolishes the first in order to establish the second. And by that will we have been sanctified through the offering of the body of Jesus Christ once for all. And every priest stands daily at his service, offering repeatedly the same sacrifices, which can never take away sins. But when Christ had offered for all time a single sacrifice for sins, he sat down at the right hand of God, then to wait until his enemies should be made a stool for his feet. For by a single offering he has perfected for all time those who are sanctified. And the Holy Spirit also bears witness to us; for after saying, “This is the covenant that I will make with them after those days, says the Lord: I will put my laws on their hearts, and write them on their minds,” then he adds, “I will remember their sins and their misdeeds no more.” Where there is forgiveness of these, there is no longer any offering for sin.

First, St. Paul states the ultimate consequence of the relationship between the OT and NT as described above, i.e., that the first is abolished and the second is established.

Rather than being sanctified externally and without internal effect of perfection or cleansing of consciousness, “we have been sanctified through the offering of the body of Jesus Christ once for all.”

The demonstration of the perfection of this offering is related to its repeatability. The OT sacrifices were imperfect since they were repeated. If they were actually able to have the effects described here and above of the sacrifice of Christ, then they would be able to be done once and be over with, yet “every priest stands daily at his service, offering repeatedly the same sacrifices, which can never take away sins.”

Let’s interpret the “take away sins” in light of what was stated above. This is a fundamental point of discussion in how we interpret the text. Throughout the entire beginning of this text, this “taking away of sins” is described alongside the perfecting of conscience/consciousness. The taking away of sins refers BOTH to the graces of overcoming disobedience in being able to adhere to Christ (the “writing of the law on the heart,” perfecting for good works, etc.) AND the merciful forgiveness of sins. These concepts are central to the Epistle and have been repeated multiple times.

Unlike the law, Christ CAN take away sins by His once for all sacrifice, “But when Christ had offered for all time a single sacrifice for sins, he sat down at the right hand of God...For by a single offering he has perfected for all time those who are sanctified.” (v. 12-14)

First, we should clarify what this does not mean.

a) It does not mean that the intercession of Christ is not continual. For, Christ “lives to make intercession” for us (7:25) since he is a “minister in the heavenly sanctuary.” (8:2) The “sitting down” of Christ does not refer to the effective removal of sin, the raining down of heavenly blessings, or the forgiveness of guilt. A major purpose of the Epistle to the Hebrews is to seek these things from Christ with hope in order to receive the benefits enumerated.

b) It does not mean that we do not need to “draw near” to God by faith, prayer, and penance. The perfect work of Christ is something that is brought about within us in perfecting our conscience and writing the law of God in our hearts by drawing near to him, as has been repeated multiple times above.

Second, what does it actually mean?

While it neither refers to the effects of the redemption (a) or the conditions necessary for grasping such a redemption (b), it does refer to the redemption itself considered as an objectively sufficient reality. The redemption itself is something that continually comes to us by the intercession of Christ (a) and is accessed by us by our approach to God (b), but it is never repeated since it has sufficiency.

The point being made by St. Paul (as he had done time and time again) is about the abundant virtue of the redemption of Christ over and against the redemption of the Levitical priests. If a system is able to explain redemption in such a way that all is done in virtue of the sacrifice of Christ, then it in no way contradicts what St. Paul says here. There is no need for there to be physical or numerical union between the acts, but only a moral or virtual union between the acts whereby any act of redemption is done in virtue of the sacrifice of Christ.

The complete destruction of the false wisdom leveled against the Church from this passage is complete upon the recognition of what the unique effects continually claimed for the sacrifice of Christ actually are, i.e., the perfecting of conscience, the writing of the law of God on the heart, the forgiveness of sins, etc.. This has been extensively demonstrated in this article and appear in the immediate context of this passage, the writing of the law of God on the heart (v. 16) and the “forgetting” of sins (v. 17). This concerns the benefits of the redemption infused within us by sanctifying grace and the propitiation of our obligation to punishment by the passion of Christ.

These effects are brought about by various kinds of “drawing near” (to use the words of St. Paul). To take an example, the preaching of the gospel. Does the gospel bring about these effects? One would need to distinguish. In virtue of its own power and without moral union with the work of Christ and his continual intercession? No. In virtue of the sufficient power of the passion of Christ and with moral union with the work of Christ and his continual intercession? Yes.

It is purely arbitrary on the part of the Protestant to restrict the scope of Hebrews 10 as referring to the effective propitiation of sins, rather than the clearly broader scope of our full redemption in all its virtualities. Hence, the Protestant proves too much, while the Catholic interpretation is harmonious.

The completion of this entire study is terminated in the careful consideration of the final verses of the chapter, v. 19-39.

This passage follows the same pattern given above of hope (v. 19-25) based on the glories and the abundance of the redemption in Christ and threats (v. 26-39) based on the reality of the Divine Judgement.

In light of these principles, we are left with two options, either they go to a place where they are deprived of the vision of God, yet free from the punishment of sense, or they are extraordinary given graces. The second option was investigated by the International Theological Commission (a non-magisterial body of Catholic theologians) in their document The Hope of Salvation for Infants Who Die Without Being Baptized. While admitting that it is uncertain that they receive this extraordinary gift of sanctifying grace (systematically refuting each of the “other options” for ordinary means, such as baptism of desire), they argue that there are “good reasons for hope” from the nature of God, although these are merely probable reasons that do not give us certain knowledge: “We emphasise that these are reasons for prayerful hope, rather than grounds for sure knowledge. There is much that simply has not been revealed to us...What has been revealed to us is that the ordinary way of salvation is by the sacrament of Baptism.” (n. 102-103)

There are many who misconstrue the conclusion of this document, pretending as if it “overturned” the teaching on Limbo and expressed certainty about the fate of unbaptized infants, rather than developing along the same line the principles expressed by the great Fathers and Doctors of the Church.

Yet, there is one argument that many find to be conclusive (hence, giving certain rather than merely probable knowledge) as a refutation of the teaching expressed by the Fathers and Theologians. This argument can be stated as follows: we know that God has made salvation really and truly possible for all men, establishing sufficient means for the salvation of all; yet, in light of the doctrine of limbo, this would not be true for infants. Therefore, they conclude that this doctrine would contradict a certain principle of theology, hence granting certainty to its negation. From this, they would state, contrary to the ITC document, that it has been virtually revealed to us that there is a certain knowledge about the fate of unbaptized infants, rather than mere probable grounds leading to prayerful hope.

There are two ways in which we can tackle this objection, either refuting the major premise or the minor premise. The major premise has been refuted in two ways by theologians. First, there are those who reject the notion that sufficient grace has been granted to “all men.” These theologians (e.g., Vazquez) argue that the teaching on sufficient grace only applies to those above the age of reason, rather than all men whatsoever. This opinion has been largely rejected. Second, there are those who articulate the “possibility” of sufficient grace in a slightly different way. We can distinguish between the simple objective possibility of something from the subjective potency to achieve some end. If we are to articulate the “possibility” of sufficient grace in the former sense rather than in the latter sense, then it is clear that all infants have sufficient means. Yet, this does not seem like a satisfying position to hold. For, in this sense, we would not only hold that unbaptized infants have sufficient grace, but also the damned and the demons. Sufficient grace is something in the order of execution that is proportional to the will of God to save and the meritorious cause of the passion of Christ intended for all men. If we were to articulate sufficient grace in this manner, the proportion would be lost with these two doctrines.

Hence, we ought to concede the major premise, and tackle the minor premise. Have truly sufficient means been given to infants who die without baptism? Yes. This question was first treated in detail by St. Prosper in his De Vocatione Omnium Gentium. He answers the question by arguing that baptism itself as a means of salvation is that sufficient means to save those infants. It was really possible for parents to seek baptism for their children, hence it was really possible for these infants to achieve salvation. St. Prosper argues,

This subtle but correct way of understanding our problem is confronted by a great difficulty in the case of infants. Infants have not the use of reason by which they can understand the mercies of their Maker and be enabled to approach to the knowledge of truth. It would not seem right to blame them for neglecting the help of grace, when they are by their nature in such a state of ignorance that they are unable (and there can be no doubt about it) to acquire any knowledge or to grasp any teaching. If, then, God wills all men to be saved, what is the reason why so great a number of infants remain deprived of eternal salvation, and why so many thousands of human beings at this tender age are not admitted to eternal life?...

If we ask, how it can be said that God wills all men to be saved, when He does not grant to all the time when they are able to receive grace in a free acceptance of the faith, I think we may believe without irreverence towards God and conceive without impropriety, that those human beings who live only a few days share in the kind of grace which has always been given to all nations.

For indeed, if the parents were to make good use of this grace, the children also would derive a saving help from it through them. In fact, all children depend for their birth and during the whole time of their infancy up to the age of reason on the decisions made by other men, and the guidance given them must come exclusively from others. Thus it follows that infants share the lot of those persons whose right or wrong dispositions decide their condition. Some of them happen to have the faith through the profession of faith of other people; in the same way some fail to have the faith on account of the unbelief or the guilty neglect of others. Though they themselves had no desire either of the present life or of the future, yet, just as their birth has become their own concern, so also the eventual privation of rebirth becomes their own. And just as in the case of adults it is obvious that some, in addition to the general grace which moves all human hearts in a more sparing and more hidden way, receive a special call with more excellent effects of grace, with more generous gifts, and with a stronger power; so also in the case of the countless infants the same election reveals itself. The election was not withheld even from the children who failed to receive baptism, when it was present in their parents; but it reached some children who were baptised, without reaching their parents. Thus it often happened that children were taken care of by strangers when their unbelieving kinsfolk failed them; and through strangers they came to receive regeneration when their own people would not have provided this for them. (bk. 2, ch. 20, 23)

This satisfies the objective exigencies of the question in relation to those infants who die without baptism. Salvation is really and truly made possible for them by the establishment of means that are presented in the ordinary manner by which they receive benefits. How could one argue that this is not truly sufficient? If a business provides healthcare that is truly and really sufficient for the entire family, is it said to be “insufficient” in virtue of the fact that it is received by the will of another, i.e., the parents? Clearly not. Further, the rejection of the true sufficiency of these means would refute arguments frequently made by the opponents of this doctrine. Many (with little reflection of the doctrine) argue that there is a certain “baptism of desire” through the will of the parents or the Church for the salvation of these infants. Is this means “truly sufficient” or not? If so, then that which is brought about by the will of another can be truly sufficient. If not, then the same argument applies against their own position.

Yet, there is a more obscure question that follows from this, what about those infants who are objectively incapable of receiving baptism due to their lack of bodily development? Those embryos in early stages of development are not apt to receive baptism, yet many hold that they truly have rational souls at this stage. While it would be possible to argue that the presence of the rational soul is only actual after the moment in which baptism is possible, such a response is ad hoc and unnecessary to uphold the doctrine.

Read more

Hence, when we adhere to Jesus Christ by faith and accept that Church who is His legate, our acceptable of divine things becomes a truly religious act, a sacrifice of our intellect unto God.

Yet, this sacrifice is not irrational or unfounded. We tremble at our own poverty of mind and blindness even toward the most evident things. If we cannot even understand the essence of a Bee, St. Thomas asks, how can we be so prideful as to expect to penetrate with full clarity the very mysteries of God? Yet, this darkness and our weakness becomes even more profound when we consider our current condition. We have added sin upon our natural weakness, which brings about the blindness of ignorance and that passion which hardens our hearts to the truth. Further, we have been upended by the business of the world around us as to be drawn from the task of contemplation, weakening us further.

Yet, Jesus Christ did not leave us without help and the rational foundation for accepting this help. He came to reveal the Father to us and provide the only means of the salvation of our souls and the correction of our intellects from our darkness, the Holy Catholic Church. In her judgements and in her judgements alone do I find that safe refuge of my soul. The truth of her message has been confirmed by those many miracles of her great saints who have covered the face of the entire world and the prophecies evidently fulfilled in her. My God, even your most sacred lips have witnessed to this truth, when you spoke those immortal words “those who hear you, hear me,” which have become that great foundation of my soul among her perplexities and doubts.

Hence, even in the greatness darkness and obscurity, my soul still professes what the Catholic Church professes and damns what the Catholic Church damns. Yet, by his sweet providence, Jesus Christ has illuminated for us great Saints and Doctors to guide me through these obscurities, especially Divine Thomas whose doctrine has always upheld me in faith. Most Blessed Thomas, prophesied to be the great light of the Church, illuminate me by your intercession that I may explain and defend the doctrine of Jesus Christ.

Yet, in this time of faith, we do not proceed to sight. These great Saints and Doctors have refuted all of the objections leveled against the Catholic Faith, but they have not given us that profound and intimate reconciliation of the mysteries that only comes by sight, reserved for the Blessed. Therefore, in this essay, I will proceed to defend the doctrine of the Divine Freedom, yet without penetrating unto the intimate reconciliation of this mystery with others, but only insofar as the doctrine is established as true, explained by analogy with created things, and is defended by the refutation of all objections against it.

First, we must make a distinction between the will of God toward Himself and toward creatures. It is necessary that God will His own goodness as the proper object of His will. God is the summit of goodness, hence, in knowing Himself, God necessarily wills Himself by the love whereby He loves Himself. God cannot but love Himself and His own goodness.

Hence, St. Thomas writes:

The divine will has a necessary relation to the divine goodness, since that is its proper object. Hence God wills His own goodness necessarily, even as we will our own happiness necessarily, and as any other faculty has necessary relation to its proper and principal object, for instance the sight to color, since it tends to it by its own nature. (ST.I.Q19.A3)

Yet, it is true that at certain times the Fathers and Doctors will state that God loves Himself “freely.” By this, they merely intend to indicate that God loves Himself without any sort of extrinsic force or compulsion (libertate a coactione), not that there is not necessity of any sort (in this case, an internal necessity flowing from the nature of His will).

Now, toward creatures, it is clear that God is free in one sense and not free in another sense. For, we can consider something necessary either absolutely or by supposition. Something is necessary absolutely when the terms mutually imply one another. Hence, it is absolutely necessary that if Socrates is a man, then he is rational, since what is signified by man implies what is signified by rational. Yet, that Socrates is sitting is only necessary by supposition, i.e., if he is sitting. Creatures are not necessary in the first sense since what is signified by “creature” is not, by its very nature, necessary, but is contingent. Yet, from supposition, it is necessary since we add a condition to their existence, i.e., “if God has willed.”

This is evident through the text of Sacred Scripture, “the God of revenge hath acted freely” (Ps. 93:1), “He hath mercy on whom he will; and whom he will, he hardeneth” (Rom. 9:18), “Who worketh all things according to the counsel of his will” (Eph 1:11), “Dividing to every one according as he will” (1 Cor. 12:11), etc.

This is evident from reason as well. First, the freedom of the will is a pure perfection, hence it would be impious to deny such freedom to Him. Second, creatures do not exist for their own sake, but for the sake of God as an end. Yet, such things are only willed necessarily if the end can only be reached by means of them. But, such is not the case since God’s goodness exists perfectly without dependence on creatures. Therefore, he wills them freely and not necessarily.

It is this argument that St. Thomas appeals to in Prima Pars, Q. 19, A. 3:

God wills things apart from Himself in so far as they are ordered to His own goodness as their end. Now in willing an end we do not necessarily will things that conduce to it, unless they are such that the end cannot be attained without them; as, we will to take food to preserve life, or to take a ship in order to cross the sea. But we do not necessarily will things without which the end is attainable, such as a horse for a journey which we can take on foot, for we can make the journey without one. The same applies to other means. Hence, since the goodness of God is perfect, and can exist without other things inasmuch as no perfection can accrue to Him from them, it follows that His willing things apart from Himself is not absolutely necessary. Yet it can be necessary by supposition, for supposing that He wills a thing, then He is unable not to will it, as His will cannot change.

While it is quite easy to demonstrate this thesis from scripture, tradition, and reason from the most luminous and universal principles of truth, various difficulties arise which obscure our understanding of this truth.

The chief of these problems is the question of what constitutes the freedom of God. How can we hold that the simple and immutable God has freedom without contradiction? Billuart states the problem thus,

It is difficult to conceive how the freedom of God stands with His immutability, while preserving the rights of both. For either the free act could have been absent from God, or not. If the first, how is God immutable? If the second, how is He free? For it is of the very nature (ratione) of a free act that it could have been otherwise. This, then, is the height of the difficulty that torments the minds of theologians. (Summa Summae, De Deo Uno, Dis. VII, Art. 2)

Cajetanus, the great Patriarch of the Thomists, states that this entire problem is most succinctly and essentially stated in the replies to the fourth and fifth objections,

Sometimes a necessary cause has a non-necessary relation to an effect; owing to a deficiency in the effect, and not in the cause. Even so, the sun’s power has a non-necessary relation to some contingent events on this earth, owing to a defect not in the solar power, but in the effect that proceeds not necessarily from the cause. In the same way, that God does not necessarily will some of the things that He wills, does not result from defect in the divine will, but from a defect belonging to the nature of the thing willed, namely, that the perfect goodness of God can be without it; and such defect accompanies all created good.

A naturally contingent cause must be determined to act by some external power. The divine will, which by its nature is necessary, determines itself to will things to which it has no necessary relation.

From this passage, the Thomists state that God’s freedom is constituted by the necessary act of His will insofar as it has a non-necessary relation or termination in creatures.

In order to understand this answer, we have to more clearly post what is meant by “freedom” and rigorously apply this insight to the problem at hand in an abstracted state. For, the solution to this problem will not come without the abstraction of a mind willing to strip from all our notions the dross of earthly things. It is only in this way that we can purify our notions from the imperfections of creatures and make them worthy of God.

Our freedom is the indifference of a power toward various acts of willing or not willing. It is an exercise of freedom for my will to either be actualized towards having a sandwich for lunch or not having such a meal. I go from the potential to such to the act of such. If we were to admit such freedom in God, it would obviously be inappropriate and imply some sort of imperfection since the potentiality of faculties implies a diminution in the actuality of God.

The freedom of God, on the other hand, is the indifference of one most simple and most pure act towards various objects, NOT the indifference of potency to act or not to act. By his freedom, God is choosing whether to specify the act of his will in bringing about the being of X creature (volition) or in not bringing about the being of X creature (nolition).

In creatures: Potency -> Act
In God: Act -> Object

It is for this reason that Cajetanus calls out the unfortunate wording of Bl. Scotus in referring to God as the “first contingent cause” (1 Sent., d. 43, q. 2, a. 1, ad 4), calling such a reference “crude and novel.” It is completely inappropriate to speak of the “contingency” of the Divine Will. Rather, we ought to distinguish (as St. Thomas does) between the “necessary connexion” of the necessary act of the Divine Will toward its primary and proper object and the “non-necessary connexion” of the necessary act of the Divine Will toward its secondary objects, which can simply be called a “free act” as distinguished from both a necessary act and a contingent act. For a better understanding of this, it is important to understand the three-fold distinction of the Thomists,

1. Necessity: The impossibility to be otherwise.

2. Contingency: Possibility to be otherwise SUCCESSIVELY, i.e., by way of being changed.

3. Freedom: Possibility to be otherwise without any implication of succession or change in the subject either way.

When we speak of the free act of God terminating in creatures as secondary objects and the necessary act of God terminating in its primary object, we speak of one and the same simple and necessary act, yet according to different aspects. For, the single and simple act of the Divine Will is entitatively necessary in all of its acts, yet can also be named terminatively according to its various virtualities, either terminating in secondary objects or in the proper object of the will.

There is even a faint analogy to this in us and among creatures. All of our free acts have this entitative unity with dual termination. For, when we make any free choice, there is BOTH a termination in the will’s proper object (which is necessary) AND a termination in the freely chosen secondary object willed for the sake of the proper object of the will.

The demonstration that this is sufficient for the notion of freedom of God stated above is clear if we consider the two aspects necessary for such a notion to be verified. First, it most be something in God, i.e., intrinsic to God. Second, it must be something capable in some sense (although, not in every sense) of not-being. Clearly, both of these are verified in God of the freedom spoken of above.

1. The act spoken of is the simple and entitatively necessary act of the Divine Will, which is truly and properly in God.

2. The termination of the act can either be or not-be depending on whether it terminates in the secondary object or not.

Hence, it verifies both the notion of “freedom” (by the second) and “being-in-God” (by the first).

Yet, as soon as this solution is put forward, an obvious difficulty arises. Is this liberty something intrinsic in God? If so, it seems that it places something defective in God, i.e., the termination in creatures. If not, it seems that it cannot truly be said to be in God as would be implied by this doctrine.

Yet, this objection can be simply resolved. To say that the defectability of the act is on the part of its termination to creatures rather than in anything intrinsic in God is NOT to say that the freedom of God is wholly extrinsic since the act itself (i.e., the one, simple, eternal, entitatively simple act of the Divine Will) is intrinsic to God. While the freedom is intrinsic insofar as the act is intrinsic, it is defectible in connexion to its terminus. As Billuart describes, “the same act, remaining unmoved in itself with no intrinsic change or defect in its own reality, could have produced or not produced creatures, and could have ordered and arranged them in various ways.” (ibid.)

Hence, the fundamental element of Divine Liberty is something intrinsic to God (i.e., the act of the Divine Will), yet there is also an additional connotation of something extrinsic and defectible, i.e., creatures, who have a non-necessary connexion with God.

If we loop back to our original principle that the Divine Freedom is quite distinct from Human Freedom insofar as it denotes the relation of non-necessary objects to an act rather than the relation of non-necessary acts to a power, then this makes complete sense. For, the entity of the liberty is derived from the act, whereas its specification is derived from the relation of the object to the power. Hence, liberty BOTH retains its intrinsicness insofar as the act remains in God AND it retains its freedom insofar as it retains a non-necessary termination in creatures.

This is similar to other titles given to God where a Divine Name is founded upon an intrinsic form, yet receives its proper nature by positing some sort of extrinsic connotation. For example, the foundation for God to be said to be ‘Creator’ or ‘Lord’ is the intrinsic form of his omnipotence, yet the proper nature is received by positing some sort of extrinsic connotation. How is it any different to have the foundation of the freedom of God in his necessary act and the reception of the proper nature by some sort of extrinsic connotation? As Billuart writes, “for the act of God to be free, and to have been able to relate differently to creatures, it was not necessary that He be changed in Himself by losing or receiving anything, but only that, while remaining unchanged in Himself, He could have changed creatures differently.” (ibid.)

It is here that we can truly experience the eminent genius of St. Thomas. In resolving this problem of the formal constituency of the Divine Freedom, he was able to simply and succinctly state the fundamental reason for it, i.e., in the “non-necessary relation to the effect.”

This is the first part of a series on the freedom of God according to the Thomistic solution. In part 2, I will be going into more detail concerning this “non-necessary relation” in the other texts where St. Thomas considers this problem.

Please consider becoming a paid substack member in order to get access to this second part when it comes out!

While I have translated a text from Fr. Berthier’s De Locis Theologicis (here) and posted an edited video (here) on the topic, in this article I wanted to deal more particularly with the claim that Fr. Ripperger is engaging in divination (something I covered briefly in the end of the aforementioned video).

Before beginning with the analysis, it is important to impress upon the reader the gravity of the claim made by Mrs. Lyons. If Fr. Ripperger was engaging in divination, he would be making an act of apostasy (St. Thomas Aquinas, Isaiah.C3.L3.n130.2), which is a “species of fornication of the soul” and “sacrilegious observances” (St. Augustine, De doctrina Christiana 2.23.35). As Cajetan teaches, “without doubt this society pertains to apostasy from God” (Com. in ST.II-II.Q95.A4, n. 5) and “incurs all the penalties of apostates and heretics.” (ibid.) In fact, as all theologians teach, it necessarily involves the worship of demons. It would be a uniquely abominable sin on the part of Fr. Ripperger. We would be more than justified in our rejection of Fr. Ripperger, not only on this point, but in all that he says.

This grave accusation requires clear evidence and a careful study of the matter. Has Mrs. Lyons made such a careful study in her definition of the matter? If she is right, then we must reject Fr. Ripperger. If she is wrong, then she must recant this error as an act of justice towards Fr. Ripperger. If this error was through malice, then it is a grave sin against his character, if it was through a simple error, then she has sinned through negligence as everyone has an obligation to a clear and careful study before making such claims.

This essay will not be an extensive study of all the sources, but the doctrine outlined here will be from the most authoritative sources cited by all theologians and by the Church (Ss. Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, and Alphonsus Liguori) and is common doctrine among moral theologians (Cajetan, Salmanticenses, Soto, Sanchez, etc.), although there is dispute on additional questions outside of the scope of this article.

The central error of Mrs. Lyons concerns her understanding of the definition of “Divination.” The classical definition of Divination comes from St. Augustine’s brief treatment in De Doctrina Christiana which is to seek knowledge from demons out of a “fellowship between men and devils.” (2.23.35) This is taken up by St. Thomas (who all theologians commonly follow) as “a compact made expressly with a demon by the very fact of invoking him” (ST.II-II.Q95.A4) which comes “from the counsel of demons” (Isaiah.C3.L3.n130) in which “pacts are contracted with demons.” (DeSortibus.C5.3)

If one were to glance over the texts of St. Thomas or some other theologian, it is quite easy, as Mrs. Lyons did, to ignore these clear qualifications. Cajetan, in his interpretation of ST.II-II.Q95.A4, makes this clear when he states that divination specifically requires that the act be “invocation,” i.e., an act that forms a society with the demon:

If one carefully considers the intention and words of the Author, he does not require this first interpretation, but remains in the second, namely concerning a social act. And indeed the intention of the Author is manifest. (n. 2)

Yet, one does not need to go far into the commentators on St. Thomas. This is already clear in the very text of the Angelic Doctor in the response to the first objection,

It is one thing to question a demon who comes to us of his own accord (and it is lawful to do so at times for the good of others, especially when he can be compelled, by the power of God, to tell the truth) and another to invoke a demon in order to gain from him knowledge of things hidden from us. (ST.II-II.Q95.A4.Rep1)

Hence, when St. Thomas uses terms like “invocation,” he clearly distinguishes it from a simple inquiry. “Invocation” requires some sort of society or pact to be formed between the demon and the individual. This is distinct from simple inquiry, which does not assume some sort of society or pact to be formed.

While it is intrinsically evil to ever form a pact with a demon, there can be various different justifications for the inquiry of a demon. Of course, this does not mean that every inquiry of a demon is justified, but it does mean that, in principle, it is neither intrinsically evil nor an act of divination.

As Cajetan points out, this is clear from the very text of the arguments that are frequently repeated by St. Thomas (ST.II-II.Q95.A4, Sent.II.D7.Q2.A2, Isaiah.C3.L3.n129-130, DeSortibus.C5.3, etc.),

The words of the Author for this in the present text are clear in the first argument, when he says that there is an express pact with the demon entered into through the very invocation of the demon. For by these words that are added, namely “through the very invocation of the demon,” he explains in what the pact consists, namely in the invocation itself: so that explicit invocation is an explicit pact, and tacit invocation is a tacit pact. But it is evident that invocation is a social act...Hence he clearly shows that by the term pact he understands society. So that when you read “a pact or compact entered into,” understand “a society entered into,” expressly by invocation, tacitly by an act to which the demon fittingly attaches himself. (n. 2)

The teaching of the theologians is summarized with clarity and authority by the moral doctor of the Church, St. Alphonsus Liguori whose writings, according to Gregory XVI “can be read by the faithful with complete safety,” which is repeatedly indicated by multiple Pontiffs and curial documents (sources). As Ven. Pius XII states, St. Alphonsus’ doctrine “is most highly approved and has often been gravely commended by the Supreme Pontiffs as a safe norm.” (26 April 1950)

St. Alphonsus begins his treatment of this question (in Theologia Moralis, lib. iii, tract. ii, cap. ii, dub. vii, n. 493) by distinguishing between various forms adjuration:

Adjuration is the invocation of God, or of sacred things, or of the saints, to induce someone to do or omit something...One is solemn, which is performed by ministers and in the manners established by the Church; another is private, without such solemnities. Likewise, one is deprecatory, as was that of the prince of the Apostles: “I adjure thee by the living God, that thou tell us whether thou art the Christ.” Another is imperative, which belongs only to superiors with respect to subjects, and to exorcists with respect to demons.

When it comes to the demons, St. Alphonsus states that this adjuration must be imperative (as commanding an inferior) rather than deprecatory,

Especially concerning the adjuration of demons two things are chiefly to be noted here. 1. That the adjuration with them be imperative, not deprecatory. 2. That it be done only to remove harms and the vexation of the possessed, not for vanity and curiosity; hence the doctors commonly say with the Salmanticenses that he cannot be excused from grave sin who engages in many useless conversations with a demon possessing someone.

Useless conversations are ordinary said to be only a venial sin of curiosity, as Sanchez, Cajetan, Suarez, Navarrus, Soto, and the Salmanticenses teach.

As all theologians teach, it is lawful for the exorcist to question demons in what is necessary for the exorcism. It is said by St. Alphonsus to be the “common opinion.” This is supported by the Roman Ritual. St. Alphonsus gives a few examples of this,

They may ask the number and names of those who dwell in the possessed, and for how long, as is found in the Roman Ritual. Likewise the cause of his entrance. Likewise a sign of his departure, as is most commonly permitted...

Directly against Mrs. Lyons, the exorcist may also ask imperatively the manifestation of some truth as is the common teaching of theologians following St. Thomas (as quoted above),

Whether, however, it is licit to ask imperatively from a demon the manifestation of some truth...more probably and most commonly it is affirmed that it is licit, if this conduces to the divine glory. Thus Sanchez (n. 24), and Cajetan, Soto, Concina, Tabiena, etc., with the Salmanticenses (n. 59). And this is expressly taught by St. Thomas Aquinas...

To summarize, the central error of Mrs. Lyons’ understanding of this topic concerns a false reading of the nature of divination insofar as divination requires some sort of society with the demon. This society is not entered into by asking the demons questions imperatively, which is supported by the Roman Ritual in those truths necessary to exorcise the demons and, following St. Thomas, more commonly by theologians in manifestation of those turths which conduce to the divine glory.

This senitment is common on both sides of the aisle, but it shows a shocking ignorance of the history of American Jurisprudence. In fact, for a greater part of our history, blasphemy laws remained an essential part of our juridical structure. Interestingly, a 2009 report from The New York Times actually found that there were multiple US states with anti-blasphemy statutes on the books.

There is well established precedent for this going back to the American founding, as a 2021 article in the Harvard Law Review titled “Blasphemy and the Original Meaning of the First Amendment” extensively demonstrates. In this article, the absurdity of claims that blasphemy laws are “Anti-American” or in any way contrary to the spirit or letter set forth by the Founding Fathers is shown by a simple appeal to history:

From the Founding era, when the country ratified the First Amendment, through Reconstruction, when the Fourteenth Amendment applied the Federal Free Exercise Clause to the states, Americans viewed blasphemy prosecutions as compatible with free religious exercise. The same state legislatures that ratified the Free Exercise Clause passed statutes that criminalized blasphemy. And the same public that ratified the state religious freedom provisions convicted defendants charged with blasphemy...The courts thus developed a body of religious liberty doctrine that was firmly established by the Civil War. Whether the relevant constitutional moment was 1791 or 1868, the Free Exercise Clause, as originally understood, posed no barrier to proscribing blasphemy. Along with the general public, the legislatures that ratified the First Amendment treated blasphemy proscriptions as compatible with religious freedom. Two years after Massachusetts adopted its 1780 constitution — including a religious liberty provision — it enacted a blasphemy statute…Under this law, Massachusetts successfully prosecuted blasphemy in 1790. Similarly, pursuant to New Hampshire’s 1784 constitution, which recognized religious liberty, the legislature passed a 1791 blasphemy law. Vermont’s 1793 constitution, guaranteeing free exercise, was followed by a 1797 blasphemy statute. New Jersey’s legislature followed the same pattern under its analogous constitutional provision. And after Pennsylvania passed its 1790 constitution securing religious freedom, a Pennsylvania jury convicted a blasphemer in 1799. (Blasphemy and the Original Meaning of the First Amendment)

While many would expect a strong judicial precedent overturning these blasphemy laws, the opposite is actually the case, “only meager precedent (a federal district court decision and a state intermediate appellate court decision) has directly held anti-blasphemy laws unconstitutional.” (ibid.) This stands in contrast to the absolutely overwhelming precedent in support of blasphemy laws from every level of the judicial system (People v. Ruggles in 1811, Vidal v. Girard’s Executors in 1844, Robertson v. Baldwin in 1897, State v. Mockus in 1921, Oney v. Oklahoma City in 1941, State v. Stoltenberg in 1974, etc.)

While the history of the matter is quite interesting, it is more profitable to consider particularly the reason why these laws were promulgated in the first place. As a Catholic, the justifications that our theologians give to blasphemy laws are quite different than the justifications given in the Anglo-American tradition.

First, it is important to recognize that the “rights” enshrined in the bill of rights were not seen as absolute principles, but themselves had a history and exceptions to the rule were baked into these formulations. As an example, Robertson v. Baldwin in 1897 states

The law is perfectly well settled that the first ten amendments to the Constitution, commonly known as the ‘Bill of Rights,’ were not intended to lay down any novel principles of government, but simply to embody certain guaranties and immunities which we had inherited from our English ancestors, and which had, from time immemorial, been subject to certain well recognized exceptions arising from the necessities of the case. In incorporating these principles into the fundamental law, there was no intention of disregarding the exceptions, which continued to be recognized as if they had been formally expressed. Thus, the freedom of speech and of the press (Art. I) does not permit the publication of libels, blasphemous or indecent articles, or other publications injurious to public morals or private reputation; the right of the people to keep and bear arms (Art. II) is not infringed by laws prohibiting the carrying of concealed weapons; the provision that no person shall be twice put in jeopardy (Art. V) does not prevent a second trial if upon the first trial the jury failed to agree or if the verdict was set aside upon the defendant’s motion, nor does the provision of the same article that no one shall be a witness against himself impair his obligation to testify if a prosecution against him be barred by the lapse of time, a pardon, or by statutory enactment. Nor does the provision that an accused person shall be confronted with the witnesses against him prevent the admission of dying declarations, or the depositions of witnesses who have died since the former trial.

Second, these liberties were not to be exercised in an absolute degree. Rather, it is clear that the principle of public order would be able to restrict the exercise of these rights. Hence, for example, one has a “right” to freedom of speech, yet this could not be exercised anywhere you feel like where it might violate the public order. The distinction that American jurists will often give is between liberty of conscience and liberty of action. The former is seen as absolute, while the latter is to be restricted according to the principles of the common good.

This principle is drawn out by Oney v. Oklahoma City in 1941

Always in civil society, two desires, which in a degree are in conflict, strive for supremacy. One is the desire of the individual to control and regulate his own actions in such a way as to promote what he conceives to be for his own good and advantage, and the other is the desire of the whole to control the actions of the individual in such a way as to promote what it conceives to be for the common good or general welfare. The realization of the desire of the individual is personal liberty, and the effectuation of the desire of the whole is authority. Our form of government is designed to secure a nice balance between the two. When the pendulum swings too far toward the rights of the individual, liberty degenerates into license and anarchy. When it swings too far the other way, authority becomes tyrannical. In the very nature of things, therefore, we must have an ordered liberty under law. For, as said by Chief Justice [of the Supreme Court] Hughes “Civil liberties, as guaranteed by the Constitution, imply the existence of an organized society maintaining public order without which liberty itself would be lost in the excesses of unrestrained abuses.” Freedom of religion embraces two concepts, freedom to believe and freedom to act. The first is absolute, but the second remains subject to regulation for the protection of society. The City, under delegation of authority from the state in the exercise of police power, may enact ordinances to punish those who abuse these freedoms, to which we have adverted, by utterances inimical to the public welfare, tending to corrupt public morals, incite crime, or disturb the peace. The ordinance here involved prohibits the use of violent, abusive, or insulting language and the display of insulting, profane, or abusive emblems, flags, or devices calculated to cause a breach of the peace; and the uttering, publication, circulation, or distribution of any words or language casting contumelious reproach or profane ridicule on God, Jesus Christ, the Holy Ghost, the Holy Scripture, or the Christian or any other religion, calculated to cause a breach of the peace. On its face it is plainly directed against actions calculated to cause a breach of the peace and disturb public order. Its object is to prevent the inciting of violence.

Third, the fundamental reason for blasphemy laws in the Anglo-American tradition is different than the fundamental reason for blasphemy laws in the Catholic tradition. In the Anglo-American tradition, the reason why blasphemy laws were seen as contrary to the common good was due to the particular offense that would be felt by the individual at hearing his religion be blasphemed. Hence, certain Jurists would justify the formation of blasphemy laws by false sects on the same grounds as blasphemy laws against the true religion.

On the other hand, the restrictions to religious liberty advocated for by the Catholic Church is quite different. As the Catechism of the Catholic Church states,

The right to religious liberty can of itself be neither unlimited nor limited only by a ‘public order’ conceived in a positivist or naturalist manner. [Pius VI, Quod aliquantum 10; Pius IX, Quanta cura 3] The “due limits” which are inherent in it must be determined for each social situation by political prudence, according to the requirements of the common good, and ratified by the civil authority in accordance with ‘legal principles which are in conformity with the objective moral order.’ (CCC 2109)

In the Anglo-American tradition, the limitations of the “public order” are essentially tied to the subjective dispositions of the populace, whereas in the Catholic tradition the limitations of the “public order” are tied to the objective principle of the common good. Hence, it may even come to pass that the laws made to preserve public order (in the Catholic sense) may contradict the subjective dispositions of the populace.

I will give a few examples of this.

Read more

It is common for Catholics to simply state Catholic doctrine as follows: “the damned suffer the punishments of hell for mortal sin.” Yet, this is not entirely accurate.

For the purposes of abstraction, let’s consider four cases. First, an adult who dies outside of a state of grace merely suffering the incursion of mortal sin without venial sin (NOTE: This does not exist in reality). Second, an adult who dies outside of a state of grace suffering the incursion of both mortal sin and venial sin. Third, an adult who dies outside of a state of grace suffering merely the incursion of venial sin (NOTE: This probably does not exist in reality, although Suarez admits the possibility in rare cases, hi casus sunt rarissimi, et facile credi potest Deum illos non permittere). Fourth, an adult who dies in a state of grace suffering merely the incursion of venial sin.

In the fourth case, it is Catholic dogma that they would suffer the punishments of purgatory. Further, in the first case, there is no venial sin to consider. Yet, how would the punishments of hell relate to venial sin in the second and third cases?

According to the common formulation given by many Catholics (i.e., “the damned suffer the punishments of hell for mortal sin”), in the second case, the Catholic would not suffer the punishments of hell on the basis of his venial sin, but only on the basis of his mortal sin. Further, shockingly, in the third case, the Catholic would not suffer any of the punishments of hell whatsoever since he is without mortal sin.

Here, we are able to see that the common formulation given by many Catholics lead to absurdities. Catholic authors commonly affirm that venial sin is actually punished by the fires of hell. While some authors (e.g., Bl. Scotus) state that the punishment of venial sin at some point ceases in hell, the more common opinion (following St. Thomas) is that this is eternally punished due to their irremissibility in that state.

In the third situation, depending on whether one follows either the opinion of Bl. Scotus or St. Thomas, one would either state that they suffer eternally in hell (St. Thomas, followed by Suarez and most theologians) or that they would temporarily suffer a sort of purgatory before going into the limbo of the children (per talem poenam, peccatum veniale tandem purgabitur, et tunc ille qui prius descenderat in purgatorium, ad puerorum limbum transibit).

Yet, according to the more common opinion, original and venial sins are punished eternally by the fires of hell. Yet, the foundation of this eternality of punishment is not on the basis of the gravity of the sin (non debetur poena aeterna ratione suae gravitatis), but by reason of the condition of the subject (ratione conditionis subiecti) who is found to be without sanctifying grace, which is the only basis whereby there can be remission of sin. (ST.I-II.Q87.A5.Rep2)

Hence, the better formulation is not to simply deny that venial sin is punished by the fires of hell in those who are not in a state of grace, but to say that it does not, simply speaking, incur this debt in virtue of its own disorder, but is punished by such a punishment in virtue of the condition of the subject who is not in a state of grace. A distinction between venial sin and mortal sin is found in the differences of the punishments they PROPERLY merit, not in the differences of the punishments they receive. Therefore, it is completely appropriate to speak of venial sins as “damnable” in either the sense that they can receive the punishments of hell or even in the sense that they can be said (in an improper sense) to merit such punishment, although this arises in conjunction with a condition of the subject rather than from the sin considered in itself (sic autem veniale peccatum non meretur poenam aeternam, sed alio modo…aeternitas poenae respondet indelebilitati ipsius, quae quidem convenit aliquando veniali peccato per accidens…tamen…in quantum est coniunctum mortali cum finali impoenitentia, per accidens habet indelebilitatem, QDeMalo.Q7.A10.Rep1-3).

In fact, St. Thomas goes so far as to say that our venial sins, while punished less intensely than mortal sins in hell, make up the greater and more extensive part of our punishments in hell as being more numerous and involving a far greater number of objects, circumstances, and bodily instruments of their execution (QDeMalo.Q7.A10.Rep1). Hence, e.g., even if we did not use our feet to commit a mortal sin, it is inconceivable that we did not use our feet to commit a venial sin, hence they will be punished in hell, yet not by reason of mortal sin, but by reason of venial sin.

Here we can distinguish between the punishment of venial sin (and even that punishment which venial sin can be said to “merit”) considered in sensu composito and in sensu diviso. In the first sense, it is clear that venial sin considered in a subject lacking charity is punished by and merits (by reason of the subject) hell. In the second sense, it can in no wise be said that venial sin merits hell since it does not do so on the basis of its own proper principles.

In order to better understand this, let’s look at a handful of texts from Catholic Authors making this same point.

Read more

Justice concerns that which is due, i.e., debt. Hence, the question arises, whether we can speak of justice within God?

It the first sense, it is clear that we cannot speak of justice in God since we cannot give to God anything sufficient to oblige him by that purchase to give back to us payment. As St. Paul teaches, “who has first given to him, and recompense shall be made him?” (Rom. 11:35)

Yet, the case of distributive justice is different since it does not oblige on the basis of some gift given, but on the very order which exists between the dignity and reward. In fact, distributive justice properly denotes some dignity in the rewarder insofar as he upholds the order of justice, e.g., a king upholds the civil order by rewarding on the basis of civic virtue.

Hence, God upholds this order both by punishing the wicked and rewarding the just, “there is laid up for me a crown of justice, which the Lord the just judge will render to me in that day: and not only to me, but to them also that love his coming...Alexander the coppersmith hath done me much evil: the Lord will reward him according to his works.” (2 Tim. 4:8, 14)

Yet, it is important to investigate more carefully the notion of debt for a more profound understanding of the matter. Debt denotes some sort of order of necessity or “exigency” existing in some thing ordering it toward another (ordo exigentiae vel necessitatis alicuius ad quod ordinatur).

It is necessary to consider the order itself. For, the order itself is something that is created. Order is some sort of relation. Now, relation is an accident that inheres in a subject. Hence, it only arises from the creation of that subject in which the relation of order arises. Whereas it existed fundamentally in the Divine Intellect before the creation of things by the measure of His Wisdom as the eternal law and measure of justice, it only came about formally by the creation of things.

It is for this reason that God, even in paying justice, is not a debtor to things, but to Himself as the author of the order of justice (Debitum enim est Deo, ut impleatur in rebus id quod eius sapientia et voluntas habet...). Hence, St. Thomas proves extensively that the universal production of things cannot proceed from justice since a payment of justice presupposes both the creature to whom the debt is owed and the very order as established.

The same applies to the supernatural order. Whereas we cannot merit our own justification (since no supernatural principle existed that would have a certain exigency for such justice), we can merit increases in justice and the rewards of heaven (as St. Paul mentions above).

Speaking of the matter of creation, St. Thomas says that “If we consider the production of a particular creature, it will be possible to find in it a debt of justice by comparing a subsequent creature to a preceding one...Accordingly, in those divine effects which were to be produced first, we find no debt, but in the subsequent production we find a debt...” (SCG2.C29)

It is for this reason that St. Thomas speaks so frequently of the “ordination” of grace when speaking about merit (meritum hominis apud Deum esse non potest nisi secundum praesuppositionem divinae ordinationis, ita scilicet ut id homo consequatur a Deo per suam operationem quasi mercedem, ad quod Deus ei virtutem operandi deputavit). It is not due to some sort of voluntaristic appraisal of grace as meriting something that is not due to it in distributive justice, but because in the first creation and production of grace there is no preceding merit. Hence, the order of supernatural justice needed to be established by God and ordered to Himself as its reward.

From Xantes Mariales’ commentary on De Malo, Question 2, Article 8

Others err concerning whether the frequency of drunkenness aggravates drunkenness to infinity, and constitutes a mortal sin. If it does not, there stands in opposition St. Augustine in the sermon De Purgatorio, where he says: “to become drunk once is a venial sin; to become drunk frequently is a mortal sin.” If it does, there stands in opposition St. Thomas in the reply to the third objection, where he consistently teaches that if becoming drunk once is venial, then becoming drunk frequently will likewise be venial; because frequency is not a circumstance constituting the species. And from what has been said, only a circumstance constituting the species can aggravate to infinity, and render a sin from venial to mortal, or from no sin to a venial or mortal sin. Nor are there lacking those who think that St. Thomas is not consistent with himself, since here in the reply to the third objection he indicates that drunkenness, by its genus, is a venial sin, with St. Augustine, in the place cited above; and yet in Summa Theologiae II–II, q. 150, art. 2, he resolutely teaches the opposite, namely that drunkenness by its genus is a mortal sin. Nevertheless, there is no disagreement in either of these positions, which, so that it may appear from the first root, [will now be explained].

It must be noted, says St. Thomas (II–II, q. 150, art. 1), that drunkenness (ebrietas) can be taken in two ways. First, for the privation of the use of reason from the drinking of wine; and thus it is not a fault, but rather a penal defect following upon the fault of excessive drinking. Second, for the act of immoderately taking wine, by which a man can become drunk. When drunkenness is taken in the first sense, it can be either no sin, or a venial sin, or a mortal sin. For it will be no sin, says St. Thomas (art. 2), if someone drinks not knowing that the drink is immoderate and that the wine is capable of causing drunkenness; and thus he becomes drunk, as Noah did (Gen. 9). It will be a venial sin, if the one who drinks perceives that the drink is immoderate, yet is ignorant that the wine is capable of causing drunkenness. It is not a mortal sin unless it is plainly presumed and voluntary. Finally, it will be a mortal sin, if the one who drinks perceives that the drink is immoderate and that the wine is capable of causing drunkenness, and nevertheless, while indulging in its use, he prefers to incur drunkenness rather than to be deprived of such pleasure. And thus drunkenness is properly and per se so called, because it occurs from knowledge and deliberation of the will; and it receives the character of mortal sin, not from those things which happen accidentally and outside the intention, but from that which is intended per se.

The fundamental reason, says St. Thomas, why drunkenness, precisely insofar as it proceeds from the will, is a mortal sin, is this: because a man knowingly and willingly deprives himself of the use of reason, by which he exercises the virtues and turns away from sins; and at that moment to deprive oneself of so great a good is a habitually sinful act. But the virtues of acting are ordered to the avoidance of sins; nor would drunkenness be a mortal sin, unless its mortality were considered according to the evil disorder that is harmful, which through the act itself is introduced by the sin. According to that saying of St. Ambrose, we say that drunkenness must be avoided, through which very many vices are caused; for those things which while sober we avoid, through drunkenness we unknowingly admit. Therefore, according to this doctrine, drunkenness taken formally, as we have already explained, is by its genus evil and a mortal sin. But if it is taken materially, that is, for the drinking of wine willed by someone, it is not a sin, and can be only a venial sin. Consequently, since drunkenness taken absolutely contains both formal drunkenness and material drunkenness, it may thus be said that it is not determined to any one kind of sin; but without further determination it can be either good or evil, that is, a virtue or a vice, not evil by declaration. Just as number in itself is neither even nor odd, but can be either of the two, so also care must be taken lest one speak equivocally of drunkenness taken absolutely, which by its genus is neither good nor evil, as was said above, and formal drunkenness, which by its genus is a mortal sin.

With these things established regarding the point, when it is asked whether the frequency of drunkenness constitutes drunkenness a mortal sin, I say that it does not constitute it per se, but only per accidens, and not by the force of frequency precisely considered. Rather, this happens only because frequency produces an experiential certainty that the drink is immoderate and that the wine is capable of causing drunkenness; and once this certainty is present, the one becoming drunk, knowingly and willingly deprives himself of the use of reason, together with the other goods already mentioned; and this cannot occur without mortal sin, as was stated above. Moreover, frequency itself, precisely considered, since it is only the repetition of an act already specified, cannot constitute a new species; nor is it among the number of circumstances that aggravate to infinity, and which constitute a sin from venial to mortal. Therefore it is rightly said that frequency, by its own force precisely considered, cannot constitute drunkenness either from not-evil to evil, or from venial to mortal.

When St. Augustine says that to become drunk once is venial, but to become drunk often is mortal, he speaks of drunkenness according to what happens in most cases . For according to the common rule concerning moral matters, judgment must be made according to what happens in most cases. But in most cases it seems to occur that in the first instances of becoming drunk a person does not perceive either that the drink is immoderate or that the wine is capable of causing drunkenness; and because such ignorance is present, drunkenness can scarcely be entirely excused from sin, as happened in the case of Noah, that is, so that it may at least be excused from mortal sin. Therefore Blessed Augustine says that drunkenness not repeated many times is venial, but when repeated many times it is mortal, for the reasons already set forth. And thus both St. Augustine and St. Thomas are not in disagreement but are true, and in no way do they destroy one another’s teaching.

They differ only in this, that they speak of drunkenness considered in relation to the difficulty which surrounds the perfect doctrine of human doubts, namely whether drunkenness by its genus is a mortal sin; because a man knowingly and willingly deprives himself of the use of reason, rendering himself incapable of acting virtuously. According to this reasoning someone might object: why is it not the same with sleep? For sleep also deprives a man of reason and renders the one sleeping incapable of acting virtuously; therefore sleep would likewise be a mortal sin, just as drunkenness. It is answered that the case is not similar. For sleep and drunkenness differ in this, that sleep is natural and necessary for the repose of the soul, in which all its powers rest and are refreshed; and in natural things there is neither sin nor demerit. But drunkenness is voluntary and destructive, coming upon man and violently depriving him of the use of reason. Moreover, in sleep the use of reason is not entirely extinguished, but rather bound only accidentally; thus those sleeping sometimes perceive things in dreams, as in the case of Solomon and the Prophets, to whom revelations appeared in sleep which they received from God. Indeed, it is commonly said that a man in sleep is more apt to receive divine revelations. But when reason is bound by wine, it is bound per se and in a remarkable manner, so that the intellect remains fettered and unable to operate, whereas nothing similar occurs in sleep. Hence the argument drawn from sleep does not hold, as inferred from a lesser cause.

From these things someone objects: therefore, if such is the case, is it lawful medicinally to make a man drunk in order to provoke vomiting, or to cure some bodily affection? It is answered: if drunkenness is evil by its genus, it is not lawful; because evils are not to be done (especially spiritual evils) so that bodily goods may come about. Thus for the health of the body it is not lawful medicinally to commit fornication, even though fornication is evil by its genus. But I respond: although it is never lawful to blaspheme even for the sake of obtaining a good, because blasphemy is of itself a mortal sin, nevertheless drunkenness is not evil by its genus, and therefore to become drunk medicinally is permitted, as many hold. But whether drunkenness is evil by its genus is a great dispute among the Doctors. St. Thomas here determines nothing, but speaks only conditionally, as you have heard. For above he had resolutely established that formal drunkenness is by its genus a mortal sin; and at the end of the article, in the reply to the third objection, he says that it is lawful to become drunk in order to provoke vomiting. Yet in the end he concludes resolutely that it is not lawful, because what is evil by its genus can never be permitted to be done, especially since there are many other remedies for provoking vomiting, such as drinking warm water and similar things. Just as for calming nature from an excess of seed, for which some claim that there are other remedies which provoke fornication for the health of the body—yet to commit fornication is in no way permitted, according to all. These things have been said incidentally, for the fuller understanding of those matters which are written here at present.

From Commentary on De Malo, Question 7, Article 4

In the second part of the Article there are five arguments, in which the following questions are treated. The first is whether frequency, duration, and lingering (morosa) can make a venial sin into a mortal one. That this is so seems to follow, for St. Augustine teaches this in the sermon De Purgatorio: “if anger is held for a long time, and if drunkenness is frequent, they pass into the number of mortal sins.” Yet many hold that anger and drunkenness are venial sins by their genus. Therefore the Holy Father seems to intend that the circumstances of frequency and duration make a venial sin mortal. Likewise the Master of the Sentences (II, dist. 24) clearly teaches that delectatio morosa is a mortal sin. However, that this is not so seems to be suggested from the fact that no matter how lingering (morosa), prolonged, or frequent a movement of sensuality may be, if reason does not fully consent, it is never mortal. St. Thomas replies that anger and drunkenness are by their genus mortal sins, but they become venial either through a defect of deliberation or through the smallness of the matter. For anger implies a movement toward harming one’s neighbor; but to inflict harm upon one’s neighbor is by its genus mortal, since it is repugnant to charity with respect to the love of neighbor. Yet when the movement remains in the lower appetite and reason does not consent that grave harm be inflicted upon the neighbor, it is a venial sin because of the imperfection of the act, that is, because of the lack of full deliberation. But if anger is held for a long time, it cannot be that the deliberation of reason does not intervene, and thus anger becomes a mortal sin. In order, however, to determine when anger is said to be held for a long time, attention must not be paid to how long it lasts, since, as I said, it can last a long time without the consent of reason, and thus it would not be a mortal sin. Rather, attention must be paid to the negligence by which it could be resisted through reason and is not resisted. Then, I say, duration arising from negligence in resisting anger renders the anger a mortal sin, even if the anger itself does not last very long. Just as in another matter it is commonly said that whoever dies quickly has not lived long, in the same sense the Master says that delectatio morosa is a mortal sin. For he manifestly speaks of the moral delay arising from negligence in excluding it through reason, and not of mere delay in duration considered absolutely. This concerns delectatio morosa in an evil matter; for to delight in a good thing, it is certain, is no sin at all.

Similarly the same judgment applies concerning drunkenness. Drunkenness, insofar as it is in itself, does not turn reason away from God, although during drunkenness reason cannot be turned toward God. Nevertheless, since man is not bound always to turn his reason actually toward God, it follows that drunkenness can be excused so that it is not always a mortal sin. Yet when a man becomes drunk frequently, he seems not to care whether reason be turned toward God. In such a case drunkenness is a mortal sin, because it appears to contain a contempt of reason’s orientation toward God, on account of the immoderate delight in wine.

All these things are confirmed, and the expressions are included in I–II, q. 88, art. 5, rep. 1, where the Holy Doctor says that duration of itself is not a circumstance that draws an act into another species; likewise frequency or assiduity is not such, unless perhaps per accidens from something supervening. For a thing does not acquire a new species from the fact that it is multiplied or prolonged, unless perhaps in the act itself there is a prolongation or multiplication accompanied by something that changes the species, such as disobedience, contempt, or something of that kind. Therefore it must be said that anger, which is a movement of the soul toward harming one’s neighbor, if the harm toward which the movement of anger tends is of a kind that is by its genus mortal, such as homicide, then such anger will by its genus be a mortal sin. Yet it can become venial because of the imperfection of the act, for example if it is a sudden movement preceding the consent of reason. But if the anger is prolonged, it is rendered according to the nature of its mortal genus through the supervening consent of reason. If, however, the movement of anger tends toward something that is venial by its genus, as when someone becomes angry against another in that he wishes to say to him a slight word or a jest, or some lightly reproachful motion, then such anger will not be mortal, however long it may last, unless perhaps per accidens, as when grave scandal arises from it, or because of some other similar circumstance. And in the same way delectatio morosa is called a mortal sin when it concerns those things which by their genus are mortal sins. But in those matters in which such delectatio morosa does not concern mortal sin, it will be a venial sin because of the imperfection of the act, as was said concerning anger. Yet if the delight is prolonged or lingering (morosa), it is reduced to the nature of its object and becomes a mortal sin, on account of the supervening approval of reason toward the intended delectatio morosa.

Concerning drunkenness, finally St. Thomas concludes that it must be said that, according to its proper notion, it has the character of a mortal sin. For when a man casts aside reason and reduces himself to the manner of an animal, through that very reason by which he is ordered to God, he is thereby exposed to many sins, since the vices of life arise from the mere pleasure of wine, which is expressly contrary to virtue. Nevertheless it can become a venial sin, either because of ignorance or because of weakness (for example, if a man does not know the strength of the wine, or does not think by his own deliberation that he will become drunk, as happened in the case of Noah when he was made drunk). Then the drunkenness is not imputed as mortal, but is called merely an excess of drinking. But when intoxication is frequent, it cannot be excused through ignorance, since it appears that the will chooses rather drunkenness with its consequent harms than to abstain from superfluous wine. Therefore drunkenness then returns to its proper nature and falls under mortal sin. Concerning these matters read above distinctly in II–II, q. 150 throughout, but especially art. 2.

Here those things which were mentioned incidentally are sufficiently resolved; and note carefully two propositions proposed by St. Thomas. The first is found here: that drunkenness is not always a mortal sin. For although it deprives one of the use of reason and of the turning toward God, nevertheless since man is not always bound by precept to turn the act of his mind toward God, and since the precept concerning such conversion is affirmative, obliging always but not for every moment, therefore drunkenness is not always a mortal sin. The second proposition is found in I–II in the place cited above: frequent drunkenness cannot fail to be a mortal sin. For it cannot be excused by ignorance, either of the strength of the wine or of one’s own weakness; and thus the will seems rather to choose to endure drunkenness with its consequent harms than to abstain from superfluous wine. But the will ought to be prepared to expose itself to great goods, even with dangers of sin, yet for the avoidance of sins; whereas to expose oneself to those things which can occur during drunkenness merely for the sake of the pleasure taken in wine is against the order of reason, and plainly mortal, from which only ignorance, as was said above, could seem to excuse. According to this doctrine someone might ask how incautiously certain people deduce that a circumstance, remaining a circumstance, can make a venial sin into a mortal one, from the fact that a circumstance makes an act from good to evil, as when someone prays out of vain glory. But to make something from good into evil is something greater than making a venial sin into a mortal one. For good and evil are said to be genera, as is said in the Predicaments (that good and evil are genera of other things); whereas venial and mortal are different species within the same genus of evil or of sin. Therefore if a circumstance can render an act from good to evil (which is the greater), it will more easily render a venial sin mortal (which is the lesser). You are mistaken. St. Thomas responds here in the reply to the third objection, where those who reason in this way are answered: the circumstance which renders an act from good to evil is not taken as a merely accidental circumstance (as you suppose), but as an essential difference specifying the act, transferring it from one genus to another different genus, and constituting it within a determinate genus and species. For example vain glory, which a circumstance taken merely as an accidental circumstance cannot produce. And in the same way a circumstance taken merely as a circumstance cannot make a venial sin mortal, as has been proved. But if it is taken insofar as it introduces the mode of an essentially specifying difference, then it can make a venial sin mortal, as has been explained. Therefore the objection is actually in favor of, and not against, the decision that has been made.

But how the end is placed among the circumstances, and yet moral actions are chiefly specified by the end (how these two things can stand together has already been explained in the preceding questions). For the present it is sufficient to adduce what is touched upon here in the reply to the fourth objection, namely that human specification does not arise from a circumstance insofar as it is a circumstance, but insofar as it is the proper object of the act of the will. And with respect to this object it is commonly agreed that human acts receive their species. Since therefore an external act does not enter the genus of morals except insofar as it is willed, it thereby participates in specification from the end, which is the object of the will. And thus the statement of others (that the end is one of the circumstances not specifying the act) is not rendered false. For the first statement is made with respect to the external act considered in the genus of nature, which in that way receives its species from its proper object entirely independently of the will. But the other statement is made with respect to the external act insofar as it is willed, and in the genus of morals, in which case it receives its species not from the object alone but from the end to which it is ordered through the will. According to that principle: moral acts are qualified by the end (moralia ex fine qualificantur). Therefore there is no difficulty.